Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, which owned a nuclear power plant, entered into the standard U.S. Department of Energy contract, under which DOE agreed to collect spent nuclear fuel (SNF) no later than 1998. DOE never began collecting SNF and has breached contracts nationwide. Massachusetts restructured the electric utility industry and, in 1999, the plant sold for $80 million; buyer agreed to accept decommissioning responsibilities for $428 million. The district court awarded $40 million for the portion of the decommissioning fund corresponding to projected post-decommissioning SNF-related costs attributable to DOEâs continuing breach. The court awarded the buyer $4 million in mitigation damages, including direct and overhead costs for new spent fuel racks and fees paid to the NRC. The Federal Circuit reversed in part and remanded. Plaintiff cannot recover damages under a diminution-of-value theory in a partial breach setting. The sale of assets does not alter the principle that when the breaching party has not repudiated and is still expected to perform, anticipated damages are not recoverable until incurred. A non-breaching party may recover from the government indirect overhead costs associated with mitigation and the costs of financing those activities.

The Court of Federal Claims dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the most recent claims brought by the Samish Indian Nation in its continuing quest for federal recognition and benefits. The claims court reasoned that some of the allegations were not premised upon any statute that was money-mandating, and that allegations reliant on money-mandating statutes were limited by other statutes, so that they fell outside the scope of the Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. 1491(a)) and the Indian Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. 1505). The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to some of the allegations because the Tribal Priority Allocation system (25 CFR 46.2) is not money-mandating. The court reversed dismissal of claims under the Revenue Sharing Act, reasoning that the court's ability to provide a monetary remedy under that law is not limited by operation of the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. 1341.

Petitioner married in 2001. Her husband had retired unmarried under the Civil Service Retirement System and elected to receive an annuity payable during his lifetime with no survivor benefits. He died in 2003, and petitioner's application for survivor annuity benefits was denied. After considering evidence about a conversation that husband purportedly had with one of its employees, the Office of Personnel Management affirmed, stating that husband could have elected to receive a reduced lifetime annuity with survivor benefits for a new wife only by notifying OPM of his intentions in a signed writing within two years of his marriage, 5 U.S.C. 8339(k)(2)(A). An administrative judge upheld the decision, stating that the decision would become final on June 21, 2004, unless a petition for review was filed. Petitioner did not file until 2010, claiming disability made her unable to attend to the matter. The Board denied her petition for review as untimely filed, finding no credible medical evidence regarding her condition. The Federal Circuit affirmed.

The class action alleged that National Guard members were required to take correspondence courses to keep positions or advance in rank and sought compensation for time spent on the courses. At the time, 37 U.S.C. 206 provided for compensation for: "equivalent training, instruction, duty, or appropriate duties, as the Secretary may prescribe . . . . This section does not authorize compensation for work or study performed by a member of a reserve component in connection with correspondence courses of an armed force." The Federal Circuit reversed dismissal. Meanwhile, Congress amended 37 U.S.C. 206(d), retroactively clarifying that National Guard members would not be compensated for correspondence courses. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a claim that retroactive application of these amendments amounted to taking of vested rights. The district court granted the government summary judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The earlier remand was not a holding that plaintiffs were entitled to compensation. The trial court had authority to consider and acted within its discretion in finding that none of the plaintiffs received written orders or authorizations from state commanders in connection with correspondence courses, so none were placed in a duty status necessary for federal payment.

Plaintiffs, California grape growers who purchased grapevines covered by the USDA's patents, brought this action to challenge the validity and enforceability of the USDA's patents on three varieties of grapes, as well as the conduct of the California Table Grape Commission (Commission) and the USDA in licensing and enforcing the patents. The court held that the district court correctly held that the USDA was a necessary party to plaintiffs' declaratory judgement claims based on the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. 1 et seq. The court also held that the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., was broad enough to allow plaintiffs to pursue equitable relief against the USDA on its patent law claims. The court further held that plaintiffs' claims were sufficient to overcome any presumption of regularity that could apply to a certain USDA employee who was one of the co-inventors of each of the three varieties of grapes. The court finally held that because plaintiffs failed to point to anything other than the issuance of a patent for the Sweet Scarlet grapes that would provide a plausible basis for finding that Sweet Scarlet grapes form a relevant antitrust market, the court upheld the district court's decision dismissing plaintiffs' antitrust claim.

In 1971 the veteran unsuccessfully sought benefits. In 1979, he sought to reopen and provided a psychiatric evaluation. The veteran took steps to appeal the regional office's refusal to reopen. The regional office requested form I-9 to "reactivate" the appeal. He responded that he had already sent the form. The VA responded in 1980 that no further action would be taken unless he submitted the form within 30 days. The veteran did not respond. In 1994, he again sought to reopen. The regional office granted him service connection for bipolar disorder with an effective date of 1994. He contended that the effective date should be 1979. In 2005 the Board rejected his "pending claim" argument because he had not filed Form 1-9 within one year of the 1979 decision. The veterans court agreed. The Federal Circuit reversed. An appeal should set out specific allegations of error of fact or law, such allegations related to specific items in the statement of the case (38 U.S.C. 7105(d)(3) ); the statute must be construed liberally. Since there was a single issue identified in the statement of the case, the 1980 letters were sufficient to identify the issue on appeal and satisfy the statute.

Petitioner served in active military duty from 1972 to 1979, and in the National Guard before and after active service. He also worked as a laborer in a supply company and in coal mines and as a carpenter. In 1997, he claimed entitlement to TDIU, which provides a veteran with a total disability rating when his disability rating is below 100% if the veteran is at least 60% disabled, meets other disability rating criteria, and is unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation as a result of service-connected disabilities. 1 C.F.R. 4.16(a). The VA rejected the claim and, on three remands, petitioner underwent a total of five VA medical examinations. In 2007, the Board denied the claim. The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. The VA was not obligated to obtain an industrial survey from a vocational expert in order to evaluate whether petitioner was employable in a job other than his former occupation (i.e., a job that did not involve heavy manual labor).

The World War II veteran died in 2004, during litigation of whether a hip injury was service-related. The VA dismissed a pending appeal as moot and rejected the widow's request to be substituted. The Federal Circuit reversed. The widow filed her own claim for accrued benefits. The motion to substitute was denied, but the widow was awarded accrued benefits and sought $87,802.17 in attorney fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412. The veterans' court determined that the widow had the right, as representative of the estate, to recover fees for attorney hours expended prior to his death, but had no right to recover fees for work performed after her husbandâs death. The Federal Circuit reversed, stating that attorney work performed after the veteran's death was directly related to his claim; it was his claim, not the widow's claim, that was being litigated.

In November 2001, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued an anti-dumping duty order on certain hot-rolled carbon steel flat products from Thailand, found that the company was selling the subject merchandise at less than normal value and assigned a dumping margin of 3.86%. In 2006 the order was partially revoked, as to the company, but remained in effect with respect to other exporters and producers. Commerce received a complaint that dumping had resumed and initiated changed circumstances review (CCR), despite the company's assertion that it lacked authority to so. The Court of International Trade (CIT) dismissed the company's suit for an injunction in 2009. Commerce reinstated the order with respect to the company; CIT affirmed. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that Commerce reasonably interpreted and acted on its revocation and CCR authority under 19 U.S.C. 1675(b, d) as permitting conditional revocation and reconsideration.

The Department of Justice issued a request for quotations for an automated recruiting and staffing system, providing that conflicting provisions would be considered as exceptions to the terms of the RFQ, and noting that any exceptions could adversely impact the evaluation rating. Plaintiff's bid included exceptions relating to confidentiality of data and how payments would be made, among other matters. Plaintiff's program obtained a higher score on a performance test. The DOJ disqualified plaintiff's bid and accepted intervenor's bid, stating that plaintiff's slight technical advantage did not justify the higher price and that plaintiff's exceptions were unacceptable. The government accountability office, claims court, and Federal Circuit upheld the decision. The contracting officer was not required to engage in discussions about the exceptions before disqualifying the bid and acted rationally in disqualifying the bid. The officer was entitled to rely on a certification of compliance with RFQ terms for the bid that was accepted and rationally accepted that bid.