Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The DC Circuit granted petitions for review asking the court to set aside the Department's decisions imposing sanctions on petitioners for violating the Horse Protection Act. The Supreme Court subsequently decided Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), holding that the SEC's ALJs had not been appointed in compliance with the Appointments Clause. In light of Lucia, the government agrees with petitioners that the ALJ who presided over petitioners' cases was improperly appointed, and moved for vacatur of the challenged orders. Petitioners oppose the government's motion, seeking to address a number of additional challenges in advance.In regard to petitioners' argument that the dual layers of for-cause-removal protections for the Department's ALJs unconstitutionally limit the President's removal power under Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010), the court concluded that petitioners have forfeited their argument by failing to raise it before the ALJ or Judicial Officer, and thus the argument is subject to a mandatory, non-excusable, issue-exhaustion requirement imposed by statute. The court concluded that petitioners preserved the remainder of their claims before the agency, but they fare no better in terms of obtaining additional relief from the court at this time. View "Fleming v. United States Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

A 2017 “tweet” by @realDonaldTrump stated: “The Amazon Washington Post fabricated the facts on my ending massive, dangerous, and wasteful payments to Syrian rebels fighting Assad.” BuzzFeed requested CIA records about Agency payments to Syrian rebels, citing the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(3)(A). The Agency invoked Exemptions 1 and 3. The district court granted the Agency summary judgment, explaining that the “tweet did not mention the [Agency] or create any inference that such a program would be linked to or run by the [Agency].”BuzzFeed sent another, more broadly stated, request. The Agency asserted that a response would reveal whether it had an intelligence interest in, intelligence sources about, and connection to programs related to Syrian rebels — information exempt from disclosure under Exemptions 1 and 3. Exemption 1 covers “matters”2 that are “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Exemption 3 covers matters “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute,” the National Security Act qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3, 50 U.S.C. 3024(i)(1).The district court granted BuzzFeed summary judgment, holding that the tweet officially acknowledged “the government’s intelligence interest in the broader categories of records that BuzzFeed has requested.” The D.C. Circuit reversed. The tweet was not an official acknowledgment of the existence (or not) of Agency records. View "Leopold v. Central Intelligence Agency" on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases, petitioners challenge four provisions of the EPA's 2015 and 2018 rules implementing the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone. Petitioners challenge four features of the 2018 Rule: (1) the interprecursor trading program, as well as provisions (2) allowing states to demonstrate compliance with the Act’s reasonable further progress milestone requirements through an implementation-based method, (3) allowing states to choose between two options for the reasonable further progress baseline year, and (4) allowing nonattainment areas to use already-implemented measures to satisfy the Act's contingency measures requirements.The DC Circuit vacated two provisions—the interprecursor trading program and the interpretation of the Clean Air Act's contingency measures requirements—because they contravene the statute's unambiguous language. The court vacated another provision—the implementation of the milestone compliance demonstration requirement—because it rests on an unreasonable interpretation of the statute. Finally, the court denied the petition for review with respect to the alternative baseline years provision. Therefore, the court granted in part and denied in part the petitions for review. View "Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit held that the Corps violated the National Environmental Policy Act (EPA) by issuing an easement allowing the Dakota Access Pipeline to transport crude oil through federally owned land at the Lake Oahe crossing site without preparing an environmental impact statement despite substantial criticisms from the Tribes.The court rejected the Corps' and Dakota Access' contention that the district court applied the wrong standard by relying on National Parks Conservation Association v. Semonite, 916 F.3d at 1083, which emphasized the important role played by entities other than the federal government. The court explained that the Tribes' unique role and their government-to-government relationship with the United States demand that their criticisms be treated with appropriate solicitude. The court concluded that several serious scientific disputes in this case means that the effects of the Corps' easement decision are likely to be "highly controversial." The court also noted that, although the risk of a pipeline leak may be low, that risk is sufficient that a person of ordinary prudence would take it into account in reaching a decision to approve the pipeline's placement, and its potential consequences are therefore properly considered. The court affirmed the district court's order vacating the easement while the Corps prepares an environmental impact statement. However, the court reversed the district court's order to the extent it directed that the pipeline be shut down and emptied of oil. View "Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit denied a petition for review challenging FERC's determination that fuel transported by pipeline to Orlando's airport—after being delivered to the Port of Tampa—moves intrastate. The court upheld the ALJ's finding, under the three Northville factors, that the stop in Tampa broke the continuity of interstate transportation, and so the jet fuel moved intrastate through the Central Florida Pipeline. Therefore, FERC lacked jurisdiction to regulate the pipeline rates. The court rejected petitioners' claims that FERC misapplied the Northville factors; the Northville factors are inadequate to make the determination; the Commission misinterpreted the teachings of old Supreme Court cases: Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U.S. 111 (1913); Carson Petrol. Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95 (1929); United States v. Erie R.R. Co., 280 U.S. 98 (1929); and the Airlines' overarching intent to transport the fuel from ships through Tampa to Orlando means the pipeline movement is interstate in nature. View "Aircraft Service International, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) adopted the 2019 Affordable Clean Energy Rule (ACE Rule), 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520, repealing and replacing the Clean Power Plan as a means of regulating power plants’ emissions of greenhouse gases. The Clean Power Plan was an Obama-era standard that set the first limits for climate change pollution from existing power plants. The EPA considered its authority under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401, 7411 to be confined to physical changes to the power plants themselves. The ACE Rule determined a new system of emission reduction for coal-fired power plants only and left unaddressed greenhouse gas emissions from other types of fossil-fuel-fired power plants, such as those fired by natural gas or oil. Several groups challenged the action.The D.C. Circuit vacated the ACE Rule, which expressly rests on the incorrect conclusion that the plain statutory text foreclosed the Clean Power Plan so that complete repeal was “the only permissible interpretation of the scope of the EPA’s authority” under section 7411. The error prevented full consideration of the statutory question and of measures other than those that apply at and to the individual source. The ACE Rule’s amendment of the regulatory framework to slow the process for the reduction of emissions is arbitrary and capricious. View "American Lung Association v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Appellant, a United States citizen working in Syria as a journalist, seeks a declaration that his alleged inclusion on the government's purported terrorist list is unconstitutional and an injunction barring the United States government from including him on the purported list without providing additional procedural protections. In this case, because five aerial bombings allegedly occurred in appellant's vicinity in Syria during the summer of 2016, he claims that he has mistakenly been placed on a purported list of individuals the United States has determined are terrorists who may be targeted and killed. The district court dismissed the complaint under the state secrets privilege.The DC Circuit held, however, that the complaint fails to allege plausibly that any of the five aerial bombings were attributable to the United States and specifically targeted appellant. Therefore, the court concluded that appellant's standing theory does not cross the line from conceivable to plausible. The court vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint on the ground that appellant lacks Article III standing. View "Kareem v. Haspel" on Justia Law

CNN filed suit against the FBI under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for access to memos that former FBI Director James Comey wrote. The FBI filed a redacted declaration by Deputy Assistant Director David Archey explaining why it redacted the Comey Memos. After the FBI disclosed most of the Comey Memos, the district court ordered the FBI to disclose the unredacted Archey Declaration under the common-law right to access judicial records.The DC Circuit vacated, agreeing with the FBI that the district court misapplied the six-factor test first articulated in United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The court explained that the Archey Declaration is a judicial record because the purpose and effect of it was to influence a judicial decision. Because the Archey Declaration is a judicial record, the court applied a strong presumption in favor of disclosing it. The court disagreed at how the district court applied the first and second Hubbard factors: (1) the need for public access to the information redacted from the Archey Declaration, and (2) the extent of previous public access to that information. The court explained that a district court weighing the first factor should consider the public's need to access the information that remains sealed, not the public's need for other information sought in the overall lawsuit. Therefore, the proper inquiry is whether the public needs to access the remaining information redacted from the Archey Declaration, not whether the public needs to access the Comey Memos as a whole or even the Archey Declaration as a whole. Likewise, a district court weighing the second factor should consider the public's previous access to the sealed information, not its previous access to the information available in the overall lawsuit. The court also parted ways with the district court as to the third, fourth, and fifth Hubbard factors. Finally, given especially the national security context of the sealed information, the sixth factor does not outweigh other factors with strong claims to the label of "most important" in this case. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to reapply the Hubbard factors. View "Cable News Network, Inc. v. FBI" on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Shawnee Tribe challenged the allocation of funds under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 801(a)(1). Of the $150 billion appropriated, the Act reserved $8 billion for “Tribal governments.” The amount paid to a Tribal government is determined by the Secretary of the Treasury “based on increased expenditures of each such Tribal government . . . relative to aggregate expenditures in fiscal year 2019 by the Tribal government." Rather than using the enrollment numbers submitted by the tribes, the Secretary relied on tribal population data used by HUD in connection with the Indian Housing Block Grant program.” That data does not reflect actual enrollment. The Secretary’s decision to use IHBG data had an unfortunate impact on the Shawnee Tribe, which had over $6.6 million in expenditures in 2019, and “incurred significant medical and public health expenses in responding to the devastation resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.” It received $100,000.The district court, finding the allocation of funds under the Act unreviewable, dismissed the case. The D.C. Circuit reversed, with directions to enter a preliminary injunction promptly. By requiring that the allocations be “based on increased expenditures,” Congress has not left the Secretary with “unbounded” discretion. The court noted that the Secretary acknowledged that the IHBG data was inadequate as a proxy for increased expenditures in some cases but did not seek alternative information for the 25 tribes with no IHBG population. View "Shawnee Tribe v. Mnuchin" on Justia Law

Pursuant to the Affordable Care Act, Congress required hospitals to make public "a list" of "standard charges" in accordance with guidelines developed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The Hospital and others challenged the Secretary's rule defining "standard charges" as including prices that hospitals charge insurers.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, holding that the rule does not violate the Affordable Care Act of 2010, the Administrative Procedure Act, or the First Amendment. The court concluded that, viewed in its entirety, 42 U.S.C. 2718(e) is best interpreted as requiring disclosure of more than list prices. The court explained that section 2718(e) permits the Secretary to require disclosure of negotiated rates, and requiring hospitals to display certain datapoints separately falls squarely within the Secretary's authority to develop guidelines for making the list public. Furthermore, contrary to the Association's argument, the best reading of section 2718(e), in its entirety, permits the Secretary to require hospitals to display the information in multiple ways.In regard to the APA claims, the court concluded that the Secretary adequately addressed the feasibility and administrative burdens, as well as the benefits, of complying with the rule. Furthermore, the court rejected the Association's claim that the agency changed its position. Finally, the court concluded that the Association's argument that the rule violates the First Amendment is squarely barred by the Supreme Court's decision in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985), and the court's case law applying that decision. View "American Hospital Ass'n v. Azar" on Justia Law