Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A federal employee working at a Veterans Affairs healthcare facility discovered that a nurse practitioner was improperly receiving overtime pay that was not actually earned and not related to COVID, contrary to requirements. The employee’s supervisors allegedly created and signed a false waiver to justify these payments, resulting in significant unearned compensation. When the employee refused to participate in the scheme and reported the conduct to the VA Office of Inspector General, he claimed to have been subjected to workplace retaliation, including a reprimand and demotion.The employee filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, asserting a qui tam false claims action against his supervisors and a retaliation claim under the False Claims Act (FCA) against the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs, in his official capacity. The government intervened and successfully moved to dismiss the false claims and conspiracy counts against the supervisors. The government also sought dismissal of the retaliation claim, arguing that the employee’s exclusive remedies lay under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), not the FCA. The district court, however, dismissed the retaliation claim on the ground that the FCA does not contain an express waiver of the federal government’s sovereign immunity for such claims, and thus federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that Congress has not expressly waived the federal government’s sovereign immunity to permit retaliation suits against federal employers under Section 3730(h) of the FCA. The court found that neither the FCA’s text nor its structure provided the required clear waiver of sovereign immunity, distinguishing such waivers present in other statutes. Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "US ex rel. Sargent v. Collins" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case are the sons of Roberto Clemente, a renowned Puerto Rican baseball player, and two corporations they control. The dispute centers on the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s use of Clemente’s name and image on commemorative license plates and vehicle registration tags. Proceeds from these items were designated to fund a new “Roberto Clemente Sports District,” a public project that would replace an earlier initiative, Ciudad Deportiva, originally founded by Clemente. The plaintiffs allege that they hold trademark rights in Clemente’s name and that the Commonwealth’s actions were unauthorized and caused public confusion, with many mistakenly believing the Clemente family benefited financially from the program.The plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico against the Commonwealth, several high-ranking officials, and the Puerto Rico Convention Center District Authority. Their claims included trademark infringement, false association, false advertising, and trademark dilution under the Lanham Act, as well as a takings claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Commonwealth and the Authority moved to dismiss, arguing sovereign and qualified immunity and failure to state a claim. The district court granted both motions, dismissing all federal claims on immunity and merits grounds, and declined to exercise jurisdiction over non-federal claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court affirmed the dismissal of all claims against the Authority and all claims against the Commonwealth and its officials in their official capacities. It also affirmed dismissal of the false advertising and takings claims. However, the court vacated the dismissal of the Lanham Act claims for trademark infringement, false endorsement, and dilution against the Commonwealth officials in their personal capacities, holding those claims were plausibly alleged and not barred by qualified immunity at this stage, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Clemente Properties, Inc. v. Pierluisi-Urrutia" on Justia Law

In early 2025, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), issued a Supplemental Guidance that implemented a uniform 15% cap on indirect cost reimbursement for all NIH-funded research grants, effective almost immediately. Indirect costs, which include necessary administrative and facility expenses not attributable to a single research project, had previously been negotiated individually with grant recipients according to established regulations and memorialized in negotiated indirect cost rate agreements (NICRAs). The new policy would substantially reduce the reimbursement many recipients, such as universities and hospitals, could receive under existing and future grants.Shortly after the guidance was issued, a coalition of states, medical associations, and higher education organizations challenged the NIH’s action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The district court first granted temporary restraining orders to prevent implementation of the guidance, then issued a nationwide preliminary injunction. After further proceedings, the district court converted this into a permanent injunction and vacated the Supplemental Guidance, concluding that the NIH’s action likely violated a congressional appropriations rider and HHS regulations, and finding the action arbitrary, capricious, and procedurally improper.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the district court had jurisdiction because the plaintiffs challenged an agency-wide policy rather than seeking contract damages, which would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. The appellate court further held that the NIH’s Supplemental Guidance violated the statutory appropriations rider and HHS regulations governing indirect cost reimbursement, including the requirements for deviations from negotiated rates. The First Circuit affirmed the permanent injunction and vacatur of the Supplemental Guidance. View "Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. National Institutes of Health" on Justia Law

John Kenney, a resident of Florida, sought to obtain a retail cannabis license in Rhode Island as a social equity applicant. He argued that, as a recipient of a social equity cannabis license in the District of Columbia and someone with nonviolent marijuana convictions in Maryland and Nevada, he would otherwise qualify under Rhode Island’s Cannabis Act. Kenney challenged two provisions of the Act: the requirement that all license applicants must be Rhode Island residents or entities controlled by Rhode Island residents, and the definition of “social equity applicant,” which, according to Kenney, only recognizes nonviolent marijuana offenses eligible for expungement under Rhode Island law.After Kenney filed an amended complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, the defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On February 6, 2025, the district court dismissed the case on ripeness grounds, reasoning that the Cannabis Control Commission had not yet promulgated final rules for retail cannabis licenses, and thus the court could not adjudicate the claims. The case was dismissed without prejudice, and Kenney appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the appeal. Following the Commission’s issuance of final rules for retail cannabis licenses, effective May 1, 2025, the appellate court determined that the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of ripeness. The First Circuit held that Kenney’s claims were not moot and that he had standing to pursue them. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal order and remanded the case for prompt consideration of the merits of Kenney’s constitutional challenges, instructing the district court to rule at least forty-five days before the Commission issues retail licenses. View "Kenney v. Rhode Island Cannabis Control Commission" on Justia Law

Riverdale Mills Corporation operates a wire mesh manufacturing facility in Northbridge, Massachusetts. In 2019, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) conducted two investigations at Riverdale’s facility, which resulted in citations alleging violations of safety and health standards under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Riverdale contested these citations, and after a consolidated hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) in 2021, the ALJ affirmed three citation items while vacating or withdrawing the others.Subsequently, in December 2023, Riverdale applied to the ALJ for recovery of attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). To establish eligibility for this recovery, Riverdale submitted its 2019 balance sheet as evidence, along with a motion to seal the document due to alleged confidential business information. The Secretary of Labor opposed the motion, arguing Riverdale had not demonstrated sufficient grounds for sealing. After considering submissions from both parties, the ALJ denied Riverdale’s motion to seal, applying balancing tests from D.C. Circuit and First Circuit case law and concluding Riverdale had not shown compelling reasons to overcome the presumption of public access. Riverdale attempted to appeal this denial to the OSHRC Commission, but the Commission automatically dismissed the appeal for lack of quorum.Riverdale then sought interlocutory review from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit assumed interlocutory jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and reviewed the ALJ’s denial for abuse of discretion. It held that Riverdale had waived certain arguments by not raising them earlier and determined the ALJ did not abuse her discretion in denying the motion to seal, finding Riverdale failed to meet its burden to justify sealing the balance sheet. The petition for review was denied. View "Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Chavez-DeRemer" on Justia Law

A group of Maine lobstermen challenged a state rule requiring all federally permitted lobster fishers to install electronic tracking devices on their vessels, which transmit GPS location data whenever the vessels are in the water. This rule was adopted by the Maine Department of Marine Resources (MDMR) to comply with an addendum to the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s American Lobster Fishery Management Plan. The addendum aimed to reduce risks to North Atlantic right whales, improve fishery data, and support regulatory enforcement. The tracking devices must remain powered and transmit data at all times, including when vessels are docked or used for personal purposes.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, arguing that the MDMR Rule violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment, as well as equal protection and state administrative law. The district court granted the state’s motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Fourth Amendment because the lobster fishery is a closely regulated industry and the rule was not unreasonably invasive. The court noted several concessions by the parties, including that the GPS tracking constituted a search, that the lobster industry is closely regulated, and that the search was administrative in nature.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the lobster industry is a closely regulated industry and that the administrative search exception, as articulated in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), applied. The court found that the MDMR Rule satisfied the Burger test: it served a substantial government interest, warrantless searches were necessary to the regulatory scheme, and the rule provided a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Thompson v. Wilson" on Justia Law

During a government shutdown that began on October 1, 2025, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced it would not provide November Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits, affecting millions of Americans who rely on these funds for food. Despite having approximately $6 billion in contingency funds appropriated by Congress for emergencies, USDA stated it would not use these funds, arguing they were unavailable once regular appropriations lapsed. Plaintiffs, including nonprofits, local governments, a union, and a food retailer, filed suit, alleging that USDA’s suspension of benefits was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) requiring USDA to provide either full or partial November SNAP payments by specified dates. The government chose to provide partial payments but failed to do so in a timely manner, as many recipients would not receive benefits by the court’s deadline. The district court found the government had not complied with its order, both by failing to resolve administrative burdens and by not ensuring timely disbursement. As a result, the court ordered USDA to make full November SNAP payments, including by using funds from the Section 32 fund in combination with contingency funds. The government appealed and sought a stay of the district court’s order.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the government’s request for a stay pending appeal. The court held that the government had not met its burden to justify a stay, finding it had failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits or that irreparable harm would result from compliance. The court emphasized the immediate and substantial harm to SNAP recipients if benefits were withheld and denied the government’s motion for a stay. View "Rhode Island State Council of Churches v. Rollins" on Justia Law

The case concerns multiple petitions for review challenging a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) order that established new rate caps for communications services provided to incarcerated individuals. The FCC’s order, issued pursuant to the Martha Wright-Reed Just and Reasonable Communications Act of 2022, also dismissed as moot certain petitions for clarification and waiver filed by Securus Technologies, LLC, a provider of these services. After the FCC published portions of the order in the Federal Register, several parties—including service providers, advocacy organizations, and state governments—filed petitions for review in various federal appellate courts, contesting different aspects of the order.Following the filing of these petitions, the FCC notified the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) under 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)(3), which randomly selected the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit to hear the consolidated petitions. The administrative record was filed in the First Circuit, and subsequent petitions filed in other circuits were transferred there pursuant to statute. Some petitioners, notably Securus and Pay Tel Communications, Inc., argued that the petitions should be transferred to the Fifth Circuit, asserting that it was the proper venue based on the timing and nature of the initial filings. The First Circuit denied these transfer motions, and a request for mandamus to the Supreme Court was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the petitions for review are properly before it, as the administrative record was filed there pursuant to the JPML’s direction. The court rejected arguments for mandatory transfer to the Fifth Circuit, finding no legal basis to override the JPML’s selection or to collaterally attack its determination. The court also declined to exercise its discretion to transfer the petitions elsewhere. View "Direct Action for Rights and Equality v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Residents and the municipality of Morovis, Puerto Rico, brought suit against the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (PRASA) and its officials, alleging that for years, Morovis has suffered from a severe water crisis, with many residents lacking water service on most days. The plaintiffs, all PRASA subscribers, claimed that despite repeated notifications and proposed solutions—including a report from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—PRASA failed to address the crisis. They alleged that sometimes the outages could be resolved by simply turning on pumps or generators, and that PRASA officials were aware of the situation but did little to provide alternative water sources or adjust billing. The plaintiffs also recounted incidents suggesting deliberate inaction or sabotage by PRASA employees.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico dismissed the case in its entirety at the pleading stage, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for a substantive due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that the alleged conduct did not rise to the level of “shocking the conscience,” and also held that the plaintiffs’ contracts with PRASA could not form the basis of a substantive due process claim. The court did not decide whether Puerto Rico law created a protected property interest in water service.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the substantive due process claim. The First Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged government conduct that could shock the conscience, particularly under a deliberate indifference standard, given the prolonged and severe deprivation of water. The court vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, leaving unresolved whether a protected property interest exists and whether qualified immunity applies. View "Maldonado-Gonzalez v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority" on Justia Law

The case concerns challenges to Executive Order No. 14160, issued in January 2025, which seeks to deny birthright citizenship to children born in the United States after its effective date if their fathers are not U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents and their mothers are either unlawfully or temporarily present in the country. Plaintiffs include individual immigrants, nonprofit organizations, and a coalition of states and local governments. They allege that the Executive Order violates the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, the Separation of Powers doctrine, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the Order.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted preliminary injunctions to both sets of plaintiffs, finding they were “exceedingly likely” to succeed on their claims under the Citizenship Clause and § 1401(a). The injunctions barred federal agencies and officials from enforcing the Executive Order against the plaintiffs and, in the case brought by the states, issued a nationwide injunction to provide complete relief. The government appealed, challenging the plaintiffs’ standing, the scope of the injunctions, and the merits of the constitutional and statutory claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s findings that the plaintiffs have Article III standing and are likely to succeed on the merits. The First Circuit held that the Executive Order’s denial of birthright citizenship to children born in the United States under the specified circumstances violates both the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), as interpreted by United States v. Wong Kim Ark and subsequent precedent. The court affirmed the preliminary injunctions in part, vacated them in part as to agency defendants, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Doe v. Trump" on Justia Law