Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Two related Wyoming companies, one owning the surface estate and the other owning the mineral estate in an adjacent tract, sought to drill a horizontal well. The plan involved drilling from the surface owner’s land, traversing through federally owned subsurface minerals, and ending in the mineral owner’s adjacent tract. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which manages the federal minerals, informed the companies that they needed to obtain a permit to drill through the federal mineral estate, as the process would involve removing a small amount of federal minerals. The companies disagreed, arguing that BLM lacked authority to require a permit for a well that would not produce from the federal minerals, and filed suit seeking a declaration of their right to drill without BLM’s consent.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming ruled in favor of BLM, holding that Congress had retained sufficient regulatory authority over the mineral estate and had delegated that authority to BLM under the Mineral Leasing Act. The court concluded that BLM could require a permit for the proposed traversing well and that the companies qualified as “operators” under BLM regulations, thus subject to the permit requirement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The Tenth Circuit determined that the dispute was fundamentally about property rights—specifically, whether the surface owner had the right to drill through the federal mineral estate without BLM’s consent. The court held that such disputes must be brought under the Quiet Title Act (QTA), which is the exclusive means for challenging the United States’ title or property interests in real property. Because the companies brought their claim under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act instead of the QTA, the district court lacked jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "True Oil v. BLM" on Justia Law

A government agency responsible for marketing hydroelectric power operated a warehouse in Colorado, where an employee, Jared Newman, orchestrated a fraudulent procurement scheme from 2014 to 2017. Newman arranged for the agency to purchase supplies from vendors owned by friends and family, including the defendant, who owned two such companies. The vendors submitted invoices for goods that were never delivered, received payments from the agency, and then funneled most of the money back to Newman, keeping a portion as a commission. The defendant received nearly $180,000 through 59 fraudulent payments, writing checks back to Newman and taking steps to conceal the scheme.A grand jury indicted the defendant in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado on six counts of wire fraud, each corresponding to a specific transfer, and sought forfeiture of all proceeds. At trial, the government introduced evidence of a co-participant’s guilty plea and the district court instructed the jury that it could infer the defendant’s knowledge of the fraud if he was deliberately ignorant. The defendant was convicted on all counts. The district court limited forfeiture to the six charged transfers, totaling about $20,000, but ordered restitution for the full amount received, for which the defendant and Newman were jointly and severally liable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the co-participant’s guilty plea, as it was used to assess credibility and not as substantive evidence of guilt, and the jury was properly instructed on its limited use. The court also held that, because there was sufficient evidence of the defendant’s actual knowledge, any error in the deliberate ignorance instruction did not warrant reversal. On the government’s cross-appeal, the Tenth Circuit vacated the forfeiture order, holding that forfeiture should include all proceeds obtained through the fraudulent scheme, not just the charged transactions, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Cline" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) manages wild horse herds in southern Wyoming under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. This Act mandates the protection and management of wild horses on public lands. The land in question is a checkerboard pattern of alternating public and private ownership. Since 1979, BLM managed these herds with the consent of private landowners. However, in 2010, private landowners revoked their consent, making it difficult for BLM to maintain the herds. In 2022, BLM amended its Regional Management Plan (RMP) to change two Herd Management Areas (HMAs) to Herd Areas (HAs), reducing the wild horse population goal to zero in two areas and significantly reducing it in another.The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming reviewed the case and ruled in favor of BLM, finding that the agency had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in amending the RMP. The court held that any challenge to BLM’s decision to remove horses was unripe and that BLM had complied with the relevant statutes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and found that BLM failed to consider whether its decision would achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance, as required by the Wild Horse Act. The court held that BLM’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it did not base its decision on this statutory requirement. The court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case to determine the appropriate remedy, considering the practical consequences of vacatur and the potential for BLM to substantiate its decision on remand. View "American Wild Horse Campaign v. Raby" on Justia Law

A motorist on Interstate 10 near Deming, New Mexico, reported a man in the median with a firearm who may have fired shots. Police officers encountered Gilbert Valencia in a nearby mesquite field, matching the description and holding what appeared to be an AR-style rifle. Valencia did not consistently comply with officers' commands and moved his hand on the weapon, prompting five officers to shoot him. Valencia died from his wounds. His estate brought federal and state law claims against the City of Deming, individual officers, Luna County, and the New Mexico Department of Public Safety.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico granted summary judgment for the officers, asserting qualified immunity, and dismissed the Estate’s claims under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. The Estate appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because their use of lethal force was objectively reasonable based on the circumstances. The court found that the Estate failed to identify a dispute of material fact that precluded summary judgment on the state law claims. The court held that the officers' actions were reasonable given the perceived threat and the totality of the circumstances, including Valencia's non-compliance and the officers' belief that he was armed and dangerous. The court also determined that the New Mexico Tort Claims Act did not apply to the City of Deming, as it only applies to law enforcement officers. View "Cruz v. City Of Deming" on Justia Law

Two environmental groups, WildEarth Guardians and Western Watersheds Project, challenged a decision by the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) to open new domestic sheep grazing allotments, known as the Wishbone Allotments, in the Rio Grande National Forest, Colorado. The groups argued that the allotments posed a high risk of disease transmission to local populations of Rocky Mountain bighorn sheep, which are vulnerable to diseases from domestic sheep.The USFS had previously vacated larger grazing allotments in 2013 and 2015 due to high risks to bighorn sheep, based on a "risk of contact model" (RCM). However, in 2017, the USFS decided to open the Wishbone Allotments despite the RCM predicting a high risk of contact. The USFS justified this decision by considering additional local factors, such as geography and herding practices, which they claimed would mitigate the risk. The environmental groups objected, arguing that these local factors were unsupported by scientific data.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado denied the groups' petition, finding that the USFS did not violate the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). The groups then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.The Tenth Circuit found that the USFS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in approving the Wishbone Allotments. The court held that the USFS failed to provide a reasoned explanation for downgrading the RCM's high-risk rating based on local factors, which lacked scientific support. The court also found that the USFS did not adequately consider the cumulative impacts on neighboring bighorn sheep herds. Consequently, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case to determine the appropriate remedy. View "WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service" on Justia Law

Stefan Green, a South African citizen, applied for an R-1 visa to serve as a worship leader at Calvary Albuquerque, Inc., a non-profit church in New Mexico. His application was denied by a consular officer, leading Calvary to sue, alleging the denial violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court dismissed the suit, citing the consular nonreviewability doctrine, which generally prevents judicial review of consular officers' visa decisions.The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico dismissed the case, ruling that RFRA did not authorize judicial review of the consular officer’s decision. The court also found that the consular officer provided a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for the visa denial, and Calvary did not plausibly allege bad faith. The district court denied Calvary’s motion for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Tenth Circuit held that RFRA does not expressly authorize judicial review of consular officers' visa decisions, thus upholding the consular nonreviewability doctrine. The court also concluded that even if RFRA claims could be considered under the constitutional claim exception, the consular officer provided a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for denying the visa, and Calvary did not plausibly allege bad faith. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Calvary Albuquerque v. Blinken" on Justia Law

The case involves the Center for Biological Diversity challenging the United States Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) approval of Colorado's revised implementation plan for ambient air quality standards. Colorado revised its plan in 2019, changing the wording of a permit requirement for new emission sources and adding language to the definition of a key threshold for evaluating compliance. The Center argued that the revisions would prevent regulators from blocking construction of new sources that generate excessive emissions and allow regulators to disregard emissions during drilling, fracking, and well completion.The EPA approved Colorado's revisions, leading the Center to file a petition for review. The State of Colorado intervened to defend the revisions. The Center contended that the revised permit requirement and the new definition of "commencement of operation" would undermine air quality standards.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected the Center's first challenge, concluding that the Center had not shown an effect from the revised wording in the permit requirement. However, the court agreed with the Center on the second challenge, finding that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to address the potential emissions during drilling, fracking, and well completion. The court held that the EPA did not independently assess whether the revised definition created a substantive change and remanded the case to the EPA for further explanation without vacating the EPA's prior approval of the revised definition. The court denied the petition for review regarding the revised permit requirement but granted it concerning the revised definition of "commencement of operation." View "Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA" on Justia Law

K.A. and C.P. were married and had three daughters. Their marriage ended in divorce, and the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (ACDHS) initiated actions against K.A. regarding her relationships with her children, leading to the termination of her parental rights and several contempt judgments. K.A. attempted to appeal the termination, but the Colorado Court of Appeals denied it as untimely, and the Colorado Supreme Court declined review. She also sought to appeal a contempt sentence, but it was again deemed untimely.K.A. filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against Michelle Barnes, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Human Services (CDHS), in her official capacity; ACDHS; and Michelle Dossey, Manager of the ACDHS Division of Child and Adult Protective Services, in her official capacity. The Arapahoe County Board of Commissioners was initially named but later dismissed by K.A. The district court dismissed K.A.'s claims and denied her motion to amend her complaint. K.A. filed a timely appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear K.A.'s claims due to sovereign immunity, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and lack of standing. The court found that K.A.'s claims for damages were barred by sovereign immunity, and her requests to reverse the termination of her parental rights and order a new hearing were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Additionally, her requests for declaratory relief were either barred by sovereign immunity or lacked standing. The court also upheld the district court's denial of K.A.'s motion to amend her complaint, as she failed to explain how the amendments would cure the jurisdictional defects. View "K.A. v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Two elderly individuals, Ms. Penelope Lamle and Ms. Maxine Houston, applied for Medicaid but faced delays and additional questions from the Oklahoma Department of Human Services, allegedly directed by attorney Susan Eads. They refused to answer these questions and subsequently sued, seeking an expedited decision, payment of Medicaid benefits, and damages. Both applicants died during the litigation, and their estates were substituted as parties in the appeal.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma dismissed the action with prejudice, citing the plaintiffs' failure to state a valid claim. However, the court was unaware that the applicants had died while the action was pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the claims for an injunction became moot when the agency denied benefits and the applicants died. The court noted that the requested relief would no longer benefit the estates, as the Oklahoma Department of Human Services had already denied the applications. The court also held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the requested retrospective relief. Consequently, the court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate the judgment on the claim for a prospective injunction and dismiss it without prejudice.Regarding the claim against Ms. Eads in her individual capacity, the Tenth Circuit held that she was entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the plaintiffs did not allege facts showing the violation of a clearly established right. As a result, the court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of the claim for damages against Ms. Eads. View "Lamle v. Eads" on Justia Law

Fiorisce, LLC, a limited liability company, filed a qui tam lawsuit against Colorado Technical University (CTU) under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleging that CTU misrepresented compliance with federal credit hour requirements to fraudulently obtain federal student aid funds. Fiorisce claimed that CTU's online learning platform, Intellipath, provided insufficient educational content and falsified learning hour calculations to meet federal standards. Fiorisce's principal, a former CTU faculty member, created the company to protect their identity while exposing the alleged fraud.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado reviewed the case. CTU moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the FCA’s public disclosure bar precluded the suit because the allegations were substantially similar to previously disclosed information. The district court denied CTU’s motion, finding that Fiorisce’s specific claims about misrepresentation of credit hours and the use of Intellipath were not substantially the same as prior disclosures. The court also suggested that Fiorisce might qualify as an original source of the information.CTU appealed the district court’s denial of its motion to dismiss to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, seeking interlocutory review under the collateral order doctrine. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the collateral order doctrine did not apply, as the public disclosure bar did not confer a right to avoid trial and could be effectively reviewed after final judgment. The court emphasized that expanding the collateral order doctrine to include such denials would undermine the final judgment rule and dismissed CTU’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Fiorisce, LLC v. Colorado Technical University" on Justia Law