Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Miller served on active duty, 2003-2007, and has a VA disability rating of 60 percent. Since 2008, Miller has been employed as an FDIC Economic Analyst. He was hired at the GS-9 level and has risen to the GS-12 level. In 2012 the FDIC posted vacancy announcements for a CG-13 Financial Economist position: one open to all citizens and another for status candidates. Miller applied under both procedures and was one of three finalists. Three FDIC employees participated in the interviews, rating each candidate’s answers to questions on bank failure prediction models as Outstanding, Good, or Inadequate. All of the candidates received some "inadequate" ratings. No candidate was selected; the vacancy was cancelled. Miller filed a Department of Labor complaint, stating that the cancellation was in bad faith to avoid hiring a veteran or having to request a “pass over” from the Office of Personnel Management. The Merit Systems Protection Board denied his petition under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act, finding that the allegation of non-selection in violation of veterans’ rights was sufficient to confer jurisdiction, but that Miller had not established a violation because the FDIC “conducted a thorough, structured interview of each of the candidates” and “none of the interviewees possessed the requisite skills and knowledge for the position.” The Federal Circuit affirmed; substantial evidence indicated that cancellation was predicated on a lack of appropriately qualified candidates. View "Miller v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Miller served on active duty, 2003-2007, and has a VA disability rating of 60 percent. Since 2008, Miller has been employed as an FDIC Economic Analyst. He was hired at the GS-9 level and has risen to the GS-12 level. In 2012 the FDIC posted vacancy announcements for a CG-13 Financial Economist position: one open to all citizens and another for status candidates. Miller applied under both procedures and was one of three finalists. Three FDIC employees participated in the interviews, rating each candidate’s answers to questions on bank failure prediction models as Outstanding, Good, or Inadequate. All of the candidates received some "inadequate" ratings. No candidate was selected; the vacancy was cancelled. Miller filed a Department of Labor complaint, stating that the cancellation was in bad faith to avoid hiring a veteran or having to request a “pass over” from the Office of Personnel Management. The Merit Systems Protection Board denied his petition under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act, finding that the allegation of non-selection in violation of veterans’ rights was sufficient to confer jurisdiction, but that Miller had not established a violation because the FDIC “conducted a thorough, structured interview of each of the candidates” and “none of the interviewees possessed the requisite skills and knowledge for the position.” The Federal Circuit affirmed; substantial evidence indicated that cancellation was predicated on a lack of appropriately qualified candidates. View "Miller v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

In 2013, Canava, a U.S. Border Patrol Agent, was indicted on felony counts and pleaded guilty to “Unlawful Imprisonment by Strangulation, Domestic Violence, a class six undesignated offense.” Judgment was entered for the “undesignated offense” of unlawful imprisonment. The Department of Homeland Security proposed to remove Canava from federal service under 5 U.S.C. 7371, which mandates removal of federal law enforcement officers convicted of a felony. The removal notice stated that “[p]ursuant to Arizona Law, A.R.S. § 13-604, this conviction is a felony conviction for all purposes until the offense is affirmatively designated a misdemeanor by the Court.” Canava argued that 5 U.S.C. 7371 did not apply and could not be the basis for his removal because he pleaded guilty to an “undesignated offense” and not a felony. According to Canava, until a judge designated his offense a felony, he had not been convicted of a felony. DHS disagreed. An Arbitrator sustained his removal. The Federal Circuit affirmed.Canava was convicted of an undesignated offense that, under Arizona law, carried the same punishment as a class 6 felony—a presumptive sentence of one year imprisonment, with a mitigated sentence of 0.33 years and an aggravated sentence of two years. View "Canava v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

In 1989, Hicks, a Secretary at Maxwell Air Force Base, was removed from her position for failure to request leave in accordance with proper procedures and being absent without official leave. Following an appeal, Hicks’ removal was mitigated to a 60-day suspension. In 1990, the Air Force effected a new removal action. A Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) ALJ affirmed. A year later, Hicks sought review with the full board. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal of her motion, explaining that Hicks had not shown how her depression prevented her from meeting filing requirements. In 2014, Hicks contacted the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, alleging that the Air Force had removed her in retaliation for making protected disclosures. After Special Counsel terminated its investigation. Hicks filed an Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal with MSPB. An ALJ dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; in 1990, when Hicks was removed, filing an appeal was not a “protected disclosure” under the Whistleblower Protection Act, 103 Stat. 16. MSPB and the Federal Circuit affirmed. The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, 126 Stat. 1465, expanded its jurisdiction to cover IRA appeals alleging that an agency engaged in the prohibited personnel practices described in 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(9), including appeals alleging reprisal for filing a previous MSPB appeal, but it did not apply retroactively to Hicks. View "Hicks v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd." on Justia Law

The High Line is an elevated “linear park” in New York City that runs along the west side of Manhattan from Gansevoort Street to 34th Street. The park, used for walking, jogging, and other recreational purposes, occupied the elevated viaduct of a former railway line. In 2005, the elevated viaduct was converted to a public recreational trail under the authority of the National Trails System Act. Before the Federal District Court of Appeals was a takings matter: appellant Romanoff Equities, Inc., contended that the conversion of the railway property to a trail entailed a taking of its property without just compensation. The Court of Federal Claims held, on summary judgment, that the conversion did not result in a taking of Romanoff’s property. Finding no reversible error, the Federal District appellate court affirmed. View "Romanoff Equities, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Karen Dixon, recently substituted as appellant for her deceased husband Donald, and appealed a Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) decision dismissing her appeal based on a nonjurisdictional timeliness defense that Secretary of Veterans Affairs Robert McDonald waived. Mr. Dixon was diagnosed in 2003 with sarcoidosis of the lungs and transverse myelitis. He filed a claim with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) seeking benefits for his sarcoidosis, which he alleged was connected to his service. A VA regional office denied Mr. Dixon’s claim, and the Board of Veterans Appeals affirmed. Acting pro se, Mr. Dixon filed a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court sixty days beyond the 120-day filing deadline set out in 38 U.S.C. 7266(a). The Veterans Court denied Mr. Dixon equitable tolling. He obtained pro bono counsel and filed a request for reconsideration of this denial, but the Veterans Court denied that request too. Mr. Dixon appealed, but then he died of his medical conditions while his appeal was pending. The Federal Circuit reversed because the Veterans Court’s denial of an extension of time had effectively denied Mr. Dixon’s new pro bono counsel access to evidence he would need to prove his claim. On remand, the Veterans Court substituted Mrs. Dixon and requested briefing from the parties on whether equitable tolling excused Mr. Dixon’s late filing. The Secretary responded by waiving his objection. Because the Veterans Court did not have the sua sponte authority to grant the Secretary relief on a defense he waived, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of Mrs. Dixon’s appeal and remanded for consideration on the merits. View "Dixon v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Maurice Sullivan appealed a Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims' judgment which affirmed a decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals conclusion that the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) had satisfied its duty to assist Sullivan with a request to reopen his claim. Sullivan filed a claim for service-connected benefits for back and neck injuries. He sought treatment in 1984 for back and neck pain at a VA medical facility in Asheville, North Carolina, but that the doctors found nothing wrong with his back and neck. The VA denied Sullivan’s claim, finding that the medical evidence of record did not establish service-connection for his injuries. Ten years later, Sullivan submitted new evidence and sought to reopen his claim. The Board denied the request to reopen, finding the newly submitted evidence was not material. The Board also determined that the VA had satisfied its duty to assist Sullivan in obtaining identified and available evidence. After review, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Veterans Court relied on the wrong legal standard in affirming the Board’s determination that the duty to assist was satisfied. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sullivan v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Wade Thompson appealed a Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims' judgment which affirmed a decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denying Thompson a disability rating in excess of 20% for degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine prior to March 8, 2011. The Veterans Court’s decision was based in part upon its interpretation of 38 C.F.R. 4.40 in light of section 4.71a. Thompson’s appeal raised a question of first impression for the Federal Circuit: whether section 4.40 provided a basis for a rating separate from section 4.71a. After review of the applicable statutes, the Court concluded "no" and affirmed the Veterans Court. View "Thompson v. McDonald" on Justia Law

In 1996, Zoltek sued, alleging that the process used to produce carbon fiber sheet materials for the B-2 Bomber and the F-22 Fighter Plane, with the consent of the Air Force and Navy, infringed its patent. The Federal Circuit answered a certified question, holding that the patentee has no claim against the government when any step of the patented method is practiced outside of the U.S., as for the F-22. On remand, the Claims Court granted Zoltek leave to substitute as defendant Lockheed, the F-22’s general contractor. The Federal Circuit then acted en banc and reversed its earlier ruling, recognizing the liability of the United States for infringement by acts that are performed with its authorization and consent, citing 28 U.S.C. 1498(a), and dismissed Lockheed. On remand, the Claims Court separated trial of the issues of validity and infringement and denied discovery as to infringement with respect to the F-22. The Federal Circuit denied a petition for mandamus. The Claims Court sustained patent eligibility, but held the asserted claims invalid on the grounds of obviousness and inadequate written description. The Federal Circuit held that in these circumstances, given the government’s official invocation of state secret privilege, the court acted within its discretion in limiting trial initially to issues of validity, but erred in its judgment of patent invalidity. View "Zoltek Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2007, McMillan a GS-13 Criminal Investigator with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and an officer in the Army Reserves. was assigned to the Lima, Peru DEA Office. His tour at Lima was to expire in 2010, but he successfully sought a one-year extension. In 2010, two months after a controversy concerning his the use of a DEA Foreign Situation Report in a military intelligence report, and his participation in a teleconference, McMillan unsuccessfully requested an additional two years. McMillan contends that the decision not to renew his tour was based improperly on his military service, in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 430. McMillan’s complaint with the Department of Labor’s Veterans’ Employment and Training Service was found unsupported; an AJ cited McMillan’s “performance issues,” in terms of the number of arrests, seizures, informant recruitment, and disruptions of criminal organizations McMillan facilitated; McMillan’s alleged failure to follow his chain of command in soliciting assistance with his military assignment; and McMillan’s “disdain[ful],” “arroga[nt], “disrespectful and improper” emails to his supervisor. The Merit Systems Protection Board denied McMillan’s appeal. The Federal Circuit reversed. DEA failed to demonstrate that it would have made the same decision in the absence of McMillan’s military service. View "McMillan v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law