Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Charles Johnson, Jr. was arrested by Officer Garrett Rolfe for driving while intoxicated. Johnson alleged that Rolfe used excessive force during the arrest, resulting in a broken collarbone. Johnson sued Rolfe and the City of Atlanta under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia state law, claiming excessive force and battery. Johnson's complaint stated that he was respectful and did not resist arrest, but Rolfe threw him to the ground, causing his injury.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia reviewed the case. The City moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it failed to state a claim for Monell liability. Rolfe moved for judgment on the pleadings, submitting body camera and dashcam footage showing Johnson resisting arrest. The district court considered the video evidence, determining it was central to Johnson's claims and its authenticity was not disputed. The court found that Rolfe did not use excessive force and was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. Consequently, the court dismissed the Monell claim against the City, as there was no underlying constitutional violation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the video evidence was properly considered under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. The court found that Rolfe's use of force was objectively reasonable given the circumstances, including Johnson's resistance and the dangerous location of the arrest. Therefore, Rolfe was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim against the City, as no constitutional violation occurred. View "Johnson v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

The case involves two Georgia non-profit organizations, New Georgia Project and New Georgia Project Action Fund (collectively referred to as "New Georgia"), and the Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Commission. New Georgia was accused of violating the Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Act by failing to register with the Commission and disclose their campaign expenditures and sources. The Commission initiated an investigation and found "reasonable grounds" to conclude that New Georgia had violated the Act.New Georgia then filed a federal lawsuit claiming that the Act violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted a preliminary injunction preventing the state from enforcing the Act against New Georgia. The state appealed, arguing that the district court should have abstained from exercising its jurisdiction under the doctrine established in Younger v. Harris.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court should have abstained under the Younger doctrine. The court found that the state's enforcement action against New Georgia was ongoing and implicated important state interests, and that New Georgia had an adequate opportunity in the state proceeding to raise constitutional challenges. The court vacated the district court's decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss New Georgia's action. View "New Georgia Project, Inc. v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The case involves Greater Birmingham Ministries, a multi-faith, multi-racial organization that promotes voter registration efforts in Alabama, and the Secretary of State for the State of Alabama. The organization requested electronic production of several voter lists, including records of individual felons disqualified from voting by Alabama, invoking the public disclosure provision of the National Voter Registration Act. The organization argued that the records should be produced electronically and at no cost. The Secretary of State agreed to provide an electronic version of the first list of voter records at a cost of one cent per name but refused to provide any records related to felony disqualifications, asserting that the request exceeded the scope of the Act.The district court ruled that the National Voter Registration Act entitled Greater Birmingham Ministries to both sets of records and that electronic disclosure was required in the specific circumstances of this case. The court also ruled that the Act entitled the Secretary to charge a “reasonable fee,” connected “to the actual costs he incurs in producing responsive voter records.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's order. The court held that the voter records that Greater Birmingham Ministries requested are covered by the National Voter Registration Act’s public disclosure provision. However, the court ruled that the Act does not require the Secretary to turn those records over in an electronic format. Therefore, the district court’s injunction ordering the Secretary to produce the records electronically was improper. The same is true for its direction that the parties reach agreement on a reasonable fee. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Secretary of State for the State of Alabama" on Justia Law

The case involves Jay Diamond, who was convicted of impersonating a federal officer in an attempt to avoid a speeding ticket and to avoid being arrested for falsely impersonating a federal officer. The incidents occurred when Diamond was pulled over for speeding and he told the officer that he was an air marshal. He presented a badge that read "United States Federal Air Marshal." However, upon investigation, it was found that Diamond was never employed as a federal air marshal or through the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).In the lower courts, Diamond argued that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that he acted as a federal officer and that the district court erred in admitting evidence of his alleged prior bad acts and in instructing the jury. The district court denied Diamond's motion to exclude his ex-wife's testimony about his prior instances of impersonating a federal officer or military member. The court also denied Diamond's request for a jury instruction on the misdemeanor offense in 18 U.S.C. § 701, which Diamond argued was a lesser included offense of his alleged § 912 crime.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Diamond's convictions were affirmed. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Diamond’s § 912 convictions. The court also ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Diamond's ex-wife's testimony. Furthermore, the court found that 18 U.S.C. § 701 is not a lesser included offense of § 912, and therefore the district court did not err in refusing to give Diamond's requested § 701 instruction. View "United States v. Diamond" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Green Rock LLC, a company that solicited taxpayers to invest in arrangements promising conservation-easement deductions. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued Notice 2017-10, which required taxpayers and their advisors to comply with reporting requirements when claiming deductions for donations of conservation easements. Green Rock challenged this notice, arguing that the IRS violated the Administrative Procedure Act by issuing the notice without public notice and comment.Previously, the district court ruled in favor of Green Rock, stating that the IRS had unlawfully promulgated Notice 2017-10 because Congress did not expressly authorize its issuance without notice and comment. The district court set Notice 2017-10 aside for Green Rock.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Notice 2017-10 was a legislative rule and Congress did not expressly exempt the IRS from notice-and-comment rulemaking. Therefore, Notice 2017-10 is not binding on Green Rock. The court clarified that its decision was specific to Notice 2017-10 and did not rule on the validity of any other listed transaction not before it. View "Green Rock LLC v. Internal Revenue Service" on Justia Law

In 2006, Doris Sloan filed for survivor’s benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act following the death of her husband, Gurstle Sloan, who had worked as a coal miner for Drummond Company for 16 years. Sloan's claim was denied by an administrative law judge, and this denial was reviewed twice. Sloan argued that the administrative law judge improperly excluded evidence supporting her request to modify her claim and erred by finding that the evidence did not establish that her husband’s death was due to pneumoconiosis.The Benefits Review Board affirmed the administrative law judge’s denial of survivor’s benefits. Sloan timely moved for reconsideration by the en banc Board, arguing that the administrative law judge erred by excluding and failing to consider certain evidence and by improperly relying on the opinion of the government’s expert witness. The Board denied Sloan’s motion for reconsideration en banc. Sloan filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was also denied by the Board.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court was required to decide whether it had jurisdiction over a petition for review of a denial of survivor’s benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act filed in this Court one day late. The court found that the filing deadline is jurisdictional and it had no jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion for reconsideration by the Benefits Review Board. Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to review the petition and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Sloan v. Drummond Company, Inc." on Justia Law

B'Quan Ferguson was convicted for possession of a firearm by a felon, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The conviction followed an incident where local police officers in Savannah, Georgia, recognized Ferguson as the subject of an ongoing investigation. The officers found a pistol in Ferguson's vehicle, and a DNA test confirmed that Ferguson's DNA was present on the pistol. Ferguson was subsequently charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a felon.Previously, Ferguson had been convicted under Georgia law for threatening physical harm to a witness, which was considered a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). This prior conviction led to Ferguson being classified as an armed career criminal, which mandated a minimum sentence of 15 years. Ferguson objected to this classification, arguing that his Georgia conviction for threatening a witness did not qualify as a violent felony for ACCA enhancement purposes. The district court overruled Ferguson's objection and sentenced him to 180 months' imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Ferguson argued that his prior Georgia conviction did not qualify as a "violent felony" under ACCA. The court disagreed, concluding that the Georgia statute under which Ferguson was convicted was divisible and that a conviction for threatening physical harm under the statute qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding Ferguson's sentence. View "USA v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

The case involves Victor Hill, the former Sheriff of Clayton County, Georgia, who was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for using his position to deprive detainees in his custody of their constitutional rights. Hill ordered individual detainees, who were neither violent nor uncontrollable, into a restraint chair for at least four hours, with their hands cuffed behind their backs and without bathroom breaks. Each detainee suffered injuries, such as “open and bleeding” wounds, lasting scars, or nerve damage.Hill was convicted by a jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. He appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that he lacked fair warning that his conduct was unconstitutional, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the district court improperly handled allegations of juror misconduct.The Eleventh Circuit rejected Hill's arguments and affirmed his conviction. The court found that case law provided Hill with fair warning that his actions violated constitutional rights. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Hill's conduct had no legitimate nonpunitive purpose, was willful, and caused the detainees’ injuries. Lastly, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in investigating and responding to alleged juror misconduct. View "United States v. Hill" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed an appeal by Quinton Handlon, a prisoner convicted of producing, coercing, and possessing child pornography. Handlon had requested compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) because his elderly father needed a caregiver. The district court denied the request as Handlon failed to provide substantial evidence about his father's condition or proving that he was the only available caretaker. Handlon appealed this decision.The Appeals Court upheld the district court's decision, affirming that Handlon's case did not meet the extraordinary and compelling reasons necessary for compassionate release under the policy statement of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. At the time of Handlon's motion, the policy statement recognized four categories for compassionate release, none of which included the incapacitation of a parent when the defendant could serve as a caregiver.The court noted that a recent amendment to the policy statement now includes such a scenario, but clarified that it could not be applied retroactively in this appeal because it was a substantive amendment, not a clarifying one. The court affirmed the denial of Handlon's motion for compassionate release, but hinted that Handlon might be able to file a new motion for compassionate release under the updated policy. View "USA v. Handlon" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) denial of a whistleblower award. The petitioner, John Meisel, reported his suspicions about his former tenant's involvement in a Ponzi scheme, which he read about in a newspaper, to the SEC. After the SEC's successful enforcement action against the scheme's perpetrators, Meisel applied for a whistleblower award. The SEC denied his application, reasoning that Meisel's information did not contribute to the enforcement action. Furthermore, his assistance to a court-appointed receiver, who was tasked with recovering funds related to the scheme, did not qualify him for an award as the receiver was not a representative of the Commission. Meisel appealed the denial, claiming it was arbitrary and unsupported by substantial evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied Meisel’s petition for review. The court held that the SEC's denial of the whistleblower award was neither arbitrary nor capricious, nor was it unsupported by substantial evidence. The court found that the SEC had not used Meisel’s information in its enforcement action, and therefore, his information did not lead to its success. The court also held that Meisel's assistance to the receiver did not qualify him for an award because the receiver was an independent court officer, not a representative of the SEC. Lastly, the court determined that Meisel could not qualify for an award in any related actions because he did not qualify for an award in the covered action. View "Meisel v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law