Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

During Winter Storm Uri in February 2021, El Paso Electric Company (EPE) relied on the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 (PV3) to supply uninterrupted electricity to its New Mexico customers amid extreme weather and soaring natural gas prices. EPE used a Commission-approved proxy price formula, based on natural gas market index prices, to calculate the incremental costs associated with PV3-generated energy during the storm. The City of Las Cruces challenged EPE’s entitlement to recover these increased costs at the proxy price rate, focusing on whether the proxy price mechanism was appropriately applied.EPE sought a variance from the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (NMPRC) to amortize the extraordinary cost increases over twelve months, which was not contested. Instead, intervenors raised legal objections to the use of the PV3 proxy price. The NMPRC conducted administrative proceedings, during which it found that the proxy price formula established in prior cases—including the 2009 Credit Suisse Agreement—remained valid and had been reaffirmed in subsequent orders. The Commission determined that PV3 was the most cost-effective resource during the storm and that EPE’s use of the proxy pricing formula was appropriate. The Commission’s final orders authorized EPE to recover the costs for PV3 energy based on the proxy price.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico reviewed the Commission’s orders. It adopted a highly deferential standard to the NMPRC’s interpretation of its own prior orders and found the Commission’s actions reasonable, supported by substantial evidence, and not arbitrary or capricious. The Court held that the City had not demonstrated that EPE’s use of PV3 at the proxy price or the Commission’s orders were unlawful or unreasonable, and it affirmed the Commission’s orders in full. View "City of Las Cruces v. Public Regulation Commission" on Justia Law

A California corporation that manufactures medical devices sought to connect two properties it owns, separated by a public street, into a single microgrid using its own private equipment. The microgrid would supplement its energy needs by drawing power from the local regulated utility when necessary. The company claimed it had obtained local approvals and that its microgrid complied with Public Utilities Code section 218, which defines when an entity is not considered a regulated "electrical corporation." However, Southern California Edison (SCE) declined to support the company’s plan, citing concerns about safety and operational control, and asserting that it had discretion to deny facility modifications or connections that could affect its distribution system.The California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) initiated a rulemaking process to develop a policy framework for microgrids, as mandated by Senate Bill No. 1339. In the fifth phase of this process, the PUC adopted tariffs for multi-property microgrids proposed by investor-owned utilities but declined to adopt the company’s proposed changes to SCE’s tariff rules. The PUC found that the company’s proposals could allow an unregulated entity to compel changes to, or control, regulated utility infrastructure, potentially compromising safety and reliability. The company’s application for rehearing was denied, with the PUC reiterating that the proposed rule changes conflicted with statutory requirements, including sections 218, 399.2, and 451.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the PUC’s decisions. The court held that the PUC had not abused its discretion, misinterpreted the statutes, or failed to proceed as required by law. It found that the PUC’s decisions were consistent with applicable law and legislative intent, particularly the priority given to safety and the requirement that regulated utilities maintain control over their distribution systems. The court affirmed the PUC’s decisions. View "Applied Medical Resources Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Three individuals filed a class action lawsuit against San Francisco, challenging new water rates adopted by the city’s Public Utility Commission in May 2023. The plaintiffs alleged that the new rates violated Proposition 218 of the California Constitution by including costs unrelated to the actual provision of water service, resulting in charges that exceeded the cost of service. Before adopting the new rates, the city provided required notice to ratepayers, including information about a 120-day period for legal challenges under the applicable validation statutes. The plaintiffs sought a refund, declaratory and equitable relief, and a writ of mandate.After the class action was filed, the City litigated the case for over a year. It participated in discovery, case management, and even moved for summary judgment, without initially arguing that the suit was procedurally improper. Eventually, the City moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiffs’ action was subject to the validation statutes, specifically Government Code section 53759 and Code of Civil Procedure sections 860 et seq., which require reverse validation actions attacking agency matters like water rates to be brought within 120 days and with specific notice by publication to all interested parties. The trial court (San Francisco County Superior Court) agreed with the City, finding the statutes mandatory and jurisdictional, and dismissed the case for failure to comply with the procedural requirements, including timely filing and appropriate notice.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the judgment de novo. The court held that compliance with the validation statutes was mandatory and jurisdictional. Plaintiffs’ failure to file a proper reverse validation action and to provide notice by publication deprived the court of jurisdiction. The court rejected arguments that the City had waived these requirements or that good cause existed for noncompliance. The judgment in favor of the City was affirmed. View "Toy v. City & County of S.F." on Justia Law

Six wind farms located in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Iowa, all subsidiaries of Avangrid Renewables, sought certification from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) to be recognized as eligible Ohio renewable-energy-resource-generating facilities. Such certification would allow these out-of-state wind farms to sell renewable energy in Ohio. Carbon Solutions Group, L.L.C. (CSG), representing Ohio-based renewable energy interests, opposed the applications, arguing that the applicants failed to demonstrate their energy was physically deliverable into Ohio as required by state law.PUCO conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing in December 2022, during which staff, the applicants, CSG, and other interested parties presented testimony and evidence. The central issue was whether the energy generated by these noncontiguous out-of-state facilities could be shown to be deliverable into Ohio. The commission relied on its established Koda test, which uses distribution-factor (DFAX) power-flow studies conducted by regional transmission organizations (RTOs) to determine whether a facility’s energy is physically deliverable into Ohio. After review, PUCO found that the applicants’ DFAX studies, performed by PJM Interconnection, met the required deliverability thresholds and approved all six applications.CSG appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that procedural errors occurred, including denial of a subpoena and improper reliance on hearsay. The Supreme Court of Ohio found that PUCO’s order was supported by sufficient evidence and complied with statutory requirements for findings and reasoning. The court held that the commission’s use of the Koda test and reliance on the PJM DFAX studies was reasonable and not against the manifest weight of the evidence or contrary to law. The court also found that CSG’s procedural objections were either waived or jurisdictionally barred. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed PUCO’s order. View "In re Application of Moraine Wind, L.L.C." on Justia Law

A California corporation that manufactures medical devices sought to connect two of its properties separated by a public street using a privately owned microgrid, with supplemental power provided by Southern California Edison (SCE). The corporation alleged it would generate electricity solely for its own use and not sell or export power to others. After obtaining local approvals, it sought SCE’s cooperation to connect its properties, but SCE declined, citing concerns about safety, reliability, and loss of control over its distribution grid. The corporation proposed amendments to three SCE tariff rules to require SCE to accommodate such microgrid connections when compliant with state law.The California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) initiated a rulemaking process to facilitate microgrid commercialization under Senate Bill 1339, dividing the process into five tracks. In track five, SCE and other investor-owned utilities submitted proposed tariffs for multi-property microgrids, while the petitioner submitted its own proposed rule changes. The PUC adopted the utility tariffs but rejected the corporation’s proposals, finding they would allow unregulated entities to compel changes to regulated utilities’ infrastructure, violating Public Utilities Code section 218 and undermining safety and reliability. The PUC’s decision was based on statutory requirements and priority for safety. The petitioner’s application for rehearing was denied, with the PUC reiterating that the proposals would effectively circumvent regulation and create risks.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the PUC’s decisions under the standards set forth in Public Utilities Code section 1757.1, applicable to quasi-legislative rulemaking. The court held that the PUC’s decisions were consistent with statutory law, not arbitrary or capricious, adequately supported by findings, and aligned with legislative priorities for safety. The court affirmed the PUC’s decisions and denied relief to the petitioner. View "Applied Medical Resources Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission" on Justia Law

Several plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against a city, challenging the validity of recently adopted water rates. They alleged that the city’s new rates, implemented by a resolution passed in May 2023, violated Proposition 218 by including costs for public fire service, resulting in charges exceeding the actual cost of water service. Prior to filing suit, the plaintiffs submitted claims under the Government Claims Act, which were denied. The plaintiffs sought refunds, declaratory relief, equitable relief, and a writ of mandate.After the city litigated the case for more than a year, including discovery and other pretrial activities, it moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that plaintiffs failed to bring a reverse validation action as required by Government Code section 53759 and Code of Civil Procedure sections 860 et seq. The San Francisco County Superior Court granted the city’s motion, holding that the validation statutes applied, were both mandatory and jurisdictional, and that plaintiffs had not complied with them in two ways: their suit was time-barred and they failed to follow proper notice procedures, including service by publication.On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, plaintiffs argued that the city had waived the validation requirements by litigating the case and that their action was timely. The appellate court reviewed the matter de novo and held that the validation statutes were mandatory and jurisdictional for challenges to water rates, and plaintiffs’ failure to comply with statutory procedures—including timely filing and notice by publication—was fatal to their claims. The court rejected arguments regarding waiver, good cause, and belated publication, ultimately affirming the trial court’s order and concluding that the procedural requirements for reverse validation actions must be strictly followed. View "Toy v. City and County of S.F." on Justia Law

Several townships, individuals, and entities challenged a decision related to the construction of an electric transmission line. In early 2024, two utility companies applied to the North Dakota Public Service Commission (PSC) for a certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) to build an 85-mile, high-voltage transmission line. The PSC provided public notice in various newspapers and held hearings before granting the CPCN later that year. No party appealed this order at that time. Months after the order was issued, a group of petitioners—including the townships and individuals—sought to intervene, arguing that the PSC’s order was deficient and that the wrong statutory framework had been applied.The PSC denied the petitioners’ request to intervene, stating that the decision on the CPCN was final and that deadlines to appeal or seek reconsideration had already passed. The PSC also noted that further permitting and proceedings would occur before construction, where concerns could be raised. The petitioners then appealed to the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District. The district court dismissed as untimely the portion of the appeal challenging the CPCN order, affirmed the PSC’s denial of intervention, and concluded it lacked jurisdiction to address the validity of the CPCN order.On review, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the petitioners lacked standing to appeal the CPCN order because they did not participate in the original proceedings before the PSC. The Court further held that the PSC did not abuse its discretion in denying post-hoc intervention, finding that notice by publication was sufficient and that the petitioners had not shown good cause for their late intervention request. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Wano Township v. North Dakota Public Service Comm'n" on Justia Law

A company sought permission from the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC) to build and operate a solar facility. After the PUC denied this request, the company filed motions for reconsideration, arguing that the decision had been made on grounds different from the proposal for decision, and later sought to serve interrogatories on the PUC Commissioners to determine if they had read the record as required by Vermont law. The PUC denied both motions, stating it had complied with statutory requirements, that Commissioners had sufficient opportunity to review the record, and that discovery from Commissioners acting in a quasi-judicial capacity was not permitted.After these denials, the company appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court regarding the underlying certificate denial and, separately, filed a complaint in the Civil Division of the Chittenden Unit of the Superior Court under 3 V.S.A. § 809b, challenging the PUC's denial of discovery. The PUC moved to dismiss this complaint, asserting that § 809b did not cover orders denying discovery and that appeals of interlocutory PUC orders were governed by another, more specific statute. The Superior Court agreed, concluding it lacked jurisdiction, since § 809b only applies to orders compelling discovery, not those denying it, and that appeals from PUC orders must proceed directly to the Supreme Court under 30 V.S.A. § 12.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the Superior Court’s dismissal de novo. It held that 3 V.S.A. § 809b does not authorize challenges to agency orders denying discovery and is limited to orders compelling action. Because the PUC’s order at issue denied, rather than compelled, discovery, the Superior Court was correct to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. View "Otter Creek Solar LLC v. Public Utility Commission" on Justia Law

In this case, a homeowner experienced property damage when sewage backed up into his residence after a sewer line was damaged during nearby excavation work. The excavation was initiated by a utility company, which hired an excavator to install a new underground electrical line following a neighbor’s complaint about electrical service. Before the excavation, the excavator notified MISS DIG Systems as required by law, which then informed local facility owners, including the township. The township responded that it did not have any facilities in the area and did not mark any sewer lines. The homeowner alleged that the township failed to comply with its duty under the MISS DIG Underground Facility Damage Prevention and Safety Act by not marking a township-owned sewer line, leading to his damages.The Oakland Circuit Court denied the township’s motion for summary disposition, concluding that governmental immunity did not shield the township from liability because the MISS DIG Act created an exception. The court also granted the homeowner leave to amend his complaint to assert a claim under the sewage disposal system event (SDSE) exception to governmental immunity, and set aside the notice issue for further briefing. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.Upon review, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a governmental agency cannot be held civilly liable for monetary damages for a violation of the MISS DIG Act in circuit court, as the statute provides that the exclusive remedy is to file a complaint with the Public Service Commission. The Court also found that the trial court erred in granting the homeowner leave to amend his complaint to assert the SDSE exception before he demonstrated compliance with the statutory notice requirement. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts on these issues, vacated the grant of leave to amend, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Zezula v. Brown" on Justia Law

A privately owned water utility company provides water services to multiple customers in Raleigh and Fayette Counties, West Virginia. Near one of its service areas is an undeveloped tract of land known as the Appalachian Heights Site. The City of Mount Hope, a municipal water provider, received funding from the legislature, county commissions, and a developer to extend water service to this Site. After Mount Hope proposed annexing the Site, the utility company filed a complaint with the Public Service Commission (PSC), seeking to prevent Mount Hope from serving the Site, claiming exclusive rights to provide water there.Initially, the PSC’s chief administrative law judge found the Site to be within the utility company’s exclusive service territory, but no cease and desist order was issued. This recommended decision became final when no exceptions were filed. After Mount Hope annexed the Site, the utility company petitioned the PSC to reopen the case, seeking an order to enforce its exclusivity. The PSC reopened the matter, remanded for further proceedings, and eventually, after Mount Hope filed exceptions to a subsequent recommended decision re-affirming the utility’s exclusivity, the PSC found the Site to be in a “gray and overlapping” service area. This meant that future developers or customers at the Site could choose either provider. The utility company’s petition for reconsideration was denied.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed whether the PSC exceeded its statutory authority by reconsidering its prior decision and whether it properly found the Site to be in a gray and overlapping service territory. The court held that the PSC had authority to revisit its prior order and that, under applicable statutes and commission tests, the PSC’s finding that the Site was in a gray and overlapping service area was supported by the evidence. The court affirmed the PSC’s order. View "Beckley Water Company v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia" on Justia Law