Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In February, 2002, the Navy awarded GM&W a contract for floor coating at a military base. GM&W subcontracted with FloorPro, which completed the work on February 27, 2002 and billed GM&W. On March 8, the Navy informed GM&W that the work was completed satisfactorily. On April 17, FloorPro informed the Navy’s contracting officer that it had not been paid. GM&W had claims pending and was not sure whether funds that the Navy directly deposited would be available to FloorPro. In April 2002, the Navy and GM&W entered into contract modification providing for mailing to FloorPro of a check payable to GM&W and Floor-Pro. The Navy paid GM&W directly by electronic transfer and informed FloorPro that its recourse was to sue GM&W. In December 2002, FloorPro submitted a claim to the Navy’s contracting officer. On March 27, 2003, FloorPro filed at the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, which awarded $37,500. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that under the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 7101, ASBCA has no jurisdiction over a claim by a subcontractor. In 2009, FloorPro filed in the Court of Claims, which ruled in favor of FloorPro. The Federal Circuit vacated, ordering dismissal under the six-year limitations period of 28 U.S.C. 2501.

Whitmore began his federal government career in 1972. In 1990 his group transferred to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Prior to 2005, Whitmore regularly received better than satisfactory performance reviews, bonuses, and awards, and was never subject to discipline. In 2005, Whitmore began making public disclosures that OSHA was failing to enforce its recordkeeping requirements and acquiescing in industry reports of impossibly low numbers of injuries and illnesses. He provided comments to newspapers. Also in 2005, Whitmore provided an affidavit supporting a co-worker in her Equal Employment Opportunity complaint for alleged discrimination and retaliation by her managers at OSHA. Due to various medical and personal matters, Whitmore took significant leave from work. Following a number of additional incidents, he was removed from his position. The Merit Systems Protection Board upheld the termination. The Federal Circuit reversed. In analyzing whether the DOL had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Whitmore would have been removed regard-less of his whistleblowing disclosures (5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)), the MSPB excluded or ignored evidence offered by Whitmore necessary to adjudicate Whitmore’s retaliation claim, and otherwise applied the law incorrectly.

The claims court found that the taxpayers were not entitled to refunds of $142,277.55 and $725,205.28 paid to the IRS for tax deficiencies in tax year 1992 and tax year 1995. The taxpayers disputed whether the IRS properly mailed the two notices of deficiency prior to December 31, 2000, tolling the statute of limitations and making the 1992 and 1995 assessments timely. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. Use of the form prescribed in the Internal Revenue Manual for establishing compliance with the notice of deficiency mailing requirement (PS Form 3877) is not a prerequisite to the government demonstrating mailing of a notice of deficiency, but some corroborating evidence of both the existence and timely mailing of the notice of deficiency is required. The IRS presented such corroborating evidence for the 1992 notice of deficiency but not as to the 1995 notice.

The 1868 Laramie Treaty, between tribes of Sioux Indians and the United States, included provisions that: “If bad men among the whites, or among other people subject to the authority of the United States, shall commit any wrong upon the person or property of the Indians, the United States will, upon proof ... proceed at once to cause the offender to be arrested and punished ... and also reimburse the injured person....”´and “If bad men among the Indians shall commit a wrong or depredation upon ...anyone ... subject to the authority of the United States ... the Indians ... will ... deliver up the wrong-doer ... the person injured shall be reimbursed ... from the annuities or other moneys due.” In 2008, two members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe were killed on the Pine Ridge Reservation by a non-Sioux, who was driving while intoxicated. The Claims Court dismissed a claim for reimbursement under the treaties. The Federal Circuit vacated. The “bad men” provisions are not limited to persons acting for or on behalf of the U.S.

Plaintiff, a physician, sought compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. 300aa-1 to -34, alleging that Hepatitis B vaccination caused her multiple sclerosis. The Special Master dismissed her petition as untimely. The Court of Federal Claims affirmed. The Federal Circuit held that, contrary to precedent, the Act's statute of limitations is not jurisdictional, and that some claims brought under the Act are subject to equitable tolling. The court rejected a discovery rule and concluded that plaintiff's claim did not meet equitable tolling criteria. The Sixth Circuit subsequently remanded for a determination of whether plaintiff should be awarded reason-able attorneys’ fees and costs. Although she did not ultimately prevail on the merits, her appeal prompted a change of law in a limited way that potentially opens the door to certain Vaccine Act petitioners who otherwise would have been precluded from seeking redress.

Norris was an SEC trial attorney from 1992, until he was removed in 2009. He had twice previously been disciplined for exercising poor judgment and misuse of government email. The firing was based on emails expressing political views, demeaning support staff, and sending a confidential suspicious activity report to an appointed receiver in violation of SEC policies. Norris claimed that the 2008 emails were influenced by his wife becoming fully disabled, his daughter suffering from Asperger's Disorder, and his own adult AD/HD. The union submitted the removal to arbitration. During the hearing, the arbitrator received testimony that Norris had a confrontation with agency commissioners in 2007 and that he was barred from presenting cases to commissioners in the future; Norris denied the allegation. Norris testified that his personal circumstances had improved. The arbitrator affirmed the firing. The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that the arbitrator should have considered evidence of post-removal change in circumstances to determine whether the penalty was reasonable. The court cautioned the arbitrator not to consider information not included in the notice of removal the 2007 incident).

Plaintiff entered into a "Stipulation Agreement Regarding Damages," approved by the EEOC, to resolve her Title VII pregnancy discrimination claim against the U.S. Postal Service. She later filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging breached of that Agreement. The court held that it did not have jurisdiction because the Agreement was a consent decree, not a contract. In the federal system, when the United States is the defendant, whether the issue is enforcement of a court decree by the issuing forum or enforcement of a settlement contract in a separate suit determines which court can hear the case. The Federal Circuit reversed, stating that the "dispute is yet another example of the wastefulness of litigation over where to litigate." Consent decrees and settlement agreements are not necessarily mutually exclusive; a settlement agreement, even one embodied in a decree, is a contract within the meaning of the Tucker Act.

A civilian employee of the Department of Defense retired in 2007 then served as a re-employed annuitant for a two-year term ending January 3, 2009. Like many Department employees, he was subject to the National Security Personnel System, and eligible for performance-based bonuses and salary increases until the system was repealed in 2009. He qualified in 2008, but was ineligible for a salary increase because of his two-year contract; by regulation, the effective date of any salary increase would be the first day of the first pay period on or after January 1. The Department denied a bonus, arguing that the effective date was the same as the effective of a salary increase. The employee argued that the effective date should be either the end of the appraisal period (September 30, 2008) or the first day of the following year. In his class action under the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, the district court ruled in favor of the Department. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the court had jurisdiction under the Act and deferring to the agency's interpretation of its own regulation.

From 2000 to 2008, plaintiff worked in a permanent position as an attorney in the Department of Homeland Security. She then spent about eight months in an excepted temporary appointment as an Immigration Judge. Upon the completion of a background investigation, she started a permanent excepted appointment as an Immigration Judge. About 17 months later, the DOJ terminated her appointment based on alleged misconduct. An ALJ dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. 7511(a)(1)(C)(ii). The Board denied review. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff did not meet the statutory definition of employee as one "who has completed 2 years of current continuous service in the same or similar positions in an Executive agency under other than a temporary appointment limited to 2 years or less."

Olivia, born in 2000, apparently healthy, became ill after her first vaccinations. Her condition required extensive hospitalization; she still requires a ventilator and a wheelchair. Her parents filed a petition with the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. 300aa-1 to34. Olivia's injuries are not covered by a table of injuries presumed to be caused by vaccines, so the parents were required to show that one of the administered vaccines caused or significantly aggravated her condition. They submitted two reports by experts. The special master identified unanswered questions, but the parents took the position that it was unreasonable to require such detail at the pre-hearing stage. Based on failure to submit a supplemental report and failure to identify a clear theory of causation, the special master dismissed. The claims court affirmed. The Federal Circuit reversed. The special master did not appropriately review the evidence of causation under the summary judgment standard.