Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was asked to consider an appeal brought by BuzzFeed, Inc. and one of its journalists, Jason Leopold, against a decision of the District Court granting summary judgment to the Department of Justice (DOJ). The appellants sought the release of a partially redacted report on HSBC Bank's conduct under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The District Court had ruled that the report was entirely exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 8 which protects reports related to the regulation or supervision of financial institutions.The Court of Appeals held that the case must be remanded to the District Court to determine whether the DOJ can demonstrate that the release of any part of the report could foreseeably harm an interest protected by Exemption 8. The Court stressed the requirement for a sequential inquiry: first, whether an exemption applies to a document; and second, whether releasing the information would foreseeably harm an interest protected by the exemption. The Court found that the District Court had not sufficiently conducted this sequential inquiry, and the DOJ had not adequately demonstrated how the release of the report would cause foreseeable harm to an interest protected by Exemption 8.The Court noted that the FOIA requires agencies to release any reasonably segregable portion of a record, even if an exemption covers an entire agency record. The Court determined that the DOJ had not satisfactorily explained why the release of a redacted version of the report would cause foreseeable harm to an interest protected by Exemption 8. Therefore, the Court vacated the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the DOJ and remanded the case for further consideration. View "Leopold v. DOJ" on Justia Law

The case pertains to J.G. Kern Enterprises, Inc. ("Company") and the National Labor Relations Board ("Board" or "NLRB"). After the Board certified a union to represent the Company's employees, the Company failed to engage in good faith bargaining for almost three months. When negotiations commenced, the Company refused to provide requested information about employee benefit plans. Two months after the certification year ended, the Company withdrew recognition from the Union, alleging the Union had lost its majority status.The Union filed unfair labor practice charges against the Company. The Board found that the Company had violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act by delaying bargaining, refusing to consider a Union-administered benefit plan, refusing to provide requested information, and withdrawing recognition from the Union during the extended certification year.The Company petitioned for review, arguing that the Board erred in finding an unlawful withdrawal of Union recognition based on a retroactive extension of the original certification year, and that the Board had no legal basis to order the Company to bargain with the Union for an additional six months.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the Board's findings that the Company committed the alleged unfair labor practices. The court concluded that the Board was free to choose which legal theory to rely on in addressing the unfair labor practice charges and that the Board acted within its discretion when it ordered an extension of the certification year and required the parties to bargain to remedy the Company’s unfair labor practices. The court, therefore, denied the Company’s petition for review and granted the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement of its order. View "J.G. Kern Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) decision to call for revisions to State Implementation Plans (SIPs) under the Clean Air Act because of the SIPs' inclusion of certain provisions related to emissions during startup, shutdown, and malfunction (SSM) periods. Two sets of petitioners, a group of states and a set of companies, challenged the EPA's decision. The court granted their petitions in part and denied them in part.The court ruled that EPA could not call the SIPs for including automatic exemptions and director’s discretion provisions without finding that it was necessary or appropriate for these restrictions to qualify as emission limitations under the Clean Air Act. The EPA had failed to make such a necessary or appropriate finding.As for affirmative defense provisions, the court agreed with petitioners as to certain types of affirmative defense provisions but rejected petitioners’ challenge as to other types.The court upheld EPA's call of overbroad enforcement discretion provisions on the grounds that they could be read to allow state officials to foreclose EPA enforcement actions and citizen suits.The court concluded that when EPA calls a SIP for a substantial legal inadequacy, it need only identify the deficiency and explain why it is substantial. The Act does not categorically require EPA to assess costs and benefits when calling SIPs for failure to comply with the Act’s legal requirements. View "Environ Comm FL Elec Power v. EPA" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled in a case involving Regenative Labs ("Regenative"), a manufacturer of medical products containing human cells, tissues, or cellular or tissue-based products ("HCT/Ps"), and the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Following the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") issuing two technical direction letters instructing Medicare contractors to deny reimbursement for claims for products manufactured by Regenative, the company filed suit challenging these letters without first exhausting administrative remedies. The District Court dismissed the case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction as Regenative had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal, in part for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and in part on grounds of mootness. The Court concluded that the claims raised by Regenative arose under the Medicare Act and had to be pursued through the statutorily-prescribed administrative process. The Court also found that the company’s request for the court to vacate the contested policy was moot because the policy had already been rescinded by CMS. Finally, the court rejected Regenative's argument for mandamus jurisdiction, finding that it did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements for this relief. View "Row 1 Inc. v. Becerra" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the General Services Administration (GSA) properly redacted the names of several low-level team members from spreadsheets of salary and benefits costs for outgoing transition teams of President Trump and Vice President Pence. The news organization Insider, Inc. had requested these documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The court found that the transition team members had a strong privacy interest in their personal information, which outweighed the public interest in disclosure. The court rejected Insider's argument that disclosure would reveal possible ethical concerns and facilitate interviews that would illuminate the transition process. The court held that these interests were not cognizable under FOIA, as they related to activities of private actors and former executive officials, not current government actors. The court concluded that, given the information already disclosed by the GSA, the incremental value served by disclosing the names of low-level transition team members did not outweigh their privacy interests. View "Insider Inc. v. GSA" on Justia Law

The case involves American Medical Response of Connecticut (AMR), a company that operates ambulances and employs emergency medical technicians and paramedics, and the International Association of EMTs and Paramedics (Union). The Union and AMR had a collective bargaining agreement that was in effect from 2019 through 2021. During the COVID-19 pandemic, AMR invoked an emergency provision in the agreement and cut shifts due to reduced demand. The Union raised concerns about AMR's actions and requested specific information from AMR to investigate potential grievances. AMR refused to provide some of the requested information, arguing that the emergency provision in the agreement excused it from providing the information during the pandemic. The Union filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging that AMR's refusal to provide the information violated the duty to bargain under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRB sided with the Union, and AMR sought review of this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with the NLRB's decision. The court held that the NLRB was required to determine whether the collective bargaining agreement relieved AMR of the duty to provide the requested information. The court explained that the NLRA requires the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, including those provisions that limit a union's information rights. The court expressed that the NLRB had put the cart before the horse by concluding that AMR failed to provide information before determining whether AMR had a contractual duty to provide such information. As a result, the court granted AMR’s petition for review, denied the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement, vacated the NLRB's order, and remanded the case back to the NLRB for it to consider whether the collective bargaining agreement excused AMR from providing the requested information. View "American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was asked to review a decision by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regarding the regulatory jurisdiction over a proposed liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility in Port St. Joe, Florida. The facility was being planned by Nopetro LNG, LLC, which sought a ruling from the FERC that the facility fell outside of its regulatory jurisdiction under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act. FERC agreed, issuing a declaratory order to this effect, which it upheld on rehearing. Public Citizen, a nonprofit consumer advocacy group, sought review of the FERC's decision.However, before the appeal was heard, the FERC informed the court that Nopetro had abandoned its plans to build the facility due to market conditions. In light of this, the court found that the case was moot and dismissed Public Citizen's petition for review. The court also vacated the FERC's orders, stating that since the appeal was moot, it would exercise its equitable authority to vacate the orders at issue. The court noted that no party argued against vacatur and it would further the public interest by precluding any potential reliance on the challenged orders the court lacked authority to review. View "Public Citizen, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was asked to review a decision from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB had determined that T-Mobile had unlawfully dominated an organization it created known as T-Voice, which the NLRB classified as a "labor organization" under the National Labor Relations Act. The issue arose when T-Mobile, a national wireless telecommunications carrier, established T-Voice and selected employees to serve as representatives to raise issues with management. The Communications Workers of America filed an unfair labor practice charge against T-Mobile, alleging that T-Voice was a labor organization and that T-Mobile had unlawfully dominated it.In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRB's determination. The court held that the NLRB was correct in finding that T-Voice was a labor organization because the organization existed at least in part to deal with T-Mobile over working conditions, which is a key criterion for qualifying as a labor organization under federal law. The court further affirmed the NLRB's finding that T-Mobile had dominated T-Voice, which is prohibited by federal law. Consequently, the court denied T-Mobile's petition for review and granted the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement of its order. View "T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

In the case between East Texas Electric Cooperative, Inc., and others, against the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and American Electric Power Service Corporation (AEP), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed FERC's decision regarding AEP's calculation of its 2019 transmission rates. The petitioners, customers of AEP, challenged the calculation, but FERC rejected their claims. The petitioners then sought a review of the agency's decision.The court stated that FERC had correctly interpreted AEP's tariff terms and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. FERC's ruling was upheld on several points, including the denial of retroactive relief for alleged errors in previous rate years, the inclusion of certain coal-related costs in the 2019 rate, the classification of certain tax credits as prepayments for tax liabilities, and the classification of employee pension and benefit costs as non-contingent liabilities. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review. View "East Texas Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Federal Election Commission's (FEC) dismissal of an administrative complaint by the Campaign Legal Center (CLC). The CLC alleged campaign finance violations by two presidential campaign committees, claiming that they concealed over $750 million in expenditures by routing them through sham payments to two LLCs. The FEC dismissed the complaint, invoking prosecutorial discretion. The CLC argued that the FEC's invocation of discretion was dependent on legal analysis and was thus subject to judicial review under the Federal Election Campaign Act. The district court concluded that the FEC's reliance on considerations of prosecutorial discretion was separate from its legal analysis and precluded judicial review.On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the FEC's reasons for dismissal, which included resource allocation concerns, potential litigation risks, and a shifting regulatory landscape, were distinct considerations of prosecutorial discretion that did not solely rest on legal interpretation, and therefore were not reviewable by the court. The court rejected the CLC's argument that the FEC's invocation of discretion was intertwined with its legal analysis, stating that the agency's estimation of the resource demands of the proposed investigation and its potential size and scope bore no discernable relationship to any legal inquiry. View "Campaign Legal Center v. FEC" on Justia Law