Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Eritrea, filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming that she was persecuted in Eritrea because of her Pentecostal faith. An immigration judge (IJ) ordered Petitioner’s removal to Eritrea. Although the IJ refrained from making an explicit adverse credibility finding regarding Petitioner’s credibility, the judge concluded that Petitioner failed to remedy credibility problems in her testimony with persuasive corroborating evidence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Petitioner filed a petition for review, asserting, inter alia, that the IJ and BIA erred in finding material inconsistencies in the evidence she presented and in relying on evidence outside the record. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) a reasonable fact-finder would not be compelled on this record to conclude that Petitioner met her burden to prove past persecution; and (2) Petitioner’s claims for other forms of relief were unavailing. View "Bahta v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a putative class of unionized “visiting” nurses, sued their employer - Baystate Visiting Nurse association & Hospice, Inc. and Baystate Health, Inc. (collectively, “Baystate”) - in state court for unpaid wages and overtime pay. Plaintiffs conceded that they were subject to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the union and Baystate. Baystate removed this action to federal court, citing the doctrine of complete preemption, under which claims requiring interpretation of a CBA are reclassified as federal claims. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to remand, concluding that complete preemption applied. The district court then granted Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) resolving one of the claims would require a court to interpret the CBA, and therefore, the claim was completely preempted, and the entire action was removable to federal court; and (2) the CBA required Plaintiffs to raise their wage claims through the grievance procedure, and therefore, the district court properly entered judgment on the pleadings. View "Rueli v. Baystate Health, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, who was born and raised in Guatemala, entered the United States without inspection. The Government initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner for entering the United States without a valid entry document. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, arguing that the threats of a police officer that shot and killed Petitioner’s father constituted persecution based on the social group of Petitioner’s family and demonstrated the likelihood that Petitioner would be tortured or killed if he returned to Guatemala. The Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that Petitioner failed to satisfy his burden of proving he is a refugee. View "Marin-Portillo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Before the immigration judge (IJ), Petitioner argued that she had suffered past persecution due to her prior attendance and had an objectively well-founded fear of future persecution due to her prior attendance at an underground Christian church in China. The IJ denied Petitioner’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, concluding that she had not demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA’s decision to affirm the IJ’s denial of Petitioner’s asylum application was supported by substantial evidence. View "Qin v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, was charged with removability. Petitioner conceded removability and indicated her intent to seek asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Before the immigration judge (IJ), Petitioner argued that she had suffered past persecution in El Salvador and had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her membership in the particular social group she defined as “Salvadoran women in intimate relationships with partners who view them as property.” The IJ denied Petitioner’s application for asylum and withholding of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, concluding that Petitioner failed to establish that her proposed social group shared immutable characteristics and had social distinction. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s finding that Petitioner failed to show either immutability or social distinction. View "Vega-Ayala v. Lynch" on Justia Law

When Jane Doe was in second grade, she began receiving special education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act based on her deficiency in reading fluency. More than six years later, an administrative hearing officer determined that Jane was no longer eligible to receive special education. The district court affirmed. The First Circuit vacated and remanded the case, holding (1) the district court erred in relying on evidence of Jane’s overall academic performance without regard to how it reflected her reading fluency skills; and (2) the district court did not make an independent judgment as to the additional evidence submitted by Jane’s parents and afforded excessive deference to the hearing officer’s determinations in weighing the relevant reading fluency measures. View "Mr. & Mrs. Doe v. Cape Elizabeth Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 2012, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, alleging a disability onset date of 1995. Plaintiff’s date last insured (DLI) was in 1998. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied benefits, concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled prior to her DLI and was thus not eligible to receive benefits. The district court vacated the Commissioner’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, ruling that the ALJ failed to comply with Social Security Ruling (SSR) 83-20 and consult a medical advisor before drawing inferences as to whether Plaintiff’s onset date preceded the expiration of her insured status. In making its ruling, the district court relied upon Social Security Ruling (SSR) 83-20, which instructs an ALJ to consult a medical expert when the ALJ must infer a claimant’s date of disability onset on the basis of ambiguous medical evidence. The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that SSR 83-20 did not require the ALJ to consult a medical expert because the medical evidence was not ambiguous, and thus, the ALJ did not need to infer Plaintiff’s date of disability onset. Remanded for consideration of Plaintiff’s remaining claims. View "Fischer v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States and was placed in removal proceedings. Petitioner cross-applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming both past persecution and fear of future persecution due to his anti-gang political opinion and his membership in a particular social group. An immigration judge denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding that there was no error in the BIA’s determinations and that the BIA's determinations were supported by substantial evidence in the record. View "Alvizures-Gomes v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Ms. S. filed a request for a due process hearing with the Maine Department of Education (MDOE) concerning alleged Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) violations in the case of her son, B.S., during his ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth grade years. A hearing officer with the Maine Department of Education (MDOE) dismissed Ms. S.’s ninth and tenth grade claims as time barred by a two-year filing limitation. Ms. S. sought judicial review, arguing that the two-year filing limitation was void because it was not promulgated in compliance with the Maine Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA). The district court upheld the hearing officer’s decision, concluding (1) the two-year filing limitation was valid; and (2) B.S. received a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in the eleventh and twelfth grades. The First Circuit vacated and remanded in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in its analysis of the validity of the two-year filing limitation, and the record is insufficient to determine whether the MDOE adequately complied with MAPA procedures when adopting the filing limitation; and (2) B.S. received a FAPE in the eleventh and twelfth grades. View "Ms. S. v. Regional School Unit 72" on Justia Law

When Thomas was a child, he was lawfully admitted to the United States for six months, but he and his parents remained in the country beyond that date. Thomas’s mother later became a naturalized United States citizen and, three days later, Thomas turned eighteen years old. Thomas did not apply to become a lawful permanent resident thereafter but, instead continued living in the United States without a lawful admission for permanent residence. Thomas was subsequently convicted in a Massachusetts state court for armed robbery. An Immigration Judge ordered Thomas removed, finding that Thomas was removable as an alien who had been convicted of an aggravated felony. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Thomas filed a petition for review, arguing that he satisfied the applicable statutory criteria for obtaining derivative citizenship in consequence of his mother’s naturalization. The First Circuit denied the petition, holding that Thomas did not satisfy the criteria set forth in the derivative citizenship statute that was in effect at the time he was still a minor. View "Thomas v. Lynch" on Justia Law