Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

U.S. Bank participates in an FHA-backed mortgage insurance program that encourages lending to high-risk borrowers. U.S. Bank had to certify that it would meet certain requirements, and each time it requested an insurance payment, had to certify that it had followed 24 C.F.R. 203.500 requirements, including engaging in “loss mitigation” measures, such as attempting to arrange a face-to-face meeting with the defaulting borrower, before foreclosing. According to ABLE, an Ohio non-profit organization, U.S. Bank did not satisfy the loss mitigation requirement, wrongfully foreclosed on 22,000 homes, and wrongfully collected $2.3 billion in federal insurance benefits. ABLE alleged violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729. The Department of Justice declined to intervene. The district court found that ABLE premised its case on information that had already been publicly disclosed, precluding it from bringing suit as a qui tam plaintiff. The Sixth Circuit agreed, noting a 2011 consent order between U.S. Bank and the government, requiring U.S. Bank to implement reforms, including measures “to ensure [that] reasonable and good faith efforts, consistent with applicable Legal Requirements, are engaged in Loss Mitigation and foreclosure prevention for delinquent loans,” and a 2011 foreclosure practices review by three federal agencies, which noted that U.S. Bank had failed to take various mitigation measures. View "ABLE v. U.S. Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Relator brought a qui tam action (False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(b)), alleging KHN (network of hospitals, physicians, and healthcare facilities) falsely certified its compliance with the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH), 123 Stat. 226 (2009), to receive “meaningful use” incentive payments. HITECH was designed to encourage the adoption of sophisticated electronic health record technology and creates incentive payments for “meaningful use” of certified technology, 42 U.S.C. 1395. To receive incentive payments, providers must meet meaningful-use objectives and accompanying compliance measures. Stage 1 of Act implementation required a security risk analysis in accordance with 45 C.F.R. 164.308(a)(1); implementation of need security updates; and correction of identified security deficiencies. During Stage 2, providers are required to address[] the encryption/security of data stored in Certified EHR Technology in accordance with 45 C.F.R. 164.312(a)(2)(iv) and 164.306(d)(3). To receive incentive payments, providers must attest to meeting these standards. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal, finding that Relator failed to plausibly allege that KHN’s attestation of HITECH compliance was false and failed to plead a specific claim for payment; and that Relator’s claims were precluded by a prior Ohio state judgment in a case involving similar claims filed by Relator against KHN. View "United States v. Kettering Health Network" on Justia Law

Cases challenging the validity of “the Clean Water Rule,” adopted by the Army Corps of Engineers and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency were consolidated in the Sixth Circuit by the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation. The Rule clarifies the definition of “waters of the United States,” as used in the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251, “through increased use of bright-line boundaries” to make identifying waters protected under the Act “easier to understand, more predictable and consistent with the law and peer reviewed science, while protecting the streams and wetlands that form the foundation of our nation’s water resources.” Plaintiffs argued that the Rule constituted expansion of regulatory jurisdiction and altered the existing balance of federal-state collaboration and that the new bright-line boundaries are not consistent with Supreme Court precedent, and were not adopted in compliance with the Administrative Procedures Act. The Sixth Circuit stayed the Rule, then denied motions to dismiss. While 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1) limits actions by the EPA Administrator that are reviewable directly in the circuit courts, many courts, including the Supreme Court, have favored a “functional” approach over a “formalistic” one in construing these provisions. Congress’s manifest purposes are best fulfilled by exercise of jurisdiction in this case. View "ArZ Mining Ass'n v. Envt'l Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Haines operates a tour bus company. In 2000, he modified the luggage compartment in a bus to become a sleeper area, designed to comply with Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) regulations. In May, 2011, FMCSA informed Haines that he could use the luggage compartment as a sleeper area without additional approval if he complied with 49 C.F.R. 393.76. On May 29, 2011, Haines permitted family members to ride in the sleeper area while the bus was in motion. An unidentified individual notified authorities. On June 10, FMCSA placed all of Haines’ busses, including three without sleeper areas, out of service, and identified Haines Tours as an “imminent hazard” to public safety based on its finding that the “unauthorized transportation of passengers in the cargo area . . . substantially increase[d] the likelihood of serious injury or death.” The suspension lasted five days. Haines sued, alleging that the handling of the temporary suspension violated his due process and equal protection rights and gave rise to a claim under the Administrative Procedures Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal without leave to amend; “Bivens” claims were time-barred by Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations and a Bivens remedy was not available because Haines had an adequate, alternative remedy. View "Haines v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin." on Justia Law

Cadillac Place (former General Motors Building), a Detroit office complex, is home to state offices, a court of appeals, a restaurant, a gift store, and even a barber shop. It is owned by Michigan Strategic Fund, a public entity, and leased by the state. Babcock, an attorney, s disabled due to Friedreich’s Ataxia, a degenerative neuromuscular disorder that impairs her ability to walk. She worked in Cadillac Place. Babcock alleged that its design features denied her equal access to her place of employment in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act , 42 U.S.C. 12132, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794(a). The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. Babcock did not identify a service, program, or activity of a public entity from which she was excluded or denied a benefit. The court noted the dispositive distinction between access to a facility and access to programs or activities. Babcock only identified facilities-related issues. View "Babcock v. State of Mich." on Justia Law

Trumbull County has provided sewer service to General Motors’ Lordstown Assembly Plant since 1964. In the mid-2000s, the County borrowed $3.4 million from the U.S. Department of Agriculture to maintain and improve its sewer lines. That loan obligation triggered the protections of 7 U.S.C. 1926(b), under which sewer providers that owe money to the Department are protected from competition with other sewer providers. The County claims that the Village of Lordstown violated section 1926(b) when the Village built sewer lines that could one day serve GM’s Plant. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding on the merits that the Village’s mere construction of sewer lines did not curtail or limit the County’s service. The Sixth Circuit vacated, reaching the same result on grounds of lack of standing. While the County still owes a balance, section 1926(b) affords it a legally protected interest in freedom from competition, but it has shown not any actual or imminent invasion of that interest. Sewer lines can last for decades, so the mere fact of their construction does not show that the Village intends to compete with the County anytime soon. View "Trumbull Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Village of Lordstown" on Justia Law

Miller is a single father who, before his alleged disability, held positions as a security guard, machine operator, material handler, and night-club bouncer. In 2006, Miller visited a hospital emergency department with an injured knee. He did not return to work but applied for disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income. On remand from the Appeals Council, an ALJ determined that Miller was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and did not qualify for benefits. The Appeals Council declined another review. The district court granted summary judgment, affirming the denial of benefits. Miller’s timely appeal followed. The Sixth Circuit vacated, finding the decision not supported by substantial evidence. A determination concerning Miller’s residual functional capacity (particularly his ability to stand) did not comport with the ALJ’s determination that a doctor’s assessment should be accorded significant weight; the limited discussion of Miller’s obesity arguably did not comply with SSR 02- 1p; the ALJ’s focus on isolated, often stale, portions of the record was an insufficient basis to determine that Miller could conduct work activities on a sustained basis, especially in light of the Appeals Council’s original decision to remand for failure to adequately evaluate Miller’s mental impairments. View "Miller v. Comm'r of Social Sec." on Justia Law

In 2013 Ohio enacted Rev. Code 3503.06(C)(1)(a): “Except for a nominating petition for presidential electors, no person shall be entitled to circulate any petition unless the person is a resident of this state.” Non-profit organizations wrote to Secretary of State Husted, asking whether he planned to “reject[] petitions where the circulator is domiciled in a state other than Ohio[.]” “While a court may ultimately find this law unconstitutional,” Husted responded, “that determination is a decision for the judicial branch, not the Secretary of State… this office and county boards of election will implement this law like any other until such time as the legislature acts to make a statutory change or a court directs otherwise.” One of the non-profit groups hired a firm to gather signatures for an initiative petition, paying a higher-than-usual fee to ensure that the firm hired in-state signature gatherers. The organizations then sought a declaration that the residency requirement was unconstitutional, an injunction prohibiting its enforcement, and damages against Husted “as compensation for extra petition circulation charges.” The court granted the plaintiffs a permanent injunction and denied Husted’s qualified-immunity motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed the qualified-immunity ruling; the Secretary had no clearly established duty to decline enforcement of the properly enacted and presumptively constitutional statute. View "Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted" on Justia Law

Askins filed a citizen suit alleging that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Ohio EPA, and the Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) violated the Clean Water Act’s permitting procedures with respect to controlling water pollution caused by certain animal feeding operations, 33 U.S.C. 1251. They alleged that the Ohio EPA failed to inform the EPA that it transferred authority over part of the state’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination (NPDES) permit program to ODA until five years after it had done so; that ODA administered part of the state-NPDES Program without approval from the EPA; that the EPA permitted Ohio EPA to transfer part of the state-NPDES program without its approval; and that the EPA allowed ODA to administer part of the state-NPDES program without its approval. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Clean Water Act does not permit suits against regulators for regulatory functions. View "Askins v. Ohio Dep't of Agric." on Justia Law

Mokdad, a naturalized U.S. citizen, alleges that he has been denied boarding on commercial airline flights between the U.S. and his native country, Lebanon because he was on the No Fly List. Mokdad applied for redress under the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP). Mokdad received a letter that did not confirm or deny whether he was on the List but informed him that “we have conducted a review of any applicable records in consultation with other federal agencies ... no changes or corrections are warranted at this time.” The letter notified him of his right to file administrative appeal with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within 30 days, that the TRIP determination would become final if he did not, and that final determinations are reviewable by the Court of Appeals under 49 U.S.C. 46110. Mokdad did not file a TSA administrative appeal or a petition with the Court of Appeals but filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Michigan against the Attorney General, the FBI, and the Director of the Terrorist Screening Center. Mokdad did not name TSA or any TSA officer. The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal, finding that the district court had jurisdiction, but declined to address the challenge to the adequacy of procedures to contest inclusion on the No Fly List, for failure to join a necessary party. View "Mokdad v. Lynch" on Justia Law