Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 1949, the federal government deeded a large parcel to the Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District (MWCD), the entity responsible for controlling flooding in eastern Ohio. The deed provided that the land would revert to the United States if MWCD alienated or attempted to alienate it, or if MWCD stopped using the land for recreation, conservation, or reservoir-development purposes. MWCD sold rights to conduct hydraulic fracturing (fracking) operations on the land. Fracking opponents discovered the deed restrictions and, arguing that MWCD’s sale of fracking rights triggered the reversion, filed a “qui tam” suit under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729. alleging that MWCD was knowingly withholding United States property from the government. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the claim. The court noted recent legislative amendments that replace a fraudulent-intent requirement in two FCA provisions with a requirement that the defendant acted “knowingly,” but concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim even under the more lenient scienter requirement; they did not specify whether or how MWCD knew or should have known that it was in violation of the deed restrictions, such that it knew or should have known that title to the property reverted to the United States. View "Harper v. Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District" on Justia Law

In 2015, the legislative body for Hardin County, Kentucky passed an ordinance, providing that no employee could be required to join or pay dues to a union. Labor organizations claimed that the National Labor Relations Act preempts right-to-work laws not specifically authorized in section 14(b) of the Act; regulation of “hiring-hall” agreements, which require prospective employees to be recommended, approved, referred, or cleared by or through a labor organization; and regulation of “dues-checkoff” provisions, which require employers to automatically deduct union dues, fees, or other charges from employees’ paychecks and transfer them to the union. The county argued that the ordinance constitutes state law within the meaning of section 14(b) and is not preempted by 29 U.S.C. 164(b). The district court rejected the “state law argument and found the ordinance preempted and unenforceable. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The ordinance’s right-to-work protection, prohibiting employers from requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, is expressly excepted from preemption in section 14(b), but the other challenged sections are unenforceable. The court reasoned that sections 14(b)’s explicit exception of state right-to-work laws from preemption trumps operation of implicit field preemption. View "United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Hardin County" on Justia Law

In 2013, the City of Detroit filed for chapter 9 bankruptcy protection, facing problems “run[ning] wide and deep”—including the affordable provision of basic utilities. In 2014, plaintiffs, customers, and the purported representatives of customers, of the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD), filed an adversary proceeding, based on DWSD’s termination of water service to thousands of residential customers. Citing 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Supreme Court holding in Monell v. Department of Social Services, plaintiffs sought injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. Section 904 of the Bankruptcy Code explicitly prohibits this relief. Whether grounded in state law or federal constitutional law, a bankruptcy court order requiring DWSD to provide water service at a specific price, or refrain from terminating service would interfere with the City’s “political [and] governmental powers,” its “property [and] revenues,” and its “use [and] enjoyment of . . . income-producing property,” 11 U.S.C. 904. Plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection claims were inadequately pled. View "Lyda v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

In 2013, Detroit filed for municipal bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. 109(c). The city had $18 billion in debt, 100,000 creditors, negative cash flow, crumbling infrastructure, and could not provide basic police, fire, and emergency services. Based on settlements with almost all creditors and stakeholders, the bankruptcy court confirmed the city’s plan, which included the reduction of municipal-employee pension benefits. The city’s General Retirement System has a traditional defined-benefit pension plan and a 401(k)-style employee-contribution annuity savings program (ASF). The city is responsible for funding the defined-benefits plan. Detroit is not responsible for funding the ASF, but $387 million of city money had been wrongly directed into and distributed from it, to ensure participants a promised 7.9% annual return regardless of investment returns. The defined-benefit plan was underfunded by $1.879 billion. The city obtained outside funding ($816 million) from the state and philanthropic foundations in order to reduce defined-benefit pensions by only 4.5%, while eliminating cost-of-living increases, dental, vision, and life insurance benefits; reducing healthcare coverage; and establishing a mechanism for the partial recoupment of excess ASF distributions. Defined-benefit pension claimants voted 73% in favor of accepting the plan, which eliminated $7 billion in debt and freed $1.7 billion in revenue for city services and infrastructure. Many aspects of the plan have been implemented or completed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of challenges to the reduction in benefits as equitably moot. View "Ochadleus v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

When the finances of a Michigan municipality or public school system are in jeopardy, state law, the Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, Public Act 436, allows temporary appointment of an emergency manager, with extensive powers that arguably displace all of those of the local governmental officials. Plaintiffs, voters in areas with emergency managers and local elected officials in place, claimed that, by vesting elected officials’ powers in appointed individuals, the law violates their substantive due process right to elect local legislative officials and violates the Constitution’s guarantee, Article IV, section 4, of a republican form of government. They also asserted claims under the First and Thirteenth amendments and under the Voting Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. It is up to the political branches of the federal government to determine whether a state has met its federal constitutional obligation to maintain a republican form of government. The financial conditions of plaintiffs’ localities are the reasons for the appointments of the emergency managers. An entity in a distressed financial state can cause harm to its citizenry and the state in general. Improving the financial situation of a distressed locality is a legitimate legislative purpose, and PA 436 is rationally related to that purpose. View "Phillips v. Snyder" on Justia Law

The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), overseen by the USDA, is administered by the states, 7 U.S.C. 2011–2036c. An individual is ineligible for SNAP benefits if he is “fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction . . . for a crime, or attempt to commit a crime, that is a felony under the law of the place from which the individual is fleeing.” Michigan’s implementation barred assistance to anyone “subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant arising from a felony charge against that individual.” Michigan had an automated program that compared the list of public-assistance recipients with a list of outstanding felony warrants maintained by the Michigan State Police; when the program identified a match, it automatically closed the recipient’s file and generated a notice of the termination of benefits. In 2015 the Secretary of Agriculture promulgated 7 C.F.R. 273.11(n), clarifying disqualification of fugitive felons. Plaintiffs challenged Michigan's automatic disqualification and notice process. The court certified a class, held that Michigan policy violated the SNAP Act and the Constitution, and issued an injunction requiring Michigan to refrain from automatic disqualifications based solely on the existence of a felony warrant and to provide adequate notices of valid disqualification. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the plaintiffs lacked standing, of mootness, that there is no SNAP Act private right of action, and that Michigan's methods were valid. View "Barry v. Lyon" on Justia Law

Puckett retired from the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (LFUCG) Division of Police in 2009, after 36 years of service; Vance retired from the LFUCG Division of Fire and Emergency Services in 2010, after 24 years of service. Both (plaintiffs) are members of the LFUCG Policemen’s and Firefighters’ Retirement Fund, governed by the Police and Firefighters’ Retirement and Benefit Fund Act, KRS 67A.360-67A.690. As members of the Fund, plaintiffs receive service retirement annuities under the Act with cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs). The Act has been amended several times. After 2013 legislation reduced the COLA, plaintiffs sued (42 U.S.C. 1983), claiming violations of the Contract, Due Process, and Takings Clauses. The district court ruled that Plaintiffs had no such contractual right to an unchangeable COLA formula. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs have no property right in a particular COLA. The legislation had a rational basis: When it amended the Act, the Kentucky General Assembly explained the need to keep the Fund financially sound and resolve its financial difficulties. View "Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty." on Justia Law

For more than 40 years, participants in the Tennessee Valley Authority Retirement System (TVARS) received cost-of-living adjustments on top of their investment returns, pension benefits, and supplemental benefits. In 2009, with the system’s financial health in jeopardy, the TVARS board amended the rules that govern the system to cap or eliminate cost-of-living adjustments for the years 2010–2013, increase the eligibility age for cost-of-living adjustments, and lower the interest rate on a savings fund. The participants sued. None of their claims survived summary judgment. According to the district court, the plaintiffs did not have a private right of action to enforce the board’s compliance with the TVARS rules, and a Takings claim failed on the merits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part; cost-of-living adjustments are not vested, the agencies were also entitled to summary judgment on the merits of the claim that the board violated TVARS rules by reducing vested benefits. The court remanded remaining claims alleging violations of the TVARS rules because those claims are judicially reviewable in the context of this case. View "Duncan v. Muzyn" on Justia Law

Under the 2000 Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act a “covered employee” (or her survivor) is entitled to a lump sum payment of $150,000 “for the disability or death of that employee from that employee’s occupational illness,” 42 U.S.C. 7384s(a)(1). The claim adjudication process culminates in a final decision by the Final Adjudication Branch (FAB), which may be challenged in court. A claimant may request to reopen his claim after a final decision by submitting new evidence of covered employment or exposure to a toxic substance or identifying a change in medical guidelines. Berry sought benefits based on his father’s employment. After FAB denied his application for lack of proof that his father worked at a covered facility, Berry did not seek reconsideration or judicial review; 10 years later, Berry filed a request to reopen, stating that he had new evidence of employment. The request was denied. Berry sued under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court dismissed, find the refusal to reopen “not a final agency action,” 5 U.S.C. 704. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. While the decision not to reopen satisfied the Supreme Court’s test for “final agency action,” and was not the type of decision that Court has recognized as “committed to agency discretion,” the court properly dismissed because the request was not actually based on new evidence, but alleged a material error in the initial decision. Under Supreme Court precedent, reopening requests based on material error are “committed to agency discretion” and unreviewable. View "Berry v. Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

The amount of additional Medicare reimbursements that a hospital is entitled to receive for serving a disproportionate share of low-income patients depends, in part, on the number of days that the hospital served patients who were “eligible for medical assistance under a State plan approved under [the Medicaid statute].” 42 U.S.C. 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(vi)(II). Kentucky hospitals contend that because Kentucky has chosen in its Medicaid plan to award additional Medicaid funds to hospitals based on how many days they treat patients who are eligible for the Kentucky Hospital Care Program (KHCP), a state program that provides medical coverage to low-income individuals who do not qualify for Medicaid, KHCP patient days should be counted in the calculation of the additional Medicare reimbursements. The Sixth Circuit affirmed rejection of the state’s argument on summary judgment, stating that the statutory term “eligible for medical assistance under a State plan approved under [the Medicaid statute]” is synonymous with “eligible for Medicaid” and KHCP patients are, by definition, not eligible for Medicaid. View "Owensboro Health, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law