Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court, which upheld the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of a claimant's application for supplemental security income. The claimant argued that the Social Security Administration's 2017 revised regulations for evaluating medical opinions were partially invalid because they did not provide a reasoned explanation for permitting an administrative law judge to avoid articulating how he or she accounts for the "examining relationship" or "specialization" factors under the Social Security Act or the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The court found that the Commissioner's decision to promulgate the 2017 medical evidence regulations fell within his wide latitude to make rules and regulations, particularly those governing the nature and extent of the proofs and evidence to establish the right to benefits. The court also joined the Eleventh Circuit in holding that the regulations were valid under the APA, as the agency's response to public comment and reasoned explanation for the regulatory changes established that the regulations were not arbitrary or capricious. View "CROSS V. O'MALLEY" on Justia Law

In this case, Zachary Silbersher, a relator, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act against Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. and others. Silbersher alleged that Valeant fraudulently obtained patents related to a drug and asserted these patents to stifle competition from generic drugmakers. He also claimed that Valeant defrauded the federal government by charging an artificially inflated price for the drug while falsely certifying that its price was fair and reasonable.The district court dismissed Silbersher’s action under the False Claims Act’s public disclosure bar, ruling that his allegations had already been publicly disclosed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court.The Court of Appeals held that an inter partes patent review proceeding, in which the Patent and Trademark Office invalidated one of Valeant's patents, did not qualify as a public disclosure under the False Claims Act because the government was not a party to that proceeding, and its primary function was not investigative. The Court of Appeals also held that the allegations in Silbersher's qui tam action were not "substantially the same" as the information that had been publicly disclosed. None of the qualifying public disclosures made a direct claim that Valeant committed fraud, nor did they disclose a combination of facts sufficient to permit a reasonable inference of fraud. Therefore, the public disclosure bar did not apply. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "SILBERSHER V. VALEANT PHARMACEUTICALS INT'L" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Myron Motley, was convicted and sentenced for his involvement in a conspiracy to distribute controlled substances—oxycodone and hydrocodone. Motley appealed his conviction, arguing that the evidence obtained from two GPS tracking warrants and a wiretap warrant was obtained illegally.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to deny Motley's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the GPS tracking warrants. The court held that Motley had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his opioid prescription records maintained in Nevada's Prescription Monitoring Program database due to the government's long-standing and pervasive regulation of opioids. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment challenge to the GPS tracking warrants failed.Additionally, the court affirmed the lower court's determination that the wiretap warrant was supported by probable cause and was necessary. The court found that the affidavit supporting the wiretap warrant application contained sufficient evidence establishing probable cause that Motley was engaged in a conspiracy to illegally distribute prescription opioids. The affidavit also contained enough information for the court to reasonably conclude that a wiretap was necessary to identify the full scope of the conspiracy.The court dismissed Motley's counterarguments, stating that the government's need for a wiretap was not negated simply because it managed to obtain some evidence of a conspiracy without a wiretap. The court explained that the government has a powerful interest in identifying all conspirators and the full scope of the conspiracy. For these reasons, the court affirmed the lower court's decisions. View "USA V. MOTLEY" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Christopher De Leon Guerrero, was convicted on two counts of attempted enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and was sentenced to ten years in prison and five years of supervised release. Guerrero appealed his conviction and sentence.Guerrero's conviction was based on his online conversations with a fictional 13-year-old girl named "Emily," who was actually a federal agent. He made plans to meet "Emily" at Andersen Air Force Base for sexual activities. Guerrero argued that he could not be charged under Guam law for actions that took place on a federal enclave, Andersen Air Force Base. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed, citing a precedent set in United States v. Lopez.The court affirmed Guerrero’s convictions under § 2422(b) by referencing another predicate offense, not specified in the indictment, with which he could have been charged. They concluded that both of Guerrero’s convictions could be supported by § 13.10, the Guam criminal attempt statute.As for the sentence, the court agreed with both parties that Guerrero’s sentence should be reversed, vacated, and remanded to the district court for reconsideration of three special conditions imposed on his supervised release. These conditions were that Guerrero must not go to places where children under the age of 18 are likely to be, must not view or possess any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct, and must participate in a sex offense-specific treatment program.The court affirmed the convictions but reversed, vacated, and remanded the sentence to the district court for reconsideration of the three special conditions of supervised release. View "USA V. GUERRERO" on Justia Law

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) failed to comply with both the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in its decision to amend the registration of streptomycin for use on citrus crops. The case was brought by a group of environmental advocacy and public interest organizations against the EPA.The EPA had concluded that the registration of streptomycin for use on citrus would not cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment." However, the court disagreed, finding a lack of substantial evidence for some of the EPA’s conclusions. In particular, the court held that the EPA’s assessment of the risk to pollinators (bees) was incomplete or inadequately explained, and the agency failed to provide a sufficient explanation for the registration labels’ suggestion that streptomycin could be used to prevent citrus diseases.Furthermore, the court also found that the EPA failed to comply with the ESA. According to the ESA, the EPA should have determined whether the pesticide registration "may affect" any endangered species or critical habitat, which it failed to do.As a result, the court vacated the EPA’s amended registration of streptomycin for use on citrus crops and remanded the case back to the agency to address the errors in its FIFRA analysis and to conduct an ESA effects determination. View "MIGRANT CLINICIANS NETWORK V. USEPA" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff named Robert A. Stanard, who was an inmate in the federal prison system, sued several prison officials, claiming they violated his Eighth Amendment rights by denying him treatment for Hepatitis C, and his Fifth Amendment rights by discriminating against him due to his pre-trial status. Stanard sought damages under Bivens, a precedent that allows individuals to sue federal officers for constitutional rights violations. The district court dismissed Stanard’s complaint, and he appealed.The Ninth Circuit partly affirmed and partly reversed the district court’s decision. First, the court reversed the dismissal of Stanard’s Eighth Amendment claim. The court found that his claim was not a new context for a Bivens action because it was similar to a previous case, Carlson v. Green, where the Supreme Court recognized a Bivens remedy for prison officials who were deliberately indifferent to an inmate's medical needs. The court rejected the defendants' argument that the prison officials in Stanard's case denied him care due to a Bureau of Prisons policy, while the officials in Carlson acted so inappropriately as to evidence intentional maltreatment causing death, holding that the difference in degree was not a meaningful difference that would create a new context.However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Stanard’s Fifth Amendment claim. The court found that this claim did present a new Bivens context because it involved disparate treatment of pre-sentencing and post-sentencing inmates, a situation not previously addressed in Bivens cases. Given that this was a new context, the court then determined that special factors counseled against extending a Bivens remedy. Specifically, the existence of alternative remedial structures, such as the Bureau of Prisons' administrative remedy process, indicated that Congress, rather than the courts, should decide whether to create a new damages remedy. View "STANARD V. DY" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the U.S. Forest Service in a case brought by Earth Island Institute and the Center for Biological Diversity. The plaintiffs challenged the Forest Service's approval of the Three Creeks Project, which aimed to restore the Inyo National Forest to its pre-European settlement conditions by thinning excess trees, removing excess fire fuel, and using prescribed fire. The plaintiffs argued that the Forest Service failed to adequately consider alternatives to logging, failed to solicit public comments following its 2018 Environmental Assessment, and failed to supplement its National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis following a 2020 bark-beetle outbreak. The court found that the plaintiff had not shown that the Service's approval of the Three Creeks Project was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful. The Service considered a reasonable range of alternatives, offered the public a reasonable opportunity to comment, and was not required to conduct further NEPA analysis following the bark-beetle outbreak. The court also held that the plaintiff had not properly raised its proposed alternatives during the comment period, and therefore it failed to exhaust its argument. Additionally, the court did not consider the plaintiff's claim regarding the Inyo Craters Project since it was not included in its amended complaint. View "EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated a Biological Opinion (BiOp) by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (the Service) and remanded the case for further consideration. The case involved a dispute over the use of water from the San Pedro River Basin in Arizona by the U.S. Army's Fort Huachuca. The Army uses water from the basin, which is also home to several species protected under the Endangered Species Act. To compensate for the water use, the federal government proposed a "conservation easement" that would limit the use of nearby land for agricultural purposes, therefore saving water and protecting the wildlife that depend on the basin. The plaintiffs, environmental organizations, argued that the BiOp lacked evidence to support the claim of water savings from the easement. The Ninth Circuit agreed, stating that the government's determination that the easement would not jeopardize wildlife was arbitrary and capricious due to the lack of evidence supporting the claimed water savings. The court stated that the government must show that the benefit from the conservation easement would be "reasonably certain" under the relevant regulations. The court also held that the government's conclusion that reduced flow in the Babocomari River, a tributary of the San Pedro River, would not jeopardize the northern Mexican gartersnake was not arbitrary and capricious. View "CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. DEB HAALAND" on Justia Law

A group of individuals from India, who have been lawfully working in the United States for years and waiting in line for more than a decade for their immigrant visas, sued the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and U.S. Department of State. They sought to compel the USCIS to act on their applications for adjustment of status to become lawful permanent residents. However, the USCIS had not processed their applications because the State Department revised its forecast and concluded that it had hit the visa cap for the year. The plaintiffs argued that the USCIS and the State Department were improperly interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by requiring an immigrant visa to be available at the time of adjudication rather than at the time of filing the application.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district courts' denials of injunctive relief. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The court found that the government's interpretation of the INA, requiring an immigrant visa to be available before the government can adjudicate an application for adjustment of status, was consistent with the INA and reasonably filled in a procedural detail left open by Congress. The court also noted that the regulation was not in conflict with the statutory text and was left in the government's discretion by Congress. The court further opined that the plaintiffs' proposed rule could result in inefficiency and further delay. View "JIGAR BABARIA, ET AL V. ANTONY BLINKEN, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and other tenants filed suit against the Duringer Law Group, PLC, and Stephen C. Duringer, alleging that Duringer violated the Act by filing a memorandum of costs in state court proceedings concerning an unlawful-detainer judgment. The district court concluded that Tenants’ federal suit constituted an improper appeal of a state-court judgment and thus was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The court explained that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, by vesting jurisdiction over state-court appeals in the U.S. Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. Section 1257 precludes a federal district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction in an action asking the court to overturn an injurious state-court judgment. The panel held that the doctrine is limited to cases (1) brought by state-court losers (2) complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments (3) rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and (4) inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments. The panel concluded that the tenants’ action did not challenge a memorandum of costs on which the state court already had rendered judgment, but rather a later memorandum. Because there was no relevant state-court judgment purporting to adjudicate the validity of the costs in the later memorandum, Rooker-Feldman did not apply. View "JANEY BROWN, ET AL V. DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC, ET AL" on Justia Law