Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

All Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) plant officers are required to maintain medical clearance as a condition of employment. Since his employment began in 2009, Hale maintained the clearance necessary for his position. In 2013, the TVA began requiring a pulmonary function test for that clearance; Hale failed the testing and was terminated because of his chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder. Hale sued, alleging disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. In an unsuccessful motion to dismiss, the TVA argued that Title VII’s national-security exemption applies to the Rehabilitation Act and precludes the court from reviewing the physical-fitness requirements imposed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the interests of national security and that the Egan doctrine precludes the judiciary from reviewing the TVA’s determination that Hale lacked the physical capacity to fulfill his job duties because this decision was one of national security. The Sixth Circuit denied an interlocutory appeal; the national security exemption does not apply to Hale’s Rehabilitation Act claim. The court declined to extend Egan to preclude judicial review of an agency’s determination regarding an employee’s physical capability to perform the duties of his position. View "Hale v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The union was charged with violating its duty of fair representation in processing the grievance of a union member, Powell, who was terminated from her position as an automotive plant janitor. The charge alleged that Faircloth, Powell’s union steward, had submitted a false statement that she had witnessed an incident in which Powell threatened a fellow employee, and that Faircloth was subsequently involved in Powell’s grievance process. An Administrative Law Judge dismissed the charge. The National Labor Relations Board reversed, finding that the union had violated its duty of fair representation by acting arbitrarily or in bad faith. The Board emphasized that: Faircloth had submitted a statement against Powell that was partly false; Faircloth had represented Powell in the first stage of the grievance process without disclosing the fact that she had submitted a statement; and Powell was unaware of Faircloth’s statement throughout the grievance process. The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that the Board’s finding regarding the falsity of Faircloth’s statement was not supported by substantial evidence, and that there was an insufficient basis to find a breach of duty of fair representation. There was nothing to contradict Faircloth’s assertion that she witnessed the threat. View "International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit declined to stay a preliminary injunction requiring the delivery of bottled water households served by the Flint water system that lack properly installed water filters. For many homes without a proper filter, safe drinking water is inaccessible due to the limited hours of the points of distribution and transportation issues. The cost of verifying and maintaining water filters and delivering bottled water to residents that are not part of the allegedly 96% of homes that have a functioning filter is "nowhere near $10.5 million" claimed by the defendants. There is still $100 million left of the $212 million that Michigan allocated to respond to the Flint water crisis. The court rejected an argument that delivering bottled water will slow down the recovery of Flint’s water system by decreasing the amount of water moving through the delivery lines. The defendants did not demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on their arguments, nor have they shown that portions of the preliminary injunction, including the provisions requiring the delivery of bottled water to non-exempt households, are overbroad. A stay would not support the public interest. Flint residents continue to suffer irreparable harm from the lack of reliable access to safe drinking water. View "Concerned Pastors for Social Action v. Khouri" on Justia Law

In 1949, the federal government deeded a large parcel to the Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District (MWCD), the entity responsible for controlling flooding in eastern Ohio. The deed provided that the land would revert to the United States if MWCD alienated or attempted to alienate it, or if MWCD stopped using the land for recreation, conservation, or reservoir-development purposes. MWCD sold rights to conduct hydraulic fracturing (fracking) operations on the land. Fracking opponents discovered the deed restrictions and, arguing that MWCD’s sale of fracking rights triggered the reversion, filed a “qui tam” suit under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729. alleging that MWCD was knowingly withholding United States property from the government. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the claim. The court noted recent legislative amendments that replace a fraudulent-intent requirement in two FCA provisions with a requirement that the defendant acted “knowingly,” but concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim even under the more lenient scienter requirement; they did not specify whether or how MWCD knew or should have known that it was in violation of the deed restrictions, such that it knew or should have known that title to the property reverted to the United States. View "Harper v. Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District" on Justia Law

In 2015, the legislative body for Hardin County, Kentucky passed an ordinance, providing that no employee could be required to join or pay dues to a union. Labor organizations claimed that the National Labor Relations Act preempts right-to-work laws not specifically authorized in section 14(b) of the Act; regulation of “hiring-hall” agreements, which require prospective employees to be recommended, approved, referred, or cleared by or through a labor organization; and regulation of “dues-checkoff” provisions, which require employers to automatically deduct union dues, fees, or other charges from employees’ paychecks and transfer them to the union. The county argued that the ordinance constitutes state law within the meaning of section 14(b) and is not preempted by 29 U.S.C. 164(b). The district court rejected the “state law argument and found the ordinance preempted and unenforceable. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The ordinance’s right-to-work protection, prohibiting employers from requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, is expressly excepted from preemption in section 14(b), but the other challenged sections are unenforceable. The court reasoned that sections 14(b)’s explicit exception of state right-to-work laws from preemption trumps operation of implicit field preemption. View "United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Hardin County" on Justia Law

In 2013, the City of Detroit filed for chapter 9 bankruptcy protection, facing problems “run[ning] wide and deep”—including the affordable provision of basic utilities. In 2014, plaintiffs, customers, and the purported representatives of customers, of the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD), filed an adversary proceeding, based on DWSD’s termination of water service to thousands of residential customers. Citing 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Supreme Court holding in Monell v. Department of Social Services, plaintiffs sought injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. Section 904 of the Bankruptcy Code explicitly prohibits this relief. Whether grounded in state law or federal constitutional law, a bankruptcy court order requiring DWSD to provide water service at a specific price, or refrain from terminating service would interfere with the City’s “political [and] governmental powers,” its “property [and] revenues,” and its “use [and] enjoyment of . . . income-producing property,” 11 U.S.C. 904. Plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection claims were inadequately pled. View "Lyda v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

In 2013, Detroit filed for municipal bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. 109(c). The city had $18 billion in debt, 100,000 creditors, negative cash flow, crumbling infrastructure, and could not provide basic police, fire, and emergency services. Based on settlements with almost all creditors and stakeholders, the bankruptcy court confirmed the city’s plan, which included the reduction of municipal-employee pension benefits. The city’s General Retirement System has a traditional defined-benefit pension plan and a 401(k)-style employee-contribution annuity savings program (ASF). The city is responsible for funding the defined-benefits plan. Detroit is not responsible for funding the ASF, but $387 million of city money had been wrongly directed into and distributed from it, to ensure participants a promised 7.9% annual return regardless of investment returns. The defined-benefit plan was underfunded by $1.879 billion. The city obtained outside funding ($816 million) from the state and philanthropic foundations in order to reduce defined-benefit pensions by only 4.5%, while eliminating cost-of-living increases, dental, vision, and life insurance benefits; reducing healthcare coverage; and establishing a mechanism for the partial recoupment of excess ASF distributions. Defined-benefit pension claimants voted 73% in favor of accepting the plan, which eliminated $7 billion in debt and freed $1.7 billion in revenue for city services and infrastructure. Many aspects of the plan have been implemented or completed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of challenges to the reduction in benefits as equitably moot. View "Ochadleus v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

When the finances of a Michigan municipality or public school system are in jeopardy, state law, the Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, Public Act 436, allows temporary appointment of an emergency manager, with extensive powers that arguably displace all of those of the local governmental officials. Plaintiffs, voters in areas with emergency managers and local elected officials in place, claimed that, by vesting elected officials’ powers in appointed individuals, the law violates their substantive due process right to elect local legislative officials and violates the Constitution’s guarantee, Article IV, section 4, of a republican form of government. They also asserted claims under the First and Thirteenth amendments and under the Voting Rights Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. It is up to the political branches of the federal government to determine whether a state has met its federal constitutional obligation to maintain a republican form of government. The financial conditions of plaintiffs’ localities are the reasons for the appointments of the emergency managers. An entity in a distressed financial state can cause harm to its citizenry and the state in general. Improving the financial situation of a distressed locality is a legitimate legislative purpose, and PA 436 is rationally related to that purpose. View "Phillips v. Snyder" on Justia Law

The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), overseen by the USDA, is administered by the states, 7 U.S.C. 2011–2036c. An individual is ineligible for SNAP benefits if he is “fleeing to avoid prosecution, or custody or confinement after conviction . . . for a crime, or attempt to commit a crime, that is a felony under the law of the place from which the individual is fleeing.” Michigan’s implementation barred assistance to anyone “subject to arrest under an outstanding warrant arising from a felony charge against that individual.” Michigan had an automated program that compared the list of public-assistance recipients with a list of outstanding felony warrants maintained by the Michigan State Police; when the program identified a match, it automatically closed the recipient’s file and generated a notice of the termination of benefits. In 2015 the Secretary of Agriculture promulgated 7 C.F.R. 273.11(n), clarifying disqualification of fugitive felons. Plaintiffs challenged Michigan's automatic disqualification and notice process. The court certified a class, held that Michigan policy violated the SNAP Act and the Constitution, and issued an injunction requiring Michigan to refrain from automatic disqualifications based solely on the existence of a felony warrant and to provide adequate notices of valid disqualification. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the plaintiffs lacked standing, of mootness, that there is no SNAP Act private right of action, and that Michigan's methods were valid. View "Barry v. Lyon" on Justia Law

Puckett retired from the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (LFUCG) Division of Police in 2009, after 36 years of service; Vance retired from the LFUCG Division of Fire and Emergency Services in 2010, after 24 years of service. Both (plaintiffs) are members of the LFUCG Policemen’s and Firefighters’ Retirement Fund, governed by the Police and Firefighters’ Retirement and Benefit Fund Act, KRS 67A.360-67A.690. As members of the Fund, plaintiffs receive service retirement annuities under the Act with cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs). The Act has been amended several times. After 2013 legislation reduced the COLA, plaintiffs sued (42 U.S.C. 1983), claiming violations of the Contract, Due Process, and Takings Clauses. The district court ruled that Plaintiffs had no such contractual right to an unchangeable COLA formula. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs have no property right in a particular COLA. The legislation had a rational basis: When it amended the Act, the Kentucky General Assembly explained the need to keep the Fund financially sound and resolve its financial difficulties. View "Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty." on Justia Law