Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, veterans Joshua Bufkin and Norman Thornton, applied for service-connected PTSD disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Bufkin's claim was denied due to insufficient evidence linking his PTSD to his military service. Thornton, who already received benefits, sought an increased disability rating, which the VA denied. Both cases were reviewed de novo by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which upheld the VA's decisions. Bufkin and Thornton then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, arguing that the evidence was in "approximate balance" and they were entitled to the benefit of the doubt.The Veterans Court affirmed the Board's decisions, finding no clear error in the approximate-balance determinations. Petitioners appealed to the Federal Circuit, challenging the Veterans Court's interpretation of 38 U.S.C. §7261(b)(1). They argued that the Veterans Court should review the entire record de novo to determine if the evidence was in approximate balance. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the Veterans Court's decisions.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the VA's determination of whether evidence is in "approximate balance" is predominantly a factual determination, subject to clear-error review. The Court clarified that the Veterans Court must review the VA's application of the benefit-of-the-doubt rule using the same standards as other determinations: de novo for legal issues and clear error for factual issues. The judgment of the Federal Circuit was affirmed. View "Bufkin v. Collins" on Justia Law

The City and County of San Francisco operates two combined wastewater treatment facilities that process both wastewater and stormwater. During heavy precipitation, these facilities may discharge untreated water into the Pacific Ocean or San Francisco Bay. In 2019, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a renewal permit for San Francisco's Oceanside facility, adding two "end-result" requirements. These requirements prohibited discharges that contribute to violations of water quality standards and discharges that create pollution, contamination, or nuisance as defined by California law. San Francisco challenged these provisions, arguing they exceeded the EPA's statutory authority.The California Regional Water Quality Control Board and the EPA approved the final Oceanside NPDES permit. San Francisco appealed to the EPA's Environmental Appeals Board, which rejected the challenge. The City then petitioned for review in the Ninth Circuit, which denied the petition. The Ninth Circuit held that the Clean Water Act (CWA) authorizes the EPA to impose any limitations necessary to ensure water quality standards are met in receiving waters.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Section 1311(b)(1)(C) of the CWA does not authorize the EPA to include "end-result" provisions in NPDES permits. The Court reasoned that determining the specific steps a permittee must take to meet water quality standards is the EPA's responsibility, and Congress has provided the necessary tools for the EPA to make such determinations. The Court reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit's decision, emphasizing that the EPA must set specific rules for permittees to follow rather than imposing broad end-result requirements. View "City and County of San Francisco v. EPA" on Justia Law

Jewish survivors of the Hungarian Holocaust and their heirs sued Hungary and its national railway (MÁV) in federal court, seeking damages for property allegedly seized during World War II. They claimed that Hungary and MÁV liquidated the expropriated property, commingled the proceeds with other government funds, and later used funds from those commingled accounts in connection with commercial activities in the United States.The District Court for the District of Columbia determined that the plaintiffs' "commingling theory" satisfied the commercial nexus requirement of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) expropriation exception. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, reasoning that requiring plaintiffs to trace the particular funds from the sale of their specific expropriated property to the United States would make the exception a "nullity" in cases involving liquidated property.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that alleging commingling of funds alone cannot satisfy the commercial nexus requirement of the FSIA’s expropriation exception. The Court emphasized that plaintiffs must trace either the specific expropriated property itself or any property exchanged for such property to the United States. The Court vacated the judgment of the D.C. Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Hungary v. Simon" on Justia Law

Several unemployed workers in Alabama applied for unemployment benefits and claimed that the Alabama Department of Labor unlawfully delayed processing their claims. They sued the Alabama Secretary of Labor in state court under 42 U.S.C. §1983, arguing that the delays violated their due process and federal statutory rights. They sought a court order to expedite the processing of their claims. The Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claimants had not satisfied the administrative-exhaustion requirement under Alabama law. The state trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.The claimants appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, which affirmed the dismissal on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court concluded that §1983 did not preempt the state's administrative-exhaustion requirement, effectively preventing the claimants from suing to expedite the administrative process until they had completed it.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that state courts may not deny §1983 claims on failure-to-exhaust grounds when the application of a state exhaustion requirement effectively immunizes state officials from such claims. The Court reasoned that Alabama's exhaustion requirement, as applied, prevented claimants from challenging delays in the administrative process, thus immunizing state officials from §1983 suits. The Court reversed the Alabama Supreme Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Williams v. Reed" on Justia Law

The E-Rate program, established under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, subsidizes internet and telecommunications services for schools and libraries. The program is funded by contributions from telecommunications carriers, managed by the Universal Service Administrative Company, and regulated by the FCC. The "lowest corresponding price" rule ensures that schools and libraries are not charged more than similarly situated non-residential customers. Todd Heath, an auditor, alleged that Wisconsin Bell overcharged schools, violating this rule and leading to inflated reimbursement requests from the E-Rate program.Wisconsin Bell moved to dismiss Heath's suit, arguing that E-Rate reimbursement requests do not qualify as "claims" under the False Claims Act (FCA) because the funds come from private carriers and are managed by a private corporation, not the government. The District Court and the Seventh Circuit rejected this argument. The Seventh Circuit held that the government "provided" E-Rate funding through its regulatory role and by depositing over $100 million from the U.S. Treasury into the Fund.The Supreme Court of the United States held that E-Rate reimbursement requests are "claims" under the FCA because the government provided a portion of the money by transferring over $100 million from the Treasury into the Fund. This transfer included delinquent contributions collected by the FCC and Treasury, as well as settlements and restitution payments from the Justice Department. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath" on Justia Law

A city is an “aggrieved person,” authorized to bring suit under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), according to the Supreme Court. The City of Miami sued Bank of America and Wells Fargo, alleging violations of the FHA prohibition of racial discrimination in connection with real-estate transactions, 42 U.S.C. 3604(b), 3605(a). The city claimed that the banks intentionally targeted predatory practices at African-American and Latino neighborhoods and residents, lending to minority borrowers on worse terms than equally creditworthy nonminority borrowers and inducing defaults by failing to extend refinancing and loan modifications to minority borrowers on fair terms, resulting in a disproportionate number of foreclosures and vacancies, impairing municipal effort to assure racial integration, diminishing property-tax revenue, and increasing demand for police, fire, and other municipal services. The Court reasoned that those claims of financial injury are “arguably within the zone of interests” the FHA protects. In remanding the case, the Court stated that the Eleventh Circuit erred in concluding that the complaints met the FHA’s proximate-cause requirement based solely on a finding that the alleged financial injuries were foreseeable results of the banks’ misconduct. Foreseeability alone does not ensure the required close connection to the prohibited conduct. Proximate cause under the FHA requires “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged,” considering the “nature of the statutory cause of action,” and an assessment “of what is administratively possible and convenient.” View "Bank of America Corp. v. Miami" on Justia Law

The Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA) authorizes the Office of Personnel Management to contract with private carriers for federal employees’ health insurance; 5 U.S.C. 8902(m)(1) states that the “terms of any contract under this chapter which relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits (including payments with respect to benefits) shall supersede and preempt any State or local law . . . which relates to health insurance.” OPM’s regulations make a carrier’s “right to pursue and receive subrogation and reimbursement recoveries" a condition of the provision of benefits under the plan’s coverage. In 2015, OPM confirmed that subrogation and reimbursement rights and responsibilities “relate to the nature, provision, and extent of coverage or benefits” under section 8902(m)(1). Nevils, insured under a FEHBA plan offered by Coventry, was injured in an automobile accident. Coventry paid his medical expenses and asserted a lien against the settlement Nevils recovered from the driver who caused his injuries. Nevils satisfied the lien, then filed a state court class action, citing Missouri law, which does not permit subrogation or reimbursement in this context. The Missouri Supreme Court ruled in favor of Nevils. The Supreme Court reversed. Because contractual subrogation and reimbursement prescriptions plainly “relate to . . . payments with respect to benefits,” they override state laws barring subrogation and reimbursement. When a carrier exercises its right to reimbursement or subrogation, it receives from either the beneficiary or a third party “payment” respecting the benefits it previously paid. The carrier’s very provision of benefits triggers that right to payment. Strong and “distinctly federal interests are involved,” in uniform administration of the FEHBA program, free from state interference, particularly concerning coverage, benefits, and payments. The regime is compatible with the Supremacy Clause. The statute, not a contract, strips overrides state law View "Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc. v. Nevils" on Justia Law

Ochoa worked in a physically demanding job for McLane, which requires new employees in such positions and those returning from medical leave to take a physical evaluation. When Ochoa returned from three months of maternity leave, she failed the evaluation three times and was fired. She filed a sex discrimination charge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The Equal Employment Opportunity (EEOC) began an investigation, but McLane declined its request for names, Social Security numbers, addresses, and telephone numbers of employees asked to take the evaluation. After the EEOC expanded the investigation’s scope, it issued subpoenas under 42 U.S.C. 2000e–9, requesting information relating to its new investigation. The district judge declined to enforce the subpoenas. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the lower court erred in finding the information irrelevant. The Supreme Court vacated. A district court’s decision whether to enforce or quash an EEOC subpoena should be reviewed for abuse of discretion, not de novo. The Court noted “the longstanding practice of the courts of appeals," to review a district court’s decision to enforce or quash an administrative subpoena for abuse of discretion. In most cases, the enforcement decision will turn either on whether the evidence sought is relevant to the specific charge or whether the subpoena is unduly burdensome under the circumstances. Both tasks are well suited to a district judge’s expertise. Deferential review “streamline[s] the litigation process by freeing appellate courts from the duty of reweighing evidence and reconsidering facts already weighed and considered by the district court,” something particularly important in a proceeding designed only to facilitate the EEOC’s investigation. Not every decision touching on the Fourth Amendment is subject to searching review. View "McLane Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission" on Justia Law

The Constitution requires that the President obtain “the Advice and Consent of the Senate” before appointing “Officers of the United States” (PAS officers). The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (FVRA), section 3345(a), provides in paragraph (1), that generally, if a PAS vacancy arises, the first assistant to that office “shall perform” the office’s “functions and duties temporarily in an acting capacity,” but “notwithstanding paragraph (1),” the President “may direct” a person already serving in another PAS office, or a senior employee in the agency, to serve in an acting capacity. Subsection (b)(1) states: “Notwithstanding subsection (a)(1), a person may not serve as an acting officer” if the President nominates him for the vacant PAS office and, during the 365-day period preceding the vacancy, the person “did not serve in the position of first assistant” or “served . . . for less than 90 days.” The National Labor Relations Board's general counsel is a PAS office. In June 2010, a vacancy arose in that office. The President directed Solomon to serve as acting general counsel. Solomon qualified under subsection (a)(3) as an NLRB senior employee. In January 2011, the President nominated Solomon to serve as permanent general counsel. The Senate never took action on the nomination. Meanwhile, an NLRB Regional Director, acting on Solomon’s behalf, issued a complaint against SW. An ALJ and the Board concluded that SW had committed unfair labor practices. SW argued that the complaint was invalid because, under subsection (b)(1), Solomon could not act as general counsel after being nominated to that position. The NLRB countered that subsection (b)(1) applies only to first assistants acting under subsection (a)(1), not to officers who serve under (a)(2) or (a)(3). The DC Circuit vacated the Board’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed. Subsection (b)(1) prevents a person who has been nominated to fill a vacant PAS office from performing the duties of that office in an acting capacity and is not limited to first assistants acting under subsection (a)(1). View "National Labor Relations Board v. SW General, Inc" on Justia Law

The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) is a federally-chartered corporation that participates in the secondary mortgage market, with authority “to sue and to be sued, and to complain and to defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction, State or Federal,” 12 U.S.C. 1723a(a). Plaintiffs filed suit in state court alleging deficiencies in the refinancing, foreclosure, and sale of their home. Fannie Mae removed the case to federal court, relying on its sue-and-be-sued clause as the basis for federal jurisdiction. The district court denied a motion to remand the case to state court and later entered judgment against plaintiffs. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. The clause does not grant federal courts jurisdiction over all cases involving Fannie Mae. Distinguishing cases in which a sue-and-be-sued clause was held to confer jurisdiction, the Court noted that Fannie Mae’s clause adds the qualification “any court of competent jurisdiction.” A court of competent jurisdiction is a court with an existing source of subject-matter jurisdiction; the clause does not grant federal court subject-matter jurisdiction, but confers only a general right to sue. View "Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corp" on Justia Law