Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, was charged with removability. Petitioner conceded removability and indicated her intent to seek asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Before the immigration judge (IJ), Petitioner argued that she had suffered past persecution in El Salvador and had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her membership in the particular social group she defined as “Salvadoran women in intimate relationships with partners who view them as property.” The IJ denied Petitioner’s application for asylum and withholding of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, concluding that Petitioner failed to establish that her proposed social group shared immutable characteristics and had social distinction. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s finding that Petitioner failed to show either immutability or social distinction. View "Vega-Ayala v. Lynch" on Justia Law

When Jane Doe was in second grade, she began receiving special education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act based on her deficiency in reading fluency. More than six years later, an administrative hearing officer determined that Jane was no longer eligible to receive special education. The district court affirmed. The First Circuit vacated and remanded the case, holding (1) the district court erred in relying on evidence of Jane’s overall academic performance without regard to how it reflected her reading fluency skills; and (2) the district court did not make an independent judgment as to the additional evidence submitted by Jane’s parents and afforded excessive deference to the hearing officer’s determinations in weighing the relevant reading fluency measures. View "Mr. & Mrs. Doe v. Cape Elizabeth Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 2012, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, alleging a disability onset date of 1995. Plaintiff’s date last insured (DLI) was in 1998. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied benefits, concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled prior to her DLI and was thus not eligible to receive benefits. The district court vacated the Commissioner’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, ruling that the ALJ failed to comply with Social Security Ruling (SSR) 83-20 and consult a medical advisor before drawing inferences as to whether Plaintiff’s onset date preceded the expiration of her insured status. In making its ruling, the district court relied upon Social Security Ruling (SSR) 83-20, which instructs an ALJ to consult a medical expert when the ALJ must infer a claimant’s date of disability onset on the basis of ambiguous medical evidence. The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court, holding that SSR 83-20 did not require the ALJ to consult a medical expert because the medical evidence was not ambiguous, and thus, the ALJ did not need to infer Plaintiff’s date of disability onset. Remanded for consideration of Plaintiff’s remaining claims. View "Fischer v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States and was placed in removal proceedings. Petitioner cross-applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming both past persecution and fear of future persecution due to his anti-gang political opinion and his membership in a particular social group. An immigration judge denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding that there was no error in the BIA’s determinations and that the BIA's determinations were supported by substantial evidence in the record. View "Alvizures-Gomes v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Ms. S. filed a request for a due process hearing with the Maine Department of Education (MDOE) concerning alleged Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) violations in the case of her son, B.S., during his ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth grade years. A hearing officer with the Maine Department of Education (MDOE) dismissed Ms. S.’s ninth and tenth grade claims as time barred by a two-year filing limitation. Ms. S. sought judicial review, arguing that the two-year filing limitation was void because it was not promulgated in compliance with the Maine Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA). The district court upheld the hearing officer’s decision, concluding (1) the two-year filing limitation was valid; and (2) B.S. received a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in the eleventh and twelfth grades. The First Circuit vacated and remanded in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in its analysis of the validity of the two-year filing limitation, and the record is insufficient to determine whether the MDOE adequately complied with MAPA procedures when adopting the filing limitation; and (2) B.S. received a FAPE in the eleventh and twelfth grades. View "Ms. S. v. Regional School Unit 72" on Justia Law

When Thomas was a child, he was lawfully admitted to the United States for six months, but he and his parents remained in the country beyond that date. Thomas’s mother later became a naturalized United States citizen and, three days later, Thomas turned eighteen years old. Thomas did not apply to become a lawful permanent resident thereafter but, instead continued living in the United States without a lawful admission for permanent residence. Thomas was subsequently convicted in a Massachusetts state court for armed robbery. An Immigration Judge ordered Thomas removed, finding that Thomas was removable as an alien who had been convicted of an aggravated felony. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Thomas filed a petition for review, arguing that he satisfied the applicable statutory criteria for obtaining derivative citizenship in consequence of his mother’s naturalization. The First Circuit denied the petition, holding that Thomas did not satisfy the criteria set forth in the derivative citizenship statute that was in effect at the time he was still a minor. View "Thomas v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Sig Sauer, Inc., a gun manufacturer headquartered in New Hampshire, sought to market a gun that included a “silencer” under the National Firearms Act (NFA). The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) issued a classification letter classifying the part at issue to be a silencer under the NFA. Big Sauer challenged ATF’s classification in a federal district court. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of ATF. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that ATF’s decision was supported by the evidence and that its classification of the part was not arbitrary or capricious. View "Sig Sauer, Inc. v. Brandon" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of El Salvador with multiple convictions, was placed in removal proceedings. An Immigration Judge (IJ) rejected Petitioner’s application for Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) special rule cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. A Massachusetts district court later vacated Petitioner’s convictions, and the charges were subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. Thereafter, the BIA vacated its prior decision and remanded the case to the IJ for reconsideration. The IJ acknowledged that Petitioner was eligible for relief from removal under NACARA but exercised its discretion by declining to grant relief. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner did not deserve a favorable exercise of discretion. View "Lima v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board (Board) issued an order ruling that a Massachusetts car dealership was liable for unfair labor practices. The dealership petitioned for review, arguing that the Board’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence and that the Board applied its precedents arbitrarily and capriciously. The Board, in turn, petitioned for enforcement of its order. The Supreme Court denied the dealership’s petition for review and granted the Board’s petition for enforcement, holding that the Board’s rulings were supported by substantial evidence and by reasoning that was not arbitrary and capricious. View "Boch Imports Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

In 2013, Plaintiff, a participant in the Section 8 Federal Housing Choice Voucher Program, listed among her assets a trust that had been established in 2010 to hold Plaintiff's proceeds from a series of tort settlements. The Brookline Housing Authority (BHA) subsequently determined that Plaintiff was “over-income” for continued participation in the Program, as locally administered by the BHA. Plaintiff appealed, requesting that the BHA exclude at least some of these trust disbursements from its income calculation in reasonable accommodation of her disability. The BHA reaffirmed its determination. Thereafter, Plaintiff sued, alleging that the BHA had violated state and federal law by incorrectly calculating her income under the relevant federal regulations and by engaging in disability-based discrimination. The district court ruled in favor of BHA. The First Circuit (1) reversed the district court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim brought under the Housing Act, holding that the BHA misconstrued federal regulations in calculating Plaintiff’s income; (2) vacated the district court’s ruling on Plaintiff’s state and federal discrimination claims and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims as moot; and (3) affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s remaining claims. Remanded. View "DeCambre v. Brookline Housing Auth." on Justia Law