Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Troy Olhausen, a former Senior Vice President of Business Development and Marketing at Arriva Medical, LLC, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act against his former employers, Arriva, Alere, Inc., and Abbott Laboratories, Inc. He alleged that the defendants submitted fraudulent claims to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for reimbursement. Specifically, Olhausen claimed that Arriva submitted claims without obtaining required assignment-of-benefits signatures and failed to disclose or accredit certain call-center locations that processed claims.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed Olhausen’s third amended complaint, holding that he failed to plead with the particularity required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) that any fraudulent claims were actually submitted to the government. The district court found that Olhausen did not provide sufficient details to establish that false claims had been submitted, as he did not work in the billing department and lacked firsthand knowledge of the claim submissions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Olhausen adequately pled with particularity that allegedly false claims were submitted under Count II, which involved claims for heating pads that lacked assignment-of-benefits signatures. The court found that the internal audit allegations provided sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy Rule 9(b). However, the court upheld the dismissal of Count IV, which alleged that Arriva failed to disclose or accredit certain call-center locations, as Olhausen did not adequately allege that any claims involving these locations were actually submitted. Consequently, the court vacated the dismissal of Counts II and VI (conspiracy) and remanded them for further proceedings, while affirming the dismissal of Count IV. View "Olhausen v. Arriva Medical, LLC" on Justia Law

Thomas Swinford was shot and killed by Athens-Clarke County police officers after he refused to drop a gun and instead raised and pointed it at the officers. His widow, Jayne Swinford, filed a lawsuit in Georgia state court alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia’s wrongful death statute against seven officers, the police chief, and the county government. The case was removed to federal court.The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on qualified and official immunity grounds, relying on body camera footage showing the events leading up to the shooting. The district court considered the footage and granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the officers acted reasonably and did not violate Thomas’s constitutional rights. The court also denied Mrs. Swinford’s motion to amend her complaint and her motion for reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that the district court properly considered the body camera footage under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. The footage showed that the officers had probable cause to believe Thomas posed a serious threat when he raised his gun at them, justifying their use of deadly force. The court found that the officers did not use excessive force and were entitled to qualified immunity. Consequently, the supervisory liability claim against the police chief and the Monell claim against the county also failed.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders, including the denial of Mrs. Swinford’s motion to amend her complaint and her motion for reconsideration. View "Swinford v. Santos" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, citizens of the Dominican Republic, requested records from three federal agencies under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) related to the revocation of their U.S. visas. The agencies produced some records but withheld others, citing FOIA exemptions, including Exemption 3 and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 222(f). The plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of the searches and the exemptions claimed by the agencies.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reviewed the case. The government filed declarations from FOIA officials explaining the searches and the withheld records. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government, concluding that the agencies conducted adequate searches and properly invoked FOIA Exemption 3 to withhold and redact documents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the agencies conducted reasonable searches and properly invoked Exemption 3. The court found that INA § 222(f) qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3 and that visa revocation records fall within its scope. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the agencies' declarations violated the best evidence rule and that the searches were inadequate because they did not include alien number searches or routing requests to other DHS components. The court concluded that the agencies' actions were reasonable and in compliance with FOIA requirements. View "Jimenez v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two federally recognized Indian tribes, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the Poarch Band of Creek Indians, over the excavation and development of a burial site known as Hickory Ground in Wetumpka, Alabama. The Muscogee Nation claims that the site is sacred and historically significant, containing graves and ceremonial grounds. The Poarch Band, which purchased the site in 1980 and later had it held in trust by the United States, excavated the site with Auburn University and announced plans to develop a hotel and casino on it. The Muscogee Nation sued to stop the development and restore the site.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama dismissed the Muscogee Nation's complaint, ruling that the Poarch Band and its officials enjoyed sovereign immunity. The court also found that the Poarch officials were immune under an exception to Ex parte Young for claims that are the functional equivalent of a quiet title action and implicate special sovereignty interests. The district court did not analyze the claims individually but dismissed them collectively, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred by not analyzing the Poarch officials' sovereign immunity on a claim-by-claim basis. The appellate court emphasized that each claim must be considered separately to determine whether it is the functional equivalent of a quiet title action and whether it implicates special sovereignty interests. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to allow the Muscogee Nation to amend its complaint and to analyze the claims individually. The appellate court also rejected the argument that the Supreme Court had abrogated the Coeur d’Alene exception to Ex parte Young, affirming that it remains a narrow but valid exception. View "Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Rollin" on Justia Law

A group called Moms for Liberty, along with several individual members, filed a lawsuit against Brevard Public Schools and members of the Brevard County School Board. The plaintiffs claimed that their speech was unconstitutionally restricted at school board meetings. They argued that the Board's policies prohibiting "abusive," "personally directed," and "obscene" speech were unconstitutional. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as nominal damages.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The district court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not show an actual or imminent injury. It also held that the Board's policies did not objectively chill the plaintiffs' protected speech. Despite finding no standing, the district court went on to rule that the Board's policies were constitutional.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiffs had standing to seek both retrospective and prospective relief. The court held that the Board's policy on "abusive" speech was unconstitutional because it was viewpoint-based and prohibited offensive speech. The policy on "personally directed" speech was also found to be unreasonable and inconsistently enforced, making it unconstitutional. Lastly, the court ruled that the prohibition on "obscene" speech was unreasonably applied to restrict protected speech, particularly when it involved reading from books available in school libraries. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Eleventh Circuit's opinion. View "Moms for Liberty v. Brevard Public Schools" on Justia Law

Robert Turner, a property owner in Suwannee County, Florida, claimed that his homestead property was sold at an impermissibly low amount under Florida law, which deprived him of any surplus after back taxes and costs were deducted. Turner had a homestead exemption on his property, which was automatically renewed until 2015. After failing to pay property taxes, a tax certificate was issued, and a tax deed sale was conducted in 2015. Turner alleged that the sale was unlawful because it did not account for the homestead exemption, and he did not receive proper notice of the sale.Turner initially sought relief in state court, challenging the removal of his homestead exemption, but his complaint was dismissed as untimely. He then filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of his constitutional rights, including First Amendment retaliation, Fourth Amendment illegal seizure, and due process violations. The federal district court dismissed his complaint, finding that abstention was warranted under the comity doctrine, which prevents federal courts from interfering with state tax administration when state remedies are adequate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the relief Turner sought would disrupt Florida's administration of its ad valorem property tax scheme. The court found that Florida provided plain, adequate, and complete state remedies, including the ability to challenge tax deed sales and homestead exemption removals in state court. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in abstaining from exercising jurisdiction under the comity doctrine. View "Turner v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Bruce Jacobs, a Florida foreclosure attorney, filed a qui tam action against JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., alleging violations of the False Claims Act (FCA). Jacobs claimed that JP Morgan Chase forged mortgage loan promissory notes and submitted false reimbursement claims to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. He asserted that JP Morgan Chase used signature stamps of former Washington Mutual employees to endorse loans improperly, thereby defrauding the government by seeking reimbursement for loan servicing costs.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed Jacobs's initial complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failing to plead fraud with particularity as required by Rule 9(b). The court also noted that Jacobs needed to establish that he was an original source of the information under the FCA’s public disclosure bar. Jacobs amended his complaint, but the district court dismissed it again, this time with prejudice. The court found that Jacobs still failed to meet the Rule 9(b) requirements and that the FCA’s public disclosure bar applied because the allegations had already been disclosed in three online blog articles, and Jacobs was not an original source of the information.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit held that the blog articles, which were publicly available before Jacobs filed his lawsuit, qualified as "news media" under the FCA. The court found that the allegations in Jacobs's complaint were substantially the same as those disclosed in the blog articles. Additionally, Jacobs did not qualify as an original source because his information did not materially add to the publicly disclosed allegations. Therefore, the FCA’s public disclosure bar precluded Jacobs's lawsuit. View "Jacobs v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A." on Justia Law

The case involves several special education students who alleged that their teacher physically and emotionally abused them. The students, who have various disabilities affecting their communication abilities, were assigned to the same classroom at Elm Street Elementary School in Coweta County, Georgia. The teacher, Catherine Sprague, was hired by the principal, Dr. Christi Hildebrand, despite lacking special education certification. Throughout the fall of 2019, the students exhibited signs of distress, and their parents noticed behavioral changes and physical signs of mistreatment. A paraprofessional, Nicole Marshall, reported multiple instances of abuse by Sprague to Hildebrand, who delayed reporting these allegations to law enforcement and the students' parents.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed the students' complaint. The court ruled that emotional distress damages are not recoverable under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) following the Supreme Court's decision in Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C. The court also found that the students failed to state a constitutional violation against Hildebrand and the school district, and that Hildebrand was entitled to qualified immunity. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law negligence claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed that emotional distress damages are not recoverable under Title II of the ADA, as Title II incorporates the remedies of the Rehabilitation Act, which the Supreme Court in Cummings ruled does not allow for emotional distress damages. However, the appellate court found that the district court erred by not considering whether the students might be entitled to other forms of relief under Title II, such as damages for physical harm or nominal damages. The appellate court also affirmed the dismissal of the section 1983 claims, ruling that the alleged abuse did not meet the "shock-the-conscience" standard required for a substantive due process violation. The case was remanded for further proceedings to consider other potential relief under Title II. View "A.W. v. Coweta County School District" on Justia Law

Jo Ann Macrina, the former Commissioner of the Department of Watershed Management for the City of Atlanta, was charged with taking bribes from a contractor, Lohrasb “Jeff” Jafari. Macrina made several decisions that favored Jafari’s company in the bidding process for a city contract. After the contract was awarded, Macrina received $10,000 in cash, a diamond ring, and other perks from Jafari. She also went to work for Jafari’s company shortly after leaving her city position. Macrina later contacted the FBI to report possible corruption, but during interviews, she admitted to receiving gifts from Jafari, which she later retracted.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia admitted portions of a recorded conversation between Macrina and federal agents, as well as the City of Atlanta’s Code of Ethics, over Macrina’s objections. The court also declined to give Macrina’s proposed jury instruction that any payments received after an official act were a gratuity and not a bribe. The jury convicted Macrina of bribery and conspiracy to commit bribery, and she was sentenced to 54 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the recorded conversation and the Code of Ethics, as both were relevant to proving Macrina’s corrupt intent. The court also found that the district court’s refusal to give Macrina’s proposed jury instruction was not an abuse of discretion, as the instruction misstated the law by failing to acknowledge that a payment received after an official act can still be considered a bribe if there was an agreement to accept the payment before the act was completed. View "USA v. Macrina" on Justia Law

Charles Johnson, Jr. was arrested by Officer Garrett Rolfe for driving while intoxicated. Johnson alleged that Rolfe used excessive force during the arrest, resulting in a broken collarbone. Johnson sued Rolfe and the City of Atlanta under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia state law, claiming excessive force and battery. Johnson's complaint stated that he was respectful and did not resist arrest, but Rolfe threw him to the ground, causing his injury.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia reviewed the case. The City moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it failed to state a claim for Monell liability. Rolfe moved for judgment on the pleadings, submitting body camera and dashcam footage showing Johnson resisting arrest. The district court considered the video evidence, determining it was central to Johnson's claims and its authenticity was not disputed. The court found that Rolfe did not use excessive force and was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. Consequently, the court dismissed the Monell claim against the City, as there was no underlying constitutional violation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the video evidence was properly considered under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. The court found that Rolfe's use of force was objectively reasonable given the circumstances, including Johnson's resistance and the dangerous location of the arrest. Therefore, Rolfe was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim against the City, as no constitutional violation occurred. View "Johnson v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law