Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A corporation owned by a federally recognized Indian tribe, along with several tribal officials, was alleged by the State of California to have violated state cigarette tax laws and regulations. The corporation manufactured and distributed cigarettes in California, including to non-tribal consumers, without collecting or remitting required state excise taxes or payments under the Master Settlement Agreement. California claimed that the corporation and its officials distributed contraband cigarettes not listed on the state’s approved directory and failed to comply with shipping, recordkeeping, and tax collection requirements under the federal Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act (PACT Act). Despite warnings and being placed on a federal non-compliance list, the corporation continued its operations.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California considered the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court found that the corporation, as an arm of the tribe, was shielded by tribal sovereign immunity and dismissed claims against it. However, the court allowed claims for injunctive relief against the individual tribal officials in their official capacities to proceed, holding that the Ex parte Young doctrine permitted such relief under the PACT Act. The court also denied the officials’ claims of qualified immunity for personal capacity claims, reasoning that qualified immunity did not apply to enforcement actions brought by a state under a federal statute.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Ninth Circuit held that the PACT Act does not preclude Ex parte Young actions for prospective injunctive relief against tribal officials, as the Act does not limit who may be sued or the types of relief available, nor does it contain a sufficiently detailed remedial scheme to displace Ex parte Young. The court also held that qualified immunity does not shield tribal officials from California’s claims for civil penalties and money damages under the PACT Act. View "STATE OF CALIFORNIA V. DEL ROSA" on Justia Law

An armed fugitive fleeing law enforcement entered a print shop owned by the plaintiff, forcibly removed him, and barricaded himself inside. After a thirteen-hour standoff, Los Angeles Police Department SWAT officers used dozens of tear gas canisters to subdue the fugitive, causing significant damage to the shop and its contents. The parties agreed that the officers’ actions were authorized, reasonable, and lawful. The plaintiff alleged that the damages, which exceeded $60,000, were caused exclusively by the police.The plaintiff initially sought compensation from the United States Marshals Service, which denied the claim and referred him to the City of Los Angeles. After the City did not respond to his claims or his attorney’s letter, the plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. The City moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the Takings Clause does not require compensation for property destroyed by police acting reasonably in an emergency. The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the City’s initial motion but later granted summary judgment for the City, finding that the destruction was a valid exercise of police power and not a compensable taking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the government’s destruction of private property, when necessary and reasonable for public safety, is exempt from the Takings Clause. The court relied on historical understanding and longstanding precedent, concluding that such actions fall outside the scope of the Takings Clause. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment. View "PENA V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

An Oregon nonprofit organization, whose board members are guided by sincerely held religious beliefs, challenged a state law requiring most employers to provide insurance coverage for abortion and contraceptive services. The organization’s governing documents and public statements reflect a commitment to traditional Judeo-Christian ethics, including opposition to abortion based on religious grounds. Although the law contains exemptions for certain religious employers, the organization does not qualify for any of these exceptions, a point not disputed by the state. The organization sought relief, arguing that being compelled to provide such coverage violates its rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon denied the organization’s request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed its complaint. The district court found there was doubt as to whether the organization’s opposition to abortion was genuinely religious in nature. It further concluded that the law was neutral and generally applicable, subject only to rational basis review, which it satisfied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and vacated the denial of a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that the organization’s beliefs are religious and sincerely held, and that the district court erred by not accepting these allegations as true at the motion to dismiss stage. The appellate court remanded the case for the district court to reconsider, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission, whether the selective denial of a religious exemption to the organization violates the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit expressed no opinion on the ultimate constitutional question, leaving it for the district court to address in the first instance. View "OREGON RIGHT TO LIFE V. STOLFI" on Justia Law

A group of grocery retailers and public interest organizations challenged federal regulations that established a national uniform disclosure standard for foods containing genetically modified ingredients. Congress had directed the Secretary of Agriculture to create this standard, which was delegated to the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS). The AMS’s regulations, effective January 1, 2022, required certain foods to disclose if they were “bioengineered” or contained “bioengineered” ingredients, but generally excluded highly refined foods where genetically modified material was undetectable. Plaintiffs argued that this exclusion, the mandated use of the term “bioengineered” instead of more familiar terms like “GMO,” and the allowance of QR code and text-message disclosure options were unlawful or arbitrary under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs only on their challenge to the QR code and text-message disclosure options, remanding those provisions to the AMS without vacating them. The court denied summary judgment on all other claims, which the Ninth Circuit construed as a final judgment granting summary judgment to the AMS and intervenor-defendants on the remaining claims. Plaintiffs appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had standing and that the AMS committed legal error by generally excluding highly refined foods from the definition of “bioengineered foods.” The court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on this issue, remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment to the plaintiffs, and directed the district court to determine whether any regulatory provisions should be vacated. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of the claim that the use of “bioengineered” was arbitrary and capricious, finding the agency’s choice reasonable. The court also held that the district court abused its discretion by not vacating the two disclosure-format regulations and directed prospective vacatur after further input from the parties. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "NATURAL GROCERS V. ROLLINS" on Justia Law

North Mountain Foothills Apartments (NMFA), a company managing a large apartment complex in Phoenix, Arizona, hired Jasper Press as a maintenance technician during a period of increased workload due to a heatwave. Press discussed his compensation and the poor conditions at the complex with several coworkers. Management became aware that other employees knew about Press’s pay and housing benefits, leading to a meeting where Press was reprimanded for these discussions and told not to talk about pest issues with residents. The day after this meeting, Press was terminated, allegedly for failing to complete work orders. Press filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging unfair labor practices.An administrative law judge held an evidentiary hearing and found that NMFA violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act by interrogating Press about his wage discussions, issuing overly broad directives restricting such discussions, threatening reprisals, and discharging Press for engaging in protected activities. The NLRB adopted these findings and ordered remedies including reinstatement and back pay for Press. NMFA appealed, raising for the first time constitutional challenges to the NLRB’s structure and process, and also contested the Board’s factual findings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to consider NMFA’s unexhausted constitutional claims because such structural challenges are not suited to agency resolution. The court rejected NMFA’s Article II removal protection challenge for lack of demonstrated harm, found no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in NLRB proceedings, and held that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions within the NLRB does not violate due process. On the merits, the court found substantial evidence supported the NLRB’s finding that Press was discharged for protected activity and granted enforcement of the NLRB’s order. View "NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. NORTH MOUNTAIN FOOTHILLS APARTMENTS, LLC" on Justia Law

After the Washington Medical Commission adopted a policy to discipline physicians for spreading COVID-19 “misinformation,” several plaintiffs—including physicians who had been charged with unprofessional conduct, physicians who had not been charged, and advocacy organizations—filed suit. The Commission’s actions included investigating and charging doctors for public statements and writings about COVID-19 treatments and vaccines. Some plaintiffs, such as Dr. Eggleston and Dr. Siler, were actively facing disciplinary proceedings, while others, like Dr. Moynihan, had not been charged but claimed their speech was chilled. Additional plaintiffs included a non-profit organization and a public figure who alleged their right to receive information was affected.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington dismissed the plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. The court found that the claims were constitutionally and prudentially unripe, and that the doctrine of Younger abstention required federal courts to refrain from interfering with ongoing state disciplinary proceedings. The district court also addressed the merits, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible First Amendment or due process claim, but the primary basis for dismissal was abstention and ripeness.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Younger abstention barred claims challenging ongoing state disciplinary proceedings (including as-applied and facial constitutional challenges, and due process claims) for all plaintiffs subject to such proceedings. The court also held that Younger abstention did not apply to claims for prospective relief by plaintiffs not currently subject to proceedings, but those claims were constitutionally and prudentially unripe because no concrete injury had occurred and further factual development was needed. The Ninth Circuit thus affirmed the dismissal of all claims. View "STOCKTON V. BROWN" on Justia Law

A civilian employee of the Defense Logistics Agency in Hawaii, who had served in the National Guard and developed post-traumatic stress disorder, alleged that his employer discriminated against him on the basis of disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. After a series of workplace incidents, the agency suspended him indefinitely, citing concerns about his access to sensitive information. The employee claimed that the agency failed to provide reasonable accommodations and improperly deemed him a direct threat.The employee filed an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint, which eventually led to a final agency decision (FAD) against him. The agency transmitted the FAD and related documents electronically using a secure system, but made several errors in providing the necessary passphrase to decrypt the document. As a result, the employee’s attorney was unable to access the FAD for several weeks, despite repeated requests for assistance and clarification. The attorney finally received an accessible, decrypted copy of the FAD by email on December 5, 2022. The employee filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii 88 days later. The district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary of Defense, finding the complaint untimely because it was not filed within 90 days of the initial electronic transmission, and denied equitable tolling.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court held that the 90-day limitations period for filing suit under the Rehabilitation Act did not begin until the attorney received effective notice of the agency’s decision, which occurred when he received the decrypted FAD on December 5. Alternatively, the court held that equitable tolling was warranted because the attorney diligently sought access to the FAD and was prevented by extraordinary circumstances. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the merits. View "ASUNCION V. HEGSETH" on Justia Law

Hundreds of thousands of Venezuelan nationals living in the United States received Temporary Protected Status (TPS), which allowed them to work and protected them from deportation due to ongoing humanitarian crises in Venezuela. In January 2025, the Secretary of Homeland Security extended TPS for Venezuelans through October 2026, consolidating two prior designations to streamline the process. Shortly after, a new Secretary, following a change in administration, attempted to vacate this extension and terminate TPS for one group of Venezuelan nationals, citing confusion and alleged improvements in Venezuela’s conditions. This abrupt reversal threatened TPS holders with imminent loss of status, employment, and the risk of deportation.The National TPS Alliance and several individual TPS holders filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking to restore the extension. The district court granted preliminary relief, postponing the effective dates of the vacatur and termination notices nationwide under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, would suffer irreparable harm without relief, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored postponement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the preliminary relief and that neither the TPS statute nor 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) barred judicial review of the Secretary’s authority. The court concluded that the Secretary lacked statutory authority to vacate a prior extension of TPS, as the statute provides specific procedures for designation, extension, and termination, but not for vacatur. The court also found that nationwide relief was necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs. The district court’s order postponing the vacatur and termination of Venezuelan TPS was affirmed. View "National TPS Alliance v. Noem" on Justia Law

A university revoked a student’s bachelor’s degree in social work after being informed by a state agency that, during her internship, she accessed confidential information in a state database without authorization. The university retroactively changed her grade for the internship course to failing, notified her that her degree and diploma were invalid, and initiated disciplinary proceedings. The student, who had already graduated and obtained a social work license, challenged the university’s actions, arguing that her procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho dismissed the student’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that she did not have a protected property interest in her degree, grade, or the disciplinary process, and that, even if such an interest existed, the university provided adequate process. The court also concluded that she failed to plausibly allege that she was unable to pursue a career in social work, and held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because any rights at issue were not clearly established.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the student’s university degree is a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and that the university failed to provide adequate process before revoking it. Specifically, the court found that the student plausibly alleged she was denied sufficient time to present her defense and was not allowed to cross-examine university-affiliated witnesses at her conduct hearing. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the procedural due process claim on these grounds and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the dismissal of the substantive due process claim and the grant of qualified immunity to the defendants for monetary relief. The appeal of the denial of a preliminary injunction was dismissed as moot. View "DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY" on Justia Law

Two individuals alleged that the Arizona Department of Revenue, through its Unclaimed Property Act (UPA), unlawfully took possession of checks owed to them by various businesses. Under the UPA, property presumed abandoned is transferred from the holder to the state, which then lists it on a public website but does not provide direct notice to the apparent owners. The plaintiffs claimed that this process constituted an unlawful taking without just compensation and a deprivation of property without due process, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the case. It found that the defendants were protected by sovereign immunity and that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief, both for retrospective and prospective relief. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing because they alleged a concrete injury: the state’s possession of their property without consent. The court also determined that sovereign immunity did not bar the claims, as the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and alleged unconstitutional conduct. On the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that the takings claim failed as a matter of law because property held in trust by the state is not considered “taken.” However, the court found that the plaintiffs stated a viable due process claim, as they plausibly alleged a property interest and that Arizona’s notice procedures were constitutionally inadequate under circuit precedent. The court affirmed the dismissal of the takings claim, reversed the dismissal of the due process claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "GARZA V. WOODS" on Justia Law