Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Mingo Logan applied to the Corps for a permit under section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1344, to discharge dredged or fill material from a mountain-top coal mine in West Virginia into three streams and their tributaries. The Corps issued the permit to Mingo Logan, approving the requested disposal sites for the discharged materials. Four years later, the EPA invoked its subsection 404(c) authority to "withdraw" the specifications of two of the streams as disposal sites, thereby prohibiting Mingo Logan from discharging them. Mingo Logan then filed this action challenging the EPA's withdrawal of the specified sites. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Mingo Logan and concluded that the EPA had post-permit withdrawal authority. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's recent authorization of a pilot program that allowed Mexico-domiciled trucking companies to operate trucks throughout the United States, so long as the trucking companies complied with certain federal safety standards. Drivers Association and Teamsters contended that the pilot program was unlawful. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that Drivers Association and Teamsters both have standing to challenge the pilot program. On the merits, the court concluded that all seven of Drivers Association's arguments and all six of Teamsters' arguments were unpersuasive. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "International Brotherhood of Teamsters, et al. v. DOT, et al." on Justia Law

The District of Columbia appealed from the structural injunction entered by the district court in this class action challenging the policies and practices of the District's "Child Find" system under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court vacated the order certifying the class, and consequently, the orders finding liability and ordering relief to that class. The court remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of whether a class, classes, or subclasses may be certified, and if so, thereafter to redetermine liability and appropriate relief. View "DL, et al v. DC, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against the District of Columbia and others regarding the pretrial conditions of his confinement. The District agreed that the the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a), requirement did not apply to plaintiff but urged the court to affirm the grant of summary judgment on his federal claims for failure to exhaust. The court joined its sister circuits and held that the PLRA exhaustion requirement did not apply because plaintiff was not a "prisoner" at the time he filed his complaint. Summary judgment was therefore inappropriately granted on his federal claims. As to his intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim, the court held that it had been abandoned because neither plaintiff's proposed amended complaint nor amicus brief, which he adopted, referenced that claim, and his pro se appellate brief provided no argument why the dismissal should be reversed. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and remanded plaintiff's federal claims to the district court. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Lesesne v. Doe, et al" on Justia Law

Indiana Boxcar, a holding company that owns several railroads, petitioned for review of the Board's determination that Indiana Boxcar was an "employer" for purposes of the Railroad Retirement Act and the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. 231, 351. To be an employer under those two Acts, a company such as Indiana Boxcar must be "under common control" with a railroad. Before this case, the Board repeatedly held that parent corporations like Indiana Boxcar were not under common control with their railroad subsidiaries. Under Board precedent, the term "common control" did not usually apply to two companies in a parent-subsidiary relationship. Here, however, the Board did not adhere to that precedent and did not reasonably explain and justify its deviation from its precedent. Therefore, the court held that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded to the Board. View "Indiana Boxcar Corp. v. RRRB" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from CREW's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, request to the FEC seeking several categories of records, including certain correspondence, calendars, agendas, and schedules of the Commissioners. At issue was when must a FOIA requester exhaust administrative appeal remedies before suing in federal district court to challenge an agency's failure to produce requested documents. The exhaustion issue in this case boiled down to what kind of agency response qualified as a "determination." The court held that, in order to make a "determination" within the statutory time periods and thereby trigger the administrative exhaustion requirement, the agency need not actually produce the documents within the relevant time period. But the agency must at least indicate within the relevant time period the scope of the documents its will produce and the exemptions it will claim with respect to any withheld documents. In this case, the FEC did not make such a "determination" and CREW was not required to exhaust administrative appeal remedies before filing its FOIA suit. Accordingly, the court reversed the contrary judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Citizens for Resp. and Ethics v. FEC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three applicants for attorney positions under the Honors Program in 2006, alleged that they were not selected for interviews because of their political affiliations. Plaintiffs claimed that senior officials at the DOJ created records describing how an individual exercised First Amendment rights, in violation of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, in the form of annotations to plaintiffs' applications and internet printouts concerning their political affiliations. The court held that summary judgment was inappropriately granted on plaintiffs' Privacy Act claims under 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(5) and (e)(7). In light of the destruction of plaintiffs' records, a permissive spoliation inference was warranted because the senior DOJ officials had a duty to preserve the annotated applications and internet printouts given that DOJ investigation and future litigation were reasonably foreseeable. On remand, the district court shall construe the evidence in light of this negative spoliation inference, which would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that two of the plaintiffs were harmed by creation and use of the destroyed records. View "Gerlich, et al v. DOJ, et al" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Cytori's application to the FDA to market two new medical devices, the Celution 700 and the StemSource 900. Two devices that use adipose tissue as a source of stem cells that could later be used in lab analysis or, potentially, in regenerative medicine. The FDA concluded that the Celution and the StemSource were not substantially similar to devices on the market that extract stem cells from blood or bone marrow. Thus, the FDA ruled that Cytori must go through an extensive premarket approval process for new medical devices, rather than go through the streamlined premarket notification process for new devices that would be substantially equivalent to another device already on the market. Cytori appealed. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that it was the proper forum for direct review of the FDA's substantial equivalence determination. On the merits, the court concluded that the FDA reasonably concluded and reasonably explained, for purposes of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., that the Celution and StemSource did not meet either the "intended use" requirement or the "technological characteristics" requirement for a substantial equivalence determination. View "Cytori Therapeutics, Inc. v. FDA" on Justia Law

Lone Mountain petitioned for review of an order of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission denying the company's motions to reopen closed civil penalty proceedings. Following the guidance of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), the Commission has long held that it may reopen otherwise final orders, including those that have been rendered final pursuant to the Federal Mine Safety Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 815(a). The court held that the Commission's order was arbitrary and capricious, and agreed with Lone Mountain's argument that the Commission abused its discretion by departing from its own precedent without explanation. Accordingly, the court need not consider Lone Mountain's alternative arguments. View "Lone Mountain Processing Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, et al" on Justia Law

FERC fined petitioner $30 million for manipulating natural gas futures contracts. Petitioner, an employee of the hedge fund Amaranth, claimed that FERC lacked authority to fine him because the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) had exclusive jurisdiction over all transactions involving commodity futures contracts. The court granted the petition for review because manipulation of natural gas futures contracts fell within the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction and because nothing in the Energy Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. 717c-1, clearly and manifestly repealed the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction. View "Hunter v. FERC" on Justia Law