Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-appellant Laurie Smith sought review when her Social Security disability benefit claims were denied. She alleged disability based in part on: impingement of her left shoulder; restrictions on her ability to: (1) reach and (2) handle and finger objects; and moderate nonexertional limitations. The administrative law judge concluded that Smith could work as a telequotation clerk, surveillance systems monitor, or call-out operator. As a result, the judge concluded that Smith was not disabled. Ms. Smith appealed to the district court, which upheld the administrative law judge’s determination. After its review, the Tenth Circuit found no reason to disturb the ALJ's or the district court's judgments and affirmed. View "Smith v. Colvin" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned two suits: one in state and one in federal court, and statutory limitations on the power of the federal court to enjoin the state court case. In the federal case, the Utah Attorney General and the Board of Tooele County Commissioners sued the federal government under the Quiet Title Act, attempting to quiet title in favor of Utah for hundreds of rights of way in Tooele County, Utah. Five environmental groups opposed this suit, and the federal district court permitted the groups to intervene. In the state court case, the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Michael Abdo, a Tooele County resident, claimed that the Utah officials lacked authority under state law to prosecute the quiet-title action in federal court. The Utah officials asked the federal court to enjoin the Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo from prosecuting the state-court case. The federal district court granted the request and entered a temporary restraining order enjoining the Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo for an indefinite period of time. The Wilderness Alliance and Mr. Abdo appealed, raising two issues: (1) whether the Tenth Circuit had jurisdiction to hear the appeal; and (2) did the federal district court have the authority to enjoin the state-court suit? After concluding it had jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the Tenth Circuit then concluded that the federal district court did not have authority to enjoin the Utah state court. "The All Writs Act grants a district court expansive authority to issue 'all writs necessary.' But the Anti-Injunction Act generally prohibits federal courts from enjoining state-court suits." An exception exists when an injunction is "in aid of" the federal court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. This exception applies when: (1) the federal and state court exercise in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over the same res; and (2) the federal court is the first to take possession of the res. These circumstances are absent because the state-court action was neither in rem nor quasi in rem. Thus, the district court’s order violated the Anti-Injunction Act. View "Tooele County v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Kansas Board of Education (the “Board”) adopted curriculum standards establishing performance expectations for science instruction in kindergarten through twelfth grade. Appellants, Citizens for Objective Public Education, Kansas parents, and school children (collectively, “COPE”), contended that although the standards purported to further science education, their concealed aim was to teach students to answer questions about the cause and nature of life with only nonreligious explanations. COPE also claimed two plaintiffs had standing as taxpayers who objected to their tax dollars being used to implement the Standards. The district court disagreed, and dismissed the suit without prejudice for lack of standing. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded all of COPE's theories of injury failed, and affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "COPE v. KS State Board of Education" on Justia Law

"This appeal is heavy, very heavy, on procedure." Plaintiff-appellee Peggy Walton worked in the New Mexico State Land Office. She was a political appointee of the elected Republican Land Commissioner, Patrick Lyons. Lyons’s decision not to seek reelection for a third term put plaintiff's job at risk: as a political appointee, a new administration could easily dismiss her. To see that she remained employed with the state, Lyons appointed plaintiff to a senior civil service job where she’d be protected by state law against removal for political reasons. A local television reporter ran a report titled “[c]ronies move up as officials move out” - a report highly critical of Lyons and plaintiff. Another reporter introducing the story aired his view that plaintiff was “distinctly unqualified” for her new job and claimed the hiring was “rigged.” Ray Powell, the newly elected Democratic candidate, dismissed plaintiff. Eight days after making the decision to dismiss her but before announcing it publicly, Powell held a meeting with the land office’s advisory board; "glared across the conference table" at plaintiff, spoke of the television news report denouncing her appointment; and, referring to her in all but name, said he “was concerned about . . . ‘protected employees’” who “for some reason didn’t have to meet the leadership criteria” for their appointments. Plaintiff sued when she was dismissed, arguing that she was a protected civil service employee, and under New Mexico Law, Powell had unlawfully retaliated against her for exercising her right to free political association in violation of the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. 1983. In reply and at summary judgment. Powell claimed qualified immunity. But the district court denied the motion and set the case for trial. Powell appealed, and finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed denial of summary judgment. View "Walton v. NM State Land Office" on Justia Law

Wasatch Equality and four snowboarders (collectively, Wasatch) sued to challenge a snowboard ban at Alta Ski Area in Utah. In its complaint, Wasatch alleged the ban unconstitutionally discriminated against snowboarders and denied them equal protection of the law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Recognizing that private action won’t sustain a civil rights complaint, Wasatch further alleged the ban constituted “state action” because Alta operated its ski resort on federal land via a permit issued by the United States Forest Service. The district court disagreed, and dismissed this case for failure to identify a state action. Because the Tenth Circuit agreed Wasatch hadn't plausibly established that the snowboard ban constituted state action, the Court affirmed. View "Wasatch Equality v. Alta Ski Lifts" on Justia Law

Colorado Secretary of State Wayne Williams appealed a district court order enjoining him from enforcing Colorado's issue-committee registration and disclosure requirements against the Coalition for Secular Government (Coalition), a nonprofit corporation that was planning to advocate against a statewide ballot initiative in the 2014 general election. Under Colorado law, the Coalition's activities triggered various issue-committee registration and disclosure requirements. Once a person or group of persons qualified as an issue committee under this definition, a substantial set of registration and disclosure requirements apply. Since 2008, the Coalition has either registered or considered registering as an issue committee in four general elections: 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014. As the 2012 election neared, the Coalition filed in federal district court a declaratory-judgment suit against Scott Gessler, the then-Colorado Secretary of State. Among other relief, the Coalition requested the court to declare that the Coalition's "expected activity of $3,500 does not require registration as an issue committee." Because a certain constitutional amendment (the "personhood amendment") failed to qualify for the general-election ballot, the Coalition had neither registered as an issue committee nor published an updated policy paper. After the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in "Gessler v. Colorado Common Cause," (327 P.3d 232 (Colo. 2014)), the Coalition renewed its preliminary-injunction motion in federal district court. By then, the personhood amendment had qualified for the 2014 general-election ballot, and Dr. Diana Hsieh (Coalition founder) and her co-author again wanted to update and expand the policy paper urging readers to vote "no" on the latest iteration of the personhood ballot initiative. The district court consolidated the hearing on the preliminary-injunction motion with a hearing on the merits of the case. As Dr. Hsieh testified at the hearing, the Coalition planned to raise about $1,500 in 2014 to fund the policy paper but still opposed registering as an issue committee. By October 3, 2014, the day of the preliminary-injunction hearing, the Coalition had already received pledges totaling about $2,000. On October 10, 2014, the district court "ORDERED and DECLARED that [the Coalition]'s expected activity of $3,500 does not require registration or disclosure as an 'issue committee' and the Secretary is ENJOINED from enforcing" Colorado's disclosure requirements against the Coalition. The Secretary appealed the district court's order granting the Coalition declaratory and injunctive relief, presenting as grounds for appeal: (1) whether Colorado's $200 threshold for issue-committee registration and reporting violated the First Amendment; and (2) could Colorado require issue-committee registration and disclosure for a group that raises and spends $3,500 to influence an election on a statewide ballot initiative? The Tenth Circuit concluded that Colorado's issue-committee regulatory framework was unconstitutional as applied to the Coalition. Therefore it did not address the facial validity of the $200 threshold. View "Coalition for Secular Govt v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Diana Schaffer appealed a district court order granting summary judgment on her 42 U.S.C. 1983 malicious prosecution claims in favor of Defendants-Appellants Ashley Hollingshead, B. Gail Cameron, and Salt Lake City Corp. (“the City”). Schaffer argued that Hollingshead and Cameron, two City parking enforcement officers, falsely reported to the police that Schaffer hit them with her truck after they issued her a parking ticket. The two elements of a Section 1983 claim were: (1) deprivation of a federally protected right by (2) an actor acting under color of state law. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the parking enforcement officers did not act under color of state law in reporting the parking incident to the police. View "Schaffer v. Salt Lake City Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Michael Allman applied for Social Security disability benefits, claiming he could not work due to spina bifida, a shunt in his brain, chronic back pain, headaches, depression, and anxiety. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC) permitted him to perform a number of jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy, defeating his disability claim. At step two of the applicable five-step sequential evaluation, the ALJ determined that plaintiff's headaches were not a “severe impairment” within the meaning of the Social Security Act and its corresponding regulations. Nevertheless, the ALJ discussed and considered plaintiff's headaches in assessing his RFC to work. After the ALJ denied his claim, the Appeals Council denied review and the district court affirmed after adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and overruling plaintiff's objections. The district court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his headaches qualified as a severe impairment and that the ALJ had provided sufficient bases for not assigning more weight to his doctor's opinion. On appeal, plaintiff challenged, among other things, the district court’s findings regarding the ALJ’s determinations at steps two and four. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Allman v. Colvin" on Justia Law

The water source at the heart of this general stream adjudication was the Nambe-Pojoaque-Tesuque Basin. The State of New Mexico was engaged in individual adjudications with parties who held permits to divert the Basin’s underground water through the use of domestic water wells. Elisa Trujillo held one such domestic well permit. During her individual adjudication, she and the State disputed her water rights. In 2010, the special master granted summary judgment in favor of the State. In 2015, the district court entered an order that adjudicated Trujillo’s water rights based on the special master’s 2010 summary judgment order. Trujillo identified only the 2015 order in her notice of appeal, which was an interlocutory order because the district court had not yet entered a final decision in the general stream adjudication. She presented no developed argument challenging the special master’s summary judgment order that served as a basis for the 2015 order. Instead, the Tenth Circuit found that she spent much of her brief challenging two orders denying her motions to quash a 1983 injunction that placed limits on the State’s issuance of domestic well permits. Finding no reason to overturn the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Trujillo's adjudication. View "New Mexico v. Trujillo" on Justia Law

In 2011, Samuel Pauly was shot to death through the window of his New Mexico home by one of three state police officers investigating an earlier road rage incident on Interstate 25 involving his brother. His father, on behalf of Samuel Pauly’s estate, filed a civil rights action against the three officers, the State of New Mexico Department of Public Safety, and two state officials, claiming defendants violated his son’s Fourth Amendment right against the use of excessive force. The officers moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied their motions, and they appealed. Taking the facts as the district court determined them, in the light most favorable to plaintiff estate, the issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review was: whether an officer outside someone’s home in the dark of night with no probable cause to arrest anyone and behind the cover of a wall 50 feet away from a possible threat, with no warning shot a man pointing his gun out of his well-lighted window at an unknown person in his yard while the man’s brother fired protective shots in the air from behind the house, a reasonable jury could find that one of the officers was not in immediate fear for his safety or the safety of others. The Court concluded that any objectively reasonable officer in this position "would well know" that a homeowner has the right to protect his home against intruders and that the officer had no right to immediately use deadly force in these circumstances. The Court therefore affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment to the officer. View "Pauly v. White" on Justia Law