Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 1992, Voting Rights Act (52 U.S.C. 10301) Section 2 litigation challenging Alabama’s districting map resulted in Alabama’s first majority-black district and its first black Representative since 1877. Alabama’s congressional map has remained similar since then. Following the 2020 census, the state enacted a new districting map (HB1), which produced only one district in which black voters constituted a majority.The Supreme Court affirmed a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the use of HB 1.Section 2 provides that the right to vote “shall not be denied or abridged ... on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” A 1982 amendment incorporated an effects test and a disclaimer that “nothing” in Section 2 “establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.” The Supreme Court subsequently employed the “Gingles framework,” under which Section 2 plaintiffs must satisfy three preconditions and then show that, under the “totality of circumstances,” the challenged process is not “equally open” to minority voters.The district court correctly found that black voters could constitute a majority in a second district that was “reasonably configured” and that there was no serious dispute that Black voters are politically cohesive, nor that the challenged districts’ white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat Black voters’ preferred candidate. The court’s findings that “Black Alabamians enjoy virtually zero success in statewide elections” and concerning “Alabama’s extensive history of repugnant racial and voting-related discrimination” were unchallenged.The Court rejected Alabama’s arguments that a state’s map cannot abridge a person’s right to vote “on account of race” if the map resembles a sufficient number of race-neutral alternatives and that the plaintiffs must prove discriminatory intent. Section 2, as applied to redistricting, is not unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment. View "Allen v. Milligan" on Justia Law

Sackett began backfilling an Idaho lot with dirt to build a home. The Environmental Protection Agency informed Sackett that the property contained wetlands and that the backfilling violated the Clean Water Act, which prohibits discharging pollutants into “the waters of the United States,” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7). The EPA ordered Sackett to restore the site, threatening penalties of over $40,000 per day. The EPA classified the Sacket wetlands as “waters of the United States” because they were near a ditch that fed into a creek, which fed into Priest Lake, a navigable, intrastate lake. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the EPA.The Supreme Court reversed. CWA jurisdiction over an adjacent wetland requires that the adjacent body of water constitutes waters of the United States (a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters) and a continuous surface connection between the wetland and that water, making it difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”The Court reviewed the history of judicial interpretation of “the waters of the United States” and enforcement by federal agencies, which argued that the significant-nexus test was sufficient to establish jurisdiction over “adjacent” wetlands. Under that test, nearly all waters and wetlands are potentially susceptible to regulation, “putting a staggering array of landowners at risk of criminal prosecution for such mundane activities as moving dirt.” The CWA’s use of “waters” encompasses only relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies, ordinarily called streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes. Wetlands qualify as “waters of the United States” only if “indistinguishable from waters of the United States,” having a continuous surface connection to bodies that are waters of the United States in their own right, with no clear demarcation between waters and wetlands. View "Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Following the 2007-2009 “Great Recession,” the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) brought an enforcement action against Calcutt, the former CEO of a Michigan-based community bank, for mismanaging one of the bank’s loan relationships. The FDIC ultimately ordered Calcutt removed from office, prohibited him from further banking activities, and assessed $125,000 in civil penalties.The Sixth Circuit agreed that Calcutt had proximately caused the $30,000 charge-off on one loan because he had “participated extensively in negotiating and approving” the transaction. The court concluded that $6.4 million in losses on other loans were a different matter and that none of the investigative, auditing, and legal expenses could qualify as harm to the bank, because those expenses occurred as part of its “normal business.” Despite identifying these legal errors in the FDIC analysis, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the FDIC decision, finding that substantial evidence supported the sanctions determination, even though the FDIC never applied the proximate cause standard itself or considered whether the sanctions against Calcutt were warranted on the narrower set of harms that it identified.The Supreme Court reversed. It is a fundamental rule of administrative law that reviewing courts must judge the propriety of agency action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. An agency’s discretionary order may be upheld only on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency itself. By affirming the FDIC’s sanctions against Calcutt based on a legal rationale different from that adopted by the FDIC, the Sixth Circuit violated these commands. View "Calcutt v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation" on Justia Law

The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS) provides for collective bargaining between federal agencies and their employees’ unions and establishes the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) to investigate and adjudicate labor disputes, 5 U.S.C. 7101. The Union represents federal civil-service employees (dual-status technicians) who work for the Ohio National Guard. After their prior collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) expired, the Guard, the Ohio Adjutant General, and the Ohio Adjutant General’s Department (petitioners) asserted that they were not bound by the FSLMRS. The Union filed a complaint with the FLRA. An ALJ concluded that the FLRA had jurisdiction over the Guard; the dual-status technicians had collective bargaining rights under the FSLMRS; and repudiating the CBA violated the FSLMRS. The Sixth Circuit upheld the decision.The Supreme Court affirmed. A State National Guard acts as a federal agency for purposes of the FSLMRS when it hires and supervises dual-status technicians serving in their civilian roles. When the Guard employs dual-status technicians, it exercises the authority of the Department of Defense, an agency covered by the FSLMRS. The statutory authority permitting the Ohio Adjutant General to employ dual-status technicians as civilian employees in the federal civil service is found in 5 U.S.C. 2105(a)(1)(F). Dual-status technicians are ultimately employees of the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, and the petitioners are the Secretaries’ designees for purposes of dual-status technician employment. View "Ohio Adjutant General's Department v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law

The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), 48 U.S.C. 2101, creates the Financial Oversight and Management Board, an “entity within the territorial government” of Puerto Rico. The Board approves and enforces the Commonwealth’s fiscal plans, supervises its borrowing, and represents Puerto Rico in Title III cases, modeled on federal bankruptcy proceedings. PROMESA does not explicitly abrogate sovereign immunity but incorporates, as part of its mechanism for restructuring debt, the Bankruptcy Code’s express abrogation of sovereign immunity. PROMESA contemplates other legal claims and sets limits on litigation targeting the Board, its members, and its employees for “actions taken to carry out” PROMESA. It provides that no district court will have jurisdiction over challenges to the Board’s “certification determinations.”CPI, a media organization, requested materials, including communications between Board members and Puerto Rican and U.S. officials. The request went unanswered. CPI sued the Board, citing the Puerto Rican Constitution as guaranteeing a right of access to public records. The district court concluded that PROMESA abrogated the Board’s immunity. The First Circuit affirmed.The Supreme Court reversed. PROMESA does not abrogate the Board’s immunity. Congress must make its intent to abrogate sovereign immunity “unmistakably clear.” PROMESA does not do so. Except in Title III debt-restructuring proceedings, the statute does not provide that the Board or Puerto Rico is subject to suit. PROMESA’s judicial review provisions are not incompatible with sovereign immunity but serve a function without an abrogation of immunity. Litigation against the Board can arise even though the Board enjoys sovereign immunity generally. Statutes other than PROMESA abrogate its immunity from particular claims; the Board could decide to waive its immunity from particular claims. Providing for a judicial forum and shielding the Board, its members, and employees from liability do not make the requisite clear statement. View "Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Centro De Periodismo Investigativo, Inc." on Justia Law

California’s Proposition 12 forbids the in-state sale of whole pork meat that comes from breeding pigs (or their immediate offspring) that are “confined in a cruel manner.” Confinement is “cruel” if it prevents a pig from “lying down, standing up, fully extending [its] limbs, or turning around freely.” Opponents alleged that Proposition 12 violated the Constitution by impermissibly burdening interstate commerce, arguing that the cost of compliance with Proposition 12 will increase production costs and, because California imports almost all the pork it consumes, most of Proposition 12’s compliance costs will be borne by out-of-state firms.The Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the case, rejecting arguments under the dormant Commerce Clause. Absent purposeful discrimination, a state may exclude from its territory, or prohibit the sale therein of any articles which, in its judgment, fairly exercised, are prejudicial to the interests of its citizens. Proposition 12 imposes the same burdens on in-state pork producers that it imposes on out-of-state pork producers. Proposition 12 does not implicate the antidiscrimination principle.The Court rejected an argument that its precedents include an “almost per se” rule forbidding enforcement of state laws that have the practical effect of controlling commerce outside the state, even when those laws do not purposely discriminate against out-of-state interests. While leaving the courtroom door open to challenges premised on even nondiscriminatory burdens, the Court noted that “extreme caution is warranted.” View "National Pork Producers Council v. Ross" on Justia Law

Then-New York Governor Cuomo’s “Buffalo Billion” initiative administered through Fort Schuyler Management Corporation, a nonprofit affiliated with SUNY, aimed to invest $1 billion in upstate development projects. Investigations later uncovered a scheme that involved Cuomo’s associates--a member of Fort Schuyler’s board of directors and a construction company made payments to a lobbyist with ties to the Cuomo administration. Fort Schuyler’s bid process subsequently allowed the construction company to receive major Buffalo Billion contracts.The participants were charged with wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud 18 U.S.C. 1343, 1349. Under the Second Circuit’s “right to control” theory, wire fraud can be established by showing that the defendant schemed to deprive a victim of potentially valuable economic information necessary to make discretionary economic decisions. The jury instructions defined “property” as including “intangible interests such as the right to control the use of one’s assets,” and “economically valuable information” as “information that affects the victim’s assessment of the benefits or burdens of a transaction, or relates to the quality of goods or services received or the economic risks.” The Second Circuit affirmed the convictions.The Supreme Court reversed. Under Supreme Court precedents the federal fraud statutes criminalize only schemes to deprive people of traditional property interests. The prosecution must prove that wire fraud defendants “engaged in deception,” and also that money or property was “an object of their fraud.” The "fraud statutes do not vest a general power in the federal government to enforce its view of integrity in broad swaths of state and local policymaking.” The right-to-control theory applies to an almost limitless variety of deceptive actions traditionally left to state contract and tort law. The Court declined to affirm Ciminelli’s convictions on the ground that the evidence was sufficient to establish wire fraud under a traditional property-fraud theory. View "Ciminelli v. United States" on Justia Law

The SEC and FTC initiated enforcement actions. Instead of making a claim within the Commission itself, and then (if needed) in a federal court of appeals, the subjects of the actions filed constitutional claims in federal district courts, arguing that the ALJs are insufficiently accountable to the President, in violation of separation-of-powers principles. One suit also challenged the combination of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions within the agency. The Ninth Circuit held that the FTC's statutory review scheme precluded district court jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit disagreed with respect to the SEC.The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and affirmed the Fifth Circuit. The review schemes set out in the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78a, and the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 41, do not displace district court jurisdiction over the far-reaching constitutional claims at issue.A statutory review scheme may preclude district courts from exercising “federal question” jurisdiction over challenges to federal agency action but does not necessarily extend to every claim. The relevant question is whether the particular claims brought were “of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within this statutory structure.” The claims here challenge functions at the core of the agencies' existence. They do not challenge any specific substantive decision or commonplace procedures. The alleged harm is “being subjected” to “unconstitutional agency authority.” It is impossible to remedy that harm once the proceeding is over and appellate review becomes available. The claims do not depend on winning or losing before the agency. The separation-of-powers claims are collateral to any Commission orders or rules from which review might be sought. The claims are outside the agencies’ expertise. Agency adjudications are generally ill-suited to address structural constitutional challenges and these constitutional claims are not intertwined with matters on which the Commissions are experts. View "Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission" on Justia Law

The Disputed Instruments, prepaid financial instruments used to transfer funds to a named payee, are sold by banks on behalf of MoneyGram and others. When these instruments are not presented for payment within a certain period of time, they are deemed abandoned. MoneyGram applies the common-law escheatment practices outlined in 1965 by the Supreme Court: The proceeds of abandoned financial products should escheat to the state of the creditor’s last known address, or where such records are not kept, to the state in which the company holding the funds is incorporated. MoneyGram does not keep records of creditor addresses but transmits the abandoned proceeds to its state of incorporation. States invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to determine whether the abandoned proceeds of the Disputed Instruments are governed by the Disposition of Abandoned Money Orders and Traveler’s Checks Act (FDA), which provides that a money order or “similar written instrument (other than a third-party bank check)” should generally escheat to the state in which the instrument was purchased, 12 U.S.C. 2503.The Court held that the Disputed Instruments are sufficiently similar to money orders to fall within the FDA’s “similar written instrument” category. Being prepaid makes them likely to escheat. The FDA was passed to abrogate common law because, for instruments like money orders, the entities selling such products often did not keep records of creditor addresses, resulting in a “windfall” to the state of incorporation. Bank liability is not a trigger for exclusion, given that banks can be liable on money orders, which are expressly covered. Whatever the intended meaning of “third-party bank check,” it cannot be read broadly to exclude prepaid instruments that escheat inequitably due to the business practices of the company holding the funds. View "Delaware v. Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

The Bank Secrecy Act requires U.S. persons with financial interests in foreign accounts to file an “FBAR” annual Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts; 31 U.S.C. 5314 delineates legal duties while section 5321 outlines the penalties, with a maximum $10,000 penalty for non-willful violations. Bittner—a dual citizen of Romania and the U.S.—learned of his reporting obligations in 2011 and subsequently submitted reports covering 2007-2011. The government deemed Bittner’s late reports deficient because they did not address all accounts as to which Bittner had either signatory authority or a qualifying interest. Bittner filed corrected FBARs providing information for 61 accounts in 2007, 51 in 2008, 53 in 2009 and 2010, and 54 in 2011. The government asserted that non-willful penalties apply to each account not accurately or timely reported. Bittner’s reports collectively involved 272 accounts; the government calculated a $2.72 million penalty. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.The Supreme Court reversed. The $10,000 maximum penalty for non-willful failure to file a compliant report accrues on a per-report, not a per-account, basis. Section 5314 does not address accounts or their number. An individual files a compliant report or does not. For cases involving willful violations, the statute tailors penalties to accounts. When one section of a statute includes language omitted from a neighboring section, the difference normally conveys a different meaning. The Act's implementing regulations require individuals with fewer than 25 accounts to provide details about each account while individuals with 25 or more accounts do not need to list each account or provide account-specific details unless requested by the Secretary. View "Bittner v. United States" on Justia Law