Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Several company operators filed a complaint against petitioner with the FCC, which ruled that petitioner's increased pole attachment rates violated the Pole Attachment Act, 47 U.S.C. 224(d), and the FCC's implementing regulations. Petitioner now sought review of that order, arguing that the Act failed to provide for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment and that the FCC's decision was arbitrary and capricious, or was otherwise not supported by substantial evidence. The court found the doctrine of collateral estoppel a fatal bar to petitioner's assertion of the constitutional issue, and its remaining arguments unavailing. Accordingly, the court denied the petition.

Petitioner filed a petition with the court, purporting to challenge the NRC's decision to reinstate the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) construction permits for the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant. Petitioner stated that it was not challenging the NRC order, but rather, petitioner asserted that its petitions for review challenged only a compilation of "Response Sheets" filed by individual Commissioners in December 2008 and January 2009. Petitioner contended that this compilation of Commissioners' views resulted in a final order on January 27, 2009. Under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2342(4), the court had jurisdiction to review only "final orders" of the NRC. The court held that the petitions at issue did not seek review of final NRC orders and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed.

Braintree, and other municipally owned utilities in southeastern Massachusetts, petitioned for review of four orders of the Commission. The orders denied petitioners' claim that they were being unjustly charged in order to ensure system reliability on Cape Code. The dispute was first addressed in a FERC-approved settlement agreement that reserved certain litigation rights to the petitioners. Because the Commission reasonably resolved the claims that were reserved, and reasonably construed the settlement agreement to foreclose petitioners' additional claims, the court affirmed the Commission's orders and denied the petitions for review.

The Department petitioned for review of a decision of the Authority that adopted a new standard to determine when a negotiated contract provision was an "appropriate arrangement" under 5 U.S.C. 7106(b)(3) and an agency head's disapproval thereof would therefore be set aside. Because the Department failed to move for reconsideration objecting to the Authority's use of the abrogation standard to review the agency head's disapproval of the negotiated agreement, the court dismissed the Department's petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to section 7123(c).

This case arose when Conrail sold its Harsimus Embankment in Jersey City to developers. The City, together with others interested in the historic and environmental value of the Embankment, sued Conrail alleging that the sale was unlawful because Conrail failed to obtain authority from the Surface Transportation Board (STB) to abandon the property. The district court dismissed the case for lack of standing. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the City enjoyed Article III standing where Conrail's refusal to invoke STB proceedings injured the City by depriving it of the benefits of those proceedings and the City's injury could be redressed by a district court ruling that the Embankment qualified as "railroad line" that Conrail could not abandon without STB approval.

Plaintiff, a DEA special agent, was presenting in front of a group of about 50 children and parents at a community center, where he displayed his DEA-issued firearm while discussing gun safety, when his firearm accidentally discharged and shot him in the thigh. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against the DEA alleging that disclosure of the four minute, nine second video-recording of plaintiff's presentation on internet websites and on the DEA's internal e-mail system violated the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to the DEA on both claims. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that plaintiff failed to establish the elements of his Privacy Act claim - specifically, that the video was retrieved from a system of records and that the disclosure was intentional or willful. The court also held that plaintiff's FTCA claim failed because he did not establish all of the elements under Florida law for the tort of invasion of privacy by public disclosure of a private fact where the video contained no private facts and where the accidental discharge was a matter of public concern.

El Paso operated an interstate pipeline that transported natural gas to California and other western states, and Freeport shipped gas on El Paso's pipeline to power its various mining, smelting, and refining facilities. El Paso and Freeport separately challenged several orders of the Commission issued in connection with El Paso's 2005 rate filing and subsequent settlement. The court denied the petition for review and held that the Commission's reasoning was sound when it found that the CAP Orders had neither changed the bargain underlying the 1996 Settlement nor abrogated Article 11.2 of the Settlement. The court also held that the Commission reasonably determined the converted FR contracts were "amended" within the meaning of that term in Article 11.2; Article 11.2 applied to turnback capacity; the applicable rate cap for turnback capacity was determined by the shipper's delivery point; Article 11.2 did not apply to capacity created by the Line 2000 project; and where the Commission adopted the presumption that the capacity of El Paso's system on December 31, 1995 was 4000 MMcf/d. The court further found that the Commission's approval of the Settlement appropriate under the so-called Trailblazer Pipeline Co. approach. Accordingly, the Commission's orders were not arbitrary or capricious and the petitions for review were denied.

The petition for review before the court arose from a dispute between the IURC and PJM, which, subject to the Commission's oversight, operated the market for wholesale electricity in the District of Columbia and all or parts of 13 states, including Indiana. The IURC petitioned for review of an order of the Commission approving the tariff of PJM. The court dismissed the petition insofar as it challenged the order on grounds that the IURC did not raise with sufficient specificity in its request for rehearing by the Commission pursuant to 16 U.S.C. 825l(b). In all other respects, the court denied the petition because the IURC had not shown the Commission acted unreasonably.

Republic challenged an order of the DOT withdrawing two Republic "slot exemptions" at Reagan National and reallocating those exemptions to Sun Country. "Slots" were take-off and landing rights. In both an informal letter to Republic and a final order, DOT held that Republic's parent company engaged in an impermissible slot-exemption transfer with Midwest. In so holding, DOT summarily dismissed Republic's argument that, under DOT and Federal Aviation Administration precedent, the Republic-Midwest slot-exemption transfer was permissible because it was ancillary to Republic Holdings' acquisition of Midwest. The court held that because DOT had departed from its precedent without adequate explanation, its decision could not survive arbitrary and capricious review. Accordingly, the court granted Republic's petition for review and vacated DOT's order.

Appellants, manufacturers, distributors, and users of ear candles, along with organizations that advocate the use of holistic health remedies like ear candles, challenged warning letters the FDA issued to several manufacturers, advising that the agency considered their candles to be adulterated and misbranded medical devices. The district court dismissed appellants' complaint on the ground, among others, that the warning letters did not constitute final agency action. The court affirmed the district court's order to dismiss for failure to state a claim because the warning letters, even as supplemented by the FDA's website and appellants' conversations with FDA officials, did not constitute final agency action and therefore, appellants' complaint was not cognizable under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq.