Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

"This appeal is heavy, very heavy, on procedure." Plaintiff-appellee Peggy Walton worked in the New Mexico State Land Office. She was a political appointee of the elected Republican Land Commissioner, Patrick Lyons. Lyons’s decision not to seek reelection for a third term put plaintiff's job at risk: as a political appointee, a new administration could easily dismiss her. To see that she remained employed with the state, Lyons appointed plaintiff to a senior civil service job where she’d be protected by state law against removal for political reasons. A local television reporter ran a report titled “[c]ronies move up as officials move out” - a report highly critical of Lyons and plaintiff. Another reporter introducing the story aired his view that plaintiff was “distinctly unqualified” for her new job and claimed the hiring was “rigged.” Ray Powell, the newly elected Democratic candidate, dismissed plaintiff. Eight days after making the decision to dismiss her but before announcing it publicly, Powell held a meeting with the land office’s advisory board; "glared across the conference table" at plaintiff, spoke of the television news report denouncing her appointment; and, referring to her in all but name, said he “was concerned about . . . ‘protected employees’” who “for some reason didn’t have to meet the leadership criteria” for their appointments. Plaintiff sued when she was dismissed, arguing that she was a protected civil service employee, and under New Mexico Law, Powell had unlawfully retaliated against her for exercising her right to free political association in violation of the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. 1983. In reply and at summary judgment. Powell claimed qualified immunity. But the district court denied the motion and set the case for trial. Powell appealed, and finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed denial of summary judgment. View "Walton v. NM State Land Office" on Justia Law

Wasatch Equality and four snowboarders (collectively, Wasatch) sued to challenge a snowboard ban at Alta Ski Area in Utah. In its complaint, Wasatch alleged the ban unconstitutionally discriminated against snowboarders and denied them equal protection of the law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Recognizing that private action won’t sustain a civil rights complaint, Wasatch further alleged the ban constituted “state action” because Alta operated its ski resort on federal land via a permit issued by the United States Forest Service. The district court disagreed, and dismissed this case for failure to identify a state action. Because the Tenth Circuit agreed Wasatch hadn't plausibly established that the snowboard ban constituted state action, the Court affirmed. View "Wasatch Equality v. Alta Ski Lifts" on Justia Law

Colorado Secretary of State Wayne Williams appealed a district court order enjoining him from enforcing Colorado's issue-committee registration and disclosure requirements against the Coalition for Secular Government (Coalition), a nonprofit corporation that was planning to advocate against a statewide ballot initiative in the 2014 general election. Under Colorado law, the Coalition's activities triggered various issue-committee registration and disclosure requirements. Once a person or group of persons qualified as an issue committee under this definition, a substantial set of registration and disclosure requirements apply. Since 2008, the Coalition has either registered or considered registering as an issue committee in four general elections: 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014. As the 2012 election neared, the Coalition filed in federal district court a declaratory-judgment suit against Scott Gessler, the then-Colorado Secretary of State. Among other relief, the Coalition requested the court to declare that the Coalition's "expected activity of $3,500 does not require registration as an issue committee." Because a certain constitutional amendment (the "personhood amendment") failed to qualify for the general-election ballot, the Coalition had neither registered as an issue committee nor published an updated policy paper. After the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in "Gessler v. Colorado Common Cause," (327 P.3d 232 (Colo. 2014)), the Coalition renewed its preliminary-injunction motion in federal district court. By then, the personhood amendment had qualified for the 2014 general-election ballot, and Dr. Diana Hsieh (Coalition founder) and her co-author again wanted to update and expand the policy paper urging readers to vote "no" on the latest iteration of the personhood ballot initiative. The district court consolidated the hearing on the preliminary-injunction motion with a hearing on the merits of the case. As Dr. Hsieh testified at the hearing, the Coalition planned to raise about $1,500 in 2014 to fund the policy paper but still opposed registering as an issue committee. By October 3, 2014, the day of the preliminary-injunction hearing, the Coalition had already received pledges totaling about $2,000. On October 10, 2014, the district court "ORDERED and DECLARED that [the Coalition]'s expected activity of $3,500 does not require registration or disclosure as an 'issue committee' and the Secretary is ENJOINED from enforcing" Colorado's disclosure requirements against the Coalition. The Secretary appealed the district court's order granting the Coalition declaratory and injunctive relief, presenting as grounds for appeal: (1) whether Colorado's $200 threshold for issue-committee registration and reporting violated the First Amendment; and (2) could Colorado require issue-committee registration and disclosure for a group that raises and spends $3,500 to influence an election on a statewide ballot initiative? The Tenth Circuit concluded that Colorado's issue-committee regulatory framework was unconstitutional as applied to the Coalition. Therefore it did not address the facial validity of the $200 threshold. View "Coalition for Secular Govt v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Diana Schaffer appealed a district court order granting summary judgment on her 42 U.S.C. 1983 malicious prosecution claims in favor of Defendants-Appellants Ashley Hollingshead, B. Gail Cameron, and Salt Lake City Corp. (“the City”). Schaffer argued that Hollingshead and Cameron, two City parking enforcement officers, falsely reported to the police that Schaffer hit them with her truck after they issued her a parking ticket. The two elements of a Section 1983 claim were: (1) deprivation of a federally protected right by (2) an actor acting under color of state law. After review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the parking enforcement officers did not act under color of state law in reporting the parking incident to the police. View "Schaffer v. Salt Lake City Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Michael Allman applied for Social Security disability benefits, claiming he could not work due to spina bifida, a shunt in his brain, chronic back pain, headaches, depression, and anxiety. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC) permitted him to perform a number of jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy, defeating his disability claim. At step two of the applicable five-step sequential evaluation, the ALJ determined that plaintiff's headaches were not a “severe impairment” within the meaning of the Social Security Act and its corresponding regulations. Nevertheless, the ALJ discussed and considered plaintiff's headaches in assessing his RFC to work. After the ALJ denied his claim, the Appeals Council denied review and the district court affirmed after adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and overruling plaintiff's objections. The district court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his headaches qualified as a severe impairment and that the ALJ had provided sufficient bases for not assigning more weight to his doctor's opinion. On appeal, plaintiff challenged, among other things, the district court’s findings regarding the ALJ’s determinations at steps two and four. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Allman v. Colvin" on Justia Law

The water source at the heart of this general stream adjudication was the Nambe-Pojoaque-Tesuque Basin. The State of New Mexico was engaged in individual adjudications with parties who held permits to divert the Basin’s underground water through the use of domestic water wells. Elisa Trujillo held one such domestic well permit. During her individual adjudication, she and the State disputed her water rights. In 2010, the special master granted summary judgment in favor of the State. In 2015, the district court entered an order that adjudicated Trujillo’s water rights based on the special master’s 2010 summary judgment order. Trujillo identified only the 2015 order in her notice of appeal, which was an interlocutory order because the district court had not yet entered a final decision in the general stream adjudication. She presented no developed argument challenging the special master’s summary judgment order that served as a basis for the 2015 order. Instead, the Tenth Circuit found that she spent much of her brief challenging two orders denying her motions to quash a 1983 injunction that placed limits on the State’s issuance of domestic well permits. Finding no reason to overturn the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Trujillo's adjudication. View "New Mexico v. Trujillo" on Justia Law

In 2011, Samuel Pauly was shot to death through the window of his New Mexico home by one of three state police officers investigating an earlier road rage incident on Interstate 25 involving his brother. His father, on behalf of Samuel Pauly’s estate, filed a civil rights action against the three officers, the State of New Mexico Department of Public Safety, and two state officials, claiming defendants violated his son’s Fourth Amendment right against the use of excessive force. The officers moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied their motions, and they appealed. Taking the facts as the district court determined them, in the light most favorable to plaintiff estate, the issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review was: whether an officer outside someone’s home in the dark of night with no probable cause to arrest anyone and behind the cover of a wall 50 feet away from a possible threat, with no warning shot a man pointing his gun out of his well-lighted window at an unknown person in his yard while the man’s brother fired protective shots in the air from behind the house, a reasonable jury could find that one of the officers was not in immediate fear for his safety or the safety of others. The Court concluded that any objectively reasonable officer in this position "would well know" that a homeowner has the right to protect his home against intruders and that the officer had no right to immediately use deadly force in these circumstances. The Court therefore affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment to the officer. View "Pauly v. White" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Leslie Taylor asked the Colorado Medicaid program to combine the benefits she received through two assistance programs to help her get to medical appointments. If approved, this combination would allow the agency to pay attendants for time driving Taylor to and from her appointments. The agency refused, and the plaintiffs in this case alleged that the refusal constituted discrimination against Taylor based on her disability. The Tenth Circuit concluded that this refusal did not constitute discriminate against Taylor based on her disability. View "Taylor v. Colorado Dept of Health Care" on Justia Law

Octavio Gutierrez-Orozco (Gutierrez), a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States illegally. Gutierrez insisted he entered the United States in March 1996. He remembered that date because his wife, who remained in Mexico, was pregnant with the second of their four children, who was born in September 1996. He claimed to have lived in the United States continuously since then, except for a brief, two-month trip back to Mexico in mid-1999 when his wife was ill, after which border patrol twice hindered his reentry. His wife joined him here sometime in 2000. Gutierrez’s immigration troubles began in February 2008, when a domestic violence incident with his teenage son led to a simple assault conviction. Shortly thereafter, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear, charging him as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Gutierrez conceded removability but requested cancellation of removal or, in the alternative, voluntary departure. The IJ conducted a hearing and concluded Gutierrez was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because he did not demonstrate a ten-year continuous physical presence in the United States from April 1, 1998, to April 1, 2008; good moral character for that time period; and an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The IJ also denied voluntary departure because Gutierrez failed to maintain good moral character during the relevant time frame and, alternatively, as an exercise of discretion. Gutierrez appealed to the BIA for relief from the IJ’s decision. The BIA denied relief, agreeing with the IJ. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Gutierrez-Orozco v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. appealed a district court’s dismissal of its due-process claims against the Kansas Department of Transportation (KDOT). After KDOT removed two Martin Marietta quarries from its preapproved lists of limestone aggregate suppliers, Martin Marietta unsuccessfully sought pre- and post-deprivation hearings from KDOT. Among its many claims in its federal lawsuit, Martin Marietta asserted a property-right claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming a property interest in keeping its two quarries on “the approved list” of aggregate suppliers, and a liberty interest in its reputation as a supplier of quality materials under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court disagreed, dismissing these claims on the pleadings. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that Martin Marietta had not plausibly alleged a protected property interest, and thus that KDOT did not violate Martin Marietta’s procedural-due-process rights by failing to provide pre- or post-deprivation hearings. Furthermore, the Court held that Martin Marietta had no cognizable liberty interest, because KDOT did not make defamatory statements about Martin Marietta and because Martin Marietta failed to allege sufficiently significant harm to its business. View "Martin Marietta Materials v. Kansas DOT" on Justia Law