Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A medical institute and its co-director sought to provide patients with psilocybin, a schedule I controlled substance, for therapeutic use. They requested the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to exempt the co-director from registration under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) or to waive the registration requirement. The DEA declined both requests, leading the petitioners to seek judicial review.Previously, the petitioners had asked the DEA for guidance on accommodating the Right to Try Act (RTT Act) for psilocybin use. The DEA responded that the RTT Act did not waive CSA requirements, and the petitioners' initial judicial review was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The petitioners then made a concrete request to the DEA for exemption or waiver, which the DEA again denied, prompting the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction under 21 U.S.C. § 877 to review the DEA's final decision. The court found that the DEA's denial was not arbitrary and capricious. The DEA provided a reasonable explanation, stating that the RTT Act did not exempt the CSA's requirements and that the proposed use of psilocybin was inconsistent with public health and safety. The DEA also noted that the petitioners did not provide sufficient details for the proposed regulation. The court denied the petition for review, affirming the DEA's decision. View "ADVANCED INTEGRATIVE MEDICAL SCIENCE INSTITUTE, PLLC V. UNITED STATES DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization, Prutehi Litekyan: Save Ritidian, challenged the U.S. Air Force's decision to engage in hazardous waste disposal at Tarague Beach, Guam, without conducting a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review. The Air Force planned to dispose of unexploded ordnance through Open Burning/Open Detonation (OB/OD) operations. The nonprofit argued that the Air Force failed to take a "hard look" at the environmental impacts and did not engage the public as required by NEPA.The District Court of Guam dismissed the case, holding that Prutehi Litekyan lacked standing because its injury was not fairly traceable to the Air Force's actions. The court also found that there was no final agency action, making the case unripe for judicial review. Additionally, the court ruled that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permitting process made NEPA review redundant, thus Prutehi Litekyan failed to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that Prutehi Litekyan had standing because the Air Force's failure to conduct NEPA review could have influenced its decision on waste disposal methods, making the injury fairly traceable to the Air Force's actions. The court also determined that the Air Force's decision to apply for a RCRA permit and its detailed plans for OB/OD operations constituted final agency action, making the case ripe for judicial review.Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that NEPA applied to the Air Force's decision to conduct OB/OD operations at Tarague Beach. The court found that RCRA's permitting process did not displace NEPA's requirements, as the two statutes serve different purposes and are not redundant. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "LITEKYAN V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE" on Justia Law

Vietnamese refugees and residents of San Diego County, Anh Thai and Don Doan, alleged that two law enforcement officers, Dulce Sanchez and William Villasenor, violated their constitutional rights by forcibly entering their homes and interrogating them about their disability benefits. Sanchez and Villasenor were Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office investigators assigned full-time to a joint federal-state task force, the Cooperative Disability Investigations (CDI) Unit, which investigates fraud in Social Security disability benefits applications. The plaintiffs claimed that the officers displayed guns and state badges, did not seek consent for the search, and failed to have an interpreter present during the investigations.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Sanchez and Villasenor, concluding that the officers were acting under color of federal law, not state law, and therefore could not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court found that the CDI Unit was implemented under federal authority, and the officers’ day-to-day work was supervised by a federal officer, Special Agent Glenn Roberts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that because the CDI Unit was created under federal authority and supervised by a federal officer, Sanchez and Villasenor were acting under color of federal law. The court noted that the officers’ paychecks were reimbursed by the Social Security Administration, and their investigations took place outside of Los Angeles County, further indicating their federal role. Consequently, the officers were not subject to suit under § 1983, which applies to actions under color of state law. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Thai v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed two successive applications for disability benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Her first application, alleging disability beginning June 24, 2017, was denied by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on September 18, 2018. While appealing this denial to the district court, she filed a second application for benefits for a later period. Washington State Disability Determination Services (DDS) reviewed the second application and awarded benefits, determining she was disabled starting September 19, 2018, the day after the ALJ denied her first application.The district court partially ruled in her favor on the first application and remanded it for further proceedings. The Appeals Council remanded the case to the ALJ with instructions. On June 23, 2021, the ALJ reopened the second application and denied the benefits previously granted by DDS. The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was disabled beginning July 14, 2020, on her first application. The district court held it lacked jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s reopening and denial of benefits on the second application.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s reopening of the second application. The Appeals Council did not reopen the second application, and the ALJ’s reopening occurred more than two years after the award, which is only permissible in cases of fraud or similar fault. Finding no evidence of fraud or similar fault, the Ninth Circuit held that the ALJ erred in reopening and reversing the award of benefits on the second application. The court remanded for the district court to direct the agency to award benefits according to DDS’s decision. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on the first application, concluding that the ALJ’s finding that the plaintiff was not disabled between June 24, 2017, and September 19, 2018, was supported by substantial evidence. View "NEVIN V. COLVIN" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the International Union of Operating Engineers, Stationary Engineers, Local 39 (the Union), Macy’s Inc., and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). During negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, Union members rejected Macy’s final offer and went on strike. After three months, the Union ended the strike and offered to return to work unconditionally. Macy’s responded by locking out the Union members, which led the Union to file a charge with the NLRB, alleging that the lockout was an unfair labor practice.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of the Union, finding that Macy’s violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by locking out employees without providing a clear and complete offer outlining the conditions necessary to avoid the lockout. The NLRB adopted the ALJ’s findings and ordered Macy’s to reinstate the employees and compensate them for any losses incurred due to the lockout. Macy’s and the Union both petitioned for review of the NLRB’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction because the Union was a “person aggrieved” by the NLRB’s decision. The court found that substantial evidence supported the NLRB’s conclusion that Macy’s lockout was unlawful because the Union was not clearly and fully informed of the conditions necessary for reinstatement. The court also upheld the NLRB’s remedial order, including the make-whole relief for direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms, finding no clear abuse of discretion.The Ninth Circuit denied both the Union’s and Macy’s petitions for review and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement of its final order. The court concluded that the NLRB’s actions were within its broad discretion to effectuate the policies of the NLRA. View "MACY'S INC. V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD" on Justia Law

Several environmental protection organizations challenged the policies governing oil and gas lease sales conducted by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) on protected sage-grouse habitat. In 2015, BLM amended its land use management plans to prioritize oil and gas leasing outside of sage-grouse habitat. In 2018, BLM revised its guidance documents, limiting the prioritization requirement to situations with a backlog of expressions of interest and shortening public comment periods.The District Court for the District of Montana found that the 2018 Instruction Memorandum (IM) violated the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) and vacated the June 2018 Wyoming lease sale. The District Court for the District of Idaho found that the lease sales violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and FLPMA due to inadequate public participation and vacated the lease sales.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the cases. It held that the Montana district court's vacatur of the 2018 IM was not injunctive and thus not appealable, but the vacatur of the lease sales was injunctive and appealable. The court affirmed that the 2018 IM was inconsistent with the 2015 Plan and that the June 2018 Wyoming lease sale violated FLPMA. The court also affirmed that the Idaho lease sales violated NEPA and FLPMA due to insufficient public participation.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Montana district court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the lease sales. However, it found that the Idaho district court abused its discretion in vacating the lease sales and remanded the case, directing the BLM to reconsider the leasing decisions with proper public participation while enjoining surface-disturbing activities in the interim. The court also held that neither district court violated the due process rights of intervenors by vacating the leases. View "MONTANA WILDLIFE FEDERATION V. HAALAND" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the EPA's conditional registration of the pesticide NSPW-L30SS, an antimicrobial materials preservative that uses nanosilver as its active ingredient. The Ninth Circuit held that the EPA failed to support the public-interest finding with substantial evidence under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. 136a(c)(7)(C). The panel explained that the EPA's finding that current users of conventional-silver pesticides will switch to NSPW and/or that NSPW will not be incorporated into new products relied on unsubstantiated assumptions. Accordingly, the panel vacated the EPA's conditional registration of NSPW. View "NRDC V. USEPA" on Justia Law

On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order denying enforcement of an administrative subpoena issued by the EEOC to McLane that was issued as part of an investigation of a sex discrimination claim filed by a former employee. The subpoena requested "pedigree information" for employees or prospective employees who took a physical capability strength test. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by denying enforcement of the subpoena because the pedigree information was relevant to the investigation. Therefore, the panel vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, McLane is free to renew its argument that the EEOC's request for pedigree information is unduly burdensome, and the district court should also resolve whether producing a second category of evidence—the reasons test takers were terminated—would be unduly burdensome to McLane. View "EEOC V. McLane Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the 2008 Tongass Forest Plan unlawfully damages the habitat of the indigenous Alexander Archipelago wolf, and that the Forest Service violated the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) by approving either the Big Thorne project or the 2008 Tongass Forest Plan (Forest Plan) under which Big Thorne was authorized. The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs' declarations were sufficient to show that actions approved under the Forest Plan would cause particularized injury to them; the panel was not aware of any authority compelling the agency to set a specific standard or benchmark for protecting the viability of a species that was neither endangered nor threatened; the Forest Service met its legal obligations when it implemented the Forest plan and its discussion of viability was not arbitrary nor capricious; and the Big Thorne Project was consistent with that plan. View "In re Big Thorne Project" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the BLM's approval of a right-of-way on federal lands in Nevada for the construction of an industrial solar project known as Silver State South. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants and its conclusion that the Biological Opinion (BiOp) analyzing the effect of Silver State South on the desert tortoise fully complied with the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706. The panel held that the BiOp's "no jeopardy" determination was neither arbitrary nor capricious; the BiOp's determination that Silver State South was "not likely to adversely affect the critical habitat of the desert tortoise," which permitted the FWS to forego an adverse modification analysis, was neither arbitrary nor capricious; the BiOp's failure to address the FWS comments to the SEIS was not arbitrary or capricious; the BiOp's consideration of Silver State South's edge effects was not arbitrary or capricious; the BiOp does not rely on an impermissibly vague "new information" reinitiation trigger; and thus the BLM permissibly relied upon the BiOp in approving of the right-of-way for Silver State South. View "Defenders of Wildlife v. Zinke" on Justia Law