Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the California Community Choice Association (the Association), which represents Community Choice Aggregators (CCAs) that purchase electricity on behalf of residents and businesses. The Association challenged a resolution by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) that set the effective dates for the expansion of two CCAs, Central Coast Community Energy (CCCE) and East Bay Community Energy (EBCE), to January 2025. The Association argued that the PUC exceeded its jurisdiction and failed to follow legal procedures in setting these dates.The PUC had issued Draft Resolution E-5258, setting January 1, 2025, as the earliest possible effective date for the expansions of CCCE and EBCE. The Association, CCCE, and EBCE opposed this, claiming the PUC overstepped its authority. The PUC adopted the resolution and later denied rehearing requests, modifying some factual findings but maintaining the 2025 effective date. The PUC justified the delay by citing past failures of CCCE and EBCE to meet resource adequacy requirements, which led to cost shifting to customers of investor-owned utilities.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the PUC acted within its jurisdiction under Public Utilities Code section 366.2, subdivision (a)(4), which mandates preventing cost shifting between CCA and non-CCA customers. The court held that the PUC's decision to delay the expansions was not arbitrary or capricious and was supported by evidence of past resource adequacy deficiencies by CCCE and EBCE. The court affirmed the PUC's decision and resolution, concluding that the Association's arguments did not demonstrate that the PUC had abused its discretion. View "Cal. Community Choice Assn. v. Public Utilities Com." on Justia Law

This case involves five large water utilities and an association representing investor-owned water utilities' interests, collectively referred to as the Water Companies. The Water Companies sought to overturn an order by the Public Utilities Commission (Commission) that eliminated a conservation-focused ratesetting mechanism known as the Water Revenue Adjustment Mechanism (WRAM). The WRAM was designed to encourage water conservation by decoupling a water company's revenue from the amount of water sold. The Commission's order to eliminate the WRAM was not based on the merits of the mechanism but on procedural issues.The Commission's decision to eliminate the WRAM was made in a proceeding that was ostensibly focused on improving the accuracy of water sales forecasts. The Water Companies argued that the Commission did not provide adequate notice that the elimination of the WRAM was one of the issues to be considered in the proceeding.The Supreme Court of California agreed with the Water Companies. The court found that the Commission's scoping memos, which are supposed to outline the issues to be considered in a proceeding, did not provide adequate notice that the WRAM's elimination was on the table. The court concluded that the Commission's failure to give adequate notice required the order to be set aside. The court did not rule on the merits of the WRAM itself. View "Golden State Water Co. v. Public Utilities Com." on Justia Law

The case revolves around the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUC) and two market participants, RWE Renewables Americas, LLC and TX Hereford Wind, LLC. Following Winter Storm Uri, the Legislature amended the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) to require that protocols adopted by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) must be approved by the PUC before they take effect. ERCOT then adopted a revision to its protocols, which was approved by the PUC, setting the price of electricity at the regulatory maximum under Energy Emergency Alert Level 3 conditions. RWE challenged the PUC's approval order in the Third Court of Appeals, arguing that the order was both substantively and procedurally invalid.The Third Court of Appeals held that the PUC's order was both substantively invalid—because the PUC exceeded its statutory authority by setting the price of electricity—and procedurally invalid—because the PUC failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act’s rulemaking procedures in issuing the order.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the PUC’s approval order is not a “competition rule[] adopted by the commission” subject to the judicial-review process for PUC rules. The court found that PURA envisions a separate process for ERCOT-adopted protocols, and the statutory requirement that the PUC approve those adopted protocols does not transform PUC approval orders into PUC rules eligible for direct review by a court of appeals. Therefore, the Third Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over this proceeding. The Supreme Court of Texas vacated the court of appeals’ judgment and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "Public Utility Commission v. RWE Renewables Americas, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the actions of the Public Utility Commission of Texas (Commission) during Winter Storm Uri, when the Texas electric grid was on the brink of collapse. The Commission issued two orders that effectively raised the market price of electricity to the regulatory ceiling of $9,000/MWh to incentivize generators to add supply and large industrial users to reduce their demand. This led to some market participants going bankrupt and subsequent litigation.The court of appeals held that the Commission’s orders exceeded its authority under Chapter 39 of the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) because the statute prohibits price-setting. The court of appeals did not address whether the Commission complied with the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) procedural rulemaking requirements.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' decision. It held that the Commission’s orders did not exceed its authority under PURA. The court also found that the Commission substantially complied with the APA’s procedural rulemaking requirements, an issue the court of appeals did not address. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment affirming the orders. View "Public Utility Commission v. Luminant Energy Co. LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed the decision of the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (PRC) to deny Southwestern Public Service Company’s (SPS) application for a financial incentive under the Renewable Energy Act (REA). SPS had proposed to retire renewable energy certificates (RECs) earlier than required to exceed the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), and in return, requested a rate rider that would allow it to charge customers one dollar for each REC retired over the twenty percent standard. The PRC denied the application, finding that SPS’s proposal did not meet the REA’s requirement to “produce or acquire renewable energy” to qualify for an incentive. The court agreed with the PRC’s interpretation of the REA, stating that the act of retiring RECs alone does nothing to further the statute’s objectives. The court also rejected SPS’s challenges to the PRC’s amendments to Rule 572, which governs the award of incentives under the REA. The court found that the amendments did not exceed the scope of the REA, were not arbitrary or capricious, and were not otherwise unreasonable or unlawful. View "S.W. Pub. Serv. Co. v. N.M. Pub. Regul. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Duke Energy Indiana, a regulated electric utility, planned to build new facilities in Noblesville, Indiana, to meet increased customer demand. The project involved demolishing an abandoned house and garage and constructing a new substation, transmission lines, and a garage. The City of Noblesville insisted that Duke comply with its unified development ordinance before proceeding with the demolition, requiring Duke to obtain multiple permits. Duke declined, arguing that the city had no power to regulate a public utility's service-related projects through local permitting requirements. Despite not obtaining the permits, Duke began demolition.In response, Noblesville issued a stop-work order and sued Duke in the Hamilton Circuit Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce its ordinance. Duke counterclaimed, arguing that Noblesville lacked jurisdiction and authority to regulate its activities. The trial court found in favor of Noblesville, ordering Duke to comply with the ordinance and obtain the permits. The court also imposed a $150,000 penalty against Duke for starting demolition without the required permits and awarded Noblesville $115,679.10 in attorneys’ fees, expert fees, and costs. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions, holding that while the trial court had jurisdiction over Noblesville’s enforcement action against Duke, only the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission could decide whether Noblesville’s ordinance interfered unreasonably with Duke’s utility functions. The court reasoned that the commission had both the fact-finding expertise and the broader non-local focus necessary to balance the competing interests of public utilities and municipalities in deciding such disputes. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "Duke Energy Indiana LLC v. City of Noblesville" on Justia Law

The City of Carmel, Indiana, enacted two ordinances in 2019, one prohibiting the construction of above-ground utility lines unless authorized by the city, and another outlining procedures for relocating utility facilities due to city projects. The ordinances placed all costs on the utilities unless the city agreed otherwise. When the city began two improvement projects requiring Duke Energy to relocate its facilities underground, a dispute arose over who should bear the costs, estimated to exceed $500,000. The city filed a complaint with the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission, asking it to uphold the ordinances as reasonable and order Duke to pay the relocation costs.The Commission, after a hearing, found the ordinances unreasonable and void. The city appealed this decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the Commission's order, dismissing the Commission as a party to the appeal. Both the Commission and Duke sought transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court.The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision, finding that the Commission was a proper party on appeal and that its findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. The court concluded that the ordinances were unreasonable because they threatened to impose unreasonable expenses on Duke, which would in turn impact all Duke customers throughout Indiana. The court also found that the Commission's order declaring the ordinances void was within its statutory power. View "City of Carmel v. Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves East Ohio Gas Company, doing business as Dominion Energy Ohio ("Dominion"), and J. William Vigrass, individually and as executor of Virginia Vigrass’s estate. Dominion had requested access to Virginia's residence to inspect the gas meter located inside. However, due to Virginia's immunocompromised state and susceptibility to COVID-19, she denied Dominion access. Despite her account being paid in full, Dominion disconnected its natural-gas service to Virginia’s residence in January 2022. The disconnection resulted in freezing temperatures inside the residence, causing the water pipes to burst and damage the property. Virginia was later found dead in her residence.In the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Vigrass sued Dominion on claims relating to the shutoff of its natural-gas service to Virginia’s residence. Dominion moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio had exclusive jurisdiction over the claims as they related to a service issue. However, Judge Peter J. Corrigan denied Dominion’s motion, reasoning that he had jurisdiction over the complaint because Vigrass had asserted common-law claims.Dominion then filed an original action in prohibition in the Supreme Court of Ohio, asserting that Judge Corrigan patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over Vigrass’s action. Dominion sought an order to prevent Judge Corrigan from exercising jurisdiction and to vacate the orders he has issued in the underlying case.The Supreme Court of Ohio granted the writ of prohibition, ordering Judge Corrigan to cease exercising jurisdiction over the underlying case and directing him to vacate the orders that he had previously issued in the case. The court concluded that both parts of the test set forth in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. were met, indicating that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The court also granted in part and denied in part Dominion's motion to strike certain parts of Vigrass's brief. View "State ex rel. E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

The case involves the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) and the City of Lancaster, Borough of Carlisle, and Borough of Columbia (collectively referred to as the Municipalities). The dispute centers around Section 59.18 of the PUC’s regulations, which gives natural gas distribution companies (NGDCs) the authority to determine the location of gas meters in historic districts. The Municipalities argued that this regulation violates Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which vests legislative power in the General Assembly, not in private entities like NGDCs.The Commonwealth Court agreed with the Municipalities, concluding that Section 59.18 unlawfully delegates legislative authority to NGDCs without providing adequate standards to guide their decisions. The court therefore declared Section 59.18 unenforceable.The PUC appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The PUC argued that Section 59.18 does not delegate legislative power to NGDCs, but rather is a regulatory act under the PUC’s administrative authority. The PUC also contended that the Commonwealth Court failed to consider the safety issues related to meter placement, which is the primary concern of the regulation.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the decision of the Commonwealth Court. The court found that the General Assembly never enacted a statute giving the PUC legislative authority to determine the location of gas meters in historic districts. Therefore, the PUC could not have unlawfully delegated this authority to NGDCs. The court concluded that the Municipalities' disagreement with the PUC's regulation does not amount to a constitutional violation. The case was remanded to the Commonwealth Court for further proceedings. View "City of Lancaster v. PUC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed a decision by the Maryland Public Service Commission ("Commission") that approved a rate increase for the Washington Gas and Light Company ("Washington Gas"). The rate increase came after the Commission approved the acquisition of Washington Gas by AltaGas Limited ("AltaGas"). The Commission had imposed conditions on the merger, including a condition that required Washington Gas customer rates to reflect "merger-related savings" of "not less than $800,000 per year over the five years" following the merger’s closing. The Office of People’s Counsel ("OPC") objected to the Commission's interpretation of this condition and the approved rate increase.The court held that the appropriate standard of review for the Commission’s interpretation of its own prior order is the arbitrary or capricious standard. Using this standard, the court found that the Commission’s interpretation of the merger-related savings condition was not arbitrary or capricious. The court determined that the Commission had reasonably explained the inclusion of the condition in the merger order and OPC had not shown that this explanation was arbitrary or capricious. Therefore, the court affirmed the Commission's decision to approve the rate increase for Washington Gas. View "Petition of the Off. Of People's Counsel" on Justia Law