Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued to Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, LLC a certificate of public convenience and necessity for a proposed project. The certificate was subject to filing of proof that Tennessee Gas received all applicable authorizations required under federal law. Tennessee Gas subsequently received from the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MassDEP) conditional certification for its proposed project. Petitioners filed a notice of claim for adjudicatory hearing to appeal the conditional certification. Tennessee Gas opposed the request for a hearing, arguing that once the agency had issued a conditional water quality certification, any further review must be pursued through a petition to the First Circuit. Tennessee Gas then filed suit in the District of Massachusetts seeking to bar MassDEP from engaging in further review. Petitioners filed this petition to preserve review of the conditional certification but asked the Court to reject their petition on the grounds that the Court’s review was premature until MassDEP completed its adjudicatory process. The First Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because there was no order or action of MassDEP in connection with Tennessee Gas’s application for a water quality certification that the Court could review under 15 U.S.C. 717r(d)(1). View "Berkshire Environmental Action Team, Inc. v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co." on Justia Law

After she was charged with removability, Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act. An immigration judge (IJ) rejected Petitioner’s application for relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s denial and dismissed the appeal. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion requesting that the BIA reopen and reconsider her appeal, contending that the BIA committed three legal errors. The BIA denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen and reconsider. The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied Petitioner’s motion. View "Cortez Cardona v. Yates" on Justia Law

In May 1990, Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, committed a felony under California law. At that time, the immigration laws allowed the Attorney General of the United States, if so inclined, to grant Petitioner a waiver from the full effect of his criminal conduct. In December 1990, Petitioner was convicted. In November 1990, the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT) took effect. IMMACT divested the Attorney General of the discretion to grant such a waiver to any person who served five or more years of incarceration for an aggravated felony. In 2014, after Petitioner was released from prison, he was charged with being removable. The Board of Immigration Appeals determined that, although Petitioner’s conduct predated IMMACT’s enactment, the fact that his conviction postdated IMMACT’s enactment controlled. The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that controlling precedent is in accord with the BIA’s decision, and therefore, the BIA did not apply IMMACT to Petitioner in an improperly retroactive manner. View "Holder v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of China, was charged with being removable. Petitioner filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all of Petitioner’s claims and ordered him removed from the United States, finding that Petitioner was not credible. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) Petitioner’s asylum claim failed, and consequently, Petitioner’s withholding of removal claim necessarily failed as well; and (2) substantial evidence existed to support the BIA’s rejection of Petitioner’s CAT claim. View "Xian Jing v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Honduran nation, conceded removability after being charged for being present in the United States without legal sanction. Petitioner cross-applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that he had a well-founded fear of persecution based on his experiences in Honduras. An immigration judge (IJ) denied relief and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding that the IJ’s and the BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s claim for asylum must stand. View "Rivera-Coca v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Here the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services approved an I-130 “immediate relative” visa petition based on an the marriage of Petitioner, a Chinese national, to a United States citizen. In a parallel removal proceeding, the immigration court inquired into the bona fides of the anchoring marriage. The immigration judge (IJ) found that the marriage was a sham, rendering Petitioner’s ineligible to adjust her status. The IJ then ordered Petitioner’s removal to China. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding (1) the IJ had jurisdiction to examine the bona fides of Petitioner’s marriage; and (2) the record did not compel a conclusion contrary to the “sham marriage” conclusion reached by the IJ and the BIA. View "Chan v. Lynch" on Justia Law

After a merger in 1995, William and Patricia Cavallaro received 38 shares of stock in Camelot, the merged company. Their three sons received 54 shares each. When Camelot was subsequently acquired, the Cavallaros received a total of $10,830,000, and each son received $15,390,000. The IRS issued notices of deficiency to the Cavallaros for tax year 1995, determining that Camelot had a pre-merger value of $0 and that when the merger occurred, William and Patricia each made a taxable gift of $23,085,000 to their sons. Therefore, each of the Cavallaros incurred an increase in tax liability in the amount of $12,696,750. The Tax Court ultimately concluded that William owed $7,652,980 and that Patricia owed $8,009,202. The Cavallaros appealed, arguing that the Tax Court erred by failing to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner. The First Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the Tax Court correctly determined that the burden of proof was on the Cavallaros; but (2) the Tax Court misstated the nature of the Cavallaros’ burden of proof. Remanded. View "Cavallaro v. Koskinen" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application for a good-faith-marriage waiver of the joint-filing requirement for a Petition to Remove Conditions on Residence (Form I-751 waiver) but made a series of representations to advance her application. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied Petitioner’s Form I-751 waiver application. An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s application for review and granted Petitioner voluntary departure, finding that Petitioner’s various misrepresentations to USCIS undermined the credibility of her testimony. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing with the IJ that, in light of Petitioner’s misrepresentations, the evidence was insufficient to meet her burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that she had entered into a good-faith marriage. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that nothing Petitioner argued on appeal compelled the Court to reverse the BIA’s decision. View "Quezada-Caraballo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The consolidated appeals in this case involved a dispute between the Secretary of Health and Human Services and a group of Maine hospitals about certain payments - called disproportionate share payments (DSH payments) - the hospitals had received in reimbursement from the federal government for charity care for fiscal years dating as far back as 1993. Generally speaking, the more low-income patients a hospital services, the higher the hospital’s DSH payment. In this case, the Secretary maintained that the Hospitals were overinclusive in their DSH payment calculations. An intermediary reassessed the DSH payments and recouped from the Hospitals approximately $22 million in alleged overpayments. The Provider Reimbursement Review Board, in turn, ordered the intermediary to restore approximately $17 million to the Hospitals. The Secretary reversed. The Hospitals sought judicial review, but neither side was satisfied with the district court’s ruling. On appeal, the First Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the Secretary properly reopened the disputed years and adequately demonstrated that the Hospitals had received substantial overpayments of DSH funds; and (2) the Hospitals’ defenses to repayment were unavailing. View "Maine Medical Center v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Ugandan national, was subjected to removal proceedings. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum and withholding of removal. An immigration judge denied Petitioner’s application for asylum and withholding of removal, concluding that no changed or extraordinary circumstances could justify Petitioner’s thirteen-year delay in seeking asylum and that Petitioner failed to establish his eligibility for withholding of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. Thereafter, Petitioner moved to reopen removal proceedings based on newly discovered evidence. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, concluding that Petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements for reopening. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding that the BIA did not commit an error of law or exercise its judgment in an arbitrary, capricious, or irrational manner. View "Bbale v. Lynch" on Justia Law