Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Daniel George, a self-taught chemist who created his own health supplements, was convicted of tax evasion based on his failure to pay taxes for the tax years 1996 through 1999. Six weeks after his tax evasion indictment, George incorporated Biogenesis Foundation, Inc. George then applied for tax-exempt status for Biogenesis as a charitable organization. The IRS granted Biogensis’s application in 2003. In 2011, Biogenesis retroactively filed tax forms claiming it was a section 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(4) organization for the tax years 1996 through 2002. Thereafter, the IRS issued a notice of deficiency to George, stating that he owed $3.790 million in income taxes and penalties on $5.65 million in bank deposits he made and interest earned for the tax years 1995 through 2002. George petitioned for review, asserting that the income earned for those tax years was not his but Biogenesis’s. The tax court rejected George’s arguments and found George liable for the full amount of the alleged deficiency. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tax court did not err in determining that an organization distinct from George did not exist during the applicable tax years. View "George v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant, a native of Cameroon, pleaded guilty to filing a false healthcare claim, larceny, and attempted larceny, in violation of Massachusetts state law. Appellant paid the full restitution amount and his case was dismissed. In an effort to be granted naturalization, Appellant attempted to revise his criminal record. Although Appellant successfully had his sentence “clarified” to establish the amount of loss to the victim of the crime, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied Appellant’s renewed application for naturalization on the grounds that Appellant had been convicted of an aggravated felony and was therefore ineligible for naturalization. Appellant filed a petition for judicial review, arguing that it had been established that the amount of loss to the victim of the crime of fraud or deceit was less than $10,000, and therefore, his petition for naturalization was improperly denied. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government, concluding that the totality of the circumstances supported USCIS’s finding that the amount of loss to the victim exceeded $10,000. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the USCIS properly discounted “Appellant’s attempts at revisionist history” and properly denied naturalization. View "Nanje v. Chaves" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, applied for withholding of removal, asserting that he suffered past persecution and faced a clear probability of future persecution in Guatemala on account of his political opinion and his membership in a particular group. Despite finding Petitioner credible, an immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s findings and dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, finding that Petitioner failed to establish that any harm he suffered or would likely suffer in the future was serious enough to constitute persecution and related to a statutorily protected ground. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s findings. View "Hernandez-Lima v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two high-profile medical researchers that held faculty appointments at Harvard Medical School and were intimately involved with a research laboratory at Brigham and Women’s Hospital, were investigated for alleged research misconduct. Responding to allegations that Plaintiffs used manipulated research data in articles reporting on studies supported by government funds, Harvard and Brigham triggered a unique federal statutory and regulatory scheme. Without awaiting the outcome of the administrative proceedings, Plaintiffs filed suit in federal court against the institutional defendants, alleging, inter alia, tortious interference with business relations, invasion of privacy, and unfair and deceptive business practices. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the suit was premature because Plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies. The First Circuit affirmed as modified, holding (1) the district court correctly applied the doctrine of administrative exhaustion; but (2) on remand, the district court is directed to convert its order of dismissal to an order staying the case pending the timely resolution of administrative proceedings. View "Anversa v. Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Eritrea, filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming that she was persecuted in Eritrea because of her Pentecostal faith. An immigration judge (IJ) ordered Petitioner’s removal to Eritrea. Although the IJ refrained from making an explicit adverse credibility finding regarding Petitioner’s credibility, the judge concluded that Petitioner failed to remedy credibility problems in her testimony with persuasive corroborating evidence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Petitioner filed a petition for review, asserting, inter alia, that the IJ and BIA erred in finding material inconsistencies in the evidence she presented and in relying on evidence outside the record. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) a reasonable fact-finder would not be compelled on this record to conclude that Petitioner met her burden to prove past persecution; and (2) Petitioner’s claims for other forms of relief were unavailing. View "Bahta v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a putative class of unionized “visiting” nurses, sued their employer - Baystate Visiting Nurse association & Hospice, Inc. and Baystate Health, Inc. (collectively, “Baystate”) - in state court for unpaid wages and overtime pay. Plaintiffs conceded that they were subject to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the union and Baystate. Baystate removed this action to federal court, citing the doctrine of complete preemption, under which claims requiring interpretation of a CBA are reclassified as federal claims. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to remand, concluding that complete preemption applied. The district court then granted Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) resolving one of the claims would require a court to interpret the CBA, and therefore, the claim was completely preempted, and the entire action was removable to federal court; and (2) the CBA required Plaintiffs to raise their wage claims through the grievance procedure, and therefore, the district court properly entered judgment on the pleadings. View "Rueli v. Baystate Health, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, who was born and raised in Guatemala, entered the United States without inspection. The Government initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner for entering the United States without a valid entry document. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, arguing that the threats of a police officer that shot and killed Petitioner’s father constituted persecution based on the social group of Petitioner’s family and demonstrated the likelihood that Petitioner would be tortured or killed if he returned to Guatemala. The Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that Petitioner failed to satisfy his burden of proving he is a refugee. View "Marin-Portillo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Before the immigration judge (IJ), Petitioner argued that she had suffered past persecution due to her prior attendance and had an objectively well-founded fear of future persecution due to her prior attendance at an underground Christian church in China. The IJ denied Petitioner’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, concluding that she had not demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA’s decision to affirm the IJ’s denial of Petitioner’s asylum application was supported by substantial evidence. View "Qin v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, was charged with removability. Petitioner conceded removability and indicated her intent to seek asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Before the immigration judge (IJ), Petitioner argued that she had suffered past persecution in El Salvador and had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her membership in the particular social group she defined as “Salvadoran women in intimate relationships with partners who view them as property.” The IJ denied Petitioner’s application for asylum and withholding of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, concluding that Petitioner failed to establish that her proposed social group shared immutable characteristics and had social distinction. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s finding that Petitioner failed to show either immutability or social distinction. View "Vega-Ayala v. Lynch" on Justia Law

When Jane Doe was in second grade, she began receiving special education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act based on her deficiency in reading fluency. More than six years later, an administrative hearing officer determined that Jane was no longer eligible to receive special education. The district court affirmed. The First Circuit vacated and remanded the case, holding (1) the district court erred in relying on evidence of Jane’s overall academic performance without regard to how it reflected her reading fluency skills; and (2) the district court did not make an independent judgment as to the additional evidence submitted by Jane’s parents and afforded excessive deference to the hearing officer’s determinations in weighing the relevant reading fluency measures. View "Mr. & Mrs. Doe v. Cape Elizabeth Sch. Dist." on Justia Law