Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Husky Marketing & Supply Company and Phillips 66 Company, two customers of a crude-oil pipeline, who petitioned for review of orders issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approving the pipeline’s application to charge market-based rates for its shipping services. The petitioners argued that the Commission adopted an arbitrary and capricious definition of the relevant geographic destination market for the pipeline’s services when analyzing whether it had market power.Previously, the matter was referred to an administrative law judge (ALJ) who, after an evidentiary hearing, found the correct destination market was the narrower Wood River market advanced by Husky and Phillips, rather than the broader St. Louis BEA Economic Area advanced by Marathon. Both Marathon and the Petitioners filed exceptions to the ALJ’s decision. The Commission unanimously reversed the ALJ’s decision and concluded the correct geographical destination market was Wood River together with Patoka, Illinois.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the FERC’s orders under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard. The court held that the FERC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it concluded Wood River and Patoka together, rather than Wood River alone, represent the area in which a shipper may rationally look for transportation service. The court also held that the FERC was not required to perform any additional empirical analysis in this case. Therefore, the petitions for review were denied. View "Husky Marketing and Supply Company v. FERC" on Justia Law

A freelance journalist, Shawn Musgrave, sought access to a classified congressional committee report on the CIA's use of detention and interrogation following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. When the committee failed to respond to his request for a copy of the full report, Musgrave filed a lawsuit invoking a common law right of access to the committee report. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the defendants were protected by sovereign immunity and that the Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause prevents compelled disclosure of the report.The district court also denied Musgrave's request for discovery about the report's purpose and the Committee's communications with the Executive Branch about the report. Musgrave appealed the decision, arguing that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the Speech or Debate Clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court held that the Speech or Debate Clause imposes a privilege against Musgrave's requests for discovery and compelled disclosure of the report. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of Musgrave's request for discovery, concluding that the district court's error was not material as Musgrave had not shown that any requested discovery could produce information that would affect the Speech-or-Debate analysis. View "Musgrave v. Warner" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Gerald Smith, was convicted of murder, kidnapping, and drug trafficking charges three decades ago. He was sentenced to multiple life sentences under the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines. In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act, which allows courts to resentence defendants convicted for certain drug crimes that carry lighter sentences today than at the time of sentencing. In 2019, the Supreme Court held unconstitutionally vague one aspect of the “crime-of-violence” definition set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). Smith sought vacatur of his crime-of-violence convictions and for First Step Act resentencing for other convictions. The district court denied both forms of relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Smith's convictions for Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) murder involved the intentional use of force against others, qualifying them as crimes of violence under Section 924(c)’s elements clause. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of resentencing under the First Step Act, as Smith was not eligible for resentencing on most counts, and the district court reasonably explained its denial of resentencing on the eligible counts. The court remanded to the district court for the limited purpose of entering a revised judgment and conviction order that reflects this court’s prior vacatur of Smith’s felony-murder and attempted-armed-robbery convictions. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Stephen Wynn, a casino owner and real estate developer, who was accused by the Department of Justice (DOJ) of acting as an unregistered foreign agent for the People's Republic of China in 2017. The DOJ alleged that Wynn lobbied then-President Trump and his administration on behalf of China to cancel a certain Chinese businessperson's visa or to otherwise remove that person from the United States. Wynn's lobbying efforts ceased in October 2017, and he never registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).The DOJ sued Wynn in 2022, seeking to compel him to register as a foreign agent under FARA. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that since Wynn's alleged agency relationship with the Chinese government ended in October 2017, FARA no longer required him to register.The DOJ appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that under the precedent set by United States v. McGoff, Wynn's obligation to register under FARA expired when he ceased acting as a foreign agent. The court rejected the DOJ's argument that the civil enforcement provision of FARA allowed for an injunction to compel compliance for past violations, stating that the provision only applies to ongoing or imminent violations. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no legal basis for the government to compel Wynn to register now. View "Attorney General v. Wynn" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) approval of a project to expand a natural-gas pipeline from western Pennsylvania to the New York metropolitan area. The petitioner, Food & Water Watch, argued that FERC overlooked environmental issues in approving the project. Specifically, they claimed that FERC's Environmental Impact Statement failed to quantify greenhouse-gas emissions from upstream drilling for the extra gas, to quantify ozone emissions from its downstream burning, and to categorize emissions impacts as either significant or insignificant. Additionally, Food & Water Watch argued that FERC did not adequately consider New York State and New York City laws mandating reductions in carbon-dioxide emissions.The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The lower courts had approved the project, with FERC issuing a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the East 300 Upgrade Project. FERC had prepared a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which estimated the downstream carbon-dioxide emissions but declined to address upstream environmental effects. FERC also declined to characterize downstream emissions as significant or insignificant.The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the petitioner's contentions and denied the petitions for review. The court found that FERC had reasonably concluded that there was too much uncertainty regarding the number and location of additional upstream wells. The court also held that FERC had reasonably explained its decision not to give a quantitative estimate of how much ozone would be produced as a result of the project. Finally, the court found that FERC had amply discussed the significance of GHG emissions and that it was not required to label the increased emissions and ensuing costs as either significant or insignificant. The court also found that FERC had reasonably explained why the New York State Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act did not undercut its finding of need for the project. View "Food & Water Watch v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves the Medical Imaging & Technology Alliance and the Advanced Medical Technology Association, two trade associations representing medical device manufacturers, who sued the Library of Congress and the Librarian of Congress. The dispute arose from an exemption to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) that allowed some access to the software of advanced medical devices. The trade associations claimed that the exemption violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court dismissed the case, ruling that the APA claims were barred by sovereign immunity because the Library of Congress is part of “the Congress” and therefore not an “agency” within the meaning of the APA’s judicial review provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court held that irrespective of whether the Library is an “agency,” Congress has specified that copyright regulations under Title 17 of the U.S. Code are subject to the APA. The court concluded that DMCA rules are subject to the APA just like other copyright rules, and therefore, the APA provides the necessary waiver of sovereign immunity for this suit. The court remanded the case back to the district court to assess the APA claims. View "Medical Imaging & Technology Alliance v. Library of Congress" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of Afghan and Iraqi nationals who served the United States during recent armed conflicts and are now facing serious threats due to their service. They applied for special-immigrant visas, but their applications were delayed. Congress had authorized the Secretary of State to issue these visas and later mandated that the government should improve its efficiency to process the applications within nine months, except in cases involving unusual national-security risks. However, the plaintiffs' applications had been pending for more than nine months.The district court held that the government had unreasonably delayed processing these applications. In 2020, the court approved a plan requiring the prompt adjudication of applications filed by class members and pending for more than nine months as of May 21, 2020. In 2022, the Secretary moved to terminate or modify the plan based on changed circumstances in the two years since 2020. The district court recognized that changed circumstances warrant modifying the plan, but it refused to terminate the plan. The government appealed the refusal to terminate.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the district court reasonably responded to the changes and that some continued judicial involvement remains appropriate. The court also noted that the government's increased difficulties in processing visa applications cannot retroactively make past unreasonable delays reasonable. The court concluded that the district court permissibly balanced the various competing interests in declining to terminate the 2020 adjudication plan. View "Afghan and Iraqi Allies v. Blinken" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request made by The National Security Archive ("Archive") to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for the disclosure of the Perroots Memo. The memo, written by Lieutenant General Perroots in 1989, detailed events from 1983 that helped avert a nuclear crisis. The CIA produced the memo's cover letter but withheld the rest of the document, citing FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3. The Archive sued the CIA to compel disclosure of the memo.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the CIA, as the Archive conceded that the response was justified under FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3, and the CIA had not waived its right to claim the exemptions. The district court also denied the Archive's motion to amend judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, upon de novo review, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the Archive had standing to bring the case, as it had suffered a concrete injury when the CIA refused its FOIA request. However, the court rejected the Archive's arguments that the CIA had waived its right to assert the exemptions through the official acknowledgment and public domain doctrines. The court found that the CIA was not involved in the disclosure of the Perroots Memo, and therefore, the exemptions were not waived. The court also declined to consider the Archive's request to reclassify the Perroots Memo, as the Archive failed to make any substantive arguments regarding its reclassification request in its briefs. View "National Security Archive v. CIA" on Justia Law

The case involves the Federal Education Association Stateside Region (FEA-SR), a teachers' union, and the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). The parties were negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) when they reached an impasse. The Federal Service Impasses Panel (FSIP) was called in to resolve the remaining issues. The FSIP issued an order resolving the impasse, but FEA-SR refused to sign the agreement, arguing that the FSIP lacked jurisdiction to resolve certain issues. FEA-SR filed an arbitral grievance claiming that the Department of Defense's submission of the agreement for agency head review without FEA-SR's signature violated the contractual ground rules and constituted bad faith bargaining.The arbitrator found in favor of FEA-SR, concluding that the Department of Defense had committed unfair labor practices by cutting negotiations short and submitting an unexecuted agreement for agency head review. The FLRA, however, set aside the arbitrator's award, finding that the arbitrator could not review whether the FSIP had jurisdiction over the disputed issues and that the agreement was "executed" when the FSIP issued its order.FEA-SR petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of the FLRA's decisions. The court held that it had jurisdiction to review the petition because the FLRA's decisions involved an unfair labor practice. However, on the merits, the court rejected FEA-SR's claims and denied the petition for review. The court agreed with the FLRA that the arbitrator lacked authority to review the FSIP order and that the agreement was executed when the FSIP issued its order. View "Federal Education Association Stateside Region v. FLRA" on Justia Law

The case involves Trenton Palmer, an experienced private pilot, who was charged by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for flying his plane at an altitude of less than 100 feet above ground level and within 500 feet of people, a house, and other structures. The FAA claimed that Palmer violated a regulation establishing minimum safe altitudes. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found Palmer guilty of the violation, and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) affirmed the decision. Palmer appealed, arguing that the ALJ committed multiple prejudicial errors and that the complaint against him should have been dismissed.Previously, the ALJ had denied Palmer's motion to dismiss the FAA’s complaint on the ground that the complaint failed to give fair notice of the charges. The ALJ found that Palmer violated Sections 91.119(a), (c), and 91.13(a) of the FAA regulations. The ALJ mitigated Palmer’s suspension from 120 days to 60 days. Palmer appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Board and the FAA cross-appealed the ALJ’s mitigation of Palmer’s suspension. On de novo review, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s order and reversed the ALJ’s mitigation of the Administrator’s sanction because the Administrator’s selected sanction was supported by a reasonable explanation and there were no mitigating circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the decision from the NTSB. The court found that Palmer's arguments on appeal as to the Section 91.119 violations turn on whether he proved his defense that the low flight was necessary for takeoff or landing. The court rejected Palmer's claim of inadequate notice as legally unsupported and facially implausible. The court also found no error in the ALJ’s reliance on expert witness testimony and the Board’s subsequent affirmance. The court denied Palmer’s petition for review. View "Palmer v. FAA" on Justia Law