Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After experiencing shortness of breath and chest pain, Jorge Armenta lost consciousness and his wife called 911. Emergency medical technicians from Unified Fire Authority (UFA) responded, evaluated Armenta, and told him that everything appeared normal, suggesting he had an anxiety attack and did not need to go to the emergency room. A week later, Armenta was hospitalized for a massive heart attack, which resulted in significant and potentially life-shortening heart damage. Armenta filed a negligence suit against UFA, alleging that their failure to properly diagnose and treat him caused his injuries.The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, reviewed UFA’s motion to dismiss, which argued that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (UGIA) shielded UFA from liability. The district court applied a three-part test, found that UFA’s actions were a governmental function, that immunity was generally waived for such activities, but that an exception for “providing emergency medical assistance” restored immunity. The court dismissed Armenta’s claims against UFA and entered judgment under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the district court’s statutory interpretation and dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in its interpretation of the “providing emergency medical assistance” exception under the UGIA. The Court determined that, when read in context with related statutory provisions, the exception applies only to medical assistance provided in response to certain types of emergencies, such as disasters or catastrophic events, not to routine emergency medical responses like the one at issue. Therefore, the UGIA does not immunize UFA from Armenta’s suit. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "ARMENTA v. UNIFIED FIRE AUTHORITY" on Justia Law

A group of residents and business owners in Salt Lake City filed a lawsuit against the city, alleging that the city's failure to eliminate encampments of unsheltered people on public land interfered with their use and enjoyment of their properties. The residents claimed that the city, as a landowner, had a duty to maintain its properties free of nuisance. The city argued that the residents were attempting to use the court to force the city to exercise its enforcement powers in a specific way, and that under the public duty doctrine, the city had no duty to the residents regarding its failure to use those powers.The Third District Court in Salt Lake County dismissed the residents' complaint with prejudice, ruling that the public duty doctrine precluded their claims. The court found that the residents failed to allege that the city breached a duty owed specifically to them, rather than a duty owed to the public at large. The court concluded that the city owed no duty to the residents individually apart from its general duty to enforce laws and protect the public.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the public duty doctrine, which protects government actors from civil liability for failing to perform duties owed to the public, precluded the residents' claims of public and private nuisance. The court found that no special relationship existed between the residents and the city that would exempt the residents' claims from the public duty doctrine's preclusion. The court emphasized that the public duty doctrine applies to omissions by government actors performing public duties and that the residents did not demonstrate any unique duty owed to them by the city. View "Barrani v. Salt Lake City" on Justia Law

Karen Jean Anderson, a licensed advanced practice registered nurse (APRN), was accused by the Utah Division of Professional Licensing (DOPL) of unlawfully practicing medicine and exceeding her APRN license by performing tumescent liposuction and fat grafting procedures. These procedures are classified as ablative cosmetic medical procedures under Utah law. DOPL barred Anderson from performing these procedures and imposed a fine. Anderson sought agency review with the Department of Commerce, which reduced the fine but upheld DOPL’s order. Anderson then sought judicial review.The Utah Board of Nursing initially found that Anderson did not unlawfully practice medicine or exceed her APRN license, reasoning that the Nurse Practice Act (NPA) allows APRNs broad authority, including the ability to perform procedures like tumescent liposuction and fat grafting. However, DOPL rejected this recommendation, stating that the legislature had granted exclusive authority to perform non-exempt ablative cosmetic medical procedures to medical and osteopathic doctors. The Department of Commerce affirmed DOPL’s decision, leading Anderson to file a petition for judicial review with the Utah Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Utah Supreme Court.The Utah Supreme Court held that the Utah Code bars APRNs from independently performing ablative cosmetic medical procedures. The court found that the statutory scheme limits such procedures to those licensed to practice medicine or those whose scope of practice includes the authority to operate or perform surgery. Since the scope of practice for APRNs does not include such authorization, Anderson unlawfully practiced medicine and exceeded her APRN license. The court affirmed the Department’s order, maintaining the restrictions and fine imposed on Anderson. View "Anderson v. Department of Commerce" on Justia Law

A four-year-old child suffered severe brain damage due to a massive air embolism during surgery in July 2018. The child's parents, John and Amelia Tullis, sued the healthcare providers, including the University of Utah, in 2019, alleging negligence and seeking damages for pain, anguish, and future medical expenses estimated to exceed $22 million.The University of Utah sought to limit the potential recovery by invoking the 2017 Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (GIA), which capped damages at $745,200. The Third District Court of Salt Lake County denied the University's motion for partial summary judgment, reasoning that the decision in Condemarin v. University Hospital, which found a different damages cap unconstitutional as applied to University Hospital, necessarily determined that the 2017 GIA’s damages cap was also unconstitutional as applied to the University.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether Condemarin controlled the current issue. The court concluded that Condemarin, a plurality decision with a narrow holding, did not control the case. The court noted that Condemarin’s holding was limited to the specific statutes at issue in that case, which imposed a $100,000 cap, whereas the 2017 GIA set a higher limit and included a mechanism for adjusting for inflation. The court emphasized that Condemarin’s holding did not automatically apply to the revised statute with different terms.The Utah Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, noting that the district court should consider the Tullises' request for discovery on the applicability of the damages cap. View "University of Utah Hospital v. Tullis" on Justia Law

Quintin Grillone resigned from his position as a police officer in 2014 while under investigation for providing false information to a prosecutor regarding a traffic citation against his mother. The Peace Officer Standards and Training Division (POST) did not learn of the incident until 2019 when Grillone disclosed it in his application to join a new police department. Following an investigation, POST initiated disciplinary proceedings, and an administrative law judge found that Grillone's conduct constituted obstruction of justice. The POST Council then retroactively suspended Grillone’s certification for three years.Grillone sought judicial review by the Utah Court of Appeals, arguing that the disciplinary proceedings were time-barred by the four-year catch-all statute of limitations for civil actions under Utah Code § 78B-2-307(4). He contended that the statute governing POST disciplinary proceedings referred to them as “civil actions,” thus subjecting them to the civil statute of limitations. The court of appeals, however, held that civil statutes of limitation do not apply to administrative disciplinary proceedings absent specific legislative authority and found that the POST statute did not incorporate the civil statute of limitations.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court agreed that civil statutes of limitation are generally inapplicable to administrative disciplinary proceedings unless the legislature indicates otherwise. The Court concluded that the POST statute’s reference to “civil actions” was intended to distinguish POST proceedings from criminal actions, not to incorporate the civil statutes of limitation. Therefore, the disciplinary proceedings against Grillone were not time-barred, and the POST Council’s three-year suspension of his certification was upheld. View "Grillone v. Peace Officer Standards" on Justia Law

Randi Mariani crashed her motor scooter and sustained a serious injury during a driving skills test, which she was taking to obtain a motorcycle endorsement to her driver license. Following the crash, the Utah Department of Public Safety-Driver License Division (DLD) denied Mariani’s application for the endorsement. Mariani sued the DLD for negligently causing her injury. The district court granted summary judgment to the DLD based on governmental immunity, and the court of appeals affirmed.The district court concluded that the DLD was immune from Mariani’s suit under the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (GIA), reasoning that Mariani’s injury arose out of the administration of her motorcycle skills test, which was part of the licensing process. The court of appeals agreed, stating that Mariani’s injury was at least incident to the licensing approval process.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court focused on the specific language of the GIA’s licensing exception, which provides immunity for injuries that arise out of or in connection with the denial of a license. The Court concluded that the relevant conduct was the denial of the motorcycle endorsement, not the licensing process itself. The Court further determined that there was no causal relationship between the denial of the license and Mariani’s injury, as the injury occurred before the denial. Therefore, the licensing exception did not apply, and the DLD was not immune from Mariani’s suit. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mariani v. Driver License Division" on Justia Law

In 2020, Utah law temporarily allowed municipalities to annex unincorporated areas without a petition or county consent. During this period, the Town of Hideout annexed land in Summit County. After receiving a certificate of annexation from the Lieutenant Governor, Summit County challenged the annexation and the related municipal ordinance in district court, claiming procedural violations and seeking to invalidate the annexation.The Fourth Judicial District Court in Wasatch County ruled in favor of Summit County, granting summary judgment on the grounds that Summit County had standing to challenge the annexation and that the annexation ordinance was invalid due to procedural issues. The court found that Summit County had standing under various statutes and the doctrine of public interest standing.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court held that Summit County lacked a legally protectible interest under the relevant statutory scheme, which did not provide counties with a right to challenge annexations. The court also determined that the public interest standing doctrine could not compensate for this lack of a legally protectible interest because the legislature had explicitly excluded counties from the annexation process. Consequently, the Supreme Court directed the district court to dismiss the case. View "Hideout v. Summit County" on Justia Law

Phil Lyman sought extraordinary relief from the Utah Supreme Court regarding the 2024 primary election for the Utah Republican Party. He requested the court annul the primary election results and certify him as the Republican nominee for Governor in the general election. Lyman argued that the Republican Party’s internal rules should override Utah’s election laws, a claim previously rejected by the court in Utah Republican Party v. Cox. Additionally, Lyman sought the production of voter signatures from nominating petitions and the removal of Lieutenant Governor Deidre Henderson and Governor Spencer Cox from office for alleged malfeasance.The lower courts had not reviewed this case. Lyman filed his petition directly with the Utah Supreme Court, bypassing the district court. He argued that it was impractical to file in the district court due to the urgency of the impending general election deadlines and the long-standing issues surrounding Senate Bill 54, which had been litigated in various courts.The Utah Supreme Court denied Lyman’s petition. The court held that the Republican Party’s internal rules do not override state election laws, reaffirming its decision in Utah Republican Party v. Cox. The court also found that Lyman had not demonstrated why it was impractical to seek relief in the district court and noted that he could not assert claims on behalf of other candidates. Additionally, the court determined that Lyman had not exhausted his administrative remedies under the Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA) for his request for voter signatures. Finally, the court found no viable factual or legal basis for Lyman’s request to remove Henderson and Cox from office. Consequently, the court denied Lyman’s petition for extraordinary relief and his related injunction motions as moot. View "Lyman v. Cox" on Justia Law

Linzi Labrum, the petitioner, sought a waiver of rules 14-704(c)(2) and 14-704(c)(3) of the Utah Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice. These rules require graduates of non-ABA-accredited law schools to practice law in another state for ten years before becoming eligible to take the Utah bar exam. Labrum graduated from Concord Law School, an online, non-ABA-accredited institution, and was admitted to practice law in California in 2021. She has since worked in Utah as a law clerk, mediator, and supervised pro bono attorney.The Utah State Bar denied Labrum's application to take the Utah bar exam, citing her insufficient years of practice. Labrum petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a waiver, arguing that her education and experience met the rules' purposes and that her circumstances were extraordinary.The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Labrum satisfied the burden of proof established in Kelly v. Utah State Bar. The court found that Concord's education, while not on par with ABA-accredited schools, was sufficient when combined with Labrum's practical experience. Her work in Utah, including her roles as a law clerk, mediator, and pro bono attorney, demonstrated her competence and ethical standards. The court also noted the significant changes in the accreditation of online law schools and the strong recommendations from Utah legal practitioners who supervised her work.The court concluded that Labrum's case was extraordinary due to the unique challenges she faced, her commitment to serving an underserved area in Utah, and the substantial support from the legal community. The Utah Supreme Court granted her petition for waiver, allowing her to take the Utah bar exam. View "Labrum v. Utah State Bar" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Brent Gordon's claim that Herriman City's policy violates his right to inspect records under the Utah Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA). Gordon did not appeal Herriman’s denial of a records request but instead sued for an injunction that would require Herriman to allow him to inspect any public record free of charge. The district court dismissed Gordon’s case, concluding that he needed to submit a formal records request and exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing suit.The district court agreed with Herriman City and dismissed Gordon’s claim. The court ruled that Gordon was not entitled to judicial review because he either did not make a formal GRAMA request or, if he did, he did not fully exhaust the administrative remedies associated with that request. Gordon appealed the district court’s decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Gordon lacked statutory standing to pursue his claim. The court explained that the injunction provision in Utah Code section 63G-2-802(1), which Gordon relied on, merely provides a remedy and does not create a right of action. The court concluded that without an express or implied statutory right to seek judicial review of Herriman’s alleged policy, Gordon lacked statutory standing to pursue this action. Therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate his GRAMA claim and correctly dismissed it. View "Gordon v. Nostrom" on Justia Law