Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A female student at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, Isabelle Arana, alleged that she was sexually assaulted by two football players, Quintez Cephus and Danny Davis III. Following an investigation, the university expelled Cephus for sexual assault and harassment. However, after Cephus was acquitted in a state court trial on a related charge, he petitioned for readmission, citing new evidence. The university's Chancellor readmitted Cephus without consulting Arana or reviewing the full trial transcript, allegedly under pressure from influential donors and the football program.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment in favor of the university, dismissing Arana's Title IX claim. The court acknowledged that a jury could find the university acted with deliberate indifference if it readmitted Cephus due to public pressure. However, it concluded that Arana could not show the harassment deprived her of educational opportunities, citing her continued academic success.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that there was a genuine dispute as to whether the harassment Arana experienced was severe and whether the university's response was clearly unreasonable, potentially having a detrimental effect on her education. The court noted that Arana's fear of encountering Cephus led her to avoid certain campus areas, skip classes, and delay her graduation, which could be seen as a deprivation of educational opportunities. The court also highlighted the suspicious timing of Cephus's readmission and the university's failure to involve Arana in the process. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Arana v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin" on Justia Law

Several rail carriers challenged a Final Rule issued by the Surface Transportation Board (STB) that allows a railway shipper or receiver to request a "reciprocal switching agreement." This agreement requires a rail carrier with a monopoly over a certain rail line to compete with another carrier for specific rail traffic. The carriers argued that the Final Rule exceeded the STB's statutory authority under the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, which grants the agency authority to prescribe reciprocal switching. They also contended that aspects of the Final Rule exceeded the Board's ancillary powers and were arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by the record.The STB issued the Final Rule after a notice-and-comment period, aiming to address service performance issues of Class I rail carriers, which were exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Board held a hearing in April 2022 and required several Class I carriers to submit service recovery plans. Subsequently, the Board proposed new regulations to improve service by increasing competition, leading to the Final Rule. The rule establishes procedures for shippers or receivers to request reciprocal switching agreements if the incumbent carrier fails to meet certain performance standards.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Final Rule exceeded the STB's statutory authority because it did not require a finding of inadequate service by the incumbent carrier before prescribing a reciprocal switching agreement. The court emphasized that the Staggers Rail Act requires such a finding to determine that a reciprocal switching agreement is "in the public interest." Consequently, the court granted the petition, vacated the Final Rule, and remanded the case to the STB for further proceedings. View "Grand Trunk Corporation v STB" on Justia Law

Verizon Wireless sought permits from the City of Milwaukee to install small cells and matching utility poles in a downtown plaza next to a major arena. The City denied most of the permits, initially citing aesthetic concerns and proximity to existing poles. Later, it claimed it lacked authority to grant the permits because the plaza was leased to Deer District LLC. Verizon sued the City, arguing the denials violated the Telecommunications Act (TCA) and Wisconsin state law. The district court ruled in favor of Verizon, finding the City's justifications insufficient and ordered the City to issue the permits. Verizon installed the poles, and the City accepted the ruling.The district court found that the City's initial reasons for denial were not supported by substantial evidence and violated the TCA. It also found the City's later rationale, based on the lease with Deer District, untimely and unconvincing. The court held that the City violated Wisconsin state law as well, and ordered the City to issue the permits. The City complied and did not appeal the decision. Deer District, an intervening defendant, appealed, challenging the district court's interpretation of the lease and state law, but not the TCA holding.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Deer District's appeal for lack of Article III standing, as Deer District could not demonstrate that its injury would be redressed by a favorable decision. The court noted that the City did not join the appeal and that the injunction ran exclusively against the City. Therefore, even if the court ruled in Deer District's favor, it would not change the City's obligations under the district court's order. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. View "Cellco Partnership v Deer District LLC" on Justia Law

Derrick Clark and Shawn Mesner worked for Didion Milling, Inc., a corn milling company. In May 2017, Didion’s grain mill exploded, killing five employees. The Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) investigated and referred Didion for criminal prosecution. The government charged Didion and several employees with federal crimes related to their work at the mill. Clark and Mesner proceeded to trial, challenging the district court’s evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, the indictment, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the constitutionality of their convictions.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin convicted Clark on four counts and Mesner on two counts. Clark was found guilty of conspiracy to commit federal offenses, false entries in records, using false documents within the EPA’s jurisdiction, and obstruction of agency proceedings. Mesner was found guilty of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and conspiracy to commit federal offenses. Both defendants were sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment and one year of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated Mesner’s conviction on Count 4, remanding for an entry of judgment of acquittal and further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The court affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings and jury instructions, as well as Clark’s convictions and Mesner’s conviction on Count 1. The court found sufficient evidence to support the convictions and determined that the jury instructions, when considered as a whole, accurately reflected the law. The court also rejected challenges to the constitutionality of the OSHA regulation involved. View "USA v Mesner" on Justia Law

Sotir Libarov, a Bulgarian citizen, applied for lawful permanent resident status in the United States based on his marriage to Elizabeth Alonso Hernandez, a lawful permanent resident. USCIS interviewed both separately and concluded that the marriage was a sham, denying Libarov's application in June 2022. Libarov then submitted a FOIA request to ICE seeking documents related to himself. ICE initially routed the request to USCIS, but Libarov clarified he wanted documents from ICE. By November 2022, having received no response, Libarov filed a lawsuit against both ICE and USCIS.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Libarov's claims against USCIS and later granted summary judgment for ICE on most issues. The court ruled that Libarov could not seek declaratory relief solely for delayed FOIA disclosure and that FOIA provided an adequate remedy, precluding his APA claim. However, the court ordered ICE to disclose portions of the withheld document containing basic personal information about Libarov.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that Libarov was not entitled to declaratory relief for the delayed FOIA response, as the agency had eventually conducted an appropriate search and provided the requested documents. The court also upheld the district court's decision to withhold parts of the document under FOIA's exemption 7(A), which protects information related to ongoing law enforcement proceedings. Finally, the appellate court confirmed that FOIA provides an adequate remedy, thus barring Libarov's APA claim. View "Libarov v ICE" on Justia Law

George and Maria Dernis borrowed money from Premier Bank, which was involved in fraudulent lending practices. The loans were secured by mortgages on their personal real estate. After Premier Bank collapsed, the FDIC was appointed as receiver and sold some of the bank's loans, including the Dernises' loans, to Amos Financial in 2014. The Dernises claimed that the FDIC was aware of the fraudulent nature of the loans and failed to take remedial action. They filed a lawsuit against the FDIC, which was dismissed by the district court. They then filed an amended complaint against the United States under the FTCA, alleging various torts based on the FDIC's conduct.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the amended complaint, determining that most of the claims were not timely exhausted under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The court also found that the sole timely claim was barred by the FTCA’s intentional torts exception under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). The court dismissed the action with prejudice and entered final judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the Dernises failed to timely exhaust their administrative remedies for most of their claims. The court also held that the only timely claim was barred by the FTCA’s intentional torts exception, as it involved misrepresentation, deceit, and interference with contract rights. The court rejected the Dernises' argument that the FDIC’s "sue-and-be-sued" clause provided a broader waiver of sovereign immunity, noting that the United States was the sole defendant and the FTCA provided the exclusive remedy for tort claims against the United States. View "Dernis v United States" on Justia Law

In July 2019, Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) workers encountered a two-month-old infant, L.M., with a severe skull fracture and extensive brain damage. The infant's parents, Erika and Brian Mabes, had taken him to the emergency room after finding him unresponsive. This led to child abuse and custody proceedings against the Mabeses. They eventually regained custody and sued nine DCS workers and a consultant doctor, alleging violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding unresolved factual disputes that precluded their requests for qualified immunity. The defendants appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's decision, granting qualified immunity to all defendants. The court found that the DCS workers and the consultant doctor acted reasonably under the circumstances and did not violate clearly established constitutional rights. The court emphasized the urgency and severity of the situation faced by the DCS workers and the consultant doctor, concluding that their actions were lawful and reasonable. The court also noted that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the defendants acted with intent to misrepresent facts or ignored exculpatory evidence. The court remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Mabes v McFeeley" on Justia Law

Denise Evans was diagnosed with a ureteral injury shortly after undergoing a hysterectomy on August 14, 2019. She filed a negligence lawsuit in state court against the surgeon and associated medical entities. The surgeon was employed by a federally-funded health center, and the Attorney General certified that he was acting within the scope of his employment, allowing the United States to substitute itself as the defendant under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). The government removed the case to federal court and requested dismissal due to Evans's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court dismissed the claims against the government without prejudice and remanded the claims against the non-governmental defendants to state court.Evans then exhausted her administrative remedies by filing a claim with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which was received on September 23, 2021. After HHS failed to render a final disposition within six months, Evans filed a lawsuit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), asserting medical negligence. The government moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the claim was barred by the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations. Evans contended that the Westfall Act’s savings provision and the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply. The district court disagreed and dismissed the suit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Westfall Act’s savings provision does not apply when the United States substitutes itself as a party under § 233(c) of the PHSA. The court also found that equitable tolling was inapplicable, as Evans did not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances preventing her from timely filing her claim. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Evans's lawsuit. View "Evans v United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC, and affiliates, sought to build and operate interstate electricity transmission lines in Indiana. An Indiana statute granted incumbent electric companies the right of first refusal to build and operate new interstate transmission facilities connecting to their existing facilities. Plaintiffs argued that this statute violated the dormant commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC) Commissioners from enforcing the statute.The IURC Commissioners and several intervening defendants appealed the injunction. They argued that the IURC did not enforce the rights of first refusal and that the injunction would not redress plaintiffs' injuries. The district court had found that plaintiffs had standing because it believed the IURC enforced the rights of first refusal and that an injunction would prevent MISO from recognizing the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing. The court concluded that the IURC had no relevant responsibilities for enforcing the challenged statute and that any genuine redress would have to operate against MISO, a non-governmental entity not party to the lawsuit. The court noted that MISO had made clear it would not respond to the preliminary injunction as plaintiffs and the district court expected. The court also rejected a dissenting opinion's novel theory of standing, which was not presented by plaintiffs or adopted by the district court. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC v Commonwealth Edison Company of Indiana, Inc." on Justia Law

Jack William Morgan, a Messianic Jew, purchased a turkey log from the commissary at the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Thomson in May 2021, which led to the suspension of his kosher diet approval for thirty days by the institutional chaplain. Morgan claimed this forced him to choose between starvation and violating his religious beliefs, and he chose starvation. After exhausting administrative remedies, he sued the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the prison warden, Andrew Ciolli, seeking changes to dietary policies and monetary damages under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Morgan has since been transferred to a different BOP facility.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Morgan’s complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court found that Morgan did not provide sufficient factual allegations to show that the BOP’s dietary policies substantially burdened his religious exercise. Additionally, the court noted that the BOP is immune from suits for damages under RFRA and that Morgan’s complaint did not include allegations about Ciolli’s conduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and focused on two threshold issues: subject-matter jurisdiction and sovereign immunity. The court determined that Morgan did not adequately allege standing to pursue his claim for injunctive relief, as his threat of future injury was too speculative. Furthermore, the court held that federal sovereign immunity barred Morgan’s claim for monetary damages, as RFRA does not waive the federal government’s sovereign immunity against damages suits. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal but modified the judgment to reflect a jurisdictional dismissal. View "Morgan v BOP" on Justia Law