Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this appeal, the parties contest the proper interpretation of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA), 5 U.S.C. 3345 et seq., as it relates to the appointment of the former Acting General Counsel of the NLRB. KTSS challenges the authority of Lafe E. Solomon, the former Acting General Counsel of the NLRB, to authorize a petition for injunctive relief against KTSS after the President nominated him to the permanent position. As a preliminary matter, the court rejected KTSS’s argument that because Solomon’s appointment did not comply with section 3(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 153(d), the appointment was necessarily invalid. The court concluded that, to be valid, a petition under section 10(j) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 160(j), must be authorized by the Board through one of two avenues: the first is for a quorum of three Board members to directly authorize the specific 10(j) petition, and the second is for the General Counsel to authorize the petition pursuant to a previous delegation of the Board’s 10(j) authority to the General Counsel. The Board concedes that the first avenue was not satisfied in this case. The court held that the second avenue was not satisfied either because Solomon was not properly serving as Acting General Counsel under the FVRA at the time that the petition was filed. In light of this holding, the court need not reach KTSS’s alternative argument that the Board never validly delegated its 10(j) authority to Solomon. Finally, the Board explicitly waived any arguments based on the FVRA’s exemption clause and it does not otherwise contest the remedy sought by KTSS. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petition. View "Hooks v. Kitsap Tenant Support Servs." on Justia Law

Three masked intruders entered plaintiff's home, fatally shooting her husband and daughter, and shooting plaintiff in the arm. Plaintiff and her surviving daughter filed suit alleging that the United States is liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), 2680(a), for damages arising out of the attack because the FBI negligently failed to disclose the information about the impending home invasion to local law enforcement, in contravention of the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations. The district court granted the United States' motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the FBI’s decision whether or not to disclose information regarding potential threats is discretionary; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery; the FBI’s decision whether to disclose information is the type of decision that Congress intended to shield from FTCA liability; and the design-implementation distinction does not apply to permit suit against the government in this case. Therefore, the district court properly concluded that the government satisfied both prongs of the discretionary function exception. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gonzalez v. United States" on Justia Law

Relators filed suit under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729(b)(2)(A), against various lenders and loan servicers, alleging that defendants certified that loans purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were free and clear of certain home owner association liens and charges when they were not. At issue was whether Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are officers, employees, or agents of the federal government for purposes of the Act. The court concluded that the district court properly held that a claim presented to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac is not presented to an “officer, employee or agent” of the United States. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are private companies, albeit companies sponsored or chartered by the federal government. The court's prior decision in Rust v. Johnson, where it held that Fannie Mae was a federal instrumentality for state/city tax purposes, does not change the result, because Rust does not address Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac’s status under the False Claims Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States ex rel. Adams v. Aurora Loan Servs." on Justia Law

The United States filed suit against E. Wayne Hage, who is now deceased, and his son, Wayne N. Hage, alleging that they grazed cattle on federal lands without a permit or other authorization. The court concluded that defendants' unauthorized grazing of cattle on federal lands was unlawful, and their water rights have no effect on the analysis. Further, defendants' counterclaim under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), is barred by the statute of limitations. The court reversed the judgment for defendants on their counterclaims and remanded with instructions that the district court enter judgment for the government; vacated the judgment with respect to the government’s trespass claims and remanded for reconsideration under the correct legal standard; and, on remand, the district court shall determine, among other things, whether the source of law - state law or federal law - has any effect on the calculation of damages. On remand, the court ordered the cased assigned to a different district judge. View "United States v. Estate of E. Wayne Hage" on Justia Law

After the district court found that USCIS engaged in a pattern or practice of violating the Freedom of Information Act’s (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(A), (B), (C), time limits, USCIS challenged the district court’s grant of summary judgment, a permanent injunction, and an attorneys’ fees award in favor of plaintiffs. USCIS also challenged the district court’s jurisdiction to enforce a 1992 Settlement Agreement entered into by an INS attorney. Determining that the court has jurisdiction to review the summary order, the court dismissed USCIS's challenge to the permanent injunction for lack of jurisdiction given its prematurely filed notice of appeal; held that while the district court may assert supplemental jurisdiction over the Settlement Agreement claims, plaintiffs have failed to show an “unequivocally expressed” waiver of sovereign immunity; and clarified the standing requirements to assert a FOIA pattern or practice claim. Therefore, the court vacated the injunction and remanded with instructions to conduct further proceedings on an open record to determine whether the attorney has standing to bring a pattern or practice claim under this standard. The court also found plaintiffs' pattern or practice claim moot and reversed the summary judgment order, remanding for further proceedings. The court vacated and remanded the attorneys' fees award for further consideration. View "Hajro v. USCIS" on Justia Law