Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In these consolidated appeals, the issue is whether overlapping statutes that affect more than two million acres of federally owned forest land in southwestern Oregon are reconcilable and, therefore, operative. The appeals arise from three sets of cases filed by an association of fifteen Oregon counties and various trade associations and timber companies. Two of the cases challenge Proclamation 9564, through which the President expanded the boundaries of the Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument. Two others challenged resource management plans that the United States Bureau of Land Management (BLM), a bureau within the United States Department of the Interior (Interior), developed to govern the use of the forest land. The final case seeks an order compelling the Interior Secretary to offer a certain amount of the forest’s timber for sale each year. The district court entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs in all five cases.   The DC Circuit reversed. The court explained that the O & C Act provides the Secretary three layers of discretion: first, discretion to decide how land should be classified, which includes the discretion to classify land as timberland or not; second, discretion to decide how to balance the Act’s multiple objectives, and third, discretion to decide how to carry out the mandate that the land classified as timberland be managed “for permanent forest production.” Further, the court held that the 2016 RMPs are well within the Secretary’s discretion under the O & C Act and are consistent with the Secretary’s other statutory obligations. View "American Forest Resource Council v. USA" on Justia Law

The Renewable Fuel Standard Program codified in the Clean Air Act requires all transportation fuel sold in the United States to contain an annually determined volume of renewable fuel. As part of its role in implementing the Program, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issues renewable fuel standards announcing the annual quantity of renewables that must be sold into United States commerce. EPA failed to meet its deadlines to publish the 2020-2022 renewable fuel standards. As part of its mitigation, EPA issued a rule extending the corresponding compliance reporting deadlines. The leeway provided in that Extension Rule ensures that obligated parties will not have to file compliance reports for 2020-2022 until after EPA has published the standards for those years. In these consolidated petitions, a group of fuel refineries (the Refineries) challenged the Extension Rule. They argue that the Rule violates the Clean Air Act, or is at least arbitrary and capricious, insofar as it provides obligated parties less than 13 months’ compliance lead time and compliance intervals shorter than 12 months.   The DC Circuit denied the petitions for review. The court explained that when EPA fails to timely issue renewable fuel standards, the Clean Air Act does not bind the agency to provide obligated parties a minimum of 13 months’ compliance lead time, nor does it require compliance intervals of at least 12 months. The court likewise rejected the Refineries’ claim that EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in setting the compliance schedule in the Rule. Rather, the agency reasonably exercised its authority to establish the compliance timeframe for the Renewable Fuel Standard Program under the circumstances. View "Wynnewood Refining Company, LLC v. EPA" on Justia Law

This petition challenges several interrelated orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “Commission”) that permitted the creation of a new energy transmission service across several states in the Southeast region of the United States, entitled the Southeast Energy Exchange Market (“SEEM”). FERC adopted the first order (“Deadlock Order”) by operation of law when its four Commissioners deadlocked 2-2 on whether the overall proposal was “just and reasonable” and otherwise met the requirements of the Federal Power Act (“FPA” or “Act”), and related FERC regulations. In a later order by majority vote, the Commission accepted tariff revisions by transmission service providers within SEEM to enable the new transmission service. Petitioners challenged these orders throughout the initial proceedings, on rehearing at the Commission, and now in this petition.   The DC Circuit granted the petition in part, denied the petition in part, and remanded it to the Commission for further proceedings. The court explained that since SEEM “began operations in November 2022” and only provides energy transactions for non-firm service, it follows that vacatur would not be disruptive, and the parties offer no arguments to the contrary in their briefing. Accordingly, vacatur of the Tariff Order is appropriate. The court wrote that the Commission’s orders finding Petitioners’ rehearing requests of the Deadlock Order untimely are vacated, and the petition—as it relates to review of the Deadlock Order and the associated orders accepting amendments to the SEEM Proposal—is remanded without vacatur of the related orders. View "Advanced Energy United, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

XO Energy petitioned for a review of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s approval of filings implementing a regional transmission organization’s (“RTO”) revised Forfeiture Rule for Financial Transmission Rights (“FTRs”). It contends that the Commission erred as a matter of law in declining to issue refunds to market participants who incurred forfeitures under the unapproved interim Rule. It further contends that the Commission’s approval of the revised 2021 Rule was arbitrary and capricious.   The DC Circuit granted the petition in part and denied it in part. The court affirmed the Commission’s denial of refunds and remands without vacating the 2021 Rule for further explanation of the Commission’s decision to exclude consideration of leverage as a required element of the Rule. The court explained that although the Commission acknowledges that leverage might be one way to determine cross-product manipulation, it states that it opted to allow PJM to employ other means to detect this conduct rather than require exemptions based on leverage. That is the extent of the Commission’s explanation. It does not address XO Energy’s position that market manipulation cannot occur when the net losses of a trader’s virtual transaction portfolio exceed the net profits from its FTR portfolio. Nor does it explain why the exclusion of this requirement strikes the appropriate balance between preventing manipulative conduct and not hindering legitimate hedging activity. Absent such explanation of its decision, the Commission’s failure to order a leverage exemption appears arbitrary and capricious. View "XO Energy MA, LP v. FERC" on Justia Law

In 2015, two citizens of the United States and one citizen of the United Kingdom brought an action in the federal district court seeking either return of the artifacts or monetary compensation. The plaintiffs trace their lineages to three of the owners of the art firms. They claim that members of the Nazi government coerced the consortium members into selling the collection for far less than its true market value. Their initial complaint was named as defendants the Federal Republic of Germany and its agency – SPK, for short – that now administers the museum where the artifacts are on display. The district court determined in a thorough opinion that plaintiffs had not preserved their notGerman-nationals claim because they failed to raise it in their original complaint, in their amended complaint, or at any point in the lengthy proceedings in the district court, or in their brief or oral argument the first time this case went on appeal to this court. This appeal is the latest chapter dealing with SPK’s immunity defense under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court correctly understood the mandates to preclude Plaintiffs from amending their pleadings with allegations to support arguments not preserved on the existing record. The court explained that the Supreme Court’s mandate directed the court to instruct the district court to determine whether plaintiffs preserved their not-German-nationals argument. That mandate would make little sense if it also allowed the district court to permit plaintiffs to cure any failure to preserve that argument by amending their complaint. View "Alan Philipp v. Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz" on Justia Law

Intellistop, Inc. (Intellistop) invented and sells a module that fits into a commercial motor vehicle’s existing brake light system and pulses the brake lights with each application of the brakes. Because the module replaces the steady-burning lights with pulsing lights when installed, Intellistop applied for an exemption. The FMCSA denied Intellistop’s application, and Intellistop petitioned for review, arguing that the FMCSA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.   The DC Circuit denied Intellistop’s petition. The court explained that the FMCSA sufficiently explained the difference between Intellistop’s application and the exemptions it had previously approved. The FMCSA explained that the “crucial distinction” between Intellistop and the previous exemption applicants was that only Intellistop’s technology modified “the functionality of original equipment manufacturers’ lamps, which are covered by an existing FMVSS.” The FMCSA adequately explained that it treated Intellistop’s application differently because Intellistop was the only exemption applicant that altered the vehicle’s brake light system to function in a way that would not maintain steady-burning brake lights.   Finally, the FMCSA’s concern that Intellistop’s exemption would alter original equipment manufacturer's lights covered by an FMVSS buttresses its conclusion that monitoring Intellistop’s module would be more difficult than monitoring other exemptions. Because previous exemptions used a supplemental pulsing light while maintaining steady-burning brake lights, they did not present the monitoring complication both the FMCSA and the NHTSA feared could result from Intellistop’s module. View "Intellistop Inc. v. DOT" on Justia Law

The Sunshine Act’s “agency” definition only encompasses those with a majority of Board members whom the President appoints and the Senate confirms to such position. Government in the Sunshine Act (Sunshine Act). For years, the Center for Biological Diversity, Friends of the Earth, and the Center for International Environmental Law (collectively, CBD) enjoyed the benefits from the Sunshine Act’s application to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). By statute, it reorganized OPIC into the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).  Congress shrunk DFC’s Board of Directors (the Board) from fifteen members to nine. DFC’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) serves by virtue of their appointment to DFC instead of to the Board itself. Thus, DFC thought its Board majority was composed only of ex officio members. Accordingly, it promulgated a rule exempting itself from the Sunshine Act without notice-and-comment. CBD sued. The district court granted DFC’s motion to dismiss.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that CBD clearly had informational standing because the information it statutorily sought is from the agency itself. Next, the court held that the Sunshine Act does not apply to DFC because a majority of its Board members serves ex officio by virtue of their appointments to other positions. Finally, the court held that CBD’s claim that DFC violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by not engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking fails because CBD did not demonstrate any prejudice arising from the asserted APA violation distinct from the legal question of Sunshine Act compliance. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Intl. Dev. Finance Corp" on Justia Law

Jones Lang LaSalle Brokerage, Inc. (JLL) represented both parties to an agreement to lease property in northwest Washington, D.C. Because dual representations of that kind pose inherent conflicts of interest, the District of Columbia’s Brokerage Act required JLL to obtain the written consent of all clients on both sides. JLL’s client on the landlord side of the transaction, 1441 L Associates, LLC, declined to pay JLL’s commission. JLL then brought this action to recover the commission. In defending against the suit, 1441 L argued that JLL, when disclosing its dual representation, failed to adhere to certain formatting specifications set out in the Brokerage Act that aim to highlight such a disclosure. The district court granted summary judgment to 1441 L.   The DC Circuit vacated and remand for further proceedings. The court concluded that that the Act does not invariably require adherence to those formatting specifications. Rather, the specifications go to whether the broker can gain an optional presumption that it secured the required written consent for its dual representation. Even without the benefit of that presumption, a broker can still demonstrate that it obtained the requisite written consent. View "Jones Lang Lasalle Brokerage, Inc. v. 1441 L Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

Congress requires transmission operators to charge reasonable rates, which must be submitted to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission through a tariff before the rates can be levied on generators. Here, a generator, Hectate Energy, accuses a transmission grid operator, the New York Independent System Operator, of charging a rate that it had not filed with FERC. Hecate argues that the System Operator’s filed tariff was not detailed enough and that Hectate was surprised when the System Operator charged it $10 million in grid-upgrade costs to connect its power plant to the grid.FERC rejected Hectate's argument, finding that the tariff imposed by the New York Independent System Operator put Hectate on notice of the cost of grid-update costs.The D.C. Circuit agreed with FERC, denying Hectates' Petition for Review, finding the tariff was detailed enough and gave notice that the System Operator would include non-jurisdictional projects in its interconnection study to determine responsibility for upgrade costs. FERC’s order pointed to three cross-referenced sections of the tariff to find sufficient notice that the interconnection study would include information about non-jurisdictional projects. View "Hecate Energy Greene County 3 LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

Last year, the court ordered the Department of Energy to address three different categories of comments raised during its informal rulemaking establishing more stringent energy efficiency standards for commercial packaged boilers ("Final Rule"). In response, the Department of Energy published a supplement to the Final Rule.Petitioners, trade associations and natural gas utilities that asserted they were negatively affected by a Final Rule issued by the Department of Energy, claim that the Department of Energy's Final Rule again failed to support its reasoning and did not provide notice and comment as required under the Administrative Procedure Act.The D.C. Circuit granted Petitioners' request to vacate a Final Rule and Supplement imposed by the Department of Energy, finding that the Department failed to offer a sufficient explanation in response to comments challenging a key assumption in its analysis. View "American Public Gas Association v. DOE" on Justia Law