Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was established to rule Iraq pending transfer of authority to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG). CPA awarded Agility a Contract to operate warehouses, providing that “[t]he obligation under this contract is made with Iraqi funds.” Agility acknowledged the impending transfer of authority and CPA’s scheduled dissolution. CPA authorized the IIG Minister of Finance to delegate contract administration to CPA’s Program Management Office (PMO). CPA administered Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), composed of various sources, including revenue from sales of Iraqi petroleum and natural gas. The IIG Minister delegated contract-administration responsibility concerning DFI-funded contracts to the PMO but did not give PMO contracting authority. Subsequent Contract task orders obligated U.S. funds. A U.S. contracting officer (CO) determined that Agility owed the government $81 million due to overpayment. Separately, Agility unsuccessfully sought $47 million for unpaid fees. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals dismissed Agility's appeals for lack of jurisdiction under the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), 41 U.S.C. 7101–7109. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Board’s CDA jurisdiction is limited to contracts “made by an ‘executive agency.’” CPA was not an executive agency under the CDA. CPA awarded the Contract and there was no evidence that it was novated or assigned to an executive agency. The government acted as a contract administrator, not as a contracting party. View "Agility Logistics Services Co., KSC v. Mattis" on Justia Law

The FBI is the sole tenant in a building under a lease between Cleveland Assets and the General Services Administration (GSA) that began in 2002 and was to expire in 2012. The lease has been extended multiple times. GSA has paid a penalty rate of $44.72 per rentable square foot (PSF) since its expiration. GSA must seek the approval of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure before obligating funds on the lease, by sending a prospectus of the proposed facility, including “an estimate of the maximum cost.” GSA prepared a prospectus for the Cleveland FBI office and considered a range of rental values, finally approving a maximum proposed rate of $26.00 PSF and an escalation clause for inflation. Both congressional committees approved the rate. GSA’s 2016 Request for Lease Proposals cited the "Congressionally-imposed rent limitation” of $26.00 PSF. Cleveland Assets sued, claiming that the Request exceeded GSA’s authority to solicit offers and that the rental cap was unreasonably low, imposed an undue restriction on competition, and shifted all risk to the contractor. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal by the Claims Court. The authorization statute, 40 U.S.C. 3307, is an appropriation, not a procurement, statute, so the challenge is not subject to Tucker Act jurisdiction. GSA’s choice of the maximum rental rate was not arbitrary or lacking a rational basis. View "Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1985, EgyptAir Flight 648 was hijacked by terrorists, who killed passengers and destroyed the aircraft. The U.S. State Department determined that the terrorists received support from the Libyan government. In 1988, a Libyan Intelligence Service agent detonated explosives on Pan Am Flight 103, killing 270 people and destroying the aircraft. Insurers paid $97 million in claims. Libya was shielded by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1604, before enactment of the 1996 State Sponsors of Terrorism Exception to FSIA, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(7). The insurers sued, asserting their insurance subrogation rights. While those claims were pending, President Bush negotiated a settlement with Libya, The U.S. agreed to terminate pending lawsuits; Libya paid the government $1.5 billion, which funded the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. The Libyan Claims Resolution Act, 122 Stat. 2999, provides that Libya shall not be subject to the FSIA exceptions. The insurers’ suit was dismissed. Some of the insurers submitted claims with the Commission, which were denied because of a rule requiring that claimants be U.S. nationals from the date of injury to the date of the espousal of their claims by the U.S. They then sued, alleging that the government took their property without just compensation. The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government. The insurers “cannot claim an investment-backed expectation free of government involvement nor can they characterize the Government’s action as novel or unexpected.” View "Aviation & General Isurance Co., Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1985, EgyptAir Flight 648 was hijacked by terrorists, who killed passengers and destroyed the aircraft. The U.S. State Department determined that the terrorists received support from the Libyan government. In 1988, a Libyan Intelligence Service agent detonated explosives on Pan Am Flight 103, killing 270 people and destroying the aircraft. Insurers paid $97 million in claims. Libya was shielded by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1604, before enactment of the 1996 State Sponsors of Terrorism Exception to FSIA, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(7). The insurers sued, asserting their insurance subrogation rights. While those claims were pending, President Bush negotiated a settlement with Libya, The U.S. agreed to terminate pending lawsuits; Libya paid the government $1.5 billion, which funded the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. The Libyan Claims Resolution Act, 122 Stat. 2999, provides that Libya shall not be subject to the FSIA exceptions. The insurers’ suit was dismissed. Some of the insurers submitted claims with the Commission, which were denied because of a rule requiring that claimants be U.S. nationals from the date of injury to the date of the espousal of their claims by the U.S. They then sued, alleging that the government took their property without just compensation. The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government. The insurers “cannot claim an investment-backed expectation free of government involvement nor can they characterize the Government’s action as novel or unexpected.” View "Aviation & General Isurance Co., Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

On September 11, 2012, President Obama published notice “continuing for [one] year the national emergency . . . with respect to the terrorist attacks.” In April 2013, O’Farrell, an Army Reservist, received an order directing him to replace another Reservist, an attorney, who had been deployed. After reaching his maximum total years of active commissioned service (28 years), O’Farrell was transferred to the Army Reserve Retired List in October 2013. O’Farrell served his active duty as legal counsel until September 30, 2013. By August 26, 2013, O’Farrell had used his 15 days of military leave, most of his accrued annual leave, and advance annual leave. To avoid being placed on Military Leave Without Pay for the remainder of his active duty service, O’Farrell (unsuccessfully) requested an additional 22 days leave under 5 U.S.C. 6323(a)(1). O’Farrell did not cite any statutory provision that would qualify him as "called to full-time military service as a result of a call or order to active duty in support of a contingency operation." He argued that he was “serving . . . during a national emergency." O’Farrell sued under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301– 4333. The Federal Circuit reversed. Section 6323(b) does not require that “a specific contingency operation" be identified in military orders when an employee is activated; “in support of” includes indirect assistance to a contingency operation, 5 U.S.C. 6323(b)(2)(B), which includes a military operation that results in service members being called to active duty under any law during a national emergency, 10 U.S.C. 101(a)(13). A service member’s leave request need not use particular language. View "O'Farrell v. Department of Defense" on Justia Law

In an inter partes review proceeding (IPR), Arthrex disclaimed all the subject claims before the Patent and Appeal Board issued an institution decision. The Board entered an adverse judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the decision is appealable and that the Board’s interpretation is consistent with the regulation. The court did not address whether the regulation is authorized by the statute or whether it was properly promulgated. While 37 C.F.R. 42.107(e) states that no IPR "will be instituted based on disclaimed claims,” 37 C.F.R. 42.73(b) provides: A party may request judgment against itself at any time... Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: (1) Disclaimer of the involved application or patent; (2) Cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial; (3) Concession of unpatentability or derivation of the contested subject matter; and (4) Abandonment of the contest. Although Arthrex stated that it was not requesting an adverse judgment, the rules permit the Board to construe a statutory disclaimer of all challenged claims as a request for adverse judgment, even when the disclaimer occurs before the Board has entered a decision, The court noted that the adverse judgment has an estoppel effect and that Arthrex had two pending continuation patent applications that have since issued as patents. View "Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc." on Justia Law

In an inter partes review proceeding (IPR), Arthrex disclaimed all the subject claims before the Patent and Appeal Board issued an institution decision. The Board entered an adverse judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the decision is appealable and that the Board’s interpretation is consistent with the regulation. The court did not address whether the regulation is authorized by the statute or whether it was properly promulgated. While 37 C.F.R. 42.107(e) states that no IPR "will be instituted based on disclaimed claims,” 37 C.F.R. 42.73(b) provides: A party may request judgment against itself at any time... Actions construed to be a request for adverse judgment include: (1) Disclaimer of the involved application or patent; (2) Cancellation or disclaimer of a claim such that the party has no remaining claim in the trial; (3) Concession of unpatentability or derivation of the contested subject matter; and (4) Abandonment of the contest. Although Arthrex stated that it was not requesting an adverse judgment, the rules permit the Board to construe a statutory disclaimer of all challenged claims as a request for adverse judgment, even when the disclaimer occurs before the Board has entered a decision, The court noted that the adverse judgment has an estoppel effect and that Arthrex had two pending continuation patent applications that have since issued as patents. View "Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Federal Claims enjoined the U.S. Army from proceeding with, or awarding, a contract to Airbus Helicopter, finding that Army Execution Order 109-14, which implemented the Army’s Aviation Restructure Initiative designating the UH-72A Lakota helicopter as the Army’s “Institutional Training Helicopter,” was a procurement decision in violation of the Competition in Contracting Act and the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The court also found the Sole Source Justification and Approval (J&A) was arbitrary and capricious. The Federal Circuit reversed and vacated the injunction, holding that Execution Order 109-14 was not a procurement decision subject to Tucker Act review because it did not begin “the process for determining a need for property or services.” The Order simply formalized the Army’s decision designating the UH-72A Lakota as the Army’s training helicopter. The Sole Source J&A was not arbitrary and capricious, and it was an abuse of discretion to supplement the administrative record. The J&A sufficiently supports the Army’s decision to award a sole-source follow-on contract because it is likely that award to any other source would result in substantial duplication of cost to the government that is not expected to be recovered through competition, or unacceptable delays in fulfilling the agency’s requirements.” View "AgustaWestland North America v. United States" on Justia Law

A U.S. Department of Commerce regulation states: “The Secretary will rescind an administrative review ... if a party that requested a review withdraws the request within 90 days of the date of publication of notice ... The Secretary may extend this time limit if the Secretary decides that it is reasonable to do so,” 19 C.F.R. 351.213(d)(1). In 2011, Commerce announced in a published guidance document that parties seeking untimely withdrawals would no longer be able to get an extension based on what might be reasonable under the circumstances in light of the concerns previously identified and employed by Commerce, but would have to demonstrate the existence of an “extraordinary circumstance.” Commerce applied the 2011 guidance in the Glycine case. The Court of International Trade remanded, invalidating the change in methodology. Commerce, under protest, extended the deadline for Glycine to withdraw its request for administrative review of an antidumping order and rescinded the review. The Trade Court and Federal Circuit affirmed. Since the 2011 Notice was intended to effectively rewrite the substantive meaning of the regulation without going through the necessary notice-and-comment rulemaking, it has no legal standing. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551, does not permit amendment of an agency regulation, previously adopted by formal notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure, by a guidance document that is not so enacted. View "Glycine & More, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Securiforce entered into a requirements contract with the government to deliver fuel to eight sites in Iraq. The government terminated the contract for convenience with respect to two sites because Securiforce intended to supply fuel from Kuwait, reasoning that delivery to those sites would violate the Trade Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. 2501, and that obtaining a waiver would take too long. Weeks later, the government ordered small deliveries to two sites, to occur by October 24. Securiforce indicated that it could not deliver until November. The government notified Securiforce that it should offer justifiable excuses or risk termination. Securiforce responded that the late deliveries were excused by improper termination for convenience, failure to provide required security escorts, small orders, and other alleged irregularities. The government terminated the contract for default. Securiforce filed suit (Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491; Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 7101-09). The Claims Court found that it had jurisdiction to review both terminations; that the Contracting Officer abused her discretion in partially terminating the contract for convenience; and that the termination for default was proper. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. The court lacked jurisdiction over the termination for convenience; a contractor’s request for a declaratory judgment that the government materially breached a contract violates the rule that courts will not grant equitable relief when money damages are adequate. The government did not breach the contract by terminating for convenience or with respect to providing security. View "Securiforce International America, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law