Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Volcano Telephone Company, a rural telephone service provider, receives subsidies from the California High-Cost Fund-A (A-Fund) administered by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC). Volcano Vision, Inc., an affiliate, uses Volcano Telephone’s broadband-capable facilities, subsidized by the A-Fund, to deliver broadband services without contributing to the underlying costs. The PUC considered Volcano Vision’s net revenues in setting Volcano Telephone’s A-Fund subsidy and future rates. The PUC also required Volcano Telephone to submit broadband service quality metrics related to Volcano Vision’s services.The PUC issued Decision No. 23-02-008, calculating Volcano Telephone’s A-Fund subsidy and approving rates for 2023. Volcano Telephone and Volcano Vision challenged this decision, arguing that the PUC’s implementation of broadband imputation constituted an unconstitutional taking and conflicted with federal law. They also contended that the order to submit broadband service quality metrics was outside the scope of the proceedings and the PUC’s jurisdiction. The PUC denied rehearing and modified the decision to clarify the reporting requirements.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court rejected the petitioners’ claims, affirming Decision Nos. 23-02-008 and 23-08-051. The court held that the PUC’s implementation of broadband imputation did not constitute an unconstitutional taking, as the A-Fund program is voluntary, and the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the rate of return was confiscatory. The court also found that the order to submit broadband service quality metrics was within the scope of the proceedings and the PUC’s jurisdiction. The court concluded that the PUC’s decisions were supported by substantial evidence and did not violate any constitutional rights. View "Volcano Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC, and affiliates, sought to build and operate interstate electricity transmission lines in Indiana. An Indiana statute granted incumbent electric companies the right of first refusal to build and operate new interstate transmission facilities connecting to their existing facilities. Plaintiffs argued that this statute violated the dormant commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC) Commissioners from enforcing the statute.The IURC Commissioners and several intervening defendants appealed the injunction. They argued that the IURC did not enforce the rights of first refusal and that the injunction would not redress plaintiffs' injuries. The district court had found that plaintiffs had standing because it believed the IURC enforced the rights of first refusal and that an injunction would prevent MISO from recognizing the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing. The court concluded that the IURC had no relevant responsibilities for enforcing the challenged statute and that any genuine redress would have to operate against MISO, a non-governmental entity not party to the lawsuit. The court noted that MISO had made clear it would not respond to the preliminary injunction as plaintiffs and the district court expected. The court also rejected a dissenting opinion's novel theory of standing, which was not presented by plaintiffs or adopted by the district court. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "LSP Transmission Holdings II, LLC v Commonwealth Edison Company of Indiana, Inc." on Justia Law

In the spring of 2018, People's Electric Cooperative and Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company (OG&E) submitted competing bids to provide retail electric service to the Tall Oak Woodford Cryo Plant in Coal County, Oklahoma. The Plant is located in People's certified territory, which grants them exclusive rights to provide electricity under the Retail Electric Supplier Certified Territory Act (RESCTA). OG&E's proposal relied on the Large Load exception to RESCTA, which allows a supplier to extend its service into another supplier's territory for large-load customers. OG&E used third-party transmission facilities to provide service to the Plant without extending its own distribution lines.The Oklahoma Corporation Commission enjoined OG&E from serving the Plant, finding that OG&E was not "extending its service" as authorized by RESCTA. The Commission determined that a retail electric supplier may not use third-party transmission lines to extend its service into another supplier's certified territory under the Large Load exception. OG&E appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and upheld the Commission's determination. The Court held that Article 9, Section 20 of the Oklahoma Constitution requires a limited review of the Commission's order. The Court affirmed the Commission's interpretation that the Large Load exception does not permit a supplier to use third-party transmission lines to extend its service into another supplier's certified territory. The Court's decision applies prospectively only and does not affect existing retail electric services and facilities established under the Large Load exception. View "OKLAHOMA GAS AND ELECTRIC CO. v. STATE" on Justia Law

In 2019, Nestle Purina Petcare Company sought to switch its electric supplier for its facility in Hartwell, Georgia, from Georgia Power Company to Walton Electric Membership Corporation. Georgia Power objected, citing the Territorial Electric Service Act, arguing that the premises were not new and did not meet the requirements to switch suppliers. Georgia Power contended that the premises had long been a manufacturing and warehousing facility and that the changes made by Nestle did not amount to the premises being "destroyed or dismantled" as required by the Act.The Georgia Public Service Commission (the "Commission") ruled in favor of Nestle, concluding that the premises were "destroyed or dismantled" and not "reconstructed in substantial kind," allowing Nestle to switch to Walton EMC. The superior court reversed this decision, finding that the premises were not "destroyed or dismantled" and that the modifications did not meet the statutory requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court's decision.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the appropriate standard of review was abuse of discretion. The Court determined that the Commission's decision should have been upheld. The Court held that "destroyed or dismantled" does not require complete destruction but can include substantial dismantling or stripping away of significant components. The Court also found that the premises were not "reconstructed in substantial kind" due to the significant differences in structure and function between the old and new facilities. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, allowing Nestle to switch its electric supplier to Walton EMC. View "WALTON ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION v. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY" on Justia Law

The City and County of San Francisco and the San Francisco County Transportation Authority challenged a decision by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to issue a phase I driverless autonomous vehicle (AV) deployment permit to Waymo, LLC for fared passenger service in San Francisco and parts of San Mateo County. The petitioners argued that the PUC failed to follow the law and disregarded significant public safety issues. However, the record showed that the PUC considered and responded to the safety concerns raised by the petitioners, noting that few incidents involved Waymo driverless AVs, each was minor, and none involved injuries.The PUC had previously issued a decision establishing a pilot program for the regulation of AV passenger carriers, which included both drivered and driverless AVs. The petitioners participated in these proceedings but did not challenge the decision at that time. Waymo submitted an advice letter in December 2022 seeking a phase I driverless AV deployment permit, which was protested by the San Francisco entities. The PUC's Consumer Protection and Enforcement Division circulated a draft resolution authorizing Waymo's permit, and after considering comments and holding meetings, the PUC issued a final resolution in August 2023, authorizing Waymo to provide fared driverless AV service.The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and found that the PUC acted within its authority and did not abuse its discretion. The court noted that the PUC's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including data showing that Waymo driverless AVs had not been involved in any collisions resulting in injuries. The court also upheld the PUC's use of the advice letter process, as it was authorized by the PUC's prior decision. The court denied the relief requested by the petitioners, affirming the PUC's decision to issue the phase I driverless AV deployment permit to Waymo. View "City and County of San Francisco v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

In 2021, the San Diego City Council approved new franchise agreements granting San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) the exclusive right to provide gas and electric services in San Diego. Kathryn Burton, a San Diego resident, filed a lawsuit against the City and the Council members, alleging a violation of the Ralph M. Brown Act. Burton claimed that the Council members had discussed and agreed on their votes in a "secret serial meeting" using the mayor as an intermediary before approving the agreements.The Superior Court of San Diego County allowed SDG&E to intervene as a defendant. SDG&E, along with the City defendants, moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, concluding that Burton failed to comply with the Brown Act's requirement to make a prelitigation demand to the legislative body to cure or correct the alleged violation.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. Burton argued that she had satisfied the demand requirement through letters sent by her later-hired attorney, Maria Severson. However, the court found that Severson's letters did not mention Burton and were not sent on her behalf. The court held that Burton did not comply with the statutory requirement to make a demand before filing the lawsuit, as required by section 54960.1 of the Government Code.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, concluding that Burton's appeal lacked merit due to her failure to comply with the demand requirement. The court also found that Burton's challenge to the order allowing SDG&E to intervene was moot, as the summary judgment was properly granted regardless of SDG&E's participation. View "Burton v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Sherry Cole filed a formal complaint against Rocky Mountain Power (RMP) alleging she had been overbilled due to her power meter being cross-connected with her neighbor’s. Initially, an RMP employee confirmed the cross-connection and credited her account with $1,256.45. However, subsequent tests revealed no cross-connection, leading RMP to remove the credit and instead apply a $450 credit for the inconvenience. Cole then filed a complaint with the Idaho Public Utilities Commission, which dismissed her complaint due to lack of evidence of overcharging. Cole's motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Commission.Cole appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Commission had reviewed Cole’s complaint, RMP’s billing calculations, and an analysis by Jon Kruck, an investigator, which concluded that Cole’s energy usage was consistent and did not indicate a cross-connection. The Commission found no substantial evidence supporting Cole’s claims and dismissed her complaint. Cole’s petition for reconsideration was denied as she failed to present new evidence or demonstrate that the dismissal was unreasonable or unlawful.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision, finding that the Commission’s factual findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence. The Court noted that Cole relied on anecdotal evidence and did not provide sufficient proof to counter the Commission’s findings. Additionally, the Court held that Cole’s constitutional arguments were waived as they were raised for the first time on appeal and were not supported by sufficient legal authority. The Court also denied Cole’s request for attorney fees, as pro se litigants are not entitled to such fees.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Idaho Public Utilities Commission dismissing Cole’s complaint and denying her petition for reconsideration. View "Cole v. IPUC" on Justia Law

Aenergy, S.A. (Aenergy) sought damages from the Republic of Angola for unpaid work related to power turbines to be installed in Angola. Aenergy had previously entered into contracts with Angolan utility subsidiaries to construct, supply, and maintain power plants and water infrastructure. The contracts involved General Electric (GE) turbines and were financed by a credit line from GE Capital. Aenergy alleged that a GE accounting error led to forged contract amendments, resulting in the Angolan government terminating the contracts and seizing turbines.Aenergy initially filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (SDNY), which dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds. The court found that Angola was an adequate alternative forum for the dispute. The Second Circuit affirmed this decision, emphasizing that Aenergy could bring similar claims in Angola, even if the breach-of-contract claim was time-barred. Aenergy's requests for rehearing and certiorari were denied.Aenergy then filed a new lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, focusing on breach of contract for unpaid work. The district court dismissed the case, citing issue preclusion based on the prior SDNY and Second Circuit rulings. The court also conducted a fresh forum non conveniens analysis, concluding that Angola remained the appropriate forum.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that issue preclusion applied because the adequacy of Angola as an alternative forum had already been determined in the previous litigation. The court found that Aenergy's trimmed-down complaint did not change the forum non conveniens analysis, and the Supreme Court of Angola's subsequent dismissal of Aenergy's administrative action did not alter the adequacy of Angola as a forum. View "Aenergy, S.A. v. Republic of Angola" on Justia Law

Entergy Arkansas, LLC, a public utility company, challenged an order by the Arkansas Public Service Commission (APSC) regarding the allocation of costs from a refund mandated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Entergy Arkansas made short-term opportunity sales to third-party wholesale customers, which led to a complaint by the Louisiana Public Service Commission. FERC ruled that Entergy Arkansas violated the System operating agreement, resulting in a net refund of approximately $135 million to other System members. Entergy Arkansas sought to recover these costs from its retail customers, but the APSC denied the request and ordered Entergy Arkansas to refund a portion to its retail customers.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas upheld the APSC's order after a bench trial, finding that it did not violate Arkansas law, the filed rate doctrine, or the dormant Commerce Clause. Entergy Arkansas appealed, arguing that the APSC's order violated the filed rate doctrine by trapping costs and improperly allocating the bandwidth adjustment. They also contended that the order violated the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce and imposing excessive burdens.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the filed rate doctrine did not apply because FERC did not preemptively decide the cost allocation of the refund. FERC explicitly left the allocation of costs to state commissions. Additionally, the court found that the APSC's order did not discriminate against interstate commerce or impose excessive burdens, as it was not driven by economic protectionism and any negative effects were speculative.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the APSC's order. View "Entergy Arkansas, LLC v. Webb" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an electric distribution company, appealed from the trial court's dismissal of its consolidated administrative appeals from two final decisions by the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA). PURA had found the plaintiff violated statutory obligations related to emergency planning and storm recovery during an August 2020 tropical storm, intending to reduce the plaintiff's authorized return on equity (ROE) by fifteen basis points. Additionally, PURA imposed over $1.2 million in fines for violating storm performance standards and $61,000 in civil penalties for late reporting of minor accidents.The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's appeals, upholding PURA's decisions. The plaintiff then appealed to the higher court, challenging the ROE reduction, the fines for storm performance violations, and the penalties for late accident reporting. During the appeal, PURA decided not to implement the ROE reduction, rendering the issue moot. The court determined that neither the voluntary cessation nor the collateral consequences exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. The court directed the vacatur of the portion of PURA's order authorizing the ROE reduction and the corresponding part of the trial court's judgment.Regarding the fines for late reporting of minor accidents, the court concluded that the failure to report a minor accident did not qualify as a "continued violation" under the statute. Instead, each monthly failure to report constituted a single, distinct violation. The case was remanded to the trial court to order PURA to recalculate the penalties accordingly.The court found sufficient evidence to support PURA's findings that the plaintiff violated storm performance standards by failing to provide a dedicated make safe crew for Bridgeport and inadequately communicating with city officials. The court affirmed the trial court's judgments in all other respects. View "United Illuminating Co. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority" on Justia Law