Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in U.S. Supreme Court
Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.; Isiogu, et al. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 56, required incumbent local exchange carriers ("LECs"), providers of local telephone service, to share their physical networks with competitive LECs at cost-based rates. This suit arose when, in the wake of the Federal Communication Commission's ("FCC") Triennial Review Remand Order, respondent notified competitive LECs that it would no longer provide entrance facilities at cost-based rates for either backhauling or interconnection, but would instead charge higher rates. At issue was whether an incumbent provider of local telephone services must make certain transmission facilities available to competitors at cost-based rates. The court held that the FCC had advanced a reasonable interpretation of its regulations, i.e., that to satisfy its duty under 47 U.S.C. 251(c)(2), an incumbent LEC must make its existing entrance facilities available to competitors at cost-based rates if the facilities were to be used for interconnection, and the Court deferred to the FCC's views.
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd
Respondent alleged that, after the September 11th terrorist attacks, then-Attorney General Ashcroft authorized federal officials to detain terrorism suspects using the federal material-witness statute, 18 U.S.C. 3144. Respondent claimed that this pretextual detention policy led to his material-witness arrest as he was boarding a plane to Saudi Arabia. Respondent filed suit pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents challenging the constitutionality of Ashcroft's alleged policy. At issue was whether the former Attorney General enjoyed immunity from suit for allegedly authorizing federal prosecutors to obtain valid material-witness warrants for detention of terrorism suspects whom they would otherwise lack probable cause to arrest. The Court held that an objectively reasonable arrest and detention of a material witness pursuant to a validly obtained warrant could not be challenged as unconstitutional on the basis of allegations that the arresting authority had an improper motive. Because Ashcroft did not violate clearly established law, the Court need not address the more difficult question of whether he enjoyed absolute immunity. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
Chamber of Commerce of United States of America, et al. v. Whiting
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and various business and civil rights organizations (collectively, "Chamber") filed a federal preenforcement suit against those charged with administering the Legal Arizona Workers Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 23-211, 212, 212.01, which provided that the licenses of state employers that knowingly or intentionally employed unauthorized aliens could be, and in certain circumstances, must be, suspended or revoked. The law also required that all Arizona employers use E-Verify, an internet-based system employers could use to check the work authorization status of employees. At issue was whether federal immigration law preempted those provisions of Arizona law. The Court held that Arizona's licensing law fell within the confines of the authority Congress chose to leave to the states and therefore, was not expressly preempted where the Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"), 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(2), prohibited states from imposing civil or criminal sanctions on those who employed unauthorized aliens but preserved state authority to impose sanctions through licensing and similar laws. The court also held that Arizona's requirement that employers use E-Verify did not conflict with the federal scheme and in no way obstructed achieving the aims of the federal program.
General Dynamics Corp. v. United States; The Boeing Co. v. United States
After petitioners fell behind schedule in developing a stealth aircraft (A-12) for the Navy, the contracting officer terminated their $4.8 billion fixed-price contract for default and ordered petitioners to repay approximately $1.35 billion in progress payments for work the Government never accepted. Petitioners filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims ("CFC"), challenging the termination decision under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. 609(a)(1). The CFC held that, since invocation of the state-secrets privilege obscured too many of the facts relevant to the superior-knowledge defense, the issue of that defense was nonjusticiable, even though petitioners had brought forward enough unprivileged evidence for a prima facie showing. Accordingly, at issue was what remedy was proper when, to protect state secrets, a court dismissed a Government contractor's prima facie valid affirmative defense to the Government's allegations of contractual breach. The Court concluded that it must exercise its common-law authority in this situation to fashion contractual remedies in Government-contracting disputes and held that the proper remedy was to leave the parties where they were on the day they filed suit.
Brown, et al. v. Plata, et al.
The State appealed a three-judge district court order directing California to remedy two ongoing violations of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a guarantee binding on the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by reducing the prison system population where the violations were the subject of two class actions involving a class of prisoners with serious mental disorders and a class of prisoners with serious medical conditions. At issue was whether the remedial order issued by the three-judge court was consistent with requirements and procedures set forth in a congressional statute, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), 18 U.S.C. 3626. The Court held that the court-mandated population limit was necessary to remedy the violation of prisoners' constitutional rights and was authorized by the PLRA.
Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk
Respondent filed an action under the False Claims Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4)(A), alleging that his former employer had submitted hundreds of false claims for payment under its federal contracts. At issue was whether a federal agency's written response to a request for records under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. 552, constituted a "report" within the meaning of the public disclosure bar. The Court held that a federal agency's written response to a FOIA request for records constituted a "report" within the meaning of the FCA's public disclosure bar where a "report," in this context, carried its ordinary meaning; where the Labor Department's three written responses in this case, along with the accompanying records produced to respondent's wife, were "reports" within the public disclosure bar's ordinary meaning; where the Court was not persuaded by assertions that it would be anomalous to read the public disclosure bar to encompass written FOIA responses; and whether respondent's suit was "based upon... allegations or transactions" disclosed in the reports at issue was a question to be resolved on remand.
Montana v. Wyoming
Montana alleged that Wyoming breached Article V(A) of the Yellowstone River Compact ("Compact"), 65 Stat. 666, by allowing its pre-1950 water appropriators to increase their net water consumption by improving the efficiency of their irrigation systems where the new systems employed sprinklers that reduced the amount of wastewater returned to the river, thus depriving Montana's downstream pre-1950 appropriators of water to which they were entitled. At issue was whether Article V(A) allowed Wyoming's pre-1950's water users, diverting the same quantity of water for the same irrigation purpose and acreage as before 1950, to increase their consumption of water by improving their irrigation systems even if it reduced the flow of water to Montana's pre-1950 users. The Court held that Montana's increased-efficiency allegation failed to state a claim for breach of the Compact under Article V(A) where Article V(A) incorporated the ordinary doctrine of appropriation without significant qualification and where, in Wyoming and Montana, that doctrine allowed appropriators to improve their irrigation systems, even to the detriment of downstream appropriators.
United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation
Respondent filed suit in Federal District Court against federal officials who managed tribal assets held in trust by the Federal Government alleging violations of fiduciary duty and requesting equitable relief. The next day after filing the suit, respondent filed this action against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims ("CFC") alleging almost identical violations and requesting money damages. At issue was whether a common factual basis like the one apparent in respondent's suits sufficed to bar jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1500. The Court held that two suits were for or in respect to the same claim, precluding CFC jurisdiction, if they are based on substantially the same operative facts, regardless of the relief sought in each suit. The Court also held that the substantial overlap in operative facts between respondent's District Court and CFC suits precluded jurisdiction in the CFC where both actions alleged that the United States held the same assets in trust for respondent's benefit and they describe almost identical breaches of fiduciary duties.