Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) filed this commodity trading fraud action against John B. Wilson and JBW Capital LLC, alleging that Defendants were liable under the Commodity Exchange Act for failing to register with the CFTC and for violating two commodity fraud provisions. The CFTC moved for summary judgment requesting a permanent injunction, restitution, and civil monetary penalties. The district court granted the CFTC’s request for a finding of liability and imposed injunctive relief and civil penalties but declined to award restitution. Both sides appealed. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and the relief it ordered, holding that the district court did not err in (1) finding that Wilson was liable for failure to register as a commodity pool operator; (2) granting summary judgment on the commodity fraud provisions; and (3) concluding that restitution was unavailable. View "Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, was issued a notice to appear. Petitioner conceded removability and sought withholding of removal based on race, nationality, and membership in a particular social group. As to his claim regarding membership in a particular social group, Petitioner wrote that he would be harassed by gang members to join them if he returned to Honduras. An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal and Petitioner’s subsequent motion to reconsider. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that because the new arguments raised in Petitioner’s motion to reconsider were previously available but not previously asserted, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to reconsider. View "Hurtado v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The government initiated deportation proceedings against Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident who was convicted of a removable offense. Petitioner filed an N-600 application for citizenship with U.S. Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS) claiming that he derived citizenship from his father’s naturalization and therefore could not be deported. USCIS denied the application. An immigration judge upheld the decision and ordered Petitioner removed to Jamaica. Petitioner appealed, arguing that his parents were common law spouses in Jamaica and legally separated within the meaning of former section 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act when they ceased cohabitating, and therefore, Petitioner, as a child, had derived citizenship from the naturalization of his father. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the removal order, determining that Petitioner had not proven that Jamaica recognized common-law marriage at the time of his birth and that the cessation of cohabitation did not qualify as a legal separation. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that Petitioner’s claim of citizenship under former section 321(a)(3) failed because he could not prove his parents were in a legally recognized relationship from which they could legally separate. View "Thompson v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Under Part A of the Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) disburses funding to combat HIV/AIDS infection in metropolitan areas that are home to more than a specified number of individuals who have AIDS. When HHS determined that the Ponce metropolitan area no longer had enough AIDS cases to qualify for continued Part A funding, Ponce and several community health groups brought this lawsuit claiming that HHS had unfairly drawn the boundaries of Ponce’s metropolitan area too narrowly. The district court concluded that HHS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in defining the “metropolitan area” of Ponce and that HHS’s methodology for defining metropolitan areas in Puerto Rico was unfair and discriminatory. The First Circuit reversed, holding that Congress could reasonably be said to have told HHS to use the boundaries that it used in defining the Ponce metropolitan area. Remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Defendants dismissing the complaint with prejudice. View "Municipio Autonomo de Ponce v. U.S. Office of Mgmt." on Justia Law

In 1991, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) placed Petitioner in deportation proceedings. In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) took action in Petitioner’s case. By that time, Congress had replaced deportation with removal, and DHS mistakenly regarded Petitioner as being in removal proceedings. The Immigration Judge (IJ) concluded that Petitioner’s conviction for aggravated identity theft was a “particularly serious crime” rendering her ineligible for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 2131(b). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s determination and ordered Petitioner deported. Without reaching the merits of Petitioner’s petition for review, the First Circuit remanded Petitioner’s case to the BIA to interpret and apply the correct law, former 8 U.S.C. 1253(h), holding that while the BIA acknowledged that Petitioner was in deportation proceedings governed by section 1253, the BIA incorrectly stated that the law governing the two proceedings was the same and improperly omitted any reference to section 1253(h)(3) in its review of Petitioner’s application. View "Valerio-Ramirez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 1999, Petitioner, a citizen of Jamaica, was convicted of third-degree assault under a Connecticut statute. The Department of Homeland Security later placed Petitioner in removal proceedings. Permanent resident non-citizens such as Petitioner are removable if they are convicted of an “aggravated felony,” which includes any offense defined as a “crime of violence.” An immigration judge (IJ) found Petitioner removable as charged, concluding that third-degree assault under Connecticut law qualified as a “crime of violence.” Reviewing the IJ’s legal conclusions de novo, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordered Petitioner’s removal, reasoning that the Connecticut offense was categorically a crime of violence and thus was necessarily an “aggravated felony.” The First Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review and vacated the removal order, holding (1) third-degree assault as defined by Connecticut law does not require proof of all of the required elements of a “crime of violence”; and (2) therefore, Petitioner’s conviction for third-degree assault, standing by itself, does not constitute proof that he has been convicted of an aggravated felony requiring his removal. Remanded. View "Whyte v. Lynch" on Justia Law

James Hopkins and John Flannery, two former employees of State Street Bank and Trust Company, were charged with violations of 15 U.S.C. 77q(a), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), and 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 for engaging making material misrepresentations and omissions that misled investors about two State Street-managed funds. The United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the proceeding, finding that neither defendant was responsible for or had ultimate authority over the documents at issue and that these documents did not contain materially false or misleading statements or omissions. The SEC reversed the ALJ with regard to a slide that Hopkins used at a presentation to a group of investors and two letters that Flannery wrote or had seen before they were sent to a investors. The Commission imposed cease-and-desist orders on both defendants, suspended them from association with any investment adviser or company for one year, and imposed civil monetary penalties. The First Circuit vacated the Commission’s order, holding that the Commission’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. View "Flannery v. Securities & Exchange Comm’n" on Justia Law

Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents were acting on an alleged tip that undocumented aliens were employed at the Michael Bianco, Inc. factory in New Bedford, Massachusetts when they raided the factory. Petitioner was detained during the raid and was subsequently arrested and detained. During Petitioner’s detention, an ICE agent interviewed Petitioner. The substance of that interview was memorialized in an I-213 form. Petitioner was later served with a Notice to Appear in removal proceedings. Petitioner denied removability and moved to suppress the I-213, arguing that the statements contained therein were obtained in violation of her Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. On remand, an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the motion, concluding the government’s introduction of Petitioner’s birth certificate independently established Petitioner’s identity and alienage whether she established egregious misconduct by ICE officers that would warrant suppression of her I-213 form. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, primarily on the ground that Petitioner had failed to show egregious violations of her constitutional rights. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that Petitioner’s birth certificate was not tainted by any alleged constitutional violations and was sufficient to prove her alienage. View "Garcia-Aguilar v. Lynch" on Justia Law

For more than a decade, the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA) has paid directly to qualified attorneys who bring Supplemental Security Income (SSI) claims a fee of no more than twenty-five percent of the successful recovery of past-due benefits to clients. When a state chooses to administer its own payments, the amount of state payments are not included as “past-due benefits” for the purpose of attorney compensation. In 2012, Attorney represented a client in a claim for SSI benefits before the SSA. In 2013, Attorney’s client received a partially favorable decision. In 2012, however, Massachusetts changed its practice and began administering its own program of supplementary payments rather than rely on federal administration of its supplementary payments. Upon learning that the SSA attorney’s fee award did not include twenty-five percent of the Massachusetts state-administered state supplementary payments, Attorney filed a complaint for declaratory relief and petition for writ of mandamus in the federal district court. The district court granted summary judgment to the Commissioner. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the Commissioner’s interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 1383(d)(2)(B) was reasonable. View "Moriarty v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States without inspection. Two years later, federal authorities instituted removal proceedings against him. Petitioner conceded removability and cross-applied for withholding of removal and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). An immigration judge denied Petitioner’s cross-applications and ordered him removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Petitioner’s appeal. More than one year later, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, concluding that the motion was untimely and, in any event, Petitioner failed to make a sufficient showing to warrant reopening the removal proceedings. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely. View "Mejia-Ramaja v. Lynch" on Justia Law