Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Kenneth Michael Sikorsky purchased a property in Newburgh, New York, in 2006 but fell behind on his property taxes, leading to foreclosure by the City of Newburgh in 2012. Sikorsky and the City later agreed on a contract for Sikorsky to repurchase the property, but the sale fell through when Sikorsky failed to make the required payments. The City subsequently sold the property for $350,500, significantly more than the $92,786.24 Sikorsky owed in taxes, but did not return the surplus to Sikorsky.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Sikorsky's pro se complaint, which alleged a constitutional taking and violations of New York state laws. Sikorsky, now represented by counsel, appealed the dismissal, arguing that he had stated a valid claim under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and that he had a right to recover under new New York state laws enacted during the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Sikorsky had indeed stated a claim for a constitutional taking against the City of Newburgh and Jeremy Kaufman. The court found that the new New York laws did not provide Sikorsky with a remedy, as they only applied to properties sold on or after May 25, 2023, or to those with active proceedings under N.Y. CPLR § 7803(1) on the effective date of the act. Since Sikorsky's property was sold in June 2021 and he had not initiated an Article 78 proceeding, he lacked a local remedy.The Second Circuit vacated the District Court's dismissal of Sikorsky's constitutional taking claims against the City of Newburgh and Jeremy Kaufman and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Sikorsky v. City of Newburgh" on Justia Law

The case involves the Board of Trustees of a multiemployer pension plan primarily benefitting unionized bakery drivers in New York City, which applied for Special Financial Assistance (SFA) in 2022. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) denied the application, citing the plan's termination in 2016 as a disqualifying factor. The Fund, asserting it was in "critical and declining status," sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the PBGC, agreeing that the plan's termination made it ineligible for SFA. The court also concluded that a terminated plan could not be restored under ERISA, thus affirming the PBGC's denial of the Fund's application.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the SFA statute does not exclude plans based solely on a prior termination. The court found that the statute's reference to "critical and declining status" incorporates the definition from 29 U.S.C. § 1085(b)(6) without importing limitations from other sections. Consequently, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment for the Fund, vacate the PBGC's denial of the SFA application, and remand to the PBGC for reconsideration. View "Bd. of Trs. of the Bakery Drivers Loc. 550 v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves the U.S. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) approving the New York State Department of Health’s (NYSDOH) application to distribute $361.25 million to certain managed care organizations. These organizations were to direct the funds to the top one-third of revenue-generating licensed home care services agencies (LHCSAs) in New York’s four rate regions, provided they agreed to use the funding in a specified manner. The plaintiffs, who are LHCSAs that did not meet the revenue threshold, argued that the approval was unlawful under federal law and regulations because the class of eligible agencies was improperly defined and the application was not assessed for actuarial soundness before approval.The district court dismissed the amended complaint against the State Appellees for failing to adequately allege a cause of action under Ex parte Young and granted summary judgment to the Federal Appellees. The court concluded that the approval of the State’s application did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and denied the plaintiffs’ motion to admit extra-record evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the district court’s decision. The court held that CMS’s approval of NYSDOH’s application complied with federal law. It found that the provider class was properly defined under 42 C.F.R. § 438.6(c)(2)(ii)(B) and that CMS was not required to assess actuarial soundness during the pre-approval process. The court also concluded that CMS did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in approving the application and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the extra-record evidence. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Safe Haven Home Care, Inc. v. United States Department of Health and Human" on Justia Law

Dr. Ahmed Diaa Eldin Ali Hussein, a dual citizen of Egypt and the United States, sought to enforce an Egyptian administrative court ruling and a related ministerial decree in the United States. These rulings purportedly entitled him to compensation for the expropriation of his shares in the SIMO Middle East Paper Company by the Egyptian government in the 1990s. Hussein filed an enforcement action in New York State court against Dr. Mohamed Ahmed Maait, the Egyptian Minister of Finance, in his official capacity.The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York by Maait, albeit after the 30-day deadline for removal. The District Court found that Egypt was the real party in interest and allowed the late removal under Section 1441(d) of the U.S. Code, which permits enlargement of the removal period for cause. The court then dismissed the suit under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Egypt was immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and that no exceptions to this immunity applied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Egypt was the real party in interest, as Hussein's claims were fundamentally against the Egyptian government and sought compensation from the public treasury. The court also upheld the District Court's finding of cause to extend the removal period, noting the lack of prejudice to Hussein and the procedural challenges faced by Maait in securing U.S. counsel. Finally, the appellate court determined that Hussein had waived any argument regarding exceptions to FSIA immunity by not raising them on appeal. Thus, the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed. View "Hussein v. Maait" on Justia Law

John Doe, an individual with a serious mental illness, sued James V. McDonald, M.D., New York’s Commissioner of Health, and other defendants, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Fair Housing Act, and Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. Doe alleged that New York State regulations discriminated against him by preventing his readmission to Oceanview Manor Home for Adults, a Transitional Adult Home (TAH) where he previously resided. After filing the suit, the State allowed Doe to return to Oceanview, amended the regulations to permit readmission of former TAH residents with serious mental illness, and removed Oceanview’s classification as a TAH.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York denied the State’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that Doe lacked standing. The district court granted the State leave to file an interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the State contended that the district court erred in finding standing because Doe lacked a concrete plan to leave and seek readmission to Oceanview.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the State’s jurisdictional challenge should be assessed as a question of mootness, not standing, because it addressed events occurring after Doe filed the suit. The court found that Doe’s suit was moot because the State had allowed Doe to return to Oceanview, amended the regulations, and removed Oceanview’s TAH classification. Consequently, there was no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation would recur.The Second Circuit dismissed the appeal, vacated the district court’s order, and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Doe v. McDonald" on Justia Law

The case involves the surviving relatives of Quinn Lucas Schansman, a passenger on Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17), which was shot down over eastern Ukraine by a missile launched from territory controlled by the Russian Federation-backed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR). The plaintiffs allege that Sberbank of Russia PJSC (Sberbank) provided material support to the DPR by facilitating money transfers from donors to the DPR via correspondent accounts in the United States, which they claim proximately caused the downing of MH17.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Sberbank’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint on foreign sovereign immunity grounds. Sberbank argued that it was immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) after the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation acquired a majority share in Sberbank. The district court found that Sberbank was presumptively immune under the FSIA but that the commercial activity exception applied, as the claims were based on commercial activities carried out in the United States.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that Sberbank is presumptively immune under the FSIA due to its majority ownership by the Russian Ministry of Finance. However, the court also held that the FSIA’s commercial activity exception applies to Sberbank’s conduct, as the alleged claims are based on commercial activities—facilitating money transfers—carried out in the United States. Additionally, the court held that the ATA’s immunity provisions apply to instrumentalities of foreign states and that the FSIA’s commercial activity exception applies equally to actions brought under the ATA. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Schansman v. Sberbank" on Justia Law

The Unkechaug Indian Nation and its Chief, Harry B. Wallace, challenged the enforcement of New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) regulations prohibiting the harvesting of American glass eels. They argued that the Andros Order, a 1676 agreement between the Royal Governor of New York and the Nation, allowed them to fish freely and preempted the DEC’s regulations. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the DEC from enforcing these regulations against the Nation’s members in their customary fishing waters.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the Andros Order is not federal law preempting New York’s fishing regulations. The court also found that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against the DEC but allowed claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Commissioner Basil Seggos in his official capacity under the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The appellate court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against the DEC but allowed claims against Commissioner Seggos under the Ex parte Young exception. The court also found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to resolve Daubert motions or privilege disputes before ruling on the summary judgment motions. Finally, the court held that the Andros Order is not federal law binding on the United States because it was entered before the Confederal period, on behalf of the British Crown, and has not been ratified by the United States. Therefore, the Andros Order does not preempt New York’s fishing regulations, and the judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Unkechaug Indian Nation v. Seggos" on Justia Law

Relators Ralph Billington, Michael Aceves, and Sharon Dorman filed a qui tam action against HCL Technologies Ltd. and HCL America, Inc., alleging that HCL defrauded the United States by securing visas for foreign employees, primarily from India, to avoid paying higher salaries to American citizens. They claimed this scheme violated the False Claims Act (FCA) by underpaying H-1B visa workers, thus reducing tax obligations, and by applying for less expensive visas instead of the required H-1B visas, thereby avoiding higher visa application fees.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dismissed all claims, concluding that relators could not demonstrate that HCL avoided or decreased any established obligation to pay money to the United States. The court found no established obligation for HCL to pay federal payroll taxes on wages it never paid and no obligation to pay higher H-1B visa fees when it applied for B-1 and L-1 visas instead.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the district court. The appellate court held that HCL did not have an obligation under the FCA to pay taxes on wages it never paid, as the duty to pay taxes arises only from wages actually paid. Similarly, the court found no obligation for HCL to pay higher visa application fees for visas it never applied for. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that relators failed to state a plausible claim that HCL decreased or avoided an established obligation to pay money to the United States. View "United States ex rel. Billington v. HCL Techs. Ltd." on Justia Law

The ACLU made requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, seeking information from government agencies regarding drone strikes. In this appeal, the ACLU challenges responses to the FOIA requests made to the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the CIA, and the DOD. The ACLU’s appeal challenges the district court’s ruling to the extent it upheld nondisclosure of 52 documents, and the government’s cross-appeal challenges the ruling to the extent it ordered disclosure, in whole or in part, of seven documents. The court concluded that none of the 52 withheld documents must be disclosed, and that the seven documents ordered disclosed may also be withheld. Accordingly, the court affirmed the appeal, reversed the cross-appeal, and remanded for entry of a revised judgment. View "ACLU v. US DOJ" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, victims of terrorist acts linked to the Islamic Republic of Iran, contend that they are entitled to enforce unsatisfied money judgments against defendants under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602 et seq., and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), 28 U.S.C. 1610 note. The court concluded that defendants in this case do not equate to the “foreign state” of Iran for purposes of the FSIA or the TRIA; defendants cannot be deemed “agencies or instrumentalities” of Iran under the FSIA, but defendants’ status as “agencies or instrumentalities” of Iran under the TRIA and their properties’ status as “blocked assets” under that statute is not foreclosed as a matter of law; but, nonetheless, the court identified questions of fact that prevent either of these TRIA questions from being decided on summary judgment. Accordingly, the court vacated the award of summary judgment for plaintiffs and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Avenue and Related Properties" on Justia Law