Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

GMS Mine Repair and Maintenance, Inc. (GMS) is a mining contractor that provides “specialized services” to mines in North America. GMS provided contract services at the Mountaineer II Mine in West Virginia on April 20 and 27, 2021, during which time the MSHA issued several citations against it. Although GMS stipulated the “findings of gravity and negligence,” it contested the $7,331 proposed penalty. Thereafter, GMS went before an ALJ to dispute the MSHA’s method of calculating the penalty. The Secretary, representing the MSHA, argued that all citations and orders that have become final during the 15-month look-back period are counted toward an operator’s history of violations, “regardless of when [the citations or orders] were issued.” The ALJ deferred to the Secretary’s reading, deeming the regulation ambiguous “on its face.” GMS petitioned the Commission to review the ALJ’s determination, and when the Commission did not act, the ALJ’s determination became the final decision.   The DC Circuit denied the petition. The court concluded that the regulation at issue is ambiguous, the Secretary’s interpretation is reasonable, and that interpretation is entitled to deference. The court explained that the Secretary’s interpretation reflects its official and steadfast practice (circa 1982) of including a violation in an operator’s history as of the date the violation becomes final. Second, the subject matter of the regulation is within the Secretary’s wheelhouse and implicates the Secretary’s expertise. View "GMS Mine Repair v. MSHR" on Justia Law

On October 29, 2018, 189 people boarded a Boeing 737 MAX airplane in Jakarta, Indonesia. A few minutes after takeoff, the plane crashed. No one survived. Five months later, 157 people aboard a 737 MAX in Ethiopia suffered the same fate. The Federal Aviation Administration then grounded the 737 MAX, prompting modifications by Boeing that eventually led the agency to recertify the plane. In this Freedom of Information Act suit, Flyers Rights Education Fund and its president seek documents that the FAA relied upon during the recertification process. Congress exempted from FOIA’s reach “commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential,” and the district court determined that is precisely what the FAA withheld.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that when an agency incorporates exempt information into its own comments, it will often be able to release at least part of those comments without revealing the exempt information. Here, however, the FAA explained that these documents “contained FAA comments to Boeing’s project deliverables, which in themselves would reveal technical data and Boeing’s proprietary methods of compliance.” Notably, the FAA released two other documents containing its comments in redacted form. That fact, coupled with the FAA’s nonconclusory affidavits and Vaughn index, demonstrates that it understands the difference between comments that reveal Boeing’s confidential information and comments that do not. Accordingly, even as to these two withheld documents, the FAA has demonstrated that it complied with its segregability obligations. View "Flyers Rights Education Fund, Inc. v. FAA" on Justia Law

Norfolk Southern Railway Company (Norfolk Southern) petitioned for review of a decision of the Surface Transportation Board (STB or Board), the successor agency to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) charged with authorizing certain rail carrier transactions under the Interstate Commerce Act. Norfolk Southern is a rail carrier that owns a 57.14 percent share of the Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad Company (Belt Line), the operator of a major switching terminal in Norfolk, Virginia. Norfolk Southern’s majority interest goes back to 1982, when its corporate family acquired and consolidated various rail carriers with smaller ownership interests in the Belt Line. Norfolk Southern’s competitor, CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX), owns the remainder of the Belt Line’s shares (42.86 percent). This case involves a different question raised before the Board for the first time:  whether the ICC/Board approvals of Norfolk Southern’s subsequent corporate-family consolidations in 1991 and 1998 authorized Norfolk Southern to control the Belt Line. The Board again answered no. Norfolk Southern petitioned for review.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the Board’s decision regarding the 1991 and 1998 transactions is neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Board reasonably sought to avoid an absurd interpretation of 49 C.F.R. Section 1180.2(d)(3)’s corporate-family exemption that would allow a carrier to gain control of a new entity without following the Board’s review requirements and then “cure that unauthorized acquisition by reorganizing the corporate family.” The Board reasonably rejected Norfolk Southern’s claim that, by reshuffling the pieces of its corporate family, it acquired control authority of the Belt Line sub silentio. View "Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. STB" on Justia Law

After finding that certain greenhouse gases endanger public health, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) regulated the emission of these pollutants from aircraft engines. The Aircraft Rule aligns domestic aircraft emissions standards with those recently promulgated by the International Civil Aviation Organization (“ICAO”). Petitioners challenge the Aircraft Rule, arguing the EPA should have promulgated more stringent standards than those set by ICAO. They contend the agency acted unlawfully as well as arbitrarily and capriciously by aligning domestic standards with ICAO’s technology-following standards rather than establishing technology-forcing standards.   The DC Circuit denied the petitions. The court held that the Aircraft Rule is within the EPA’s authority under section 231 of the Clean Air Act and that the agency reasonably explained its decision to harmonize domestic regulation with the ICAO standards. The court reasoned that the EPA possesses substantial discretion to regulate aircraft emissions under section 231 of the Clean Air Act. In aligning domestic regulation with standards promulgated by ICAO, the EPA acted lawfully, and petitioners have not shown the agency’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. View "State of California v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency designated northern Weld County, Colorado and El Paso County, Texas, as areas that had already attained a 2015 ozone pollution standard. But EPA reversed course after Clean Wisconsin v. EPA, 964 F.3d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2020), remanded these designations. In November 2021, EPA folded northern Weld and El Paso Counties into areas previously designated as not having attained the standard. Weld County contends that EPA improperly relied on data available in 2018 rather than updated data and that the data do not support its adverse designation.   The DC Circuit denied Weld County’s petition for review, granted Texas’s petition for review, and reversed the Final Rule insofar as it designates El Paso County to be a marginal nonattainment area. The court held that EPA reasonably relied on the same data it had used to make the original designation and that the data support the revised one. The court explained that Texas argues that El Paso’s 2021 nonattainment designation was impermissibly retroactive because EPA made it effective as of the 2018 attainment designation. As a result, a statutory deadline for El Paso to attain the governing standard passed some three months before EPA made the nonattainment designation. And missing the deadline triggered adverse legal consequences. View "Board of County Commissioners of Weld County, CO v. EPA" on Justia Law

A Council of ten members, appointed by the President, supervises the work of the Conference. The question, in this case, is whether an appointee to the Council is removable at will by the President. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Congress designed the Conference to be a forum inside the Executive Branch for shop talk and collaboration with external experts. It has no adjudicatory or legislative features that would clearly signal a need for some measure of independence from Presidential control. And nothing in the text of the legislation creating the Conference and Council hints at a congressional intent to limit the President’s removal power, let alone overcomes the presumption of presidential control over Executive Branch officials. The statute, in other words, gives no indication that Congress intended to take the unusual and potentially constitutionally troublesome step of tying the President’s hands when it comes to the at-will removal of such a core Executive Branch officer as a member of the Administrative Conference’s Council. View "Roger Severino v. Joseph Biden, Jr." on Justia Law

The H-1B visa program allows foreign nationals to work in the United States in specialized positions for sponsoring employers. By regulation, any such employer must file amended paperwork with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services whenever it makes a “material change” in the terms of covered employment. In Simeio Solutions, LLC, 26 I & N Dec. 542 (AAO 2015), USCIS interpreted that phrase to include a change in the place of employment. And in an ensuing guidance document, USCIS memorialized this interpretation and exercised discretion to limit its retroactive enforcement. ITServe Alliance, Inc., a trade association representing employers, seeks a declaratory judgment that Simeio and the guidance document are unlawful. ITServe contends that Simeio was a procedurally defective rulemaking and that USCIS lacks statutory authority to require the amended filings.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and held that ITServe has Article III standing to raise these arguments, but the court rejected them on the merits. The court explained that because USCIS may consider LCA-related issues in exercising its own authority to approve, disapprove, or revoke H-1B petitions, it may require new or amended petitions corresponding to changes in the place of employment that necessitate the filing of new LCAs. View "ITServe Alliance, Inc. v. DHS" on Justia Law

According to the Environmental Protection Agency, greenhouse gases called hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) threaten the environment because they “can be hundreds to thousands of times more potent than carbon dioxide.” To reduce their use, Congress enacted the American Innovation and Manufacturing Act. 42 U.S.C. Section 7675. The Act directs the EPA to pass a rule phasing them out. After the EPA passed that rule, two regulated companies and three trade associations sought judicial review. They say that the agency exceeded its statutory authority in two different ways and that the Act violates the nondelegation doctrine.   The DC Circuit vacated in part the EPA’s Phasedown Rule, holding that the EPA has not identified a statute authorizing its QRcode and refillable-cylinder regulations. The court explained that the AIM Act gives the EPA authority to regulate HFCs within blends, and the court wrote it may not consider the nondelegation argument because Petitioner failed to exhaust it before the agency. But the trade associations’ petition fares better: The EPA does not identify a statutory provision authorizing its QR-code and refillable cylinder rules. View "Heating, Air-Conditioning, & Refrigeration Distributors International v. EPA" on Justia Law

Methane is considered the most dangerous gas in underground mining; in sufficient concentrations, methane can ignite and cause a potentially catastrophic explosion. To protect worker safety, Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) regulations thus require miners to deenergize equipment and cease work when they detect certain methane concentrations. But during the methane inundation at the Francisco mine the miners did not stop work. They instead continued operating an energized drill, trying to stop the flow of methane. MSHA issued two orders citing the mine operator, Peabody Midwest Mining, LLC, for violating the applicable safety regulations and designated those violations as unwarrantable failures. It also individually cited the mine’s manager as Peabody’s agent. An administrative law judge and then the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission agreed with MSHA that Peabody violated MSHA safety regulations, that those violations constituted unwarrantable failures, that mine manager was individually liable, and that civil penalties were appropriate. Peabody and the manager petitioned for review in this court.   The DC Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that MSHA safety regulations unambiguously prohibited Peabody’s operation of an energized drill in a high-methane environment, and substantial evidence supports the Commission’s unwarrantable failure and individual liability determinations. Further, as the Commission recognized, by permitting miners to work with energized equipment, the manager risked incurring the very hazard section 75.323(c)(2) is intended to address, i.e., potential ignition [in a] high-methane environment. View "Peabody Midwest Mining, LLC v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought judicial review of the Merit Systems Protection Board’s (MSPB) final decision affirming his removal from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) but filed his complaint in the district court one day after the statutory deadline prescribed in 5 U.S.C. Section 7703(b)(2). The district court dismissed his complaint as untimely. The district court held in the alternative that Plaintiff had not presented facts to warrant equitable tolling.   The DC Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the alternative ground that Robinson failed to show that he was entitled to equitable tolling. The court explained that in light of the combined weight of intervening United States Supreme Court authority and the decisions of the other circuits interpreting section 7703(b)(2) as a non-jurisdictional claims-processing rule since King, the court now holds that section 7703(b)(2)’s thirty-day filing deadline is a non-jurisdictional claims-processing rule. As such, the record shows that Plaintiff chose to mail his complaint by standard mail four days before the statutory filing deadline and assumed the risk his complaint would arrive late. On these facts, Plaintiff’s decision to use standard mail is a 14 “garden variety claim of excusable neglect” insufficient to warrant equitable tolling. View "Adam Robinson v. DHS Office of Inspector General" on Justia Law