Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Sie Giok Giang, a passenger on a Sky Express interstate, was killed when the driver fell asleep at the wheel and ran the bus off the side of a highway. About seven weeks before the crash, Sky Express had been given an “unsatisfactory” safety rating by the FMCSA. At issue is whether the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671-2680, bars an FTCA claim against the FMCSA for allowing Sky Express to continue to operate during a 10 day extension. The district court concluded that, pursuant to that exception, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The court concluded that, considering that any waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed, the FMCSA’s decision to promulgate a regulation permitting 10-day extensions for passenger carriers was a permissible exercise of judgment subject to the FTCA’s discretionary function exception and thus did not waive sovereign immunity. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Pornomo v. United States" on Justia Law

Relators filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., against Purdue, alleging that the company was involved in a fraudulent scheme regarding the equianalgesic ratio of OxyContin. The court declined realtors' invitation to read United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., so as to render it internally inconsistent and at odds with the public disclosure bar’s purpose. Indeed, by foreshadowing the court’s conclusion in this case, Siller itself eschews the interpretation relators urge. Here, relators’ claims are based on facts their counsel learned in the course of making the prior public disclosure of Purdue’s allegedly fraudulent scheme. The court held, consistent with its reasoning in Siller and the public disclosure bar’s purpose, that the district court correctly dismissed the relators’ suit. View "United States ex rel. May v. Purdue Pharma L.P." on Justia Law

Knox Creek challenged the Commission's determination that four uncontested violations of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 814(d)(1), by Knox Creek were “significant and substantial.” In regard to the permissibility violations, the court concluded that the Commission should have applied the legal standard advocated by the Secretary, but that the outcome is unaffected when the proper standard is applied. In regard to the accumulations violation, the court concluded that the Commission applied the correct legal standard, one also endorsed by the Secretary. Further, the Commission did not improperly reweigh evidence in this case. On the contrary, the Commission’s decision with respect to both the permissibility and accumulations violations did not question even one of the ALJ’s factual findings. Accordingly, the court denied Knox Creek's petition for review. View "Knox Creek Coal Corp. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

The County petitions for review of an FCC order, which issued rules implementing Section 6409(a) of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, 47 U.S.C. 1455(a), also known as the Spectrum Act. The County contends that the procedures established in the Order conscript the states in violation of the Tenth Amendment, and that the Order unreasonably defines several terms of the Spectrum Act. The court concluded that the FCC’s “deemed granted” procedure comports with the Tenth Amendment where the Order does not require the states to take any action whatsoever. The court also concluded that the FCC has reasonably interpreted the ambiguous terms of Section 6409(a): "substantially change" and "base station." Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Montgomery County v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the denial of his application for Social Security disability benefits, contending that the ALJ failed to resolve a conflict between the vocational expert's testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. The court held that an ALJ has not fully developed the record if it contains an unresolved conflict between the expert’s testimony and the Dictionary; nor has the ALJ fulfilled this duty if he ignores an apparent conflict because the expert testified that no conflict existed. In this case, the ALJ did not fulfill his duty to make an independent identification of apparent conflicts. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pearson v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek review of the Board's 2014 decision affirming an award of black lung benefits to Arvis R. Toler. Petitioner contends that, by applying the fifteen-year rebuttable presumption to Toler’s second claim for benefits, the ALJ contravened the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901-945, and its regulations, as well as principles of finality and separation of powers. The court concluded that, the text of the statute and regulations, as well as the preamble to the 2000 Final Rule, demonstrate that the fifteen-year presumption applies to subsequent claims and may be used to establish a change in an applicable condition of entitlement. Therefore, the court rejected petitioner's contention that the ALJ contravened either the Act or the applicable regulations by applying the fifteen-year presumption to Toler’s second claim. The court also rejected petitioner's remaining constitutional contention that utilization of the fifteen-year presumption to decide Toler’s second claim contravened constitutional principles of separation of powers. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. DOWCP" on Justia Law

Relator filed suit against PHEAA and other private and state-created student-loan entities under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-33, alleging that defendants fraudulently claimed hundreds of millions of dollars in federal student-loan interest-subsidy payments to which they were not entitled. At issue on appeal is whether PHEAA qualifies as an “arm of the state” or “alter ego” of Pennsylvania such that it cannot be sued under the FCA. The court concluded that PHEAA is an independent political subdivision, not an arm of Pennsylvania, and therefore PHEAA is a "person" subject to liability under the FCA. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of PHEAA and remanded for further proceedings on the merits of relator’s FCA claims against PHEAA. View "US ex rel. Oberg v. PHEAA" on Justia Law