Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Charitable organizations soliciting funds in California generally must register with the Attorney General and renew their registrations annually by filing copies of their IRS Form 990, on which tax-exempt organizations provide the names and addresses of their major donors. Two tax-exempt charities that solicit contributions in California renewed their registrations and filed redacted Form 990s to preserve their donors’ anonymity. The Attorney General threatened the charities with the suspension of their registrations and fines. The charities alleged that the compelled disclosure requirement violated their First Amendment rights and the rights of their donors. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the Attorney General.The Supreme Court reversed. California’s disclosure requirement is facially invalid because it burdens donors’ First Amendment rights and is not narrowly tailored to an important government interest. Compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as other forms of governmental action. Exacting scrutiny requires that a government-mandated disclosure regime be narrowly tailored to the government’s asserted interest, even if it is not the least restrictive means of achieving that end.A dramatic mismatch exists between the Attorney General's asserted interest and the disclosure regime. While California’s interests in preventing charitable fraud and self-dealing are important, the enormous amount of sensitive information collected through the disclosures does not form an integral part of California’s fraud detection efforts. California does not rely on those disclosures to initiate investigations. There is no evidence that alternative means of obtaining the information, such as a subpoena or audit letter, are inefficient and ineffective by comparison. Mere administrative convenience does not “reflect the seriousness of the actual burden” that the disclosure requirement imposes on donors’ association rights. It does not make a difference if there is no public disclosure, if some donors do not mind having their identities revealed, or if the relevant donor information is already disclosed to the IRS. View "Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta" on Justia Law

Under the Natural Gas Act, to build an interstate pipeline, a natural gas company must obtain from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) a certificate of "public convenience and necessity,” 15 U.S.C. 717f(e). A 1947 amendment, section 717f(h), authorized certificate holders to exercise the federal eminent domain power. FERC granted PennEast a certificate of public convenience and necessity for a 116-mile pipeline from Pennsylvania to New Jersey. Challenges to that authorization remain pending. PennEast sought to exercise the federal eminent domain power to obtain rights-of-way along the pipeline route, including land in which New Jersey asserts a property interest. New Jersey asserted sovereign immunity. The Third Circuit concluded that PennEast was not authorized to condemn New Jersey’s property.The Supreme Court reversed, first holding that New Jersey’s appeal is not a collateral attack on the FERC order. Section 717f(h) authorizes FERC certificate holders to condemn all necessary rights-of-way, whether owned by private parties or states, and is consistent with established federal government practice for the construction of infrastructure, whether by government or through a private company.States may be sued only in limited circumstances: where the state expressly consents; where Congress clearly abrogates the state’s immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment; or if it has implicitly agreed to suit in “the structure of the original Constitution.” The states implicitly consented to private condemnation suits when they ratified the Constitution, including the eminent domain power, which is inextricably intertwined with condemnation authority. Separating the two would diminish the federal eminent domain power, which the states may not do. View "PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey" on Justia Law

Title V of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act allocates $8 billion to “Tribal governments” to compensate for unbudgeted expenditures made in response to COVID–19, 42 U.S.C. 801(a)(2)(B). A “Tribal government” is the “recognized governing body of an Indian tribe” as defined in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), which refers to “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community, including any Alaska Native village or regional or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.” 25 U.S.C. 5304(e).Consistent with the Department of the Interior’s view that Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) are Indian tribes under ISDA, the Department of the Treasury determined that ANCs are eligible for Title V relief, although ANCs are not “federally recognized tribes” (i.e., tribes with which the United States has entered into a government-to-government relationship). Federally recognized tribes sued. The D.C. Circuit reinstated the suit following summary judgment.The Supreme Court reversed. ANCs are “Indian tribe[s]” under ISDA and eligible for funding under Title V.. ANCs are “established pursuant to” ANCSA and “recognized as eligible” for that Act’s benefits. ANCSA, which made ANCs eligible to select tens of millions of acres of land and receive hundreds of millions of tax-exempt dollars, 43 U.S.C. 1605, 1610, 1611, is a special program provided by the United States to “Indians.” Given that ANCSA is the only statute ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition mentions by name, eligibility for ANCSA’s benefits satisfies the definition’s “recognized-as-eligible” clause. The Court noted that even if ANCs did not satisfy the recognized-as-eligible clause, they would still satisfy ISDA’s definition of an “Indian tribe.” View "Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation" on Justia Law

When the housing bubble burst in 2008, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) suffered significant losses. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), an independent agency tasked with regulating the companies and, if necessary, stepping in as their conservator, 12 U.S.C. 4501. Congress installed a single Director, removable by the President only “for cause.” The Director placed the companies into conservatorship and negotiated agreements with the Department of Treasury, which committed to providing each company with up to $100 billion in capital and in exchange received senior preferred shares and fixed-rate dividends. A subsequent amendment replaced the fixed-rate dividend with a variable formula, requiring the companies to make quarterly payments consisting of their entire net worth minus a small specified capital reserve. Shareholders challenged that amendment.The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit in part, affirmed in part, and vacated in part.The shareholders’ statutory claim was properly dismissed. The Act's “anti-injunction clause” provides that unless review is specifically authorized by one of its provisions or is requested by the Director, “no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the Agency as a conservator or a receiver.” Where, as here, the FHFA’s challenged actions did not exceed its “powers or functions” “as a conservator,” relief is prohibited.The Court first concluded the shareholders have standing to bring their constitutional claim because they retain an interest in retrospective relief, despite that the FHFA was led by an Acting Director, as opposed to a Senate-confirmed Director, at the time the amendment was adopted. The Act’s for-cause restriction on the President’s removal authority violates the separation of powers. The Court rejected arguments based on the facts that the FHFA’s authority is limited; that when the Agency steps into the shoes of a regulated entity as its conservator or receiver, it takes on the status of a private party and does not wield executive power; and that the entities FHFA regulates are government-sponsored enterprises. The President’s removal power serves important purposes regardless of whether the agency directly regulates ordinary Americans or takes actions that have a profound, indirect effect on their lives. The Constitution prohibits even “modest restrictions” on the President’s power to remove the head of an agency with a single top officer.The Court remanded for determination of a remedy. Although an unconstitutional provision is never really part of the body of governing law, it is still possible for an unconstitutional provision to inflict compensable harm. View "Collins v. Yellen" on Justia Law

Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) conduct adversarial proceedings for challenging the validity of an existing patent before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), 35 U.S.C. 6(a), (c). The Secretary of Commerce appoints PTAB members, including APJs, except the Director, who is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. APJs concluded that Arthrex’s patent was invalid. The Federal Circuit concluded that the APJs were principal officers who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate; their appointment was unconstitutional. To remedy this violation, the court invalidated the APJs’ tenure protections, making them removable at will by the Secretary.The Supreme Court vacated. The unreviewable authority wielded by APJs during patent review is incompatible with their appointment by the Secretary to an inferior office. Inferior officers must be “directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” While the Director has administrative oversight, neither he nor any other superior executive officer can directly review APJ decisions. A decision by the APJs under his charge compels the Director to “issue and publish a certificate” canceling or confirming patent claims he previously allowed. Given the insulation of PTAB decisions from executive review, APJs exercise power that conflicts with the Appointments Clause’s purpose “to preserve political accountability.”Four justices concluded that section 6(c) cannot constitutionally be enforced to prevent the Director from reviewing final APJ decisions. The Director may review final PTAB decisions and may issue decisions on behalf of the Board. Section 6(c) otherwise remains operative. Because the source of the constitutional violation is the restraint on the Director’s review authority not the appointment of APJs, Arthrex is not entitled to a hearing before a new panel. View "United States v. Arthrex, Inc." on Justia Law

The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act required most Americans to obtain minimum essential health insurance coverage and imposed a monetary penalty upon most individuals who failed to do so; 2017 amendments effectively nullified the penalty. Several states and two individuals sued, claiming that without the penalty, the Act’s minimum essential coverage provision, 26 U.S.C. 5000A(a), is unconstitutional and that the rest of the Act is not severable from section 5000A(a).The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge section 5000A(a) because they have not shown a past or future injury fairly traceable to the defendants’ conduct enforcing that statutory provision. The individual plaintiffs cited past and future payments necessary to carry the minimum essential coverage; that injury is not “fairly traceable” to any “allegedly unlawful conduct” of which they complain, Without a penalty for noncompliance, section 5000A(a) is unenforceable. To find standing to attack an unenforceable statutory provision, seeking only declaratory relief, would allow a federal court to issue an impermissible advisory opinion.The states cited the indirect injury of increased costs to run state-operated medical insurance programs but failed to show how that alleged harm is traceable to the government’s actual or possible enforcement of section 5000A(a). Where a standing theory rests on speculation about the decision of an independent third party (an individual’s decision to enroll in a program like Medicaid), the plaintiff must show at the least “that third parties will likely react in predictable ways.” Nothing suggests that an unenforceable mandate will cause state residents to enroll in benefits programs that they would otherwise forgo. An alleged increase in administrative and related expenses is not imposed by section 5000A(a) but by other provisions of the Act. View "California v. Texas" on Justia Law

The Ordot Dump was constructed on Guam by the Navy in the 1940s. Both the federal government and Guam allegedly deposited waste at Ordot. A 2004 consent decree between the EPA and Guam resolved litigation concerning Clean Water Act violations.About 13 years later, Guam sued the U.S. under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601. A section 107(a) action sought recovery of the costs of a “removal or remedial action” from the government based on its ownership or operation of the site at the time of the disposal of hazardous substances. A section 113(f) action sought "contribution," alleging that Guam “has resolved its liability to the United States…for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in [a] settlement." The D. C. Circuit held that cost recovery was not available if a party could have brought a contribution action and found the contribution claim untimely under a three-year limitations period in light of the 2004 settlement.A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. A settlement of environmental liabilities must resolve a CERCLA-specific liability to give rise to a section 113(f)(3)(B) contribution action. That remedial measures under different environmental statutes might functionally overlap with a CERCLA response action does not justify reinterpreting section 113(f)(3)(B)’s phrase “resolved its liability . . . for some or all of a response action” to instead mean “settled an environmental liability that might have been actionable under CERCLA.” A party may seek CERCLA contribution only after settling CERCLA-specific claims, as opposed to resolving environmental liability under another law. View "Guam v. United States" on Justia Law

The FTC filed a complaint against Tucker alleging deceptive payday lending practices in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act Section 5(a). The district court entered a permanent injunction to prevent Tucker from committing future violations and relied on the same authority to direct Tucker to pay $1.27 billion in restitution and disgorgement. The Ninth Circuit rejected Tucker’s argument that section 13(b) does not authorize the award of equitable monetary relief.The Supreme Court reversed. Section 13(b) does not authorize the Commission to seek, or a court to award, equitable monetary relief such as restitution or disgorgement. The Commission has authority to enforce the Act’s prohibitions on “unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)–(2), by commencing administrative proceedings under Section 5. Section 5(l) authorizes the Commission, following completion of the administrative process and the issuance of a final cease and desist order, to seek civil penalties, and permits district courts to “grant mandatory injunctions and such other and further equitable relief.” Section 19 authorizes district courts to grant “such relief as the court finds necessary,” in cases where someone has engaged in unfair or deceptive conduct with respect to which the Commission has issued a final cease and desist order.In Tucker's case, the Commission sought equitable monetary relief directly in district court under Section 13(b)’s authorization to seek a “permanent injunction” without having used the Commission’s traditional administrative proceedings. Section 13(b) does not explicitly authorize the Commission to obtain court-ordered monetary relief, and such relief is foreclosed by the structure and history of the Act. It is unlikely that Congress, without mentioning the matter, would grant the Commission authority to circumvent traditional Section 5 administrative proceedings. In enacting Section 19 two years after Section 13(b), Congress did not create an alternative enforcement path with similar remedies. View "AMG Capital Management, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission" on Justia Law

Petitioners, whose applications for disability benefits were denied by the Social Security Administration (SSA) unsuccessfully challenged their adverse determinations before an SSA administrative law judge (ALJ). The SSA Appeals Council denied discretionary review in each case. Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided Lucia v. SEC, holding that the appointment of Securities and Exchange Commission ALJs by lower-level staff violated the Constitution’s Appointments Clause. The SSA ALJs were also appointed by lower-level staff. The Courts of Appeals held that the petitioners could not obtain judicial review of their Appointments Clause claims because they failed to raise those challenges in their administrative proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed. The Courts of Appeals erred in imposing an issue-exhaustion requirement on petitioners’ Appointments Clause claims. Administrative review schemes commonly require parties to give the agency an opportunity to address an issue before seeking judicial review of that question. If no statute or regulation imposes an issue-exhaustion requirement, courts decide whether to require issue exhaustion based on “an analogy to the rule that appellate courts will not consider arguments not raised before trial courts.” In the context of petitioners’ Appointments Clause challenges, two considerations tip the scales against imposing an issue-exhaustion requirement: agency adjudications are generally ill-suited to address structural constitutional challenges, which usually fall outside the adjudicators’ areas of technical expertise, and the Supreme Court has consistently recognized a futility exception to exhaustion requirements. Petitioners assert purely constitutional claims about which SSA ALJs have no special expertise and for which they can provide no relief. View "Carr v. Saul" on Justia Law

Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ownership rules limit the number of radio stations, television stations, and newspapers that a single entity may own in a given market. Section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 directs the FCC to review its media ownership rules every four years and to repeal or modify rules that no longer serve the public interest. In 2017, the FCC concluded that three ownership rules were no longer necessary to promote competition, localism, or viewpoint diversity and that the record did not suggest that repealing or modifying those rules was likely to harm minority and female ownership. The FCC repealed two ownership rules and modified another. The Third Circuit vacated the order.The Supreme Court reversed. The FCC’s decision to repeal or modify the three ownership rules was not arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA); it considered the record evidence and reasonably concluded that the rules at issue were no longer necessary to serve the agency’s public interest goals of competition, localism, and viewpoint diversity and that the changes were not likely to harm minority and female ownership. The FCC acknowledged the gaps in the data sets it relied on and noted that, despite its repeated requests for additional data, it had received no countervailing evidence suggesting that changing the rules was likely to harm minority and female ownership. The FCC considered two studies that purported to show that past relaxations of the ownership rules had led to decreases in minority and female ownership levels and interpreted them differently. The APA imposes no general obligation on agencies to conduct or commission their own studies. Nothing in the Telecommunications Act requires the FCC to conduct such studies before exercising its discretion under Section 202(h). View "Federal Communications Commission v. Prometheus Radio Project" on Justia Law