Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff served as the Chief of Police for the Sneads Police Department from March 2006 until October 2018. On October 9, 2018, the five-member Town Council terminated Plaintiff’s employment by a 4-to-1 vote. The Town Council did so under the charge that Plaintiff was disrespectful at best and insubordinate at worst. Plaintiff, on the other hand, claims his firing was in retaliation for things he said, disclosed, and reported, all regarding various matters related to the newer Councilmembers with whom he had a contentious relationship.   Plaintiff filed an eight-count action against the Town of Sneads, the Town Manager, Town Councilmembers, Town Council President, and Town Clerk (collectively, “Defendants”). He brought unlawful-retaliation claims against the Town of Sneads under the Florida Whistle-blower’s Act (“FWA”), the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), and the First Amendment. And he brought identical retaliation claims under the First Amendment against each of the five individual defendants. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all eight counts, and Plaintiff appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Plaintiff has not established that he satisfied all three of these requirements for each instance of his speech that he claims were protected under the FWA. Further, the court wrote that because the record evidence shows that the Town of Sneads terminated Plaintiff for insubordination, not his invocation of the FMLA, the court concluded that the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim was also proper. View "John "Burt" McAlpin v. Town of Sneads Florida, et al" on Justia Law

Based in Auburn, Alabama, Plaintiff and her pharmacy were one of the thousands of businesses that answered the call to provide Covid-19 tests to the public. However, the Alabama Board of Pharmacy (the Board) concluded that Plaintiff’s administration of these tests fell short of the medical safety standards required under Alabama law. When the Board instituted an administrative enforcement proceeding against Plaintiff, she sought to avail herself of the legal immunity provided by the Secretary’s PREP Act Declaration. Plaintiff filed a federal suit, seeking to enjoin the Board from even considering the charges against her. The district court exercised its discretion to abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and declined to intervene in the Board’s proceedings.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to abstain under Younger. The court concluded that Plaintiff has not established that she lacks an adequate opportunity to present her federal claims to the Alabama Board of Pharmacy or an adequate opportunity to obtain judicial review of her claims in Alabama’s courts, and so Younger abstention is warranted. The court wrote that it did not decide today whether Plaintiff is immune from the Board’s charges or if they are, in fact, preempted by the PREP Act. All the court concluded is that this is not one of the “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify federal intervention in a state proceeding that is adequate to hear Plaintiff’s claims. View "Lisa Hill Leonard, et al. v. The Alabama State Board of Pharmacy, et al." on Justia Law

Thirteen states sued the Treasury Secretary and related officials to challenge a tax offset provision in the American Rescue Plan Act, a coronavirus stimulus package passed by Congress in 2021. That offset provision prohibits states from using Rescue Plan funds “to either directly or indirectly offset a reduction in [their] net tax revenue” that results from a change in law that “reduces any tax.” The States argued that this “tax mandate” exceeds Congress’s authority under the Constitution. The district court agreed and permanently enjoined enforcement of the offset provision. The Secretary appealed.   At issue was whether the States’ challenge presents a justiciable controversy and if so, whether the offset provision is unconstitutional. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court answered both questions correctly. The court explained that all four elements weigh in favor of granting a permanent injunction. The district court did not misapply the law nor base its determination on clearly erroneous facts. It did not abuse its discretion. We also agree with the district court that the permanent injunction fully redresses the States’ harm in this case—declaratory relief is unnecessary. The court reiterated, however, that the permanent injunction applies only to Section 802(c)(2)(A), which is severable from the remaining provisions of the Act. View "State of West Virginia, et al v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a U.S. citizen and a U.S. national, as that term is defined in 22 U.S.C. Section 6023(15). He claims to be the “rightful owner of an 82.5% interest in certain commercial waterfront real property in the Port of Santiago de Cuba,” identified by the Cuban government as La Marítima and Terminal Naviera. According to the complaints, the knowing and intentional conduct of Carnival and Royal Caribbean constitutes trafficking under Section 6023(13)(A). As a result, Plaintiff—who provided the cruise lines with written notice by certified mail of his intent to commence an action under Title III—claims that he is entitled to damages under Section 6082.   The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for panel rehearing and vacated our prior opinion. The court held that Plaintiff has standing to assert his Title III claims, but that those claims fail on the merits. The court explained that the Cuban government confiscated La Marítima prior to March 12, 1996, and because Plaintiff acquired his interest in the property through inheritance after that date, his claims failed. The court, therefore, affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of Carnival and Royal Caribbean. View "Javier Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corporation" on Justia Law

Norwegian Cruise Lines Ltd. obtained the injunction barring the Florida Surgeon General from enforcing a prohibition against businesses requiring proof of vaccination as a condition of service. But Norwegian recently filed a suggestion of mootness stating that it no longer requires proof of vaccinations on its cruises. Yet, Norwegian’s filings make clear that it has not suspended its vaccination requirements permanently or categorically. It also continues to defend its entitlement to equitable relief by asking us to leave the preliminary injunction intact.   The Eleventh Circuit denied Norwegian’s motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. The court explained that it agrees with the Surgeon General that a “live dispute” exists because Norwegian has not established that it has relaxed its vaccination requirements permanently or categorically. “The possibility that a party may change its mind in the future is sufficient to preclude a finding of mootness.” The court explained Norwegian has offered no evidence of its vaccine policies or its intentions for the future beyond the boilerplate statement that it is not requiring COVID-19 vaccination for now and for the foreseeable future. Indeed, Norwegian appears to concede that it has not abolished its policy forevermore.’The court saw no reason to believe that Norwegian will not seek to reinstate its policy given its continued insistence that the Florida law is unconstitutional. View "Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd, et al. v. State Surgeon General" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that toxic chemicals used during the carpet manufacturing process have been allowed to seep into the rivers that supply drinking water to communities near Dalton, including Rome, Georgia and the rest of Floyd County. On behalf of himself and a proposed class of water subscribers and ratepayers, he sued Dalton Utilities, a municipal corporation that operates Dalton’s wastewater treatment system, for violating the Clean Water Act and for creating a public nuisance. His lawsuit claims that Dalton Utilities has caused the City of Rome’s domestic water supply to be contaminated with dangerously high levels of toxic chemicals.   The question before the Eleventh Circuit was whether Dalton Utilities is entitled to municipal immunity from Plaintiff’s nuisance abatement (injunctive relief) claim. The Eleventh Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Dalton Utilities’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction. However, the court affirmed district court’s order denying Dalton Utilities’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s nuisance abatement claim on municipal immunity grounds. The court explained that at oral argument counsel for Dalton Utilities conceded that if Phillips is still good law, Plaintiff has properly alleged a Phillips kind of nuisance claim for personal injury. The court agreed and held that municipal immunity does not shield Dalton Utilities from Plaintiff’s nuisance abatement claim. View "Jarrod Johnson v. Water, Light, and Sinking Fund Commission of City of Dalton" on Justia Law

Former President Donald J. Trump brought a civil action seeking an injunction against the government after it executed a search warrant at his Mar-a-Lago residence. He argues that a court-mandated special master review process is necessary because the government’s Privilege Review Team protocols were inadequate because various seized documents are protected by the executive or attorney-client privilege because he could have declassified documents or designated them as personal rather than presidential records, and—if all that fails—because the government’s appeal was procedurally deficient. The government disagrees with each contention.   At issue on appeal is whether the district court had the power to hear the case. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court improperly exercised equitable jurisdiction in this case. For that reason, the court vacated the September 5 order on appeal and remanded with instructions for the district court to dismiss the underlying civil action. The court explained that it cannot write a rule that allows any subject of a search warrant to block government investigations after the execution of the warrant. Nor can it write a rule that allows only former presidents to do so. Either approach would be a radical reordering of the court’s caselaw limiting the federal courts’ involvement in criminal investigations. And both would violate bedrock separation-of-powers limitations. View "Donald J. Trump v. USA" on Justia Law

Intervenor is a former commercial pilot who now flies a small Cessna jet for his own personal use. The intervenor landed his Cessna at the Lantana Airport. A Palm Beach County ordinance prohibits “pure turbo-jet aircraft” and cargo-carrying aircraft that weigh more than 12,500 pounds from using Lantana Airport, and Palm Beach County enforces the ordinance in a way that actually bans all jets, not just the “pure turbo” variety. The intervenor complained to the Federal Aviation Administration that the ordinance’s jet restriction violated a grant assurance the County had made to the FAA in exchange for federal airport improvement money. The FAA agreed with the Intervenor and ordered the County to rescind the restriction. The County and the City of Atlantis, which borders Lantana Airport, have petitioned us for review of the FAA’s final agency decision.   The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition for review. The court explained that the FAA has exclusive authority over our national navigable airspace, which means it’s responsible for “developing plans and policy . . . necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use” of that space. It “may modify or revoke an assignment of airspace when required in the public interest.” As long as any change in the FAA’s position on an airport restriction isn’t based on an impermissible bias, it has the authority to make that change. The Associate Administrator’s conclusion that Lantana Airport’s jet restriction violates Grant Assurance wasn’t arbitrary and capricious but instead was supported by substantial evidence. View "Palm Beach County, et al. v. Federal Aviation Administration" on Justia Law

After Wisteria Island’s birth, Congress ceded title to all lands within three miles of the United States’s coast to the states, except for lands that were (1) “built up,” “filled in,” “or otherwise reclaimed” (2) by the United States (3) for the United States’s use. We must determine whether Wisteria Island satisfies this exception. Only the third requirement is at issue in this appeal: whether the United States created Wisteria Island for its “use.” Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellee United States says that it created Wisteria Island to store dredged soil. Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant F.E.B., which claims to own the island, rejects the United States’s assertion that it built Wisteria Island for its “use.” According to F.E.B., the island arose simply as a result of the United States’s discarding of the soil it dredged from the channel.   The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the United States that, if it created Wisteria Island as a place to store dredged soil, then the United States built up or filled in Wisteria Island for the United States’s use. But on this record, the court found a genuine issue of material fact exists as to why the United States created the island. So after a thorough review of the record and with the benefit of oral argument, the court affirmed in part and vacate in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the United States and denial of summary judgment to F.E.B., and remanded this case for a factual determination of why the United States created Wisteria Island. View "USA v. F.E.B. Corp." on Justia Law

Appellant was sexually assaulted by a deputy sheriff in Harris County, Georgia, who’s now serving an eight-year prison term. In the part of this civil-rights lawsuit, Appellant sued Harris County and the Sheriff of Harris County (Sheriff), alleging that the Sheriff failed in various ways to prevent the deputy from assaulting her. The district court found that the Sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity, and granted summary judgment.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellant fails the first prong of the court’s analysis because she cannot show that, in the course of supervising the deputy, the Sheriff violated her constitutional rights. The court reasoned that “It is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under Section 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior”. Accordingly, the court concluded that because the Sheriff had no notice of the deputy’s tendency to sexually assault civilians in his custody—he cannot be held responsible for the unpredictable acts of his subordinate View "Lynette Christmas v. Harris County, Georgia, et al" on Justia Law