Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Meyers used his credit card to make purchases at the Green Bay are Oneida Travel Center and Oneida One Stop retail locations, owned and operated by the federally‐recognized Oneida Indian tribe. He received electronically printed receipts that included more than the last five digits of his credit card and the card’s expiration date. He alleged, in a putative class action, that the Tribe issued these receipts in violation of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act, which states: [n]o person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of business shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction, 15 U.S.C. 1681c(g)(1). FACTA defines a person as “any individual, partnership, corporation, trust, estate, cooperative, association, government or governmental subdivision or agency, or other entity.” The district court concluded that the Tribe was immune from suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that whether a tribe is subject to a statute and whether the tribe may be sued for violating the statute are two different questions. Any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of immunity; “government or governmental subdivision or agency” does not unambiguously refer to tribes. View "Meyers v. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis." on Justia Law

Rebirth ran a child care ministry—a “child care operated by a church or religious ministry that is a religious organization exempt from federal income taxation,” Ind. Code 12‐7‐2‐28.8. After an unannounced inspection, a Bureau of Child Care employee gave Rebirth a “Plan of Improvement,” stating that Rebirth had violated statutes and regulations governing registered child care ministries and directed Rebirth to cure the purported infractions and submit proof within 10 days. Rebirth believed that it had not committed any violations and did not submit any documentation. The Bureau sent Rebirth a notice of termination. Despite Rebirth’s request to appeal administratively, the Bureau terminated Rebirth’s registration and the child care operation closed. Indiana’s statutory scheme does not give providers an administrative opportunity to challenge the decision to revoke a certificate of registration. Rebirth sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of the due‐process clause. The district court dismissed Rebirth’s individual‐capacity claims, citing qualified immunity. After the parties developed an evidentiary record on the official‐capacity claims, Rebirth prevailed on its claims for injunctive relief. The Seventh Circuit reinstated the individual-capacity claims, concluding that the complaint adequately alleged that the defendants violated clearly established law by depriving Rebirth of a property interest (its registration) without first providing any opportunity to be heard. View "Rebirth Christian Acad. Daycare, Inc. v. Brizzi" on Justia Law

In order to receive federal housing funds (42 U.S.C. 2000d; the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601; and “42 U.S.C. 608(e)(5), 5304(b)(2), and 12705(b)(15)), the City of Chicago must certify that it is in compliance with federal requirements related to reducing the city’s admitted racial segregation. Hanna filed a qui tam suit, alleging that the city violated the False Claims Act because its policies, particularly “aldermanic privilege” and strategic zoning of relatively wealthy neighborhoods, have actually increased segregation, making its certifications false. Under “aldermanic privilege,” the City grants each alderman the “full authority to determine whether and where affordable, multifamily rental housing will be built and renovated in the ward.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Hanna did not allege the circumstances of the purported fraud with sufficient particularity to satisfy Federal Rule of Procedure 9(b). Hanna apparently had no insider information. He did not allege the “time, place, … and the method by which the misrepresentation was communicated” to him. Hanna’s complaint gave no information about which regulatory provisions Hanna thinks the city violated; it does not draw a link between the statutes Hanna cited and any particular alleged false certification. View "Hanna v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Witter contends that in August 2007 he telephoned Skelton, an employee of his broker, TransAct, with instructions to cancel several standing orders. Skelton did not do so, and Witter lost $23,000 on the resulting market position. Skelton claims that Witter never told him to cancel all seven of the working orders at issue. Witter filed a complaint with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 7 U.S.C. 18(a), which found no violation. The judgment officer refused to draw an adverse inference based on TransAct’s failure to produce a recording of the “one crucial conversation” because TransAct was not required to record the call; he found that Skelton’s version was more plausible and Witter had a “propensity to confuse trading terms” like “position” and “order.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the Commission’s decision was supported by the evidence. Federal regulations require that, before buying or selling a commodity, a merchant must receive either “specific authorization” or “authorization in writing,” 17 C.F.R. 166.2. No regulation requires the merchant to record phone calls to cancel previously authorized orders to buy or sell. View "Witter v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n" on Justia Law

After the 2012 enactment of the American Energy Manufacturing Technical Corrections Act, 42 U.S.C. 6313(c)(4)), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) published two final rules in 2014, aimed at improving the energy efficiency of commercial refrigeration equipment (CRE). One adopted new energy efficiency standards for CRE, 79 Fed. Reg. 17,726. The second rule, issued a month later, clarified the test procedures that DOE uses to implement those standards, 79 Fed. Reg. 22,278. Trade associations of CRE manufacturers challenged the rules. The Seventh Circuit upheld the rules, rejecting challenges to DOE’s engineering analysis, economic analysis, regulatory flexibility analysis, and assessment of the cumulative regulatory burden. The court concluded that “DOE acted in a manner worthy of deference.” The first rule was premised on an analytical model that is supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary. DOE conducted a cost‐ benefit analysis that is within its statutory authority and is supported by substantial evidence. It gave appropriate consideration to the rule’s effect on small businesses and the role of other agency regulations. DOE similarly acted within its authority, and within reason, when it promulgated the Test Procedure Rule. View "Zero Zone, Inc. v. Dep't of Energy" on Justia Law

Musunuru, a citizen of India, was the beneficiary of visa petitions filed by his previous employer, VSG, and by his current employer, Crescent. The priority date assigned to VSG’s petition allowed him to file an application with USCIS for adjustment of status to permanent resident. When an immigrant visa finally became available, USCIS did not adjust his status, but revoked VSG’s petition, invalidating its earlier priority date. Because the date assigned to Crescent’s petition was much later, Musunuru would have to wait several years for adjudication of his application . VSG’s owners had pleaded guilty to the unlawful hiring of an alien and mail fraud, in connection with an unrelated employee; USCIS presumed that all VSG’s visa petitions were fraudulent. Musunuru could have shown that his employment was not fraudulent, but USCIS sent notice to VSG only, even though VSG had gone out of business and Musunuru had changed employers. USCIS concluded that Musunuru lacked standing to challenge the revocation. The district court dismissed his appeal. The Seventh Circuit reversed. USCIS applied the notice and challenge regulations inconsistently with the statutory portability provision that allowed Musunuru to change employers. Musunuru’s current employer, Crescent, was entitled to pre-revocation notice and an opportunity to respond and to administratively challenge the decision. View "Musunuru v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2009, Pyles fell down a wet staircase and injured his back while incarcerated at Menard. Since then he has experienced numbness and radiating pain. In 2012, Pyles twice saw Dr.Nwaobasi, an employee of the company that furnishes medical care at Menard. Nwaobasi refused to order additional testing or specialist care. Pyles wanted to photocopy his original grievance before filing it but copies could be made only by the library, which did not accept new photocopying orders until December 21, 2012. On that day, Pyles submitted his grievance for photocopying. He received his copies on January 3, 2013, after the 60-day filing window had passed. Pyles submitted the grievance that day. On January 13, Pyles filed a separate grievance against the library, which was lost in the prison administrative system. On March 1, Pyles saw Dr. Shearing, another Wexford employee, and again failed to obtain relief. Pyles filed a grievance against Shearing on March 27, which was denied on June 12, 2013. Pyles claimed that he never received notice of the denial. On July 30, Pyles filed a civil rights action. After a hearing under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e, the magistrate found that he had not shown good cause for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment. Pyles had good cause for failing to timely file his grievance against Nwaobasi. The defendants did not meet their burden of proving that Pyles failed to exhaust available administrative remedies for the Shearing grievance. View "Pyles v. Nwaobasi" on Justia Law

Citilink, a municipal corporation that provides bus service in Fort Wayne, Indiana, has regulatory authority over advertisements inside the buses and on the buses’ exterior. Health Link, a nonprofit corporation, provides women’s healthcare and wanted to post an advertisement. Citilink refused because it forbids public service ads that “express or advocate opinions or positions upon political, religious, or moral issues.” Although the proposed ad did not express or advocate any such opinion or position, Citilink discovered that Health Link is pro‐life and suggests (not in the ad) that women with unplanned or crisis pregnancies consider health care and related services that provide alternatives to abortion. Even Health Link’s home page does not indicate its position. The ad referred to “life affirming healthcare.” Health Link and Allen County Right to Life share a street address. The Seventh Circuit reversed judgment in favor of Citilink. Once a government entity has created a facility (the ad spaces in and on the buses) for communicative activity, it “must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set.” Citilink’s refusal to post the ad was groundless discrimination against constitutionally protected speech. View "Women's Health Link, Inc. v. Fort Wayne Pub. Transp. Corp." on Justia Law

Thomas applied for Supplemental Security Income in 2010 when she was 55 years old. An administrative law judge identified her medically determinable impairments as degenerative changes in her back and left shoulder, Graves’ disease, and dysthymic disorder (a form of chronic depression), but concluded that the impairments did not impose more than minimal limitations on Thomas’s ability to work and denied her application. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The ALJ’s omission of fibromyalgia from Thomas’s medically determinable impairments and his conclusion that she has no severe impairments were not supported by substantial evidence. Thomas’s doctors’ lack of specialization in rheumatology was not an acceptable basis for discounting their assessments. View "Thomas v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Tri-Corp, a nonprofit corporation, offered low-income housing to mentally disabled persons in Milwaukee. Its lender, the Wisconsin Housing and Economic Development Authority, filed a foreclosure action. Tri-Corp blamed others for its financial problems and named several third-party defendants. The state court allowed the foreclosure and rejected the third-party claims except those against Milwaukee Alderman Bauman, who removed the claims to federal court. Tri-Corp contends that Bauman is liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for issuing statements critical of its operations and for lobbying other officials to rule against it in administrative proceedings, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Seventh Circuit joined six circuit courts in holding that section 1983 cannot be used to alter the categories of persons potentially liable in private actions under the Rehabilitation Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act. Tri-Corp did not allege that Bauman himself denied it any right under the Fair Housing Act, or even was a member of a public body that did so. Tri-Corp accuses Bauman of speech, not action. Public officials enjoy the right of free speech and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applies to claims under the Act, allowing governmental officials to try to persuade other officials to take particular actions. View "Tri-Corp Hous. Inc. v. Bauman" on Justia Law