Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Cork Wine Bar, a restaurant that competes with President Trump's eponymous hotel, filed suit alleging violations of the District's common law of unfair competition. Cork alleged that President Trump's hotel attracted more of the lobbyists, advocacy groups, and diplomats that Cork had relied on to fill its events calendars, and that these customers chose the hotel because of a perception that patronizing it would be to their advantage in their dealings with the Trump Administration. After removal, the district court denied Cork's motion to remand, dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim.The DC Circuit held that the case was properly removed based on its two-step analysis in officer-removal cases. First, the court held that President Trump's theory that the District may not impose legal conditions on the lawful performance of his presidential duties was colorable. Second, the court held that President Trump demonstrated that Cork's suit fell within the scope of 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1).The court also held that case law did not support Cork's claims on the merits and that Cork failed to cite any contrary precedent. In this case, Cork suggested in passing that President Trump and the hotel were impairing competition and interfering with access to its business. However, the court explained that these claims bear little resemblance to the examples listed in Ray v. Proxmire and B B & W Mgmt., Inc. v. Tasea Inv. Co. Finally, the court declined to certify the core question of District law to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. View "K&D LLC v. Trump Old Post Office LLC" on Justia Law

NTCH challenged the Commission's three spectrum-management decisions: first, the Commission "modified" Dish Network's license in the AWS-4 Band to authorize the company to develop a stand-alone terrestrial network that could support wireless broadband services; second, the Commission "waived," a year later, certain technical restrictions on these modified licenses, though it conditioned the waivers on Dish Network's commitment to bid a certain sum of money in a public auction for adjacent spectrum in the so-called "H Block;" and third, the Commission designed and conducted "Auction 96," in which Dish Network bid as promised and won the H Block licenses.The DC Circuit denied NTCH's petitions for review of the district court's orders modifying Dish Network's AWS-4 licenses and establishing Auction 96’s procedures. Applying a deferential standard of review, the court held that the Commission's decision to authorize standalone terrestrial services in the AWS-4 Band sought to encourage "innovative methods of exploiting the spectrum," to address the "urgent need" for wireless broadband. Furthermore, the Commission chose to modify Dish Network's licenses largely because of the "technical judgment," that same-band, separate-operator sharing of the spectrum would be impractical. The court held that the Commission's decision was logical and that the Commission's failure to consider an alternative was not unreasonable. The court rejected NTCH's remaining contentions that the Commission's decision exceeded its authority under section 316 of the Communications Act. In regard to the Auction 96 procedures, the court held that NTCH failed to show that the Commission's decision was arbitrary and capricious.However, the court held that the Commission wrongly dismissed NTCH's challenges to the waiver orders for lack of administrative standing, and thus remanded for the Commission to consider those claims on the merits. View "NTCH, Inc. v. FCC" on Justia Law

Jackson served in the Marine Corps, 1977-1991. Almost 30 years after his honorable discharge, Jackson filed a pro se complaint alleging that toward the end of his military career, his supervising officers discriminated against him because he is a black male, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court inferred additional claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), and the Military Pay Act, 37 U.S.C. 204 but ultimately dismissed all of Jackson’s claims. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. The court noted the unanimous rulings of other sister circuits, concluding that Title VII does not apply to uniformed members of the armed forces. Jackson’s APA claim was untimely and, although the limitations period is no longer considered jurisdictional, the facts alleged were insufficient to apply equitable tolling. Jackson was able to manage his affairs and comprehend his rights; he alleged that at the time of the alleged discrimination, he knew that he “had been subjected to wrongdoing and strongly desired justice.” The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the dismissal of Jackson’s Military Pay Act claim; the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction of such claims. View "Jackson v. Modly" on Justia Law

Kentucky and Arkansas residents sued the Secretary of Health and Human Services based on the approval under 42 U.S.C. 1315(a) of an “experimental, pilot, or demonstration projects which, in the judgment of the Secretary, is likely to assist in promoting the objectives” of Medicaid. The district court held that the Secretary failed to analyze whether the projects would promote the primary objective of Medicaid—to furnish medical assistance. Kentucky terminated its project and obtained voluntary dismissal.The D.C. Circuit affirmed with respect to the Arkansas Works program, which required beneficiaries aged 19-49 to “work or engage in specified educational, job training, or job search activities for at least 80 hours per month,” except beneficiaries who show they are medically frail or pregnant, caring for a dependent child under age six, participating in a substance treatment program, or are full-time students. Works proposed to eliminate retroactive coverage, to lower the income eligibility threshold from 133% to 100% of the federal poverty line, and eliminated using Medicaid funds to assist beneficiaries in paying the premiums for employer-provided health care coverage. Instead of analyzing whether the demonstration would promote the objective of providing coverage, the Secretary identified three alternative objectives. Congress has not conditioned the receipt of Medicaid benefits on fulfilling work requirements or taking steps to end receipt of governmental benefits View "Gresham v. Azar" on Justia Law

Baystate filed suit against the Secretary, challenging his promulgation of a final rule calculating the wage index for hospital reimbursements in 2017. Baystate alleged that the Secretary failed to comply with the statutory requirement to calculate a wage index that reflected the actual wage levels in Massachusetts, relied on data that he knew to be false, and entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Secretary, holding that the Secretary's interpretation of his authority under the Medicare statute was lawful and his action was not arbitrary and capricious. In this case, the Secretary provided a reasonable explanation for his decision to enforce the deadline and reject Nantucket's revised data; the decision to enforce the deadline against third-party hospitals was not arbitrary or capricious; and the Secretary's interpretation of his authority to enforce a deadline in calculating the wage index fell squarely within them. View "Baystate Franklin Medical Center v. Azar" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's suit, alleging that President Trump violated the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 by obscuring liabilities on financial disclosure reports, because plaintiff has not shown that he has a clear and indisputable right to mandamus-type relief. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that President Trump violated the Act by over-disclosing; that is, by listing debts in Part 8 of his May 2018 and May 2019 financial disclosure reports for which he was not personally liable.The court rejected plaintiff's contention that the declaratory judgment statute and the federal question statute provided statutory bases for jurisdiction. The court also held that the Mandamus Act did not provide a base for jurisdiction, because plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that the Ethics Act, once interpreted, imposed a clear and indisputable duty on President Trump to differentiate personal from business liabilities. Therefore, the court vacated the portions of the district court's decision addressing whether the equities would favor issuing mandamus-type relief but otherwise affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "Lovitky v. Trump" on Justia Law

The Narragansett Tribe petitioned for review of the Commission's order denying its motion to intervene in a natural gas pipeline certificate proceeding after the certificate to build a pipeline had issued. While the Tribe awaited the Commission's action on its pending motion to intervene and its separate motion for reconsideration of an order allowing construction to commence, the pipeline was completed. In the process, more than twenty ceremonial stone features were destroyed. The Tribe then petitioned for review seeking only an order compelling the Commission to amend its regulation so that it cannot repeat the alleged violations of the National Historic Preservation Act in the future.The DC Circuit held that the Tribe lacked standing to seek such relief because it has not shown a substantial risk that a similar disagreement between it and the Commission will recur. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition based on lack of jurisdiction. View "Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic Preservation Office v. FERC" on Justia Law

215 Members of the Congress sued President Donald J. Trump based on allegations that he has repeatedly violated the United States Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause. The district court denied the President's motion to dismiss the complaint.The DC Circuit reversed and held that the members of Congress lacked standing. The court held that the district court erred in holding that the members suffered an injury based on the President depriving them of the opportunity to give or withhold their consent to foreign emoluments, thereby injuring them in their roles as members of Congress. The court held that Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997), and Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1953–54 (2019), were controlling in this case. In Bethune-Hill, the Supreme Court summarily read in Raines that individual members of Congress lack standing to assert the institutional interests of a legislature in the same way a single House of a bicameral legislature lacks capacity to assert interests belonging to the legislature as a whole. The court stated that the members—29 Senators and 186 Members of the House of Representatives—do not constitute a majority of either body and are, therefore, powerless to approve or deny the President's acceptance of foreign emoluments.Accordingly, in regard to the district court's holding that the members have standing, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. In regard to the district court's holding that the members have a cause of action and have stated a claim, the court vacated as moot. View "Blumenthal v. Trump" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit denied a petition for review of the Commission's order finding that the company violated regulations promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). In this case, the company had hired a construction contractor to remove steel beams from four shipping containers by crane. During unloading, the contractor crane operator touched an overhead power line with the crane, electrocuting three company employees and injuring others.The court held that the Commission adequately explained why it viewed the circumstances here as different from Sec'y of Labor v. Sasser Elec. & Mfg. Co., 11 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2133, and more akin to Fabi Construction Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 508 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Unlike in Sasser, the Commission explained that this was the first time that the company had hired the contractor to perform crane work, so there was no history of safe crane practices in compliance with the Act upon which to base reasonable reliance. Furthermore, the Commission stated the potential duration of exposure to the violative condition was different. Therefore, the Commission's decision not to treat Sasser as dictating the outcome here was not arbitrary.The court also held that the Commission did not misapply the summary judgment standard, because there was no genuine dispute about the scope of the agreement between the company and the contractor, the foreseeability of the accident, and the "signaling" within OSHA regulation. View "Manua's, Inc. v. Scalia" on Justia Law

The First Amendment does not create an implied damages action against officials in the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) for retaliatory administrative enforcement actions under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). The DC Circuit held that, consistent with the Supreme Court's marked reluctance to extend Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), to new contexts, the First Amendment does not create such an implied damages action.In this case, plaintiff filed suit against the United States and four OCC officials, alleging Bivens claims against the officials as well as various tort claims. The Bivens claims were based on the theory that the officials caused the OCC enforcement action in retaliation for plaintiff's protected speech criticizing an OCC investigation, in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution. The court held that this case clearly presented a new Bivens context, and FIRREA's administrative enforcement scheme is a special factor counselling hesitation. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss plaintiff's First Amendment claims. View "Loumiet v. United States" on Justia Law