Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Brunson purchased the only liquor store in Bridgeport, Illinois. Bridgeport Police Chief Murray was a frequent visitor and often told Brunson that he was violating liquor laws that did not actually exist. Once, Bridgeport Mayor Schauf, also the local liquor commissioner, “confirmed” a non-existent law. Schauf had made a competing offer to purchase the store and had an interest another alcohol-serving establishment by subterfuge. Schauf’s son opened another Bridgeport bar. In 2010, Brunson applied to renew his liquor license weeks before it would expire. A licensee with no violations is entitled to pro forma renewal. Chief Murray told Bronson to hire a lawyer; Schauf told Brunson that he would not renew the license in time. Brunson had to close his business, hired counsel, and contacted the state Commission, which ordered that Brunson be allowed to remain open pending a hearing. Brunson’s liquor supplier then was told by the city clerk to not sell to Brunson. Before the Commission’s scheduled hearing, Schauf retroactively renewed the license without explanation. Subsequently Brunson discovered an attempted break-in; Murray did not file a report. The following weekend, the store was vandalized and the police took no action. Brunson stood guard the next weekend. During the night, the store’s windows were shattered. Bronson found Harshman—a convicted felon, and occasional employee at Schauf’s businesses. After a fight and a chase, Bronson held Harshman at gunpoint until police arrived. Brunson pointed out Schauf’s son waiting nearby. Brunson was charged with felony aggravated battery. Brunson sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the prosecutor, based on absolute prosecutorial immunity, and with respect to false arrest. The court reversed summary judgment on Brunson’s class-of-one equal protection claim and for Schauf, who is not entitled to absolute immunity on Brunson’s due process claim. View "Brunson v. Murray" on Justia Law

In 2014, the IRS attempted to collect $244,464 in unpaid taxes and penalties from Adolphson for tax years 2002 and 2006-2010. Adolphson claims he was unaware of the IRS’s collection efforts until the agency levied on his funds held by third parties (26 U.S.C. 6330). Rather than challenge the levies with the IRS, Adolphson filed a pro se petition, asking the tax court to enjoin the collection efforts and refund amounts already collected. Adolphson argued that the IRS had not mailed him the required Final Notice of Intent to Levy, so that he was deprived of a “collection due process hearing” (CDP) before the IRS Office of Appeals. Adolphson cited tax court decisions in which the tax court asserted that it lacked jurisdiction without an IRS notice of determination, yet nevertheless invalidated levies after finding that the taxpayer was prevented from requesting a CDP by failure to mail a Final Notice to the proper address. The IRS was unable to say “with certainty” whether the Final Notices were sent to proper addresses. Exhibits corroborated the dates on which the Final Notices were issued but did not show where the notices were mailed. The tax court dismissed, reasoning that it lacked authority to grant relief without a notice of determination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While Adolphson’s case is indistinguishable from the tax court precedent he cited, those decisions were unsound and reflect an improper extension of the tax court’s jurisdiction. View "Adolphson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2012, the City of Country Club Hills City Council adopted an ordinance that provided to homeowners a 25 percent rebate of 2010 city property taxes paid in 2011, subject to the completion of an application by the homeowner and approval by the City Clerk. This was the city’s twelfth consecutive year of offering a rebate program. The application stated that the “FILING OF THIS APPLICATION DOES NOT GUARANTEE APPROVAL BY THE CITY OF COUNTRY CLUB HILLS.” The city prepared the rebate checks but never distributed them. In 2012, the Cook County treasurer overpaid the city by more than $6 million. The county successfully sued to collect the overpayment. Bell filed a purported class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that refusal to issue the rebates amounted to an unconstitutional taking and asserting state law claims for conversion and unjust enrichment. The City Council then repealed the 2012 ordinance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, agreeing that Bell had no constitutionally protected property interest in the expectation of a rebate, and that she had adequate state court remedies for her claims under state law. View "Bell v. City of Country Club Hills" on Justia Law

Since 1935, federal law has regulated the hours of service of truck drivers operating in interstate commerce. Drivers must keep paper records showing their driving time and other on‐duty time. In 2012, Congress directed the Department of Transportation to issue regulations to require most interstate commercial motor vehicles to install electronic logging devices (ELDs) linked to vehicle engines to automatically record data relevant to hours of services: whether the engine is running, the time, and the vehicle’s approximate location. Congress instructed the Department to consider factors including driver privacy and preventing forms of harassment enabled by the ELDs, 49 U.S.C. 31137. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration promulgated the final rule: Electronic Logging Devices and Hours of Service Supporting Documents, 49 C.F.R. Pts. 385, 386, 390, 395 (2015). The Seventh Circuit rejected a challenge by the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association and drivers. The court rejected arguments that the rule permits ELDs that are not entirely automatic; uses a narrow definition of “harassment” that will not sufficiently protect drivers; that the agency’s cost‐benefit analysis was inadequate; that the agency did not sufficiently consider confidentiality protections for drivers; and that the ELD mandate imposed, in effect, an unconstitutional search or seizure on truck drivers. Even if the rule imposes a search or a seizure, inspection of ELD data recorded would fall within the “pervasively regulated industry” exception to the warrant requirement. View "Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. v. United States Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a customer service representative, was in an automobile accident in 2011, after which she used a cane and limped. She was fired in 2012, allegedly because of a perceived disability that had required her to take time off and to use her health insurance. Represented by counsel, she filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, citing failure to submit a charge of discrimination to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within the 300-day statutory deadline, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1). Six months after being fired she had filed with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) a “Complainant Information Sheet” (CIS). A charge filed with IDHR is automatically cross-filed with EEOC. Despite the EEOC amicus curiae brief, arguing that the CIS was the equivalent of a charge, the court concluded that it was not. A charge is the administrative equivalent of a judicial complaint; a CIS is not unless it asks for relief. Without such a request the CIS is a pre-charge screening form, which does not prompt IDHR to notify the employer, launch an investigation, or sponsor mediation. Although the CIS form does say that IDHR will cross-file the complainant’s “charge of discrimination” with EEOC, it also says “THIS IS NOT A CHARGE,” followed by the statement that “if IDHR accepts your claim, we will send you a charge form for signature.” View "Carlson v. Christian Brothers Services" on Justia Law

In 2001, Israel injured his back while digging posts for a porch. He worked while receiving treatments but his pain worsened; he stopped working in February 2003. He underwent a lumbar laminectomy and diskectomy, which did not resolve his pain Two surgeons determined that further surgery was not an option. Under the care of various doctors, Israel tried physical therapy, transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation (TENS), a dorsal column stimulator, epidural injections, narcotic pain medications including Methadone and morphine, lidocaine patches, a muscle relaxer, an anti‐depressant, and drugs for nerve pain. Diagnosed with lumbar radiculopathy and post‐laminectomy pain syndrome, Israel continues to experience severely limiting pain. His doctor sought approval to implement an “intrathecal drug delivery system,” a pain pump that delivers medication directly to the spinal cord. Israel’s insurer refused to cover the cost. Israel sought Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income benefits in 2007. On remand, the Social Security Administration repeatedly denied benefits.The Commissioner conceded in the district court that her decision was not supported by substantial evidence and requested remand. Israel, frustrated with years of delay, sought a direct award of benefits. The district court remanded. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a remand; the agency should expedite proceedings so that the matter may be resolved. View "Israel v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Heartland Alliance’s National Immigrant Justice Center submitted to the Department of Homeland Security a Freedom of Information Act request for information relating to Tier III terrorist organizations. Membership in any tier makes a person inadmissible to the United States, with narrow exceptions. Tier I and Tier II organizations are publicly identified terrorist groups such as ISIS and al‐Qaeda. Tier III organizations are defined in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) as any group that engages in terrorist activity (defined in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)), even if the activity is conducted exclusively against regimes that are enemies of the United States. The government typically does not have good intelligence about Tier III organizations. The Department provided only some of the requested information. The Center filed suit. The district judge granted, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, summary judgment for the government on the ground that the names of the Tier III organizations are protected from disclosure by the Freedom of Information Act’s exemption, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(E), for “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ... would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” View "Heartland Alliance National Immigrant Justice Center v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Cbeyond provides telecommunications service to small businesses using telephone lines. AT&T Illinois provides similar service on a larger scale. Their networks are interconnected; a new entrant (Cbeyond) may connect with existing local exchange carriers, 47 U.S.C. 251; if the parties are unable to agree on terms the issue is referred to arbitration. In 2004, the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) approved the agreement between Cbeyond and AT&T. In 2012 Cbeyond complained to the ICC: when Cbeyond leases new digital signal level loop circuits, AT&T charges a separate price for “Clear Channel Capability” (CCC) for the loops. CCC codes the electrical pulses in a line to improve data streaming. Cbeyond argued that there was no extra work involved. The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejection of Cbeyond’s claims, noting that the parties’ agreement designates CCC as an “optional feature” available “at an additional cost” and that some of the loops did not have CCC built in. The court noted the lack of information about how AT&T charges others for CCC or whether AT&T’s charges are inconsistent with 47 C.F.R. 51.505, which constrains incumbent carriers to lease network elements to newcomers at a price slightly higher than the incumbent’s marginal cost. Finding no violation of federal law, the court called the claim “a dispute over a price term in a contract,” a matter of state law. “Cbeyond has imposed an excessive and unnecessary burden on the district court by bringing this sloppy lawsuit.” View "Cbeyond Communications, LLC v. Sheahan" on Justia Law

Darren's parents began operating S&N Fireworks in the 1970s and obtained a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) license (18 U.S.C. 842(f)) to import explosives. Darren founded DCV in 2004, intending to eventually buy out S&N. DCV shared S&N’s Lincoln, Illinois place of business and obtained its own ATF import license. From 2004-2011, S&N ordered fireworks from DCV, which imported them from China and immediately transferred them to S&N, which packaged and sold fireworks for shows. Darren was employed by S&N and was listed as a “responsible person” on S&N’s license. DCV was not storing any explosives during this period and had no ATF violations. S&N, however, was cited for numerous violations in a 2006 inspection, relating to records and storage of fireworks. A 2009 inspection revealed multiple violations. Darren attended a meeting and signed a report acknowledging the violations. ATF notified S&N that its license would not be renewed. S&N voluntarily surrendered its license. DCV bought out S&N’s inventory, equipment, and contracts Darren delegated substantial responsibility to his brother, who had been responsible for many of S&N’s problems. ATF inspected in 2013, found multiple violations, and notified Darren that it did not intend to renew DCV’s license. DCV argued that its violations should not be deemed willful given its perfect compliance record before 2013. The agency responded that S&N and DCV were essentially the same operation and equated the S&N violations with DCV. After a hearing, the license was not renewed. The Seventh Circuit upheld the decision as supported by substantial evidence. View "D.C.V. Imports, L.L.C. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives" on Justia Law

Meuser, 46 years old, was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1996. For 15 years managed his symptoms with the antipsychotic drug Zyprexa. From 1995-2012, Meuser worked in a mailroom. Meuser’s health began deteriorating in late 2011 after his pharmacist gave him the generic version of Zyprexa. Meuser started having insomnia; he could not focus at work. Hoping that a break would improve his symptoms, Meuser took a leave of absence from his job. He was and is living with his parents.His new psychiatrist rediagnosed Meuser’s schizophrenia from “undifferentiated” to “paranoid type,” which involves “prominent delusions or auditory hallucinations,” switched Meuser back to the brand‐name Zyprexa, and increased his dosage. Meuser said he still did not feel well enough to return to work. Faced with the choice of returning to work or being fired, Meuser quit his job. An ALJ denied his application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits, finding that Meuser’s schizophrenia was not a severe impairment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the ALJ misunderstood the medical evidence and improperly rejected the treating psychiatrist’s opinion, so the conclusion that Meuser did not have a severe impairment was not supported by substantial evidence View "Meuser v. Colvin" on Justia Law