Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2005, the SEC promulgated a series of initiatives dubbed “Regulation NMS,” which stands for National Market System. One of those initiatives established the concept of the “[n]ational best bid and national best offer,” which are the best bid and best offer for a security, from the taker’s point of view, across all U.S. securities exchanges. Regulation NMS also classifies some providers’ orders as “protected” bids or offers (collectively “protected quotations”). Protected quotations are “automated,” publicly displayed, and the national best bid or offer.At issue is not whether companies like Petitioner may seek advantages in the market by using advanced technology and ingenious trading strategies, but instead whether the SEC may allow an exchange to innovate, with the D-Limit order, in a way that offers new opportunities to long-term investors.The D.C. Circuit approved the SEC's rule, finding that substantial evidence supported the SEC’s findings and the SEC’s conclusions were reasonable and reasonably explained. View "Citadel Securities LLC v. SEC" on Justia Law

The  FDA declared that “preventing tobacco use initiation in young people is a central priority for protecting population health.” Congress has called on the FDA to regulate e-cigarette products pursuant to the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act.   Prohibition Juice makes flavored liquids containing nicotine derived from tobacco. Prohibition applied in September 2020 for FDA authorization to market several flavors in a range of sizes. The FDA denied those applications a year later. The FDA requires applicants to present reliable evidence of robust public health benefits exceeding known risks. Finding the manufacturers had presented insufficient evidence that their flavored products are more effective than unflavored products in helping adult cigarette smokers decrease or quit harmful tobacco uses, the FDA denied the applications. The manufacturers petitioned for a review of those denials.   The DC Circuit denied the petitions. The court explained that FDA plainly had statutory authority under the Tobacco Control Act to regulate as it did. As to the arbitrary and capricious challenges, the court held that the FDA did not change the evidentiary or substantive standard from its 2019 Guidance. The court further held that any error in the FDA’s failure to consider the marketing plans was harmless because the manufacturers failed to identify how an individualized review of the plans they submitted could have made any difference. Finally, the FDA did not otherwise fail to consider important aspects of the problem. View "Prohibition Juice Co. v. FDA" on Justia Law

In 2020, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) modified its regulations governing the maximum hours that commercial motor vehicle operators may drive or operate within a certain timeframe. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, a labor union representing commercial truck drivers, and three national nonprofit organizations petitioned for review. They argued that the Final Rule was arbitrary and capricious for failing to grapple with the safety and driver health consequences of changes to record-keeping rules for short-haul commercial vehicle drivers and break requirements for long-haul drivers.   The DC Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the modifications to the hours-of-service rules were sufficiently explained and grounded in the administrative record. The court explained that the Administration not only directly tackled the issue of driver health but also reasonably explained why the health benefits estimated in the 2011 Rule would continue under the modified 30-minute break rule. That met the APA’s requirements. View "Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety v. FMCSA" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Army veteran, arrived at the Tampa International Airport to pick up two of his children who were visiting for the holiday. After a swab of Petitioner’s hands tested positive for traces of explosive material, screening personnel from the Transportation Security Administration attempted to perform a full-body pat-down. Citing medical reasons, Petitioner repeatedly refused to be patted down and was subsequently escorted away from the checkpoint by law enforcement.   The agency assessed Petitioner a civil penalty for “interfer[ing] with screening personnel in the performance of their screening duties[.]” 49 C.F.R. Section 1540.109. Petitioner petitioned the DC Circuit to overturn the penalty on the ground that his refusal to submit to a pat-down, particularly in light of his medical justifications, did not constitute interference under the regulation. The court denied the petition finding that the agency lawfully applied its interference regulation to Petitioner’s conduct.   The court explained that it has recently defined the “ordinary meaning” of interfere as “to interpose in a way that hinders or impedes: comes into collision or be in opposition.” Here, in light of the established meaning, the TSA logically concluded that Petitioner’s conduct interfered with TSA personnel engaged in screening operations. TSA policy requires that whenever an individual triggers a positive explosives alarm, he or she must undergo a full-body pat-down. Petitioner’s repeated resistance to being patted down was “in opposition” to and “r[a]n at cross-purposes” with that policy.   Further, the court found that TSA’s conduct did not approach the level of egregiousness or outrageousness needed to establish a violation of substantive due process. View "Rohan Ramsingh v. TSA" on Justia Law

The House of Representatives Oversight Committee issued a subpoena to then-President Trump’s personal accounting firm, Mazars USA, LLP. The subpoena sought an array of the President’s personal financial records. President Trump then brought a lawsuit challenging the Committee’s authority to subpoena his financial records.   After the DC Circuit upheld the subpoena, the Supreme Court took up the matter. Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020). Since the remand, there have been two developments that potentially affected the shape of the court’s inquiry into the subpoena’s validity. First, President Trump is no longer the sitting President. And second, the Committee’s chairwoman has prepared a detailed explanation of the legislative purposes the subpoena serves and of how the subpoena satisfies the test laid out by the Supreme Court.   The DC Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court. The court agreed with President Trump that the heightened separation-of-powers scrutiny prescribed by the Supreme Court continues to govern in the unique circumstances of this case even though he is no longer the sitting President. However, the court also agreed with the Committee that the court can consider its detailed accounting of the legislative purposes its subpoena serves even though that explanation came after the subpoena’s original issuance.   Thus, the court upheld the Committee’s authority to subpoena certain of President Trump’s financial records in furtherance of the Committee’s enumerated legislative purposes. However, the court wrote it cannot sustain the breadth of the Committee’s subpoena. Rather, in carrying out the Supreme Court’s directive to “insist on a subpoena no broader than reasonably necessary to support Congress’s legislative objective,” the court determined that the Committee’s subpoena must be narrowed in a number of respects. View "Donald Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted petitions for review as to two order issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) aimed at consolidating existing national market system (NMS) plans governing the dissemination of equity market data into a single, consolidated plan (CT Plan) and modifying the governance structure to increase efficiencies and facilitate greater involvement by non-exchange stakeholders (Governance Plan), holding that Petitioners' petitions were granted as to one challenged provision.Petitioners, a group of national securities exchanges, brought this action challenging the Commission's orders, arguing that several of the provisions were arbitrary and capricious or were contrary to the the text and goals of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. Specifically, Petitioners challenged a provision of the final Commission-approved CT Plan that included representatives that did not belong to "self-regulatory organizations" (SROs) as voting members of the CT Plan's operating committee. The District of Columbia Circuit granted Petitioners' petitions as to the non-SRO representation provision and denied them in all other respects, holding that the provision including non-SROs on the CT Plan's operating committee as voting members was invalid. View "Nasdaq Stock Market LLC v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court declining to reach the merits of Plaintiffs' complaint challenging a determination of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2), holding that the district court erred in concluding that the FDIC exceeded its authority in making the determination.Plaintiffs, two bank executives, were fired after a proposed merger because they refused to accept a reduction in the amount of a payment that was contractually provided for them. Plaintiffs sued the bank that terminated them and the bank with which it merged, alleging that they were entitled to the full payments. The banks, in turn, sought guidance from the FDIC as to whether the relief sought by Plaintiffs would constitute a statutorily-restricted "golden parachute" payment. The FDIC responded that the payment would constitute a golden parachute. Plaintiffs then brought this action challenging the FDIC's determination as unlawful under the APA. The district court declined to reach the merits, concluding that the FDIC lacked authority to render a golden parachute determination at all. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the FDIC lacked authority to render its golden parachute determination. View "Bauer v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

Crowley Government Services, Inc. sued the General Services Administration and its Administrator (collectively, GSA), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to halt the GSA’s purported practice of interfering with payments owed to Crowley under its contract with the United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). Crowley argued the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, conferred subject matter jurisdiction on the district court to review the GSA’s alleged violation of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, and the Transportation Act of 1940. The question this case presented for the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia's review was whether Crowley’s suit against the GSA, whichwasis not a party to Crowley’s contract with TRANSCOM, was “at its essence” contractual, including whether Crowley “in essence” sought more than $10,000 in monetary relief from the federal government such that it was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court) pursuant to the Tucker Act. The district court answered affirmatively and dismissed Crowley’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals disagreed: Crowley’s action against the GSA in district court was not “at its essence” contractual because Crowley did not seek to enforce or recover on the contract with TRANSCOM. Nor did Crowley “in essence” seek monetary relief from the federal government in district court. Rather, it requested declaratory and injunctive relief that, if granted, would have considerable value independent of (and not negligible in comparison to) any monetary recovery Crowley may ultimately attain in other proceedings. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Crowley Government Services, Inc. v. GSA" on Justia Law

Appellants brought an action contesting a Department of Agriculture rulemaking in the district court. Appellants argued that the rule violated both the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees.   Appellants contested four aspects of the Final Rule: (1) that collection of a reserve surcharge violates the FACT Act; (2) that the Final Rule violates the FACT Act’s prohibition on cross-subsidization; (3) that the Final Rule violates the FACT Act and the APA by charging both a per-passenger and a per aircraft fee; and (4) that APHIS violated the APA by withholding certain information during the rulemaking process.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in part, reversed it insofar as the challenged rule authorizes collecting fees to fund a reserve after 2002. The court explained that Congress has directly addressed the question of whether APHIS may continue to collect fees to fund a reserve after fiscal year 2002. They may not do so. Thus, the court remanded this case to the district court for vacating insofar as the Final Rule authorizes collecting fees to maintain a reserve account.  Further, the court wrote that all of Appellants’ arguments regarding the dual application of the Commercial Aircraft User Fee and the Commercial Air Passenger Fee fail. Moreover, Appellants’ argument that fees collected from multiple user classes cannot be comingled in a fund that pays for the inspections of fee-paying user classes fails because the FACT Act does not prohibit this form of cross-subsidization. View "Air Transport Association v. AGRI" on Justia Law

The Federal Power Act (“FPA”), 16 U.S.C. Section 824d(d), ISO-NE filed tariff revisions with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “the Commission”) to compensate generators for maintaining an inventory of energy during the winter months of 2023–24 and 2024–25. The revisions implemented the Inventoried Energy Program (“IEP”), under which ISO-NE will provide additional payments to generators to maintain up to three days’ worth of fuel on-site and convert it into electricity.  The Commission issued an order accepting ISO-NE’s proposed tariff revisions. Petitioners contended that FERC’s decision to approve IEP imposes unjust and unreasonable, discriminatory, and preferential rates.   The DC Circuit upheld all but one component of the Commission’s decision to approve ISO-NE’s proposed tariff revisions implementing the Inventoried Energy Program. The court left in intact the Commission’s June 2020 order except for the portion of IEP that is arbitrary and capricious: the agency’s inclusion of nuclear, biomass, coal, hydroelectric generators. The court wrote that it believes there is no substantial doubt that FERC would have adopted IEP if it had not included these resources in the first place, and IEP can function sensibly without them. View "Belmont Municipal Light Department v. FERC" on Justia Law