Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), 114 Stat. 202, requires the government, if it seizes property that someone else purports to own, to file a complaint for judicial forfeiture within 90 days or return the property, 18 U.S.C. 983(a)(3)(A). The government has a heightened burden of proof. The Langbords purportedly found, in their father’s safe deposit box, 10 double eagle $20 gold coins, minted in 1933, allegedly “the most valuable ounce of gold in the world.” President Roosevelt issued an executive order in 1933 removing gold coins from circulation. In 2004, the Langbords made the coins available to the government for authentication. When the Langbords requested their return, the Mint responded: “they already are, and always have been, property belonging to the United States; this makes forfeiture proceedings entirely unnecessary.” Langbords submitted a “seized asset claim,” demanding return of the coins or institution of civil forfeiture. The Mint refused to take action. The Langbords filed suit. The Third Circuit intially found that the Langbords were entitled to the coins, but, on rehearing, en banc, held that they were always the property of the government. The evidence demonstrated overwhelmingly that no 1933 Double Eagle ever left the Mint through authorized channels. The district court did not err when it ordered the government to pursue judicial forfeiture; certain errors were committed at trial, but did not affect the outcome. View "Langbord v. United States Dep't of the Treasury" on Justia Law

In 2009 the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) suspected that Dr. Melgen, a Florida-based ophthalmologist​, had overbilled Medicare for $8.9 million by engaging in “multi-dosing.” Before CMS began formal proceedings, U.S. Senator Menendez (New Jersey) began to advocate on behalf of the doctor. In 2015, a 22-count indictment charged that Menendez solicited and accepted numerous gifts from Melgen; used the power of his office to influence the CMS enforcement action and to encourage the State Department and U.S. Customs to intervene on Melgen’s behalf in a multimillion dollar contract dispute with the Dominican Republic. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of motions to dismiss the Indictment, finding that the senator is not protected from prosecution under the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, section 6, cl. 1, which states that Members of Congress “shall not be questioned in any other Place” for “any Speech or Debate in either House.” The charged actions were not protected "legislative acts." The court rejected a separation of powers challenge to the Ethics in Government Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 4, 101-11; 18 U.S.C. 1001, and noted the Supreme Court’s statement “that Members [of Congress] are not to be ‘super-citizens’ immune from criminal liability or process.” View "United States v. Menendez" on Justia Law

Section 202(h) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 110 Stat. 56, requires the Federal Communications Commission to periodically examine its broadcast ownership rules to limit consolidation in the industry. After the Third Circuit reviewed the Commission’s 2002 and 2006 reviews of its ownership rules, “the process broke down.” The 2010 and 2014 reviews are not complete. In 2016, the Third Circuit held that the Commission has unreasonably delayed action on its definition of an “eligible entity,” a term it has attempted to use as a lynchpin for initiatives to promote minority and female broadcast ownership, and ordered mediation. The court speculated that it might be necessary to invalidate FCC rules in the future if the Commission does not act quickly to carry out its legislative mandate. The court vacated a rule based on Commission’s 2014 determination that parties were evading its limits on the number of television stations that an entity can own through the influence exerted by advertising contracts known as joint sales agreements. The rule was procedurally invalid because it was adopted even though the Quadrennial Review cycle was severely backlogged. View "Howard Stirk Holdings LLC v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n" on Justia Law

Teamsters Local 384 filed a representation petition with National Labor Relations Board Regional Director Walsh, seeking to represent workers at Advanced’s facilities. The proposed unit consisted of approximately 120 full-time and regular part-time drivers, helpers, and mechanics. The Union and Advanced entered into a Stipulated Election Agreement. Secret ballot elections were held at Advanced’s facilities, with 60 voters supporting unionization and 58 opposing it. Advanced challenged the outcome. A hearing officer and a three-member NLRB panel overruled all of Advanced’s objections. To preserve its right to appeal, Advanced refused to bargain with the certified bargaining unit. Director Walsh filed a Complaint and a three-member NLRB panel issued a Decision and Order, concluding that Advanced had violated 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5) by refusing “to bargain collectively with the representatives of [its] employees.” The Third Circuit affirmed and ordered enforcement, rejecting a claim that, because Walsh was appointed at a time when the Board lacked a valid quorum, his actions were ultra vires. Advanced did not lose the ability to challenge Walsh’s authority by failing to raise this issue during the representation proceeding, nor did the Stipulated Election Agreement constitute an implied accession to his authority. Walsh and the Board properly ratified their previously unauthorized actions. View "Advanced Disposal Servs. E., Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

The Textron Lycoming engine, manufactured in 1969, was installed on a Cessna aircraft in 1998. It was overhauled in 2004, with a carburetor in accordance with Lycoming’s type-certificated design. Sikkelee was piloting the aircraft when it crashed shortly after taking off. Sikkelee died. His estate sued, claiming that the aircraft lost power as a result of a malfunction or defect in the carburetor. The court held that Sikkelee’s claims, which were premised on state law standards of care, fell within the preempted “field of air safety.” An amended complaint incorporated federal standards of care by alleging violations of FAA regulations. Before trial, the court concluded that the federal standard of care was established in the type certificate. Reasoning that the FAA issues a type certificate based on its determination of compliance with pertinent regulations, it held that the FAA’s issuance of a type certificate for the engine meant that the federal standard of care had been satisfied as a matter of law. The court granted Lycoming partial summary judgment and certified an immediate appeal. The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that federal statutes and FAA regulations reflect that Congress did not intend to categorically preempt aircraft products liability claims. Subject to traditional principles of conflict preemption, including concerning specifications included in a type certificate, aircraft products liability cases may proceed using a state standard of care. View "Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp" on Justia Law

Under the South Pacific Tuna Treaty (SPTT), a limited number of licenses to fish the waters of the Pacific Island nations are available to vessels under the control and command of U.S. citizens. Moore, a law firm, filed suit under the False Claims Act against Korean nationals and LLCs, alleging that the LLCs acquired two SPTT licenses by fraudulently certifying to the U.S. government that they were controlled by U.S. citizens and that their fishing vessels were commanded by U.S. captains. Moore first learned of this alleged fraud through discovery in a wrongful death action that it litigated in federal court against two of the defendants. The district court dismissed, citing the FCA’s public disclosure bar and its “original source” exception, particularly the 2010 amendments to those provisions. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the alleged fraud was disclosed through any of the qualifying public disclosure sources, but that Moore has materially added to those public disclosures by contributing details of the alleged fraud that it independently uncovered through discovery in the wrongful death action in federal court. The court noted that the public disclosure bar is no longer jurisdictional. View "Moore & Co., P A v. Majestic Blue Fisheries LLC" on Justia Law

The members of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PPUC) and Core Communications, Inc., appealed a District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of AT&T Corp. Core billed AT&T for terminating phone calls from AT&T’s customers to Core’s Internet Service Provider (ISP) customers from 2004 to 2009. When AT&T refused to pay, Core filed a complaint with the PPUC, which ruled in Core’s favor. AT&T then filed suit in federal court seeking an injunction on the ground that the PPUC lacked jurisdiction over ISP-bound traffic because such traffic is the exclusive province of the Federal Communications Commission. After review of the matter, the Third Circuit found that the FCC’s jurisdiction over local ISP-bound traffic was not exclusive and the PPUC orders did not conflict with federal law. As such, the Court vacated the District Court’s order and remanded this case for entry of judgment in favor of Core and the members of the PPUC. View "AT&T Corp v. Core Communications Inc" on Justia Law