Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
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Thirty years ago, the Tenth Circuit decided all boundary disputes between the Ute Indian Tribe, the State of Utah, and its subdivisions. The only thing that remained was for the district court to memorialize that mandate in a permanent injunction. Twenty years ago, the Court modified its mandate in one respect, but stressed that in all others, the Court's earlier decision remained in place. The matter came before the Tenth Circuit again: the State of Utah, one of its cities, and several of its counties sought to relitigate the same boundaries. "Over the last forty years the questions haven’t changed - and neither have our answers." This case and all related matters were reassigned to a different district judge. The court and parties were directed to proceed to a final disposition both promptly and consistently with the Tenth Circuit's mandates in "Ute V," "Ute VI," and this case. View "Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah v. Myton" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-Appellant A.M. filed this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on behalf of her minor child, F.M., against two employees of the Albuquerque Public Schools: Cleveland Middle School (“CMS”) Principal Susan LaBarge and Assistant Principal Ann Holmes. A.M. also filed suit against Officer Arthur Acosta of the Albuquerque Police Department (“APD”). A.M. brought several claims stemming from two school-related events: (1) the May 2011 arrest of F.M. for allegedly disrupting his physical-education class, and (2) the November 2011 search of F.M. for contraband. Holmes and LaBarge sought summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and the district court granted their respective motions. The court also denied A.M.’s motion for summary judgment on her claims pertaining to Officer Acosta after determining that Officer Acosta was entitled to prevail on qualified-immunity grounds too. On appeal, A.M. argued that the district court erred in awarding qualified immunity to all of the defendants. The Tenth Circuit consolidated these matters for review, and found o reversible error in the district court's grant of qualified immunity. View "A.M. v. Holmes" on Justia Law

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Zia Shadows, LLC operated a mobile-home park in Las Cruces, New Mexico, under a special-use permit from the City. In late 2000, a dispute over water-rights fees arose between Zia Shadows and the City, and principal Alex Garth protested these fees and lodged written and oral complaints with the City Council. This appeal arose out of that zoning dispute. Zia Shadows and its principals, Alex and William Garth (collectively, Zia Shadows), filed suit in federal district court, alleging the City’s delays in approval of a zoning request (and the conditions ultimately attached to the approval) violated Zia Shadows’ rights to due process and equal protection. Zia Shadows also alleged the City’s actions were taken in retaliation for Zia Shadows’ public criticisms of the City. The district court granted summary judgment to the City on Zia Shadows’ due-process and equal-protection claims, and a jury found in favor of the City on Zia Shadows’ First Amendment retaliation claim. Zia Shadows argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit: (1) that the district court erred in granting summary judgment; (2) the district court abused its discretion both in its instruction of the jury and its refusal to strike a juror; and (3) the jury’s verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding Zia Shadows failed to establish the requisite elements of its due-process and equal-protection claims and did not demonstrate reversible error in either the proceedings or verdict at trial. View "Zia Shadows, LLC v. City of Las Cruces" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Planned Parenthood Association of Utah (PPAU) filed this 42 U.S.C. 1983 action claiming that defendant Gary Herbert, the Governor of Utah, violated PPAU’s constitutional rights by directing defendant Joseph Miner, the Executive Director of the Utah Department of Health (UDOH), to stop UDOH from acting as an intermediary for “pass-through” federal funds that PPAU used to carry out certain programs within the State of Utah. PPAU also filed a motion seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction. Although the district court initially issued a TRO, it ultimately withdrew it and denied PPAU’s request for a preliminary injunction. PPAU filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the denial of its motion for preliminary injunction. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a stay in favor of PPAU to prevent the cessation of funding during the pendency of this appeal, and expedited the briefing and oral argument schedule. After that briefing and oral argument, the Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and remanded with instructions to grant PPAU’s motion for preliminary injunction. View "Planned Parenthood v. Herbert" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action in which they raised various claims relating to their arrests and now-vacated convictions for prostitution. The district court, with a magistrate judge presiding by consent of the parties, dismissed most of Plaintiffs’ claims as barred by the statute of limitations and granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ surviving claims of malicious prosecution. Plaintiffs appealed only the grant of summary judgment on their malicious prosecution claims against one Defendant, David Young. Young was employed by the City of Albuquerque as a civilian fleet manager for the police department. He also served as a voluntary reserve officer for the police department. In separate incidents occurring in 2007 and 2008, Plaintiffs were each arrested by Young on charges of prostitution after a brief conversation in his unmarked vehicle. Young then filed criminal complaints and prosecuted misdemeanor prostitution cases against Plaintiffs in municipal court. Each Plaintiff pled guilty to the charges against her. In 2011, an attorney filed a petition for relief from judgment on behalf of Plaintiffs and nine other women who had pled guilty to prostitution after being arrested and prosecuted by Young, arguing he abused and misrepresented his position and authority as an agent of the City of Albuquerque when making the arrests. Instead of filing a response to the petition, the city entered into a stipulation with the petitioners agreeing that the requested relief should be granted. The state district court entered a set aside petitioners’ guilty pleas, vacating and dismissing with prejudice their judgments and sentences. Plaintiffs then filed this federal 1983 action in which they alleged, among other claims, that Young subjected them to malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. After dismissing Plaintiffs’ other claims as barred by the statute of limitations, the federal district court determined Young was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims because they had not met their burden of demonstrating that their criminal cases were terminated in a way that indicated their actual innocence of the charges against them. "Although we sympathize with Plaintiffs’ concerns about possible abuses of police power and authority, we are not persuaded that these concerns require (or permit) us to vary from our settled law on malicious prosecution." The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "M.G. v. Young" on Justia Law

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New Mexico Rule of Professional Conduct 16-308(E) prohibited a prosecutor from subpoenaing a lawyer to present evidence about a past or present client in a grand-jury or other criminal proceeding unless such evidence was “essential” and “there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information.” In a lawsuit brought against the New Mexico Supreme Court and the state’s Disciplinary Board and Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the United States claimed that the enforcement of this rule against federal prosecutors licensed in New Mexico violated the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court concluded that Rule 16-308(E) was preempted with respect to federal prosecutors practicing before grand juries, but was not preempted outside of the grand-jury context. With this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. NM Supreme Court" on Justia Law

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Caring Hearts Personal Home Services, Inc. provided physical therapy and skilled nursing services to “homebound” Medicare patients. It sought reimbursement from Medicare for services provided. The definition of who qualified as "homebound" or what services qualified as "reasonable and necessary" was unclear, even to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). CMS has developed its own rules on both subjects that had been repeatedly revised and expanded over time. In an audit, CMS purported to find that Caring Hearts provided services to at least a handful of patients who didn’t qualify as “homebound” or for whom the services rendered weren’t “reasonable and necessary.” As a result, CMS ordered Caring Hearts to repay the government over $800,000. It was later found that in reaching its conclusions CMS applied the wrong law: the agency did not apply the regulations in force in 2008 when Caring Hearts provided the services in dispute. Instead, it applied considerably more onerous regulations the agency adopted years later, "[r]egulations that Caring Hearts couldn’t have known about at the time it provided its services." The Tenth Circuit found that Caring Hearts "[made] out a pretty good case that its services were entirely consistent with the law as it was at the time they were rendered" when CMS denied Caring Hearts' request for reconsideration. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment affirming CMS' denial to Caring Hearts for reimbursement, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Caring Hearts v. Burwell" on Justia Law

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Jimma Pal Reat was driving in Denver when he called 911 to report that several men had thrown a bottle and broken the rear windshield of the car he was driving. Operator Juan Rodriguez took the call. Reat told Rodriguez that though the attack occurred at Tenth Avenue and Sheridan in Denver, he and his passengers fled to safety in nearby Wheat Ridge. For reasons that were unclear, Rodriguez told Reat that because the attack took place in Denver, he needed to return to Denver to receive help from the police. Reat was shot and killed after driving back to Denver, into the path of his armed assailants. His estate sued the 911 operator, alleging civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and various state law claims. Rodriguez moved for summary judgment on all claims against him on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment in his favor on all constitutional claims except for a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim based on a theory of state-created danger. Under that claim, Reat’s Estate contended Rodriguez used his governmental authority to subject him to the callous shooting that caused Reat’s death. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the law was not clearly established such that a reasonable 911 operator would have known his conduct violated Reat’s constitutional rights. The court therefore reversed and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Rodriguez. View "Estate of Jimma Pal Reat v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought a civil enforcement action against three Papa John’s entities for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by denying a reasonable workplace accommodation to the appellant. Scott Bonn, and firing him for requesting this accommodation. Bonn moved to intervene, but the district court determined that Bonn’s claim was subject to arbitration under an agreement that Bonn’s mother had executed. Based on this determination, the district court denied the motion to intervene and ordered Bonn to arbitrate his claim. Bonn appealed the denial of his motion to intervene and the order compelling arbitration. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the arbitration agreement did not curtail Bonn’s unconditional statutory right to intervene. Accordingly, the Court reversed the denial of the motion to intervene. Furthermore, the Court concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the order compelling arbitration. "Although the district court ordered Mr. Bonn to arbitrate his claim, that order did not affect the EEOC’s claim against Papa John’s, which remains pending. Because that claim remains, the order compelling arbitration did not constitute a 'final decision,' which is necessary for appellate jurisdiction over an order compelling arbitration. Therefore, we dismiss this part of Mr. Bonn’s appeal." View "EEOC v. PJ Utah, LLC" on Justia Law

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J.S. is the mother of M.S., a child covered by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). M.S. was a residential student at the Utah Schools for the Deaf and Blind (“USDB”). Believing USDB was not complying with IDEA’s procedural requirements and was not providing M.S. with free appropriate public education (FAPE), J.S. sought a due process hearing. Unsatisfied with the relief she obtained in that hearing, J.S. filed a civil action in federal court, and appealed the district court decision granting her additional limited relief. She asserts the district court erred when it: (1) delegated its authority to resolve the propriety of M.S.’s residential placement to members of the team tasked with developing M.S.’s individualized education program (“IEP”); and (2) granted her only a partial award of attorneys’ fees. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court delegated the issue of M.S.’s residential placement to her IEP team and that such delegation "[was] at odds with" 20 U.S.C. 1415. The Court remanded this case to the district court to resolve the issue of M.S.’s residential placement and reconsideration of the attorney fee award. View "M.S. v. Utah School for the Deaf" on Justia Law