Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Richard Hightower, a pretrial detainee, was attacked by his cellmate, Anthony Tyler, in a Philadelphia jail, resulting in Hightower's paralysis. Hightower was classified as a low-security risk, while Tyler was classified as a high-security risk with a history of violent behavior. Due to a mistake by a prison health services company, Tyler was placed in Hightower's intake cell instead of being transferred to a permanent cell. Tyler's aggressive behavior escalated, culminating in a violent attack on Hightower.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Philadelphia and the guards. Hightower did not appeal the judgment for the guard but did appeal the judgment for the city.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Hightower failed to prove that the city caused any constitutional violation. To succeed in his Monell claim, Hightower needed to show that the city had an unconstitutional policy or custom or was deliberately indifferent to inmates' rights. The court found that the city had no policy of not separating inmates by security-risk level during intake and that the lack of a policy is not a policy. Additionally, Hightower could not show a custom that violated his rights or that the city acted with deliberate indifference. The court concluded that the risk to Hightower was not so obvious that the city could be held liable without a pattern of similar violations.The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's summary judgment in favor of the City of Philadelphia. View "Hightower v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

A New York wine retailer, Jean Paul Weg LLC, and its owner, Lars Neubohn, challenged New Jersey's regulations that require wine retailers to have a physical presence in the state and to purchase their products from New Jersey licensed wholesalers. These regulations prevent the retailer from directly shipping wine to New Jersey customers. The plaintiffs argued that these requirements violate the Commerce Clause by discriminating against out-of-state economic interests.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, including the Director of the New Jersey Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control and the Attorney General of New Jersey. The District Court found that New Jersey's regulations were justified by legitimate local purposes, such as ensuring alcohol sold to New Jersey consumers passes through the state's three-tier system and facilitating inspections to ensure compliance with regulations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit held that New Jersey's regulations, while discriminatory in effect, were justified on legitimate nonprotectionist grounds. The court found that the physical presence requirement facilitates inspections and investigations, while the wholesaler purchase requirement helps quickly identify sources of contamination and facilitates product recalls. Additionally, the court determined that these regulations are essential features of New Jersey's three-tier system of alcohol regulation, which is "unquestionably legitimate" under the Twenty-first Amendment. Therefore, the challenged regulations were upheld as constitutional. View "Jean-Paul Weg LLC v. Director of the New Jersey Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control" on Justia Law

Krishna Kishore Geda and Chaya Durga Sruthi Keerthi Nunna, married Indian nationals residing in the U.S. on employment-based nonimmigrant visas, filed I-485 applications for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residents. After waiting nearly eight years, they were informed that their applications were on hold due to the unavailability of the required immigrant visa. Frustrated by the delay, they sued the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and its Director, claiming unlawful withholding and unreasonable delay under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed their claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, stating that the Adjudication Hold Policy is a discretionary decision shielded from judicial review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Third Circuit held that the decision to delay adjudication of the Gedas' applications under the Adjudication Hold Policy is a discretionary action specified under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), which grants the Secretary of Homeland Security broad discretion over the adjustment of status process. Consequently, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which precludes judicial review of discretionary decisions by the Secretary of Homeland Security. The court concluded that only the executive and legislative branches could provide the relief sought by the Gedas. View "Geda v. Director United States Citizenship and Immigration" on Justia Law

Third Circuit rejects "reverse" False Claims Act suit involving Small Business Administration.The SBA, a federal agency, provided $90 million to L Capital, a venture capital group, through the purchase of securities. L Capital invested $4 million in preferred shares of Simparel. The Certificate of Incorporation specified that Simparel must pay preferred shareholders accrued dividends if Simparel’s Board exercised its discretion to pay the dividends or if Simparel underwent liquidation, dissolution, or windup. The SBA was appointed as L Capital’s receiver after Simparel failed to comply with its funding agreement. Petras, Simparel’s Chief Financial Officer, claimed that this failure resulted in the SBA becoming a preferred shareholder, entitled to accrued dividends. The Simparel Board never declared dividends nor did Simparel undergo liquidation, dissolution, or windup. Petras claimed that the Simparel defendants engaged in fraudulent conduct—to which he objected—to avoid paying the contingent dividends: hiding Simparel’s deteriorating financial condition; failing to hold board meetings: and neglecting to send the SBA Simparel’s financial statements. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the “reverse FCA” claim. The Simparel defendants could not have “knowingly and improperly avoid[ed] or decrease[d] an obligation” to pay the accrued dividends at the time of their alleged misconduct because the obligation did not yet exist. View "Petras v. Simparel, Inc." on Justia Law

The Mirabellas alleged that their neighbors extended their backyard into wetlands owned by Montgomery Township, Pennsylvania by fencing the open space, placing playground equipment, and landscaping. They complained to the Township, which removed the fence, required the neighbors to move their playground equipment and required the neighbors to stop landscaping the open space. The Mirabellas alleged the neighbors continued to “cut and clear.” They continued to complain. The Township gave the neighbors permission to mow the open space. The Mirabellas, both attorneys, notified the Township Board that they intended to sue their neighbors and stated that, as the owner of the open space, “the Township will be an indispensable party.” Officials interpreted this as a threat that the Mirabellas would sue the Township and responded that the Township would seek sanctions. The Board’s chair, Walsh, emailed the Mirabellas to “direct all further communications to the Township attorney. Please never contact me, the Board of Supervisors or the Township employees directly.” The Mirabellas attended a Board meeting and protested the destruction of the open space and the emails. The Mirabellas filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment violations. The district court rejected claims of qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed. While the Mirabellas adequately alleged a retaliation claim and a violation of their right to petition, those rights were not clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity. View "Mirabella v. Villard" on Justia Law

Edinboro, a Pennsylvania public university, collaborated with Edinboro University Foundation, a nonprofit entity, to construct new dormitories. In 2008, the Foundation amended its Articles of Incorporation to authorize borrowing funds “to acquire, lease, construct, develop and/or manage real or personal property.” The University leased property to the Foundation in a favorable location; the Foundation issued bonds to raise the funds and completed construction. Since 1989, the University required non-commuting first-year and transfer students to reside on-campus for two consecutive semesters. Two and one-half years after the first phase of the new dormitories opened, the University amended its policy to require certain students to reside on-campus for four consecutive semesters. Businesses that provide off-campus housing sued, asserting that the University and the Foundation conspired to monopolize the student housing market in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2. Plaintiffs did not sue the University, conceding that it is an arm of the state subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal. The University’s actions are not categorically “sovereign” for purposes of “Parker” immunity, so the court employed heightened scrutiny, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, (1985), which requires anticompetitive conduct to conform to a clearly articulated state policy. The University’s conduct withstands Hallie scrutiny. The Foundation’s actions were directed by the University, so the Foundation is also immune. View "Edinboro College Park Apartments v. Edinboro University Foundation" on Justia Law

Maliandi alleges that she began working for Montclair State University (MSU) in 2007 and took medical leave for breast cancer treatment in 2013. Despite having complied with all policies and procedures for taking such leave, Maliandi allegedly was denied her original position when she returned and instead was offered an inferior position, which she declined. She was subsequently terminated. Maliandi then filed suit against MSU, citing the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601 and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. 10:5-1 to -49. The district court denied a motion dismiss, determining that MSU is not the state’s alter ego for purpose of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Third Circuit reversed, applying a balancing test to the “close case” and concluding that MSU is an arm of the state. While the funding factor counsels against immunity the status under state law and autonomy factors weigh in favor of extending MSU immunity from suit. In analyzing the funding factor, the court considered the state’s legal obligation to pay a money judgment entered against MSU; alternative sources of funding from which MSU could pay such judgments; and specific statutory provisions that immunize the state from liability for money judgments. View "Maliandi v. Montclair State University" on Justia Law

From 2009-2012, the federal government appropriated $150 million annually to the government of the Virgin Islands; Willis was Executive Director of the Legislature for the Virgin Islands, with authority to administer contracts. During Willis’s tenure, the legislature’s main building underwent major renovations. Willis was substantially involved in securing contractors. Three contractors later testified that they gave cash or other items of value to Willis to secure more government work or to ensure payment of their invoices. In 2010, the U.S. Department of the Interior audited the legislature’s administrative section while the renovations were taking place and concluded that the legislature had mismanaged public funds. After an investigation, an indictment issued for Willis’s prosecution on extortion charges (18 U.S.C. 1951(a)) and bribery charges (18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)). The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction and five-year prison term, upholding admission of evidence of Willis’s prior acceptance of bribes. The indictment adequately alleged all required elements of bribery: the parties, the relevant amounts of money exchanged, where the illegal transactions occurred, that Willis used his public position unlawfully, specific details of each transaction, and improper purposes under the federal statutes. The government proved a sufficient nexus between Willis’s conduct or his status as Executive Director and a corresponding effect on federal funds. View "United States v. Willis" on Justia Law

In 2011, in response to a severe budget crisis, the Government of the Virgin Islands enacted the Virgin Islands Economic Stability Act (VIESA), which reduced most government employees’ salaries by 8%. Many government employees were covered by collective bargaining agreements that set forth detailed salary and benefit schedules. Their unions sued, alleging that the VIESA salary reductions constituted an impermissible impairment of the collective bargaining agreements, in violation of the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution. The district court, after a bench trial, held that VIESA did not violate the Contract Clause. The Third Circuit reversed, first holding that the issue is not moot, although VIESA has expired. The court’s determination will have a preclusive effect in pending arbitration between the unions and the government, concerning wages not paid in the interim. VIESA’s substantial impairment of the collective bargaining agreements was not reasonable in light of the fact that the government knew of its precarious financial condition when it agreed to the contracts. View "United Steel Paper and Forestry Rubber Manufacturing Allied Industrial & Service Workers International Union AFL- CIO- CLC v. Government of the Virgin Islands" on Justia Law

The district court dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, a constitutional challenge to an electronic surveillance program operated by the National Security Agency (NSA) under the authority of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1881a. The court noted that the plaintiff failed to plead facts from which one might reasonably infer that his own communications had been seized by the federal government. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. The second amended complaint alleged that because the government was “intercepting, monitoring and storing the content of all or substantially all of the e-mail sent by American citizens,” plaintiff’s own online communications had been seized in the dragnet. That allegation sufficiently pleaded standing to sue for a violation of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Plaintiff may lack actual standing to sue; the government may, on remand to make a factual jurisdictional challenge to that pleading. The alleged facts—even if proven—do not conclusively establish that a dragnet on the scale alleged by plaintiff. On remand, the court must closely supervise limited discovery. View "Schuchardt v. President of the United States" on Justia Law