Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A Mississippi statute empowers boards of supervisors to contract “by the year” for legal counsel. The Hinds County Board of Supervisors hired Plaintiff and his law firm to perform legal work for the County. Plaintiff’s contracts with the County were each for a one-year term. But before the year was up, an election flipped the board’s composition, and the new board terminated both contracts. Plaintiff sued, arguing that the contracts required the County to pay him a fixed sum for the full year—even if the County no longer wanted his legal services. The district court granted the County’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that no statute expressly authorized the old board to bind the new one. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the statutory phrase “by the year” gave the old board “express authority” to bind the new board.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s final judgment and remanded. The court held that Section 19-3-47 expressly authorized the board to bind successors. The court explained that the court’s research has revealed no statutes that would satisfy the standard that the district court relied on for express authorization. The court wrote that the Mississippi statute books are rife with laws that apparently would allow individual officers to bind their successors under Cleveland’s test but apparently would not allow officers to bind successors under the district court’s test. The court found that the phrase “by the year” is the kind of express authorization that Cleveland calls for. Any other reading leaves the phrase “by the year” as surplusage. View "Teeuwissen v. Hinds County, MS" on Justia Law

Seven years ago, the Fifth Circuit court vacated d, as arbitrary and capricious, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) cost allocation scheme for electrical grid improvements in the WestConnect region, which covers utility service to much of the American West. On remand, FERC was instructed to provide a more complete justification for its orders. The petition under review asserts that the reasons FERC gave on remand remain insufficient.   The Fifth Circuit granted the petition and reversed the orders. The court explained that FERC’s orders violate the Federal Power Act as a matter of law and, alternatively, the agency has again inadequately explained its actions. The cost causation principle that binds FERC does not authorize it to force its regulated jurisdictional utilities to assume the costs of providing service to non-jurisdictional utilities. The court explained that FERC’s compliance orders cannot “satisfy its statutory mandate—except by ignoring the benefits the non-jurisdictional utilities would receive.” View "El Paso Electric v. FERC" on Justia Law

The National Firearms Act of 1934 (“NFA”) and the Gun Control Act of 1968 (“GCA”) are two of the primary means of federal arms regulation and licensure T.he statutes impose heightened and at times, onerous requirements on manufacturing, selling, and transferring certain firearms, including short-barreled rifles (“SBRs”). The ATF issued a Proposed Rule indicating that the agency would use a point system to classify a firearm with a stabilizing brace as either a braced pistol or a rifle. The ATF published the Final Rule. Plaintiffs sued for injunctive relief, alleging various statutory deficiencies with the process and substance of the Final Rule. They also brought constitutional challenges. The district court denied injunctive relief, and after it did not rule expeditiously on a motion for an injunction pending appeal, this court enjoined enforcement of the Final Rule against the named plaintiffs. Plaintiffs now request that we extend that interim relief.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the order denying a preliminary injunction and remanded with instruction to consider that motion expeditiously. The court explained that because the Final Rule is properly characterized as a legislative rule, it must follow the APA’s procedural requirements for notice and comment, including providing the public with a meaningful opportunity to comment on the proposed rule. The court wrote that it is relatively straightforward that the Final Rule was not a logical outgrowth of the Proposed Rule, and the monumental error was prejudicial. The Final Rule must be set aside as unlawful or otherwise remanded for appropriate remediation. View "Mock v. Garland" on Justia Law

The bankruptcy court, administering a complex bankruptcy, dismissed NexPoint Advisors, LP’s objection to professional fees paid to myriad organizations. NexPoint appealed to the district court, sitting as an appellate court. The district court dismissed for lack of standing to appeal. NexPoint appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that NexPoint failed to establish that the adversary proceeding “directly, adversely, and financially impacts” it beyond anything other than mere speculation. Further, the court held that: Lexmark does not expressly reach prudential concerns in bankruptcy appeals and brought no change relevant here. The court wrote by failing to raise the Cajun Electric argument simultaneously, NexPoint waived its right to do so here. Finally, the court wrote that Collins, when read in conjunction with the “party in interest” language from Bankruptcy Code Sections 330 and 1109, still fails to engage the court’s longstanding precedent that appellate standing in bankruptcy actions is afforded only to a “person aggrieved.” View "NexPoint Advisors v. Pachulski Stang" on Justia Law

A company providing crane services, TNT Crane & Rigging, Inc., petitioned the Fifth Circuit to overturn the final orders of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. Those orders reversed decisions by an administrative law judge that were favorable to the company. The principal dispute is whether regulations applicable to the disassembly of a crane apply to the tragic accident that occurred here.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court held that substantial e supports the Commission’s determination that TNT did not have a work rule designed to prevent violations of Section 1926.1407(b)(3). Second, substantial evidence supports the Commission’s determination that TNT did not adequately monitor employee compliance with its power line safety rules. Finally, substantial evidence supports the Commission’s determination that TNT did not prove it effectively enforced its power line safety rules when it discovered violations. View "TNT Crane & Rigging v. OSHC" on Justia Law

The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA” or “the Act”), Plaintiff appealed the district court’s entry of judgment, after a jury trial, in favor of Defendant Spring Independent School District (“Spring ISD”). Plaintiff asserted that the district court gave the jury improper instructions and that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. He also contends that he is entitled to front pay and attorney’s fees in addition to compensatory damages because he was the “prevailing party.”   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the jury's instructions were not erroneous, and the jury’s verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. Plaintiff failed to properly raise his asserted errors in the district court and therefore did not preserve them for appeal, and, in any event, his arguments lack any basis in case law and are inconsistent with the text of USERRA. The court explained that Plaintiff acknowledged, as he must, that USERRA provides employers with an affirmative defense, yet contends, without supporting authority, that the court should disregard the statute here. But the text of USERRA clearly provides employers with a mixed-motive defense. There is no carve-out for constructive discharge claims. Thus, it was not an error for the district court to instruct the jury on the defense, and it was proper for the jury to answer Questions 4 and 5. View "Garcia-Ascanio v. Spring Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s summary judgment of his claims against Safeco Insurance Company of Indiana (“Safeco”) for violating Section 541 and Section 542 of the Texas Insurance Code.   The Fifth Circuit explained that in 2017, the Texas legislature amended Section 542, raising an important issue of Texas insurance law as to which there is no controlling Texas Supreme Court authority, and the authority from the intermediate state appellate courts provides insufficient guidance. Thus, the court certified the following question of state law to the Supreme Court of Texas: In an action under Chapter 542A of the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act, does an insurer’s payment of the full appraisal award plus any possible statutory interest preclude recovery of attorney’s fees? View "Rodriguez v. Safeco" on Justia Law

The Treasury Department administers the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund. The Fund supports financial institutions that serve low-income clients and communities. To be eligible for funding, a financial institution must apply for and receive certification. As part of its certification application, the institution must show that it serves either (1) an Investment Area or (2) a Targeted Population. OnPath Federal Credit Union submitted a certification application. Its application stated that OnPath did not serve an Investment Area but that it did serve a Targeted Population. The Inspector General of the Treasury Department subsequently started an audit of OnPath. Based on the Inspector General’s report, the Fund determined that “as a result of [OnPath] submitting invalid information in its . . . Certification Application, the . . . awards made to [OnPath] constitute improper payments.” OnPath brought an action to challenge the agency’s findings and its demand for repayment. The district court denied OnPath’s motion to supplement the administrative record. The district court then granted summary judgment to the agency, rejecting OnPath’s arbitrariness challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act. OnPath appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court and held that the agency here did not abuse its discretion by requiring repayment under these circumstances. The court explained that when n application for federal funding contains materially false information, it’s reasonable for the federal agency to want the money back. And that is so even if it turns out that the recipient might’ve been eligible to receive the funds on some other basis not presented in the application. View "OnPath Fed Crdt Un v. US Dept of Trea" on Justia Law

At issue in this case are three such Texas laws: Texas Election Code sections 61.003, 61.010, and 85.036 (collectively, the “electioneering laws”). Plaintiff filed this action, alleging that she was unconstitutionally censored under the electioneering laws when she voted in 2018 and that the statutes unconstitutionally “chilled” her right to free speech by criminalizing political expression within polling places. The district court, adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, upheld section 61.010 as constitutional, but concluded that sections 61.003 and 85.036 are facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Both sides appealed, contesting jurisdictional issues as well as the merits.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s holding denying Texas’s Secretary of State and Attorney General sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and dismissed those defendants for lack of jurisdiction. The court affirmed that Plaintiff has standing to bring her claims against the remaining two Defendants. The court also affirmed the district court’s holding that section 61.010 is constitutional. However, the court reversed and rendered the district court’s holding that sections 61.003 and 85.036 are unconstitutional and instead uphold all three electioneering laws. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of nominal damages. View "Ostrewich v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Two Texas employers: Braidwood Management, Inc. (“Braidwood”) and Bear Creek Bible Church (“Bear Creek”), filed suit, as per their closely held religious beliefs, asserting that Title VII, as interpreted in the EEOC’s guidance and Bostock, prevents them from operating their places of employment in a way compatible with their Christian beliefs. Plaintiffs have implicitly asserted that they will not alter or discontinue their employment practices. all parties admitted in district court that numerous policies promulgated by plaintiffs (such as those about dress codes and segregating bathroom usage by solely biological sex) already clearly violate EEOC guidance. Both plaintiffs also contend that they are focused on individuals’ behavior, not their asserted identity.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable; reversed the class certifications; affirmed the judgment against Bear Creek; affirmed the ruling that Braidwood is statutorily entitled to a Title VII exemption; vacated the judgment that Braidwood is constitutionally entitled to a Title VII exemption; and vacated the judgment regarding the scope-of-Title-VII claims as a matter of law. The court reasoned that under the facts presented, it cannot determine a more appropriate, limited class definition for any of the classes presented here. Accordingly, the court held that both Braidwood and Bear Creek have standing and bring individual claims. Further, the court explained that the EEOC failed to show a compelling interest in denying Braidwood, individually, an exemption. The agency does not even attempt to argue the point outside of gesturing to a generalized interest in prohibiting all forms of sex discrimination in every potential case. View "Braidwood Management v. EEOC" on Justia Law