Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal stemmed from plaintiffs' suit against the government after the government alleged that plaintiffs failed to file adequate tax returns. The court understood plaintiffs' pro se appeal to contend that the government had waived the limitations defense by failing to raise it in its first dispositive motion. The court expressed no opinion on the government's jurisdictional argument and concluded instead that the government had not forfeited its limitations defense. The court also found plaintiffs' argument that the statute of limitations should have been tolled was without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety. View "Kim, et al v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Congress's amendment of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7545(o), to establish a renewable fuel standard (RFS) program. API objected to the EPA's 2012 projection for cellulosic biofuel and to its refusal to reduce the applicable advanced biofuels volume for 2012. The court rejected API's argument that the EPA failed to justify its determination not to reduce the applicable advanced biofuels volume for 2012. However, because the EPA's methodology for making its cellulosic biofuel projection did not take neutral aim at accuracy, the court held that it was an unreasonable exercise of agency discretion. Accordingly, the court vacated the 2012 RFS rule and remanded for further proceedings. View "American Petroleum Institute v. EPA" on Justia Law

The DEA, under the authority of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. 812(b)(1)(B), classified marijuana as a Schedule I drug, the most restricted drug classification under the Act. Petitioners challenged the DEA's denial of its petition to initiate proceedings to reschedule marijuana as a Schedule III, IV, or V drug. The principal issue on appeal was whether the DEA's decision was arbitrary and capricious. First, the court denied the Government's jurisdictional challenge because the court found that at least one of the named petitioners had standing to challenge the agency's action. On the merits, the court held that the DEA's denial of the rescheduling petition survived review under the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard where the petition asked the DEA to reclassify marijuana, which, under the terms of the Act, required a "currently accepted medical use." A "currently accepted medical use" required, inter alia, "adequate and well-controlled studies proving efficacy." The court deferred to the agency's interpretation of these regulations and found that substantial evidence supported the agency's determination that such studies did not exist. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Americans for Safe Access, et al v. DEA" on Justia Law

Petitioner objected to an order of the FERC that allowed certain rates to be reduced as a corrective to the exercise of "supply-side" market power, but which declined to resolve petitioner's call for a parallel intervention to protect suppliers from what petitioner called "buy-side" market power. Concluding that the court had jurisdiction to consider petitioner's arguments, the court concluded that it had no reason to think that "the total effect of the rate order" was unjust and unreasonable, but the court had affirmative reason to believe that petitioner would have an adequate opportunity to pursue remedies for possible uneconomic entry. The court further concluded that the Commission did not abuse its discretion; in struggling to address the complexities posed by regional integration and independent systems operators, the Commission has pursued an iterative process with the court's explicit approval at least in one case, TC Ravenswood v. FERC; the specific context of the mitigation orders here exemplified the iterative process; and the court rejected petitioner's argument that the Commission violated due process and other obligations by neglecting to answer petitioner's arguments and proposals. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "TC Ravenswood, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Sierra Club sought review of the EPA's regulations regarding particulate matter less than 2.5 micrometers under Section 166 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7476. After the Sierra Club filed its petition, the EPA acknowledged that portions of the rule establishing Significant Impact Levels (SILs) did not reflect its intent in promulgating the SILs, and requested that the court vacate and remand some parts of its regulations. Notwithstanding the EPA's concession, the Sierra Club maintained that the EPA lacked authority to establish SILs. The court vacated and remanded to the EPA for further consideration the portions of the EPA's rule addressing SILs, except for the parts of its ruling in 40 C.F.R. 51.165(b)(2). The court granted Sierra Club's petition as to the parts of the EPA's rule establishing the Significant Monitoring Concentration (SMC), and vacated them because these parts of the rule exceeded the EPA's statutory authority. View "Sierra Club v. EPA" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the EPA's administration of a cap-and-trade program regulating the production and consumption of hydrochlorofluorcarbons (HCFCs) under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7671d(c), 7671e(b). The program entailed overall caps on production and consumption of various HCFCs for each year, as well as EPA-administered baseline allowances of HCFCs for each participating company. Companies were then permitted to transfer their allowances subject to certain statutory and regulatory restrictions. Honeywell complained that certain 2008 transfers made by their competitors Arkema and Solvay were deemed to permanently increase those competitors' future baseline allowances of HCFCs. The court concluded that Honeywell's claim was foreclosed by the court's decision in Arkema, Inc. V. EPA, which held that the EPA, having approved the 2008 interpollutant transfers, had to honor them in the future at least so long as the EPA continued to set baselines by considering the historical usage of HCFCs by participating companies. The Arkema Court necessarily concluded that permanent interpollutant transfers were permissible under the statute. Absent en banc review, the court must adhere to circuit precedent. Because Honeywell's other challenges to the 2008 transfers were meritless, the court denied the petition for review. View "Honeywell International, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

DISH, a direct broadcast satellite provider, challenged two orders of the Commission because they imposed "encoding rules," which limited the means of encoding that cable and satellite service providers could employ to prevent unauthorized access to their broadcasts. The court held that the FCC's decision to apply these encoding rules exceeded the agency's statutory authority. Consequently, the court need not reach DISH's alternate contention that the decision was arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review. View "EchoStar Satellite, LLC v. FCC, et al" on Justia Law

ARTBA challenged the EPA's regulations relating to nonroad engines and vehicles several years after the regulations were promulgated. As such, ARTBA's challenges to the regulations were time-barred under the Clean Air Act's, 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1), 60-day filing period. ARTBA also challenged the EPA's approval of California's State Implementation Plan, but that challenged must be brought in the Ninth Circuit. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "American Road & Transportation v. EPA, et al" on Justia Law

GameFly filed a complaint under 39 U.S.C. 3662(a) with the Commission accusing the Postal Service of providing preferential rates and terms of service to Netflix in violation of 39 U.S.C. 403(c). When the Commission properly finds that discrimination has occurred, it is obligated to remedy that discrimination, even if it concludes that none of the parties' proposed remedies is appropriate. The court held that, in this case, even if the Commission's rejection of GameFly's proposed remedies was reasonable, its order was still arbitrary and capricious because it left discrimination in place without reasonable explanation. Therefore, the court vacated the Commission's order and remanded the case for an adequate remedy. Accordingly, the court granted GameFly's petition for review. View "GameFly, Inc. v. PRC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two widowed spouses of homeowners with reverse-mortgage contracts, brought suit against the Secretary of HUD, alleging that HUD's regulation defining the conditions under which it would insure a reverse-mortgage agreement was inconsistent with the applicable statute. The court held that the district court correctly reasoned that if relief for plaintiffs' injuries depended on the independent actions of the lenders, then plaintiffs would lack standing. The court held, however, that assuming the regulation was unlawful, HUD itself had the capability to provide complete relief to the lenders and mortgagors alike, which eliminated the uncertainty of third-party action that would otherwise block standing. Because the court decided that plaintiffs had standing, the court need not consider their alternative argument. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bennett, et al v. Donovan" on Justia Law