Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Louisiana law recognizes the right to extract minerals separately from ownership of the land (mineral servitudes). Servitudes generally revert back to the landowner if not used for 10 years. The servitudes at issue were established in 1932-1934, by deeds contemplating the 10-year prescriptive period. From 1934-1937, the United States acquired 180,000 acres of the encumbered land in Kisatchie National Forest. In 1940, Louisiana’s Act 315 retroactively declared that outstanding mineral rights in land sold to the United States would be imprescriptible while the government remained the landowner. Nebo acquired mineral rights in 1942, believing its rights imprescriptible. The government sought a declaratory judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that Nebo’s rights to a specific tract were imprescriptible. In 1973, the Supreme Court held that Act 315 could not be applied retroactively to land acquired by the government under the Migratory Bird Conservation Act. The Court did not overrule Nebo, distinguishing its facts. The government began issuing mineral leases. Servitude owners sought declaratory relief. The Fifth Circuit held that Act 315 could not provide the federal rule of decision and that the Kisatchie servitudes had prescribed. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. One servitude holder sued in the Claims Court, based on the same facts. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal of permanent takings claims, contract claims, and some temporary takings claims under the statute of limitations. The Claims Court subsequently held that remaining temporary takings claims were barred by 28 U.S.C. 1500; because the judicial takings claim would require the Claims Court to question the merits of the Fifth Circuit’s decision it also lacked jurisdiction over those claims. View "Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellants, current and former employees of the U.S. Secret Service, alleged that, as a result of new practices, the government denied them the two consecutive days off from work to which they were entitled under 5 U.S.C. 6101(a)(3)(B). The Claims Court concluded that it was without jurisdiction because this provision is not money-mandating because it only concerns work scheduling practices and does not address employees’ entitlement to pay. The Federal Circuit affirmed that court's dismissal of the case. “At most,” section 6101(a)(3)(B) entitles employees to have their basic 40-hour workweek scheduled in a particular fashion; whether their basic 40- hour workweek is Monday through Friday with Saturday and Sunday off, or Monday through Saturday with Wednesday and Sunday off, does not, itself, affect employees’ statutory entitlement to pay. Because section 6101(a)(3)(B) does not “‘command[] payment of money to the employee,’” nor is it “reasonably amenable to the reading that it mandates a right to money damages,” violations of the subsection do not implicate the remedies prescribed in the Back Pay Act. View "Adams v. United States" on Justia Law

Presumptive service connection exists for veterans who served in the Persian Gulf War and have chronic: undiagnosed illness; medically unexplained chronic multisymptom illness (MUCMI); or any diagnosed illness as determined by the Secretary, 38 U.S.C. 1117(a)(2). VA regulations define MUCMI as “a diagnosed illness without conclusive pathophysiology or etiology, that is characterized by overlapping symptoms and signs and has features such as fatigue, pain, disability out of proportion to physical findings, and inconsistent demonstration of laboratory abnormalities. Chronic multisymptom illnesses of partially understood etiology and pathophysiology, such as diabetes and multiple sclerosis, will not be considered medically unexplained.”. Both the statute and regulation identify sleep disturbances and signs or symptoms involving the respiratory system as possible MUCMI manifestations. The VA revised its M21-1 Manual, changing the definition of MUCMI to require “both an inconclusive pathology, and an inconclusive etiology.” Under the subsection “Signs and Symptoms of Undiagnosed Illnesses or MUCMIs,” the VA added, “Sleep apnea cannot be presumptively service-connected (SC) under the provisions of 38 C.F.R. 3.317 since it is a diagnosable condition.” The Federal Circuit dismissed a veterans’ group’s petition for review for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that the revisions are not binding and not reviewable under 38 U.S.C. 502. View "Disabled American Veterans v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

Tartaglia served as Chief of Police at the Veterans Administration Hampton Virginia Medical Center. The VA proposed Tartaglia’s removal based on Abuse of Authority” (six specifications); “Lack of Candor” (two specifications); and “Misuse of Government Property” (one specification). The VA’s deciding official rejected Charge 3 as unsubstantiated, sustained Charge 1 based on five specifications and Charge 2 based on both specifications, and removed Tartaglia from service. An administrative judge affirmed Tartaglia’s removal, finding that the VA failed to prove either specification of Charge 2 and that it proved only three specifications of Charge 1. As to Charge 1, Tartaglia admitted to Specification 5: instructing a subordinate to drive him in a government-owned vehicle for a personal errand while on duty. The Merit Systems Protection Board sustained Tartaglia’s removal based solely on Specification 5, stating that removal fell within the Table of Penalties for that misconduct; Tartaglia’s “misconduct was particularly serious because it went beyond merely misappropriating a Government vehicle, but also included instructing a subordinate to help him”; mitigating factors such as Tartaglia’s “outstanding work record and lack of prior discipline” were “temper[ed]” because Tartaglia had served with the VA for “only approximately [four] years” and Tartaglia expressed remorse “only after initially denying the misconduct..” The Federal Circuit vacated, based on the Board’s miscalculation of Tartaglia’s length of service. View "Tartaglia v. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

The Wyandot Nation of Kansas, a Native American tribe allegedly tracing its ancestry to the Historic Wyandot Nation, claims to be a federally recognized Indian tribe and a successor-in-interest to treaties between the Historic Wyandot Nation and the United States. Wyandot Nation filed suit, alleging that the government had breached its trust and fiduciary obligations with respect to trusts that resulted from those treaties, including one related to amounts payable under an 1867 treaty and one related to the Huron Cemetery. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and standing. The Federal Circuit affirmed. Tribal recognition is within the primary jurisdiction of the Department of Interior; a court cannot independently make a determination of the effects of the various treaties or resolve the various conflicting legal and factual contentions. Wyandot Nation petitioned the Department of Interior in 1996 for federal recognition pursuant to the List Act regulations. Interior preliminarily determined that “the Wyandot Nation of Kansas, which consists of the descendants of the citizen Wyandotts of Kansas terminated in 1855, [does not qualify for] Federal acknowledgment through the administrative process and can only become a Federally recognized Indian Tribe by an act of Congress.” The Nation did not pursue further administrative or judicial review. View "Wyandot Nation of Kansas v. United States" on Justia Law