Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Postal Service sought review of the Commission's 2010 Annual Compliance Determination (ACD), which found in part that the rates for a particular product - Standard Mail Flats - were in violation of 39 U.S.C. 101(d)'s mandate. The Postal Service argued that the 2006 Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA), Title 39 of the U.S. Code, did not permit reliance on section 101(d) for purposes of the ACD, and that the determination regarding Standard Flats was otherwise arbitrary and capricious. The court concluded that the Commission acted within its statutory authority but remanded for an explanation of the relation between its remedy, on one hand, and its treatment of other products and indeed the bounds of its authority, on the other.

Plaintiffs, owners of two dairy operations, appealed the dismissal of their constitutional challenges to two provisions of the Milk Regulatory Equity Act of 2005 (MREA), 7 U.S.C. 608c. Plaintiffs alleged that the provisions, which subjected certain large producer-handlers of milk to contribution requirements applicable to all milk handlers, constituted a bill of attainder and violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Because the court found that the MREA did not apply with specificity to affected persons, the court need not address whether it satisfied either of the remaining elements of a bill of attainder. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claim. In regards to plaintiffs' remaining arguments, the court held that mere disparity of treatment was not sufficient to state an equal protection violation. The court also found that the government provided an explanation that was not only rational on its face but also had been consistently recognized by the courts as legitimate. Further, plaintiffs failed to plead the threshold requirement of a due process claim: that the government had interfered with a cognizable liberty or property interest. Finally, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow plaintiffs to file a supplemental complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff sued United States Attorney General Eric Holder, alleging that the FBI refused to hire him as a special agent because of his Type I diabetes in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. A jury found in favor of plaintiff and awarded him compensatory damages. Subsequently, the district court denied both Holder's motion for judgment as a matter of law and plaintiff's request for equitable relief. Both parties appealed. The court held that a reasonable jury could reasonably conclude that plaintiff's diabetes and treatment regiment "substantially limited" his major life activity of eating and that plaintiff was therefore disabled within the meaning of the Act. Rejecting the remaining arguments, the court held that the district court did not err in denying Holder's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of equitable relief to plaintiff and rejected plaintiff's assertion that the district court erred in denying him front pay or instatement based on Holder's after-acquired evidence defense and in determining that plaintiff was not entitled to back pay based on the testimony of Holder's expert witness.

Manufacturers obtained authorization from the Board to discontinue service over its entire system but the Board did not apply its entire-system exception. Instead, the Board required Manufacturers to pay dismissal allowances to its dismissed employees. The court concluded that the Board did not reasonably explain and justify the departure from its longstanding entire-system exception. Therefore, the court found that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board's decision, and remanded for further proceedings.

The Postal Service determined, in two informal adjudications, that PenAir was qualified to carry "nonpriority bypass mail" on five Alaska routes. The Postal Service acted pursuant to the Rural Service Improvement Act of 2002, 39 U.S.C. 5402(a)(4), (a)(13), and (g)(4)(A) and (5), which permitted PenAir to enter five routes as what was termed a "mainline bypass mail carrier" only if it met certain statutory conditions. Three competing carriers sued to challenge the Postal Service's determinations as contrary to the Act. The district court ultimately concluded that the Postal Service's position was authorized. The court held, however, that the three relevant statutory sections were quite ambiguous and because the court had no authoritative Postal Service interpretations of the statute at issue, the court vacated the district court's judgment with instructions to remand.

Occidental and a number of its subsidiaries petitioned for review of final orders of the FERC granting negotiated rate authority to Tres Amigas, a proposed energy transmission project. Occidental argued that Tres Amigas did not satisfy the criteria the FERC had set out as preconditions for such authority. Because the court concluded that Occidental lacked standing to challenge these orders, the court did not reach this question and instead dismissed the petition.

Dayton was served with a citation alleging over 100 willful violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. 654. Dayton contested the citation and by 1997, its appeal was before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. Twelve years later, the Commission issued an order affirming nearly all of the violations and assessed a penalty. Dayton asked the court to set aside the order because of the Commission's delay. The court declined, holding that the delay alone was not enough to set aside the order. The court held, however, that the Commission lacked substantial supporting evidence for its finding that Dayton's violations were willful. Accordingly, the court vacated that portion of the Commission's order and remanded for the Commission to reassess the nature of Dayton's violations and recalculate the appropriate penalty. The court affirmed the Commission's order in all other respects.

Noble Energy and other lessees sued in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging that application of the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1451-1464, suspension requests constituted a material breach of their lease agreements to drill for, develop, and produce oil and natural gas on submerged lands off the coast of California. The Court of Federal Claims agreed; on appeal the Federal Circuit affirmed. One year after the Federal Circuit's decision in the breach-of-contract litigation, the Minerals Management Service (MMS), sent a letter to Noble ordering it to plug and abandon Well 320-2 permanently. The district court ruled that the common law doctrine of discharge did not relieve Noble of the regulatory obligation to plug its well permanently, an obligation that the lease did not itself create. Resolution of the dispute depended on what the plugging regulations meant. The court held that it was up to MMS's successor to interpret its regulation in the first instance and to determine whether they apply in situations like Noble's. If they do, the agency must explain why. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and sent the case back to the district court with instructions to vacate Interior's order and to remand to the Secretary for further proceedings.

This case arose when plaintiffs filed a class action complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the District was violating the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq. Since 1993, a consent decree has governed how the District provides "early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services" under the Act. The District has now asked the district court to vacate that decree on two grounds: that an intervening Supreme Court decision has made clear that plaintiffs lack a private right of action to enforce the Medicaid Act, and that in any event, the District has come into compliance with the requirements of the Act. Because the court concluded that the district court's rejection of one of the District's two arguments did not constitute an order "refusing to dissolve [an] injunction[]" within the meaning 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1), the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners sought partial vacation of a final rule designating certain areas of nonattainment for the 2006 24-hour fine particulate matter standard. Petitioners challenged the inclusion of parts of Tooele and Box Elder Counties within the Salt Lake City nonattainment area. The EPA concluded that emissions from eastern portions of both Box Elder County and Tooele County contributed to nearby violations of the 24-hour fine particulate matter. Because EPA's nine-factor test was intended to be applied on a case-by-case basis to account for diverse considerations, including the varying effects of local topography and meteorology on the 24-hour fine particulate matter dispersion, and EPA reasonably explained its designations, the court denied the petition for review.